Non-Monetary Incentives and Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from U.S. Courts

Authors

• Jonathan B. Petkun, Duke Law SchoolFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2026

Keywords

non-monetary incentives, bureaucratic incentives, judicial performance, courts, deadlines, accountability, regression discontinuity, bunching

Abstract

Federal judges—who enjoy lifetime tenure and constitutionally protected salaries—represent an especially hard test case for incentive-based bureaucratic reform. I study the “six-month list,” a reform requiring U.S. federal courts to publicly identify judges with overdue matters. Using a regression discontinuity design and other methods, I find that matters most exposed are resolved approximately 14% faster than those least exposed, with larger effects among younger, non-white, and female judges. The speed gains come with trade-offs: upfront time savings are partially offset by downstream delays, and more-exposed matters are more likely to be reversed on appeal. A bunching analysis estimates aggregate time savings of approximately 4%, demonstrating that non-monetary levers can shift behavior even among highly insulated elite professionals.

Citation

Jonathan B. Petkun, Non-Monetary Incentives and Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from U.S. Courts, 262 Journal of Public Economics: 105741, 1-14 (2026)