Document Type
Chapter of Book
Publication Date
2025
Abstract
This chapter will address the place of cost–benefit analysis (CBA) in constitutional law, by way of a case study. I’ll describe, and puzzle over, CBA’s absence from most U.S. constitutional doctrines, notwithstanding its major role in U.S. administrative law. The general questions that I seek to illuminate are by no means limited to the U.S. How might CBA figure within the tests that constitutional courts use to adjudicate alleged violations of constitutional rights? How might it serve to determine the structure of constitutional institutions? Would it be justified for CBA to play these doctrinal roles? But these general questions are fruitfully addressed in the context of a specific legal system – here, the U.S. legal system.
Citation
Matthew D. Adler, Cost-Benefit Analysis, in The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory 470-490 (Richard Bellamy & Jeff King eds., 2025)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Administrative agencies--Cost effectiveness, Well-being, Constitutional law
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.031
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/4637
Comments
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