Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2021
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has produced a public health debacle of the first order. But the virus has also propagated the kind of exogenous shock that can precipitate-and to a certain degree did precipitate-a systemic event for our financial system. This still not fully resolved systemic shock comes a little more than a decade after the last financial crisis. In the intervening years, much has been written about the global financial crisis of 2008 and its systemic dimensions. Considerable scholarly attention has focused on first devising and then critiquing the macroprudential reforms that ensued, both in the Dodd-Frank Act and the many regulations and policy guidelines that implemented its provisions. In this essay, we consider the coronavirus pandemic and its implications for the financial system through the lens of the frameworks we had developed for the analysis of systemic financial risks in the aftermath of the last financial crisis. While the COVID-19 pandemic differs in many critical respects from the events of 2008, systemic events in the financial sector have a common structure relevant to both crises. Reflecting back on responses to the last financial crisis also affords us an opportunity both to understand how financial regulators responded to the COVID-19 pandemic and also to speculate how the pandemic might lead to further reforms of financial regulation and other areas of public policy in the years ahead.
Citation
Howell E. Jackson & Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Stability: Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic, 11 Harvard Business Law Review 193-232 (2021)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Risk assessment, Financial risk management, Medical policy, Financial institutions--Law and legislation, Pandemics--Economic aspects
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/4582