Document Type
Chapter of Book
Publication Date
2025
Abstract
In corporate America, directors wield increasing influence across multiple companies, often within the same industry (“horizontal directors”), which creates tension between antitrust laws and corporate governance. Horizontal directors are well-positioned to bring industry expertise and potentially increase higher profits, benefiting shareholders but also possibly enabling potential collusion. This chapter provides an overview of the prevalence of horizontal directors, the regulatory grey space in which they exist and the connection to some recently debated issues, including that of common ownership by institutional investors. To inform this debate, this chapter provides a thorough overview of horizontal directors from corporate and antitrust perspectives employing theoretical and empirical research. This chapter concludes with a discussion of recent enforcement actions by both the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, illustrating the increased attention to the topic by both regulators and academics alike.
Citation
Yaron Nili, Interlocking Directorates in the United States, in Research Handbook on Competition and Corporate Law 288-309 (Florence Thépot & Anna Tzanaki eds., 2025)
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Interlocking directorates, Corporate governance, Directors of corporations, Outside directors of corporations, Antitrust law
Included in
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781803920559.00027
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/4471