What Explains Taxation by Resource-Rich Rebels? Evidence from the Islamic State in Syria

Authors

Mara R. Revkin, Duke Law SchoolFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2020

Keywords

rebel governance, state formation, civil war, Syria, Islamic State

Abstract

Greed-based theories of civil war predict that rebel groups will only engage in taxation and other state-building activities in areas where they lack exploitable resources. However, this prediction is contradicted by the Islamic State’s pattern of taxation across time and space. A new data set mapping seven types of revenue-extracting policies imposed by the Islamic State, a jihadist rebel group, in the 19 Syrian districts that it governed between 2013 and 2017 indicates that these policies were just as prevalent in resource-rich as in resource-poor districts. I propose a new theory that better explains this pattern—a rebel group’s pattern of taxation is codetermined by (1) ideology and (2) the costs of warfare—and establish the plausibility of this theory through a case study of al-Mayadin, the most oil-rich district governed by the Islamic State and therefore an ideal site in which to investigate the puzzle of taxation by resource-rich rebels.

Citation

Mara R. Revkin, What Explains Taxation by Resource-Rich Rebels? Evidence from the Islamic State in Syria, 82 Journal of Politics 757-764 (2020)