Standing and Probabilistic Injury

Authors

Curtis A. Bradley
Ernest A. Young, Duke Law SchoolFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2024

Abstract

Standing to sue often turns on questions of probability. For example, public law plaintiffs must show that they are likely to be affected by allegedly unlawful government surveillance or environmental policies, and consumers may wish to sue private defendants over false credit reporting or data breaches that may or may not cause them financial or reputational harm in the future. This Article offers a framework for resolving a wide range of these “probabilistic standing” issues. Our core claim is that courts and commentators ask too much of standing doctrine in probabilistic cases. First, scholars sometimes seek a unified theory of probabilistic standing to cover categories of cases that ask distinct questions, such as cases involving who is subject to a challenged action, on the one hand, and those involving whether a person subject to such an action is sufficiently likely to be harmed, on the other. Second, courts should not ask how probable elements of a plaintiff’s case must be in order to support standing, but rather who should decide whether a given probability is sufficient. Judges and parties struggle in litigation to assess the actual probability of occurrences, and Article III of the Constitution provides no standard for how probable an injury must be to support a lawsuit. Third, any doctrinal probability threshold for standing would encounter a related problem, which is that the probability of an injury depends significantly on how that injury is framed. Which harms “count” for standing is thus a vital question in assessing the probability of injury, but Article III is an unlikely place to look for answers. Within certain constraints, courts should look instead to the underlying substantive law to define the relevant injuries for standing purposes. Finally, we contend that many of the concerns associated with probabilistic claims are better addressed through the law of remedies and prudential elements of the timing doctrines (mootness and ripeness) than through the constitutional law of standing.

Citation

Curtis A. Bradley & Ernest A. Young, Standing and Probabilistic Injury, 122 Michigan Law Review 1557-1622 (2024)