Making Talk Cheap (and Problems Easy): How Legal and Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2010
Abstract
In many legal, political, and social settings, people must reach a consensus before particular outcomes can be achieved and failing to reach a consensus may be costly. In this article, we present a theory and conduct experiments that take into account the costs associated with communicating, as well as the difficulty of the decisions that groups make. We find that when there is even a small cost (relative to the potential benefit) associated with sending information to others and/or listening, groups are much less likely to reach a consensus, primarily because they are less willing to communicate with one another. We also find that difficult problems significantly reduce group members’ willingness to communicate with one another and, therefore, hinder their ability to reach a consensus.
Citation
Cheryl Boudreau et al., Making Talk Cheap (and Problems Easy): How Legal and Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus, 7 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 868-885 (2010)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Communication, Consensus (Social sciences), Decision making
Included in
Communication Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Law and Politics Commons
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3304