Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2009
Abstract
Networks can affect a group’s ability to solve a coordination problem. We utilize laboratory experiments to study the conditions under which groups of subjects can solve coordination games. We investigate a variety of different network structures, and we also investigate coordination games with symmetric and asymmetric payoffs. Our results show that network connections facilitate coordination in both symmetric and asymmetric games. Most significantly, we find that increases in the number of network connections encourage coordination even when payoffs are highly asymmetric. These results shed light on the conditions that may facilitate coordination in real-world networks.
Citation
Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination, 37 American Politics Research 899-920 (2009)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Networks, System analysis
Included in
Communication Commons, Experimental Analysis of Behavior Commons, Law Commons, Models and Methods Commons
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3267
Comments
This is an article pre-print.