Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2013
Abstract
One of the primary policy initiatives instituted in response to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is a requirement that all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after January 1 2013 include provisions referred to as Collective Action Clauses or CACs. These CACs allow for a super-majority of creditors to impose restructuring terms on minority holdouts. This article assesses the likely effect of this proposal on the borrowing costs of sovereign debtors. Contrary to much of the literature, we find that the presence of CACs leads to a lower cost of capital, especially for below-investment grade bonds
Citation
Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the EurozoneReview of Finance 1-58 (2013)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Debt relief, Bonds, Government bonds, Eurozone, Public debts, Bailouts (Government policy)
Included in
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2455