Document Type
Chapter of Book
Publication Date
2009
Abstract
This chapter reviews the literature on the selection of regulatory policy instruments, from both normative and positive perspectives. It first reviews the mechanism design literature to identify normative objectives in selecting among the menu or toolbox of policy instruments. The chapter then discusses the public choice and positive political theory literatures and the variety of models developed to attempt to predict the actual selection of alternative policy instruments. It begins with simpler early models focusing on interest group politics and proceeds to more complicated models that incorporate both supply and demand for policy, the role of policy entrepreneurs, behavioral and cognitive choice, and public perceptions and mass politics. It compares these theories to empirical experience. The chapter examines literature in law, economics, political science, and related fields, and it draws examples from US, European, and international regulation. It concludes with suggestions for future research. Document is the author's manuscript
Citation
Mechanism Choice, in Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law 363-396 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Public opinion, Planning, Industrial policy
Included in
International Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2278