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Duke Law > Duke Law Scholarship Repository > Journals > LCP > Vol. 57 > No. 1 (1994)

 

Volume 57, Number 1 & 2 (Winter-Spring 1994)
Regulating Regulation: The Political Economy of Administrative Procedures and Regulatory Instruments

James T. Hamilton
Special Editor

Preliminary

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Foreword

James T. Hamilton

1

 

Articles

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Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation

3

 

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Comment on McNollgast “Legislative Intent”

Robert H. Bates

39

 

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A Comment on the Positive Canons Project

Miriam R. Jorgensen and Kenneth A. Shepsle

43

 

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A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent

Edward P. Schwartz, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo

51

 

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Post-Enactment Legislative Signals

William Eskridge Jr.

75

 

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Comment on a “Positive Theory of Legislative Intent”

Michael Munger

87

 

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Designing Bureaucratic Accountability

Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins

91

 

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On Pressing McNollgast to the Limits: The Problem of Regulatory Costs

Michael Asimow

127

 

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Bureaucratic Accountability for Regulatory Decisions: Comment on Lupia and McCubbins

Kathleen Bawn

139

 

Journal Staff

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Journal Staff