The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch of Directors’ Self-Interested Transactions
A central question that underlies many analyses of corporate governance is whether the law and legal institutions have a constituent role in shaping governance practices, or whether the law, as well as governance practices, are best viewed as the inevitable results of market forces, centered upon capital markets. A separate, but related question is the degree to which mechanisms of governance -- such as shareholder voting, take-over bids, independent directors, mandatory disclosure, and shareholder litigation -- can function adequately as substitutes for one another. The perspective I offer on these questions is based on a comparison between the United States and the United Kingdom, which are sufficiently similar in relevant respects that their divergences are illuminating.
Deborah A. DeMott, The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch of Directors’ Self-Interested Transactions, 62 Law and Contemporary Problems 243-271 (1999)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/855
This article was first published, in slightly different form in 2 Company, Financial & Insolvency Law Review 190 (1999)