We model personnel policies in public agencies, examining how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and develop policy projects. However, doing so requires internal personnel policies that sort "slackers" from "zealots." Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Finally, even with well-designed personnel policies, there remains an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition.
Charles M. Cameron et al., Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off (October 15, 2016)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Employee motivation, Civil service--Salaries, etc., Civil service--Personnel management, Human capital, Labor economics
Benefits and Compensation Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Public Policy Commons
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3727