We ﬁnd strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties’ (and not government parties’) roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the ﬂoor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties sky- rocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 per cent leftward under a leftist government.
William M. Chandler et al., Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980-2002, 15 German Politics 89-111 (2006)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Parliamentary practice, Germany, Political science
Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Legislation Commons, Models and Methods Commons
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