Two Economists, Three Opinions? Economic Models for Private International Law - Cross Border Torts as Example
Chapter of Book
Many agree that private international law does a poor job of leading to good and predictable results. Can law and economics bring more scientific, objective foundations to the discipline? Economics, one may hope, can bring the conclusiveness to the field that doctrine could not. But even a fleeting review of existing studies reveals a discrepancy of views or economic approaches that mirrors the discrepancy in the traditional private international law doctrine. This article sets out to test whether different models lead to different outcomes. It makes arguments in three economic models - a private law model, an international law model, and a model combining the two. The subject area for this analysis is private international law of torts, more specifically the question of the law applicable to cross-border torts. The result is that the debate whether private international law is "private law" or (public) "international law" is replicated in the economic analysis of private international law. Rather than resolve problems of private international law, economic analysis reformulates them. This does not make economic analysis useless at all, but it puts into question its promise of objective neutral solutions.
Ralf Michaels, Two Economists, Three Opinions? Economic Models for Private International Law - Cross Border Torts as ExampleAn Economic Analysis of Private International Law 143-184 (2006)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/1234