Event Title
Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation
Location
Duke Law School
Start Date
20-1-1994 1:00 PM
End Date
20-1-1994 2:00 PM
Description
Some recommendations are designed to improve the efficiency of public regulation. Incentive-based systems, for example, can make government policies more cost-effective. Other recommendations are disembodied law reforms, espoused without much concern for the substantive problems to which they might apply. This Comment contrasts one of these recommendations - regulatory negotiation - with incentive-based proposals.
Related Paper
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 Duke Law Journal 1206-1220 (1994)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol43/iss6/3Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation
Duke Law School
Some recommendations are designed to improve the efficiency of public regulation. Incentive-based systems, for example, can make government policies more cost-effective. Other recommendations are disembodied law reforms, espoused without much concern for the substantive problems to which they might apply. This Comment contrasts one of these recommendations - regulatory negotiation - with incentive-based proposals.
Comments
This event was not recorded.