Event Title
To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law
Location
Duke Law School
Start Date
5-3-1990 10:45 AM
End Date
5-3-1990 12:00 PM
Description
Virtually all administrative law writers and teachers at one time or another assiduously seek to expand and fine-tune judicial review of agency action, and they usually advocate a variety of institutional and doctrinal reforms for those purposes. They suppose, at least by implication, that what courts do matters substantively - that when a court decides that an agency erred or failed adequately to support its action, the court's ruling actually (and not just normatively) controls the agency's subsequent behavior in that case. This behavioral supposition, after all, is one of the raisons d'etre of most of administrative law. The conventional explanation for judicial review of agency action is the need to confine agencies to their legal authority. To deny that courts actually perform this task is to raise dark and difficult questions about the compatibility of the administrative state with the rule of law.
Related Paper
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke Law Journal 984-1077 (1990)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol39/iss5/2To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law
Duke Law School
Virtually all administrative law writers and teachers at one time or another assiduously seek to expand and fine-tune judicial review of agency action, and they usually advocate a variety of institutional and doctrinal reforms for those purposes. They suppose, at least by implication, that what courts do matters substantively - that when a court decides that an agency erred or failed adequately to support its action, the court's ruling actually (and not just normatively) controls the agency's subsequent behavior in that case. This behavioral supposition, after all, is one of the raisons d'etre of most of administrative law. The conventional explanation for judicial review of agency action is the need to confine agencies to their legal authority. To deny that courts actually perform this task is to raise dark and difficult questions about the compatibility of the administrative state with the rule of law.
Comments
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