Event Title

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of Judicial Responsibility

Presenter Information

James R. Elkins

Location

Duke Law School

Start Date

20-1-1978 11:15 AM

End Date

20-1-1978 12:15 PM

Description

This Article will examine the relationship between the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA) and the administrative agencies created to implement emergency economic legislation and will demonstrate that TECA judicial review of the peacetime economic stabilization and energy agencies has inadequately controlled administrative decisionmaking. The resolution of "the tension between expediency and principle" has not resulted in "principled fairness," but rather has resulted in almost total judicial deference to administrative expediency. In its review of the Cost of Living Council (COLC), the Price Commission, the Pay Board, the Construction Industry Stabilization Committee, the Federal Energy Office (FEO) and, currently, the Federal Energy Administration, the TECA has failed to control agency decisionmaking to such an extent that "principled fairness" has become the sacrificial lamb for the feast of regulatory urgency.

Comments

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Related Paper

James R. Elkins, The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 1978 Duke Law Journal 113-153 (1978)

Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol27/iss1/3


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Jan 20th, 11:15 AM Jan 20th, 12:15 PM

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of Judicial Responsibility

Duke Law School

This Article will examine the relationship between the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA) and the administrative agencies created to implement emergency economic legislation and will demonstrate that TECA judicial review of the peacetime economic stabilization and energy agencies has inadequately controlled administrative decisionmaking. The resolution of "the tension between expediency and principle" has not resulted in "principled fairness," but rather has resulted in almost total judicial deference to administrative expediency. In its review of the Cost of Living Council (COLC), the Price Commission, the Pay Board, the Construction Industry Stabilization Committee, the Federal Energy Office (FEO) and, currently, the Federal Energy Administration, the TECA has failed to control agency decisionmaking to such an extent that "principled fairness" has become the sacrificial lamb for the feast of regulatory urgency.