Event Title

Informal Action—Adjudication—Rule Making: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law

Presenter Information

Brice McAdoo Clagett

Location

Duke Law School

Start Date

5-2-1971 10:15 AM

End Date

5-2-1971 11:15 AM

Description

The present article has two basic theses. First, there is general and sound agreement, at least among those outside Government and also by many inside -it, that the realm of informal action should be considerably restricted, to the profit of its two rivals, from the area which it presently occupies; and informal action itself-in the area which it continues to occupy-should often be accompanied by a greater degree of articulation of standards and of reasons for decisions. Second, the contest between rule making and adjudication is largely an unprofitable one and, in at least many instances where the choice between them is debatable, the course of greatest wisdom is to employ elements of both in fashioning a procedure most appropriate to the particular issues and circumstances of each case or class of cases. As will be suggested, both of these propositions are greatly illuminated and strengthened by judicial decisions, publications, and other events of the last two years.

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Related Paper

Brice M. Clagett, Informal Action—Adjudication—Rule Making: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 Duke Law Journal 51-88 (1971)

Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol20/iss1/2

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Feb 5th, 10:15 AM Feb 5th, 11:15 AM

Informal Action—Adjudication—Rule Making: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law

Duke Law School

The present article has two basic theses. First, there is general and sound agreement, at least among those outside Government and also by many inside -it, that the realm of informal action should be considerably restricted, to the profit of its two rivals, from the area which it presently occupies; and informal action itself-in the area which it continues to occupy-should often be accompanied by a greater degree of articulation of standards and of reasons for decisions. Second, the contest between rule making and adjudication is largely an unprofitable one and, in at least many instances where the choice between them is debatable, the course of greatest wisdom is to employ elements of both in fashioning a procedure most appropriate to the particular issues and circumstances of each case or class of cases. As will be suggested, both of these propositions are greatly illuminated and strengthened by judicial decisions, publications, and other events of the last two years.