Document Type
Chapter of Book
Publication Date
2015
Abstract
This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.
Citation
John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, Democratic Rulemaking, in Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (forthcoming)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Administrative law, Administrative procedure, Democracy, Representative government and representation
Included in
Administrative Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, President/Executive Department Commons
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3516