This article argues for a “public governance duty” to help manage excessive risk-taking by systemically important firms. Although governments worldwide, including the United States, have issued an array of regulations to attempt to curb that risk-taking by aligning managerial and investor interests, those regulations implicitly assume that investors would oppose excessively risky business ventures. That leaves a critical misalignment: because much of the harm from a systemically important firm’s failure would be externalized onto the public, including ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse, such a firm can engage in risk-taking ventures with positive expected value to its investors but negative expected value to the public. The article analyzes why corporate governance law should, and shows how it feasibly could, take the public interest into account.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 Notre Dame Law Review (forthcoming)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Risk management, Financial crises, Corporate governance, Public finance, Financial institutions—Law and legislation