In this Article, the author explores Grutter v. Bollinger from the vantage point of the colorblindness principle. He posits that the Grutter decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the Court rejected the argument that the Constitution is colorblind and that the classifications based on race are per se unconstitutional. Second, the Court explicitly recognized that racial categorizations are not all morally equivalent. The author uses classical liberalism as a heuristic for exploring whether the colorblindness argument is necessarily a moral imperative. He ultimately concludes that the Court adopted the correct approach in Grutter in rejecting the allure of the colorblindness principle.
Guy-Uriel Charles, Affirmative Action and Colorblindness from the Original Position, 78 Tulane Law Review 2009-2036 (2004)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Race discrimination, Cultural pluralism, Liberalism, Affirmative action programs, Post-racialism, Supreme Court