Affirmative Action and Colorblindness from the Original Position

Authors

Guy-Uriel Charles, Duke Law SchoolFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2004

Keywords

affirmative action, diversity, race, liberalism, racial classification, colorblindness principle, Supreme Court

Abstract

In this Article, the author explores Grutter v. Bollinger from the vantage point of the colorblindness principle. He posits that the Grutter decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the Court rejected the argument that the Constitution is colorblind and that the classifications based on race are per se unconstitutional. Second, the Court explicitly recognized that racial categorizations are not all morally equivalent. The author uses classical liberalism as a heuristic for exploring whether the colorblindness argument is necessarily a moral imperative. He ultimately concludes that the Court adopted the correct approach in Grutter in rejecting the allure of the colorblindness principle.

Citation

Guy-Uriel Charles, Affirmative Action and Colorblindness from the Original Position, 78 Tulane Law Review 2009-2036 (2004)