Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets

Authors

James D. Cox, Duke Law SchoolFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1999

Abstract

Due to globalization, the world is a much smaller place today than it was when the U.S. securities laws were enacted. In an era of global trading and offerings of securities disclosure policy for U.S. securities markets is formulated with a healthy respect for the rules, customs, and practices of foreign markets. Thus, for policymakers, regulatory competition is as important a strategy as is harmonization. Theorists have long embraced the view that regulatory competition among markets will result in a regulatory hierarchy that is optimal for investors and the issuers of securities. In this Article, Professor Cox takes the regulatory paradigm to the next analytical level. He considers the policy implications of diverse regulatory standards within a single market, focusing much of his analysis on the significant issue presently confronting the SEC: Whether its registrants whould be permitted to satisfy the mandatory disclosure requirements by using International Accounting Standards.

Citation

James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 Columbia Law Review 1200-1252 (1999)