Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2011
Abstract
Responding to Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 118 (2010) In his comment on political corruption, Professor Samuel Issacharoff questions traditional accounts that aim to squeeze money out of politics entirely. Instead, he focuses on the danger that political spending will promote private influence over government policy. In this response, Professor Stephen E. Sachs argues that "private influence" is itself too broad a category to control, and that campaign finance policy should be restricted to a more manageable scope. Professor Sachs argues that if protecting the government from private influence is too diffuse a goal, we can at least attempt to protect the government from itself, by ensuring that it does not channel public resources into self-sustaining political machines.
Citation
Stephen E. Sachs, Corruption, Clients, and Political MacHines a Response to Professor Issacharoff, 124 Harvard Law Review Forum 62-71 (2011)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Samuel Issacharoff, Corruption, Patron and client, Campaign funds--Law and legislation
Included in
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2444