Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2009

Keywords

climate change, greenhouse gases, emissions trading, cap and trade, regulation

Subject Category

Environmental Law

Abstract

In this contribution to the symposium on “Local Property, Global Justice: Law and Resources in the Era of Climate Change,” I examine a property theory approach to the international legal structure of climate change regulation. My analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I frames the discussion by describing the tragedy of the climate commons and the menu of regulatory instruments available to solve this global problem. Part II outlines the choice between the two most prominent regulatory instruments on the current menu: prices (taxes) versus property (a cap and trade system). Part III argues that the difficulty of engaging participation in international regulatory schemes means that the cap and trade system is better suited than a tax system to solving the problem of global climate change. I conclude that a property-based instrument has distinct advantages over a pricebased instrument to protect the global climate commons at the international level.