Event Title

Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Problems of Commitment, Non-Contractibility, and the Proper Incentives

Presenter Information

Nicholas S. Zeppos

Location

Duke Law School

Start Date

3-3-1995 2:15 PM

End Date

3-3-1995 3:00 PM

Description

Despite the already extensive treatment of Chevron, Professors Shapiro and Levy manage to add significantly to the understanding and discussion of scope of review. The author's misgivings about their project stem almost entirely from three central points. First, he believes that Shapiro and Levy move too quickly in asserting the determinacy of the Chevron two-step. Second, Shapiro and Levy seem to argue that determinacy of doctrine and deference are directly related. In fact, however, the relationship they posit is not inevitable. Finally, although usefully broadening our understanding of Chevron to include judicial incentives, Shapiro and Levy ignore other incentives and institutional arrangements.

Comments

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Related Paper

Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Problems of Commitment, Non-Contractibility, and the Proper Incentives, 44 Duke Law Journal 1133-1154 (1995)

Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol44/iss6/5


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Mar 3rd, 2:15 PM Mar 3rd, 3:00 PM

Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Problems of Commitment, Non-Contractibility, and the Proper Incentives

Duke Law School

Despite the already extensive treatment of Chevron, Professors Shapiro and Levy manage to add significantly to the understanding and discussion of scope of review. The author's misgivings about their project stem almost entirely from three central points. First, he believes that Shapiro and Levy move too quickly in asserting the determinacy of the Chevron two-step. Second, Shapiro and Levy seem to argue that determinacy of doctrine and deference are directly related. In fact, however, the relationship they posit is not inevitable. Finally, although usefully broadening our understanding of Chevron to include judicial incentives, Shapiro and Levy ignore other incentives and institutional arrangements.