Abstract
Feibelman focuses on two particular doctrines of lender liability-equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer, expanding upon proposals to employ private domestic law as a strategy for addressing the problem of odious debt. Although doctrines of equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer do not appear to have been applied to sovereign debt by US courts in the past, both should be available to sovereigns' creditors in most if not all US jurisdictions. In addition, he also addresses practical, doctrinal concerns as well as normative implications of employing theories such as equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer to respond to the problem of odious debt. These doctrines arguably capture the precise harm of odious debt better than other doctrines of private law.
Citation
Adam Feibelman,
Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer, and Sovereign Debt,
70 Law and Contemporary Problems
171-192
(Fall 2007)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol70/iss4/7