“Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative Law

Authors

Alan Charles Raul
Julie Zampa Dwyer

Abstract

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc, the US Supreme Court empowered federal judges to reject irrelevant or unreliable scientific evidence. Daubert provides a suitable framework for reviewing the quality of agency science and the soundness of agency decisions consistent with the standards established for review of agency rulemakings under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Citation

Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, “Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative Law, 66 Law and Contemporary Problems 7-44 (Fall 2003)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol66/iss4/2