Abstract
This Article examines an evolving dispute in professional responsibility: whether a lawyer makes a prohibited communication when viewing a juror’s LinkedIn account. When one LinkedIn user views another’s profile, the platform automatically notifies the profile owner and may include the viewer’s identity. Ethics rules are currently divided on whether or not this notification would count as a prohibited juror communication. On one hand, the ABA and some state bar associations explicitly allow attorneys to view social-media profiles of jurors even when the lawyer’s identity is revealed. On the other hand, some bar associations and courts believe these automatic notifications violate ethical rules, primarily, the juror-contact rule. Drawing on a survey of ethics opinions and the purpose of juror-contact rules, this article argues against a strict interpretation of what prohibited juror contact means in the digital age. This article argues that, with respect to the juror-contact rule, a communication requires that the attorney have a purpose to convey information. Since there is no purpose to convey information through these automated notifications, there is no communication. During voir dire, lawyers have an obligation to understand the people who will be deciding their client’s case. This interest needs to be balanced against the purpose of the juror-contact rule, which is preserving an impartial jury. Hiding the fact that an officer of the court is researching a juror’s public internet presence does little, if anything, to promote an impartial jury. Therefore, the ethical juror-contact rule cannot be used to justify a ban on researching jurors’ LinkedIn profiles.
Citation
Drew Thornley, Juror Contact in the Digital Age: The LinkedIn Problem, 26 Duke Law & Technology Review 111-126 (2026)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dltr/vol26/iss1/5