Abstract

Courts reviewing the constitutionality of an agency's design have increasingly turned to historical comparison. Under this mode of reasoning, courts treat resemblance between a modern agency and a Founding-era institution as evidence that the agency's design comports with the separation of powers. When, by contrast, courts cannot identify a historical counterpart, they treat that absence as evidence of constitutional infirmity. This Note terms this methodology "institutional analogy" and argues that its results depend on three variables. First, courts must decide which features of an agency's design to treat as constitutionally relevant. Second, they must decide whether to demand one historical institution that shares all those features, or to seek precedents for each feature in isolation. Third, they must decide at what level of abstraction to describe each feature. Using the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as a case study, the Note explains how divergent choices along these variables have led courts to opposing conclusions about the same agency's historical pedigree. It then proposes principles for disciplining each variable so that institutional analogies produce more consistent and more defensible results.

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