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Abstract

This Article aims to call attention to the demise of ambiguity as the key doctrinal trigger across statutory interpretation. So doing is an essential exercise in understanding the modern view of Article III and the judicial role when it comes to statutory work. As the role of ambiguity declines, we move from a framework of faithful agency by judges to Congress toward an era in which the judiciary instead lacks no confidence about its own interpretive authority and is happy to act alone.

A finding of ambiguity has long opened the door to hundreds of interpretive tools—not only to widely known doctrines like administrative deference but also to virtually every tool of interpretation, from legislative history to more than one hundred substantive (policy- or constitutional law-based) canons like constitutional avoidance, and even to drier presumptions about grammar and linguistic meaning. Today, however, after more than a century at the fulcrum of statutory interpretation, the ambiguity threshold is starting to vanish from many parts of interpretive doctrine and is being used as a vehicle by the Court to demote many others. In many cases, oft-deployed canons, ranging from constitutionally inspired presumptions like federalism and the Major Questions rule to linguistic assumptions like ejusdem generis to remedial presumptions like severability, are now the starting point for a statutory inquiry, rather than a tiebreaker when other inquiries fail. These old rules are being refashioned to shape textual meaning, even when the Court admits that the text itself, without applying those rules, has a different, more plausible, and more natural reading.

In other cases, the ambiguity threshold for particular canons is being raised so high that it seems some judges are trying to eliminate use of that canon entirely—a debate currently playing out over the rule of lenity. And in still other cases, the very fact that certain canons still depend on an ambiguity threshold, for example the Indian canon, has made those same canons targets for possible elimination. Together, these moves appear to be creating an unprecedented hierarchy of interpretive rules. In other words, it is not that the ambiguity has vanished completely—it only has for some of the canons so far. And the relationship of an interpretive rule to ambiguity is being used as a signal by the Court of that rule's strength and legitimacy.

The path to ambiguity's demise is being paved by a few factors. First is the enduring frustration about the manipulability of any ambiguity threshold. Second, there is a growing jurisprudential discomfort with the substantive canons in general; a majority of Justices have raised questions about what makes the canons legitimate, all in the context of discussing the ambiguity triggers for them. Third, this Court lacks the professed inferiority complex of its predecessors. Federal courts for decades have articulated concerns about their role in interpreting statutes under the umbrella of legislative supremacy. These concerns long expressed themselves in interpretive doctrine. But this Court—the newest textualists—has argued that courts should care much less about Congress and focus instead on the "ordinary reader." This new focus—and with it a growing lack of interest in whether Congress has delegated any interpretive space to courts (via ambiguity)—has combined with long-standing critiques of the construct to create momentum for toppling the ambiguity-based pyramid altogether.

Ultimately, the shift away from ambiguity is about Article III and judicial power. A court that requires ambiguity as evidence of delegation of interpretive authority has a different conception of its own constitutional power than a court that thinks it can apply its policy preferences atop Congress's work, even if the text does not naturally permit it. The jurisprudential underpinnings of the rules of interpretation and what triggers them go to the heart of any conception of the judicial role under Article III and the judiciary's relation to the other branches in our constitutional structure.

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