This Article concerns an aspect of Article III standing that has played a role in many of the highest-profile controversies of recent years, including litigation over the Affordable Care Act, immigration policy, and climate change. Although the federal courts constantly emphasize the importance of ensuring that only proper plaintiffs invoke the federal judicial power, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have developed a significant exception to the usual requirement of standing. This exception holds that a court entertaining a multiple-plaintiff case may dispense with inquiring into the standing of each plaintiff as long as the court finds that one plaintiff has standing to pursue the claims before the court. This practice of partially bypassing the requirement of standing is not limited to cases in which the plaintiffs are about to lose on other grounds anyway. Put differently, courts are willing to proceed as if all plaintiffs have standing as long as one plaintiff has it, and they will then decide the merits for or against all plaintiffs despite doubts about the standing of some of those plaintiffs. We could call this the “one-plaintiff rule.”
This Article examines the one-plaintiff rule from normative and positive perspectives. On the normative side, the goal is to establish that the one-plaintiff rule is erroneous in light of principle, precedent, and policy. All plaintiffs need standing, even if each presents similar legal claims and regardless of the form of relief they seek. To motivate the normative inquiry, the Article also explains that the one-plaintiff rule is harmful as a practical matter because it assigns the benefits and detriments of judgments to persons to whom they do not belong. The Article’s other principal goal is to explain the puzzle of how the mistaken one-plaintiff rule could have attained such widespread acceptance. The explanatory account assigns the blame for the one-plaintiff rule to the incentives of courts and litigants as well as to the development of certain problematic understandings of the nature of judicial power.
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
One Good Plaintiff Is Not Enough,
67 Duke Law Journal
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol67/iss3/1