Abstract
Courts and scholars have largely overlooked the constitutional source and scope of a state executive's powers to avert and respond to crises. This Article addresses how actual and perceived legal barriers to executive authority under state constitutions can have major consequences beyond a state's borders during times of crisis. It proposes to empower state executives to address federal and regional goals without any previous authorization from the state legislature-a presumption of state executive lawmaking, subject to state legislative override, which would give a state or local executive expansive lawmaking authority within its system of government to address national and regional goals during times of crisis. Although the approach of this Article is to suggest a solution for state courts, based on state constitutional interpretation, its analysis also recommends an approach for state legislatures as they consider state emergency management statutes, as well as for Congress as it considers national emergency management legislation.
Citation
Jim Rossi,
State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis,
56 Duke Law Journal
237-277
(2006)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol56/iss1/6