Abstract
Respected commentators have floated several proposals for startling reforms of America's seventy-year-old securities regulation scheme. Many involve substantial deregulation with a view toward allowing issuers and investors to contract privately for desired levels of disclosure and fraud protection. The behavioral literature explored in this Article cautions that in a deregulated securities world it is exceedingly optimistic to expect issuers voluntarily to disclose optimal levels of information, securities intermediaries such as stock exchanges and stockbrokers to appropriately consider the interests of investors, or investors to be able to bargain efficiently for fraud protection.
Citation
Robert Prentice,
Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future,
51 Duke Law Journal
1397-1511
(2002)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol51/iss5/1