Abstract
When, if at all, should courts make agencies follow the President's "personal" policies declared in non-statutory executive orders? Professor Raven-Hansen here seeks an answer by making the case for general judicial enforceability of Executive Order No. 12,291, which requires regulatory impact analysis of major rules. He concludes that a non-statutory executive order which is not mere housekeeping can bind agencies under the principle that they must follow their own rules, but that the committal of enforcement to executive discretion is often a serious obstacle to judicial enforceability. Whether such discretion bars judicial review altogether or only narrows the scope of review, however, depends upon the efficacy of executive enforcement and its compatibility wity judicial enforcement.
Citation
Peter Raven-Hansen,
Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Violations of Executive Order 12,291,
1983 Duke Law Journal
285-353
(1983)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol32/iss2/3