The arid conceptionalism of the power theory of state-court jurisdiction derived from Pennoyer v. Neff is nowhere more prevalent than in the exercise of jurisdiction based upon the attachment of intangible obligations. This comment discusses that vulnerable segment of current jurisdictional law in order to expose the theoretical and constitutional inadequacies of the Pennoyer power theory and its attendant differentiation between jurisdiction in rem and in personam. The comment proceeds by the following steps: first, consideration of the theoretical necessity for the in rem-in personam distinction under the power theory; second, observations on the erosion of the Pennoyer rationale; third, review of the conceptual and constitutional difficulties created by application of the Pennoyer theory to intangibles in Seider v. Roth and Podolsky v. Devinney; and finally, suggestions for a jurisdictional theory of general application founded upon the minimum-contacts approach of International Shoe Company v. Washington.

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