Abstract
A majority of American jurisdictions refuse to permit the use of learned treatises as direct evidence, reasoning that to do so would violate the rule against hearsay evidence. However, many commentators have contended that, in adopting such a position, these courts have failed to consider the underlying purposes of the hearsay rule. Alabama, which has permitted the introduction of treatises as direct evidence, affords a useful contrast for testing both the rationale of the majority rule and the criticisms of it. It has been the goal of this comment to evaluate the present majority view against the Alabama experience. On the basis of the responses of Alabama attorneys, the conclusion is that the admission of learned treatises as direct evidence would be a desirable modificacation of the present rules of evidence.
Citation
Learned Treatises as Direct Evidence: The Alabama Experience,
1967 Duke Law Journal
1169-1201
(1967)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol16/iss6/4