Abstract
Biological weapons are not new, but recent developments in genetic technology have fundamentally transformed their threat potential. Advances in genome sequencing, editing technologies, and CRISPR have made pathogen modification faster, cheaper, and more accessible than ever before, reinvigorating fears of large-scale biological warfare and giving rise to a new class of synthetic bioweapons. This note examines the implications of genetically modified biological weapons for the jus ad bellum, the international law governing the use of force. Drawing an analogy to cyberweapons, it argues that bioweapons share key characteristics with cyberweapons—stealth, latency, asymmetry, non-kinetic lethality, and anonymity—that will generate similar legal uncertainties around the use of force and armed attack thresholds. It further contends that these weapons will pressure a reinterpretation of imminence, enabling pre-emptive self-defense claims and undermining the jus ad bellum's deterrent effect. Most significantly, this note argues that bioweapons' capacity to alter the human genome may destabilize the meaning of "attack" under international law, while their asymmetrical capabilities may erode the jus ad bellum's efficacy to an unprecedented degree.
Citation
Sabrina I. Slagowitz,
From Smallpox to Synthetic Biology: The Evolving Threat of Biological Weapons and the Jus Ad Bellum,
36 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law
87-120
(2026)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol36/iss1/3