Defining the direct conflict between law and social norms as a tragedy and their reconciliation as a comedy, this paper serves as a case study of the mixture of tragedies and comedies of collective land governance in China. The term tragicomedy encapsulates such a mixture. This paper presents two contrasting cases of collective land governance: one village co-op is captured by a mafia and the consequent mafia-style land development business is maintained through violence and the bribing of government officials; the other village co-op from time to time takes actions “in the name of law” in their bargaining for legal property rights with the government and with a hold-out couple who refused to submit their “nailhouse” to the village co-op for redevelopment. This paper reveals that the different identities that village leaders simultaneously assume under different social control systems are key to understanding the co-evolution of property law and norms. It also highlights the essential roles of the laws and communities’ legal strategies in governing common-pool resources.
Fragmented Laws, Contingent Choices: The Tragicomedy of the Village Commons in China,
29 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol29/iss2/3