Abstract
On August 21, 2024, the Greek-flagged oil tanker MV SOUNION ("Sounion") was attacked by Houthis as it passed through the Red Sea. The Houthis, a rebel group that controls large swaths of Yemen, then set the ship ablaze, threatening to spill roughly 1 million barrels of crude oil into the water. The cleanup was anticipated to cost $20 billion. The question thus arises: who would—and who should—pay for that cleanup? At the moment, there is no effective solution.
As an initial matter, current international law focuses on State liability and is therefore unlikely to require the Houthis—as a non-State actor—to pay. Furthermore, even if the Houthis were deemed liable under existing treaties and customary international law, the Houthis, who regularly and flagrantly disregard international law by attacking civilian vessels, are unlikely to pay even in the event of a judgment against them. With the ability of the international community to hold the Houthis responsible under existing law in question, and the minute likelihood of successfully extracting a payment from the Houthis even in the event of a judgment against the group, the cost of an oil spill will likely be borne by private parties.
Second, under the current maritime civil liability regime, the burden may fall to shipowners and their insurers, but that regime currently is also inadequate. The 1992 Civil Liability Convention requires shipowners to purchase standard liability insurance, which does not cover damage resulting from war or terrorism. Shipowners may also purchase specialized war risk insurance, but that policy is not required, may have exceptions for terrorism, and often covers only damage to the ship itself. While shipowners can also purchase additional insurance that would cover damage affecting third parties, as would be the case with an oil spill, this policy only offers coverage up to a maximum of $1 billion—a grossly inadequate amount given the gargantuan costs of cleaning up a spill.
Third, the 1971 International Convention for the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage requires oil companies to contribute to a fund that is available for oil spill cleanups around the world. However, the Fund has an exception for armed attacks and is therefore unavailable to address oil spills caused by belligerent activity. Ultimately, under the current system, international and regional groups likely will have to shoulder the bulk of the costs associated with cleaning up an oil spill in the Red Sea.
This Article examines the civil liability regime governing responsibility for environmental disasters in the Red Sea intentionally caused by non-State actors and proposes changes to create a system more capable of addressing the threat posed by such actors. This Article recommends rerouting oil tankers away from the Red Sea; advises in favor of imposing a requirement on oil tankers to obtain war risk protection and indemnity insurance (which covers damage to third parties); advocates for the creation of an international, regional, or joint task force prepared to address oil spills; and suggests utilizing security forces such as Aspides to provide protection for tankers traveling through the Red Sea.
Citation
Emery Hansell,
The Civil Liability Gap for Oil Spills Caused by Non-State Armed Groups: The Case of the MV Sounion Tanker in the Red Sea,
36 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum
233-262
(2026)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/delpf/vol36/iss2/3