Abstract
In Jacobson v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted the word “operate” in Alaska’s driving under the influence statute to include sitting in a running, parked car. Jacobson was part of a national trend. In the last few decades, courts in about half of states have interpreted “operate” to mean “being in control of” or “exercising dominion over” a vehicle—for example, sitting in an unmoving vehicle. This judge-made law is controversial as it expands the definition of “operate” without legislative approval. As one dissenting justice put it in a case similar to Jacobson, “[t]he effect of the majority opinion is to create a new crime: Parked While Intoxicated.” This Article argues that the Alaska Supreme Court effectively created a new crime of being parked while intoxicated in Jacobson, despite a lack of legislative intent to do so. Further, the Court’s reasoning is flawed because 1) the statute’s plain meaning does not include being parked while intoxicated; 2) the Court analogized from out-of-state cases that were inapposite to the facts in Jacobson; and 3) the statute’s legislative history supports a narrower interpretation that criminalizes only driving under the influence. This Article will demonstrate that the statute simply codified the ordinary meaning of “operate” when the statute was passed, which was “to drive.” It concludes with a discussion of how the Alaska Court of Appeals has already begun to undermine the Jacobson ruling in the past decade.
Citation
Paul A. Clark,
“Parked Under the Influence” Is Not a Crime: Why the Alaska Supreme Court’s Broad Interpretation of “Operating a Vehicle” Is Wrong,
42 Alaska Law Review
125-169
(2026)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol42/iss1/5