Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2017
Abstract
This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.
Citation
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Corporate Governance for a Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, 58 William & Mary Law Review 1345-1374 (2017)
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Corporate governance, Financial risk management, Bondholders, Shareholders, Creditors, Corporations--Finance--Law and legislation
Included in
Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Securities Law Commons
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3582