Introduction
Paul Finkelman

This book examines the history of a single federal court—the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. This is not a comprehensive, day-to-day or year-to-year history of the court. Nor is it a collection of biographies of the many judges who have served on it. Rather, we have chosen to examine a series of cases and topics that illustrate the nature of the court and the wide-ranging work it does. Some chapters focus on famous cases that began in the district court and went on to the Supreme Court—such as the World War I prosecution of the socialist leader Eugene Victor Debs. Other chapters center on equally famous cases and the events surrounding them that never went beyond this court, including the prosecution of scores of abolitionists after the Oberlin-Wellington fugitive slave rescue and the litigation following the shooting of students by the Ohio National Guard on the Kent State University campus in 1970. In addition to essays on great cases and historic events, the authors of these chapters analyze topics and themes such as the role of this district court in fighting political corruption, protecting the environment, or sorting out incredibly complicated social issues, including school desegregation and the relationship of religion to the government under the First Amendment.
Congress established Ohio's first federal district court on February 19, 1803. Initially, the court met in Chillicothe, but in 1820, it moved to Columbus when that city became the state capital. In its first fifty years of statehood, Ohio grew at an astounding pace. In 1800, there were only about 42,000 settlers in what would become Ohio. The first census after statehood found some 231,000 people in the state. By 1850, Ohio's population had grown to about 938,000, and in the next twenty years, the state would more than double to 1,980,000 in 1870. On the eve of the Civil War, Ohio was the nation's third-largest state, with a population of about 2,340,000. The growth in northern Ohio was particularly dramatic in the four decades leading to the Civil War. For example, in 1820, Cleveland was a mere village, with a population of 600. With an astounding growth of 7100 percent over the next forty years, the city had more than 43,000 people by 1860. Cincinnati remained the largest city in the state, with just over 160,000 people, but its rate of growth had slowed, especially in contrast to northern Ohio. In 1830, Cincinnati was about twenty times the size of Cleveland; by 1860, its population was a little more than three times Cleveland's. Cincinnati was the nation's sixth-largest city in 1850, but that is where it peaked. By 1920, it would drop to sixteenth, well below Cleveland. Congress could not, of course, have known this outcome in 1855, but it was clear northern Ohio was the focus of the state's growth and thus the region needed its own federal court.

The rapid growth of Cleveland, as well as the emergence of other northern Ohio cities such as Akron, Canton, Toledo, and Youngstown, led to increased legal business in the region. The expansion of Great Lakes shipping meant even more legal business for northern Ohio. Shipping led to admiralty disputes, which often required speedy access to courts. The presence of a federal court in northern Ohio seemed essential to the growing business, lake commerce, and population of that part of the state. On February 10, 1855, Congress recognized these changing needs by creating two separate district courts in the state. The existing court moved to Cincinnati and was now called the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio; the new court—the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio—would meet in Cleveland. Thus, the history of this court begins in the 1850s. However, before turning to that history, it is important to explore the origin and role of federal districts courts in American society.

Federal district courts have played a complicated role in American history. Before the modern era, they were often the embodiment of the national government at the local level. Until the Civil War, there was very little federal presence in most communities, and the majority of federal officials other than the postmaster. In port cities or Philadelphia—there were large customhouses in the national government, and on the frontier. But these offices were mostly administrative, postmasters, customs collectors, and land office administrators. There was little sense of the national government attached to them.

From the beginning, the lower federal court was important, and the prosecution of lawbreakers. Yet it was also a forum for dispute resolution. The district courts were the primary place where Americans could sort out their problems. The court was, as historian Roberta Sue Alexander, where Americans could settle disputes. But a federal court was also a human face representing the national government. Dressed in magic and law, the proceedings in the courtroom were often impressive courthouse and marshal, the district judges symbolizing national government.

One significant role of the district courts was recognizing aliens. In a nation of immigrants, this has always been particularly significant. For instance, the federal district court was not a place to be feared in the courts in much of Europe. Rather, the fear of justice where the tired and poor, “the huddled masses yearning to be free,” became American citizens, was a feature of self-government.

From the beginning of the American nation, the district courts have been both important and controversial. Initially, the district courts were seen as a way to ensure the implementation of the Articles of Confederation. Indeed, Edmund Randolph of Virginia offered an amendment. The Constitution Convention of 1787 insisted that national courts be established in different states, to enforce the laws of the nation for bringing the authority of the nation.

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in most communities, and the majority of Americans rarely encountered a federal official other than the postmaster. In port cities—such as New York, Boston, or Philadelphia—there were large customhouses, collecting revenue to help run the national government, and on the frontier, there were federal land offices. But these offices were mostly administrative, and the people who ran them—postmasters, customs collectors, and land commissioners—were by and large administrators. There was little sense of the power or prestige of the national government attached to them.

From the beginning, the lower federal courts created a more commanding national presence. The district courts offered a forum for the resolution of disputes and the prosecution of lawbreakers. The courts provided a safe and orderly venue where Americans could sort out their differences. A federal district court was, as historian Roberta Sue Alexander has noted, “a place of recourse” for Americans to settle disputes. But a federal judge was more than a referee for disputes; he was also a human face representing the authority and reputation of the national government. Dressed in magisterial robes, presiding over solemn proceedings in often impressive courthouses, surrounded by bailiffs and clerks and marshals, the district judges symbolized the power and prestige of the national government.

One significant role of the district courts was to oversee the process of naturalizing aliens. In a nation of immigrants, this aspect of the court's business has always been particularly significant. For immigrants seeking naturalization, the federal district court was not a place to be feared or a palace of oppression—like the courts in much of Europe. Rather, the federal district court was a temple of justice where the tired and poor, “the huddled masses” of the world “yearning to be free,” became American citizens, with the right to vote and participate in self-government.

From the beginning of the American nation, the idea of national courts was both important and controversial. Initially, there was no system of national courts. Most leaders in the new nation saw this as one of the defects of the government under the Articles of Confederation. Indeed, the Framers of the Constitution in 1787 insisted that national courts be established to resolve disputes between citizens of different states, to enforce the laws of the nation, and to provide a mechanism for bringing the authority of the national government to the people.

When the Constitutional Convention began in late May 1787, Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia offered an outline for a new system of government. Called the Randolph Plan or the Virginia Plan, this document, largely
written by James Madison, proposed that “a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature.” On June 4, the convention unanimously agreed that “a National Judiciary be established.” Without any debate, the delegates also agreed that the judiciary should consist of “one supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals.” The next day, the convention had a full-blown debate over the court system. The convention began by eliminating the clause that required the creation of “inferior tribunals”—that is, what would eventually become the lower federal courts. The vote was close, with five states voting for the change, four against, and two delegations divided. Significantly, the three Deep South states opposed the idea of federal district courts, as did two of the northern states, Connecticut and New Jersey. Edward Rutledge, a wealthy South Carolina slave owner, argued that the state courts “are the most proper to decide in all cases of first instance.” The South Carolinians, always fearful of national power, initially resisted the creation of federal courts. After a long debate over the nature of a national court system, James Madison from Virginia and James Wilson from Pennsylvania proposed “that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals.” Under their proposal, the creation of lower federal courts would be discretionary, not mandatory. This debate revealed both the importance of district courts to the Framers and the high quality of their deliberations. In what was essentially a reconsideration of the earlier vote, eight states now voted for federal courts, one state (New York) remained divided, and only South Carolina and Connecticut voted no.

On July 18, 1787, the convention once again considered the creation of courts under the new national government. The provision before the convention was the one Madison and Wilson had proposed a month earlier: “Resolved: that the National (Legislature) be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.” Like his South Carolina colleague Rutledge, Pierce Butler opposed the motion, noting he “could see no necessity for such tribunals.” Butler believed that the state courts “might do the business” of the federal government. He supported a strong national government, but at the same time, as a wealthy slave owner who vociferously argued throughout the convention for the protection of slavery, he may have had at least some fear of national courts. After Butler made his objection to federal courts, Luther Martin, who would ultimately oppose the Constitution and argue against ratification, supported him. Martin believed national courts would “create jealousies” in the states because the national courts would interfere with state jurisdiction.

There is some irony in the opposition of these southern men, especially Butler. Near the end of the debate over the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution, federal courts in numerous conflicts with state courts were used to protect the interests of free blacks or fugitive slaves in the northern black and white—who resisted the law. In many cases, they directly challenged the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 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Ind ute that “a National Judiciary be established to tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen 6 June 4, the convention unanimously agreed established.” Without any debate, the delegates could consist of “one supreme tribunal, and of day the convention had a full-blown convention began by eliminating the clause inferior tribunals”—that is, what would eventu- The vote was close, with five states voting and two delegations divided. Significantly, the d the idea of federal district courts, as did two at and New Jersey. Edward Rutledge, a wealthy sued that the state courts “[are the most proper] ance.”” The South Carolinians, always fearful ed the creation of federal courts. After a long onal court system, James Madison of Virginia proposed “that the National Legislature be tribunals.” Under their proposal, the creation of cretionary, not mandatory. This debate revealed outs to the Framers and the high quality of their tally a reconsideration of the earlier vote, eight rts, one state (New York) remained divided, and techut voted no.10 enion once again considered the creation of government. The provision before the conven- Wilson had proposed a month earlier: “Resol; power to appoint inferior tribunals.”11 Like his edge, Pierce Butler opposed the motion, noting ch tribunals.” Butler believed that the state courts federal government. He supported a strong na- time, as a wealthy slave owner who vocifer- convention for the protection of slavery, he may national courts.12 After Butler made his objection on, who would ultimately oppose the Constitution, supported him. Martin believed national in the states because the national courts would

There is some irony in the opposition to federal courts on the part of the southerners, especially Butler. Near the end of the convention, Butler authored the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution, which ultimately embroiled the federal courts in enormous conflicts with some northern states, as the federal courts were used to protect the interests of slave owners.13 In the 1850s, there would indeed be conflicts and jealousies between federal district courts and the state courts because the federal courts would be the primary forums for the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Meanwhile, some state courts in the 1850s would be called on to stymie that law in order to protect the liberty of free blacks or fugitive slaves in the northern states or to protect abolitionists—black and white—who resisted the law. In 1854, the Wisconsin Supreme Court directly challenged the jurisdiction of the federal courts in fugitive slave cases.14 Because of state jealousies, it would take five years for this case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court: the Wisconsin Supreme Court simply refused to forward the record of the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, the nation’s highest court was unable to decide the matter until the Wisconsin Supreme Court published its opinions. Then, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously overruled the state court.15 The prediction that federal courts would stimulate state jealousies also proved true for the Northern District of Ohio. Indeed, the first great case to come before that court was the prosecution of abolitionists after the Oberlin-Wellington fugitive slave rescue. While the rescue cases were pending in the Northern District Court, the Ohio Supreme Court was considering whether to issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering the U.S. marshal to bring the Oberlin rescuers into the state courts. In Ex parte Bushnell, Ex parte Langston,16 the Ohio Supreme Court, by a single vote, failed to challenge the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Had there been a different ruling, there might have been a constitutional crisis of enormous proportions emanating from the Northern District.

These conflicts between northern state courts and federal district courts over slavery were of course not on the horizon as the delegates in Philadelphia debated whether to have national courts sitting in the states. In the debate at the Philadelphia convention, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts noted that there were “already” national courts established under the Articles of Confederation to adjudicate cases of piracy and that “no complaints have been made by the States or the Courts of the States.” Lower federal courts, he believed, would get the same respect and function in the same way. Governor Randolph of Virginia was even more emphatic about the need for a system of lower federal courts, declaring that the state courts “can not be trusted with the administration of the
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National laws.” He envisioned a conflict between state and national laws and understood that national courts were necessary to ensure the enforcement of national laws. He may have also understood from personal experience that the Virginia courts might not be willing to enforce federal law, especially if they were under the control of staunch opponents of a strong national government, such as Patrick Henry. His Virginia colleague, George Mason, was skeptical about a strong national government and ultimately would not sign the Constitution. Yet he too supported the idea of lower federal courts, noting that “many circumstances might arise not now to be foreseen, which might render such a power absolutely necessary.” Thus, at that point in the deliberations, all the state delegations at the convention unanimously endorsed the idea of Congress having the discretionary power to create lower federal courts.

A month later, on August 17, the convention agreed without debate or dissent that Congress would have the power to “constitute inferior tribunals.” On August 27, the delegates considered what was emerging as the final language of the Constitution: “The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.” By then, even the South Carolina delegates supported the clause. It may be that these Deep South delegates were finally persuaded that lower federal courts were necessary. But the vote may also have reflected South Carolina’s huge victory in the previous session, when the convention had adopted the slave trade clause, preventing Congress from ending the African slave trade until at least 1808. On August 29, two days after approving a system of federal courts, the convention adopted, without debate, what became the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution. As I noted earlier, this clause would eventually have an enormous impact on the federal courts and lead to the jealousies that delegates such as Pierce Butler feared.

The members of the First Congress quickly used their constitutionally created discretion to devise a court system that included lower federal courts. The first substantive measure introduced in the Senate led to the Judiciary Act of 1789. The bill quickly moved through the Senate but took longer in the House. On September 24, President George Washington finally signed the bill creating the federal courts. This was the twentieth act passed by Congress. The 1789 act created a three-tiered system. At the top was the Supreme Court, with six justices.

At the bottom were the district courts and then one district judge, except for Massachusetts, where two states were part of Massachusetts. The First Congress rejected a suggestion by the Virginians that two districts required an extra district judge for Virginia. When several states entered the Union, Congress would create districts, and Congress would create one district court for Ohio.

In addition to the district courts and the Supreme Court, the new government created a hybrid circuit court. Initially this consisted of one Supreme Court justice. With confusing names he was called the circuit judge when sitting in district court. He might be called the circuit judge riding circuit would be called the circuit judge riding circuit. This new court was important, under this law the district court could not hear cases if no Supreme Court justice was present.

The new courts had to be established between the district court and the circuit court. The average American, often the same individual, might be both. In the morning, he might be a district judge; in the afternoon, he might be the circuit judge.

The main difference on the kinds of cases they heard and tried was that of the district courts. The cases of the circuit courts’ early cases consisted of controversies involving $500 or less and minor cases not more than $100 or the possible jail time was in a private suit as well as more significant crimes.

Over the next seventy-five years, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the district courts. The federal courts were given concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts. In addition to charging the district judges with increasing the number of these courts and with jurisdiction, they were given the power to try cases in the district courts. In some cases, the district judge would hold court. Though there might be court clerks, bailiffs, and other officials, the judge himself had to travel to three places, all served by the same j
At the bottom were the district courts and their judges. Initially, every state had one district judge, except for Massachusetts and Virginia. At the time, the modern state of Maine was part of Massachusetts and the modern state of Kentucky was part of Virginia. The First Congress recognized that the geography of these two states required an extra district judge for Maine and Kentucky. As new states entered the Union, Congress would create new district judges. Thus, in 1803, Congress created a district court for Ohio.

In addition to the district courts and the Supreme Court, Congress created a hybrid circuit court. Initially this consisted of a district judge sitting with two Supreme Court justices. With confusing nomenclature, the district judge would be called the circuit judge when sitting in the circuit court, and a Supreme Court justice riding circuit would be called the circuit justice. After 1802, only a single Supreme Court justice was assigned to the circuit court. More importantly, under this law the district judge could preside over the circuit court even if no Supreme Court justice was present. As a consequence, the distinction between the district court and the circuit court was not particularly clear to the average American. Often, the same individual presided over both courts on the same day. In the morning, he might be a district judge, and in the afternoon, he might be the circuit judge. The main difference between the two courts centered on the kinds of cases they heard and the importance of those cases. Most of the district courts’ early cases consisted of private suits where the matter in controversy involved $500 or less and minor criminal cases where the fine was not more than $500 or the possible jail time not more than six months. District judges also heard admiralty cases. The circuit courts had jurisdiction over larger private suits as well as more significant criminal cases.

Over the next seventy-five years, Congress tinkered with the court system, expanding the jurisdiction of the district courts. For example, in 1842, the district courts were given concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts for all noncapital federal crimes. In addition to changing the jurisdiction of the courts, Congress increased the number of these courts and the number of judges. Starting in 1801, it divided some district courts, recognizing that it was almost impossible for people in certain areas to reach the only district court in their state. Under this process, a district judge would hold court in different sections of a state, and though there might be court clerks, bailiffs, or other functionaries in more than one place, the judge himself had to travel. By 1838, for example, Tennessee had three district courts, all served by the same judge. In 1812, Congress authorized
the appointment of a second district judge in New York, recognizing that the
nation's largest state had such a huge docket of cases that no single judge could
data handle it.24 Eastern and western districts or northern and southern districts were
commonly used in a number of states.25 Meanwhile, starting with Tennessee in 1862,
Congress began to create multiple districts in the same state.26

By 1850, Ohio, with nearly 2 million people, was ripe for a new federal
court. Residents of Columbus not surprisingly objected to the creation of a
second district court because this would hurt business in their city. The federal
court supplied clients for local attorneys, while litigants, witnesses, and visiting
lawyers patronized hotels, restaurants, and other enterprises. Opening a new
federal court in Cleveland would take some of commerce out of
Columbus. But in the context of the nineteenth century, the creation of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio was an obvious and logical
outcome of the phenomenal growth of the state and the rapid expansion of its
northern part. The creation of the new court also symbolized the change that
took place in Ohio in the previous half century. At statehood, Ohio was an
outcropping of the South, with a plurality of its settlers coming from Virginia
and Kentucky and most of its population focused on Ohio River traffic and the
growing city of Cincinnati, which by 1830 was the eighth-biggest city in the
country. But by 1850, the population in the northern part of the state was growing
deeper, with most of that section's residents coming from New England, New
York, or Europe.27 Lake traffic now competed with river traffic as canals fed
commerce north to Lake Erie as well as south to the Ohio River.28 For many in
the state, the focus of commerce and transportation was no longer the Ohio
River, the Mississippi River, and the port of New Orleans. Rather, it was the
state's huge canal system and the Cuyahoga River, flowing into Lake Erie and
taking the produce of the state to New York's Erie Canal and ultimately the port
of New York.

The creation of the new court in Cleveland symbolized the shift in population
and power in the state. Four American presidents—Rutherford Hayes,
James Garfield, William McKinley, and Warren Harding—would come out of
the counties that constituted the Northern District of Ohio. In the next century
and a half, northern Ohio would become an industrial powerhouse—the home
and even the birthplace of new industries, businesses, and technologies. Glass,
steel, and rubber would flow from Toledo, Youngstown, Cleveland, and Akron.
Before World War I, factories in northern Ohio would run second only to those
in Detroit in the production of automobiles. Meanwhile, state and local
laws weighed the produce of the nation, oatmeal boxes with a cornflower
as its logo became an American standard, and cooking stoves with matches manufactured in nearby
cities. Much of the grain, ore, and finished goods that had traveled on giant transports built and
operated by Ohio helped provide the major fuel for the new industrial society. 
ism be born in Cleveland in 1870, when a local
capitalist created the Standard Oil Company, which is still a global leader in the production and
marketing of petroleum products in the United States.

As the economy of northern Ohio expanded in the 1870s, Ohio was being
turned into an inland nation. It was a new Ohio that emerged in the 1870s,
when New York's Erie Canal was closed and Ohio's Lake Erie system was
used. Lake Erie became the busiest port in the country as Ohio cities in the
Middle West were able to ship their goods through Lake Erie to the

Throughout the nineteenth century, the economy of northern Ohio expanded
in response to new technologies and industries that were developing in the
region. The growth of the state's economy was driven by a number of factors,
including the expansion of railroads, the development of new industries such as
steel and glass, and the growth of trade with other parts of the country.

With all this change came new social issues. Cases involving the rights of workers,
pollution in the environment, and the expansion of businesses, conflicts over
corruption in government, and the growth of cities all affected the
northern region. In the 1870s, the economy of the northern states was
expanding rapidly, and new industries such as steel and glass were
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in Detroit in the production of automobiles. Scales from Toledo would help weigh the produce of the nation, oatmeal boxed in Akron with a smiling Quaker as its logo became an American standard, and more Americans lit their morning stoves with matches manufactured in nearby Barberville than from any other city. Much of the grain, ore, and finished goods from Ohio and the American heartland traveled on giant transports built at Lake Erie shipyards. The industry that provided the major fuel for the new industrial American economy would be born in Cleveland in 1870, when a local entrepreneur, John D. Rockefeller, created the Standard Oil Company, which quickly became the largest refiner of petroleum products in the United States.

As the economy of northern Ohio expanded, the demographics of the region changed. Most of the region was first settled by New Yorkers, relocating to northern Ohio to claim land in the Western Reserve. In 1840, northern Ohio was almost entirely populated by white Protestants from New England and upstate New York whose ancestors had migrated from Great Britain. But starting in the 1840s, Irish, German, and central European immigrants began moving to the region. After 1870, millions of immigrants and migrants from eastern and southern Europe, the Middle East, Appalachia, and the American South poured into northern Ohio. A century later, the region had one of the most ethnically, racially, and religiously heterogeneous populations in the nation. In 1860, Cleveland ranked twenty-first among American cities; by 1920, it was fifth. And as late as 1950, with just under a million people, it would rank seventh in the nation. In that year, Toledo, Youngstown, Akron, and Canton were also among the hundred largest cities in the country.

With all this change came enormously complicated and interesting legal issues. Cases involving the rights of workers, the changing notions of land use, pollution and environmental waste, demands for racial justice, immigration, expanding notions of due process and criminal justice, protests over the draft and national foreign policy during World War I and the Vietnam War, the changing and expanding rights of women, conflicts over religion and public life, and political corruption all were adjudicated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The chapters in this book teach us how that court developed and grew, how it affected the region and the nation, and how in turn it changed as the region and the nation changed. In essence, these essays tell some of the story of America at the local level. It is a story that instructs us about our past, enhances our understanding of our present, and helps us prepare for our future.
Notes

2. An act altering the place of holding the circuit and district court of the district of Ohio, 3 Stat. 544 (1825).
3. 10 Stat. 604 (1855). For a history of the Ohio federal court before this division, see Alexander, Place of Recourse. See also chapter 1 of this volume.
4. Alexander, Place of Recourse.
6. However, as the case on John Demjanjuk shows, the court can also be a place where fraudulent paths to citizenship can be undone and where those who do not merit inclusion in society can face deportation. See chapter 12.
8. Ibid., 1104–5.
9. Ibid., 1109.
10. Ibid., 1125.
11. Ibid., 245. The quotations in the rest of this paragraph come from this source (245–47).
12. Ibid., 245. Earlier in the convention, John Rutledge of South Carolina had also opposed the creation of lower federal courts; see Farrand, Records, 3:119. For a discussion of Butler’s proslavery arguments at the convention, see Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson, and ed. (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), chap. 1.
16. 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859).
17. Farrand, Records, 2:45–47.
18. Ibid., 2:134.
19. Ibid., 2:428.
20. Ibid., 2:416.
21. In Pollard v. Dwight, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 421 (1808), the Supreme Court affirmed that a district judge could preside over the circuit court without a U.S. Supreme Court justice being present and a Supreme Court justice could preside over a circuit court without a district judge being present. See also chapter 1 of this volume.
26. Act of April 20, 1832, 2 Stat. 165. For greater details on the creation of the new court, see chapter 1.
27. The changing demographics of the state and the emerging power of its northern part can be seen in Ohio’s regulation of race. Shortly after achieving statehood, Ohio passed
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