BOARD DIVERSITY: PEOPLE OR PATHWAYS?

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I

INTRODUCTION

The movement for corporate board diversity is reaching an inflection point. Publicly traded corporations have increasingly embraced the push for gender diversity, with the number of women on their boards climbing to over 20%, a 6.5% increase over the last four years. A Nasdaq Diversity Rule, approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on Aug. 6, 2021, establishes a disclosure standard designed to “encourage board diversity and to provide stakeholders with ways to track board composition.” The report supporting the diversity proposal specifically referenced the business case for diversity, citing the literature showing that greater diversity is correlated with improved business performance, particularly “the quality of a company’s financial reporting,

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1. The case for increased board diversity extends, of course, well beyond gender. See, e.g., Lisa Fairfax, All on Board? Board Diversity Trends Reflect Signs of Promise and Concern, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2018). This article, however, focuses on the distinctive case for gender diversity that considers the gendered nature of corporate practices that disproportionately affect women. These practices fall into three categories: an emphasis on long hours that limits opportunities for those with primary childcare responsibilities, disproportionate rewards for certain masculine traits, and the type of in-group favoritism that tends to increase in workplaces characterized by distrust. These categories involve a mix of classic discrimination against women based on sex stereotyping and rewards for gendered traits such as narcissism, rule-breaking, and risk-taking that may nonetheless be exhibited by both men and women.


internal controls, public disclosures and management oversight.\(^4\) And, following the European Union example, California has mandated greater board diversity as a matter of state law.\(^5\)

With increasing board diversity, however, skepticism has increased about just how much diversity can accomplish on its own. Simply adding women and stirring, that is, increasing the representation of women on corporate boards without other changes, does not necessarily improve business performance or lead to gender equality in upper management ranks.\(^6\) While the lack of gender diversity in an era that supports diversity as an intrinsic good may be a red flag for underlying management issues, the mere presence of women does not guarantee corporate reform. The reasons it does not illustrates the complex interaction between gendered traits and the fate of women in upper management. Modern corporations, over the last half century, have changed from the days of “the organization man” to a model that celebrates “tournament” victors.\(^7\)


\(^5\) CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (West 2019) (“No later than the close of the 2021 calendar year, a publicly held . . . corporation shall comply with the following: (1) If its number of directors is six or more, the corporation shall have a minimum of three female directors. (2) If its number of directors is five, the corporation shall have a minimum of two female directors. (3) If its number of directors is four or fewer, the corporation shall have a minimum of one female director.”); see also Anne Steele, California Rolls Out Diversity Quotas for Corporate Boards, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/168alifornia-rolls-out-diversity-quotas-for-corporate-boards-11601507471 (last accessed Jan. 8, 2022); Jennifer Rankin, EU Revives Plans for Mandatory Quotas of Women on Corporate Boards, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/05 /eu-revives-plans-for-mandatory-quotas-of-women-on-company-boards [https://perma.cc/5K95-UEHQ]. Other states have introduced legislation to increase the representation of women on corporate boards. Women on Corporate Boards: Quick Take, CATALYST (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.catalyst.org /research/women-on-corporate-boards/ [https://perma.cc/4P5X-DCYE]. For an argument questioning the statute’s constitutionality, see, e.g., Ilya Somin, California’s Unconstitutional Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.reason.com/2018 /10/04/californias-unconstitutional-gender-quot [https://perma.cc/6H6S-5CJR] (arguing that general interest in diversity does not justify gender quotas and that such quotas are of dubious constitutional validity).

\(^6\) Indeed, many support greater diversity as a positive good without any clear indication of what the causal mechanisms might be that connect diversity on corporate boards to other outcomes. See Lisa L. Broome et al., Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 805 (2011) (describing interviewees as favoring board diversity but giving vague answers on the role of diversity in improving business performance). For a review of the social science finding, see, e.g., Alice H. Eagly, When Passionate Advocates Meet Research on Diversity, Does the Honest Broker Stand a Chance?, 72 J. SOC. ISSUES 199, 201 (2016) (generally critiquing failure to establish diversity as a causal factor once appropriate controls are added); Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 384 (2014) (concluding that that social science literature does not establish that the addition of women per se increases diversity); Darren Rosenblum, When Does Sex Diversity on Boards Benefit Firms?, 20 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 429, 443 (2018) (arguing that the “big tent of instrumentalists, filled with both sincere instrumentalists and normative proponents and opponents, seems to inflate diversity’s value.”).

\(^7\) Compare WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956) (criticizing mid-century executives as conformists lacking creativity, unwilling to take risks, and content to move up secure career ladders within a single company), with Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
organization man was thought to have been loyal, complacent, risk averse, and consensus oriented: “he” (and corporate executives in that era were almost all men) could have been a stereotypical woman. The corporate tournament, in contrast, which sometimes promotes women, nonetheless selects for traits such as “over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy, and a deep capacity for ethical self-deception,” traits that are associated with masculine stereotypes and are in fact more common in men than women.9

This shift, however, does not just select for alpha males to the exclusion of overconfident, narcissistic, and amoral women who might willingly join in fleecing customers or stabbing colleagues in the back in the quest for the next promotion. It also does two other things that muddy the distinctions between biological sex and social gender, increasing women’s disadvantages. First, zero sum competitions that pit employees against each other often become “masculinity contests” that select for the most dominant, driven, and stereotypically male employees, even when such characteristics are unnecessary or counterproductive.10 Second, such competition increases distrust. Managers may promote the employees they see as allies in outflanking the group down the hall, and in doing so, they play favorites; they prefer workers they see as sharing the same world views they hold (crush the red team!) and whose reactions they can predict. In workplaces in which all employees are insecure, and that emphasize getting results without scrutiny of the means, managers have every reason to look out for employees who will make them look good without the need to ask them directly to do something that is legally or ethically dubious and to retaliate against those who might question their tactics or authority.11 In today’s competitive workplaces, such environments do not exclude women in wholesale ways, but they tend to reserve the greatest rewards for a relatively small group of alpha males. In these environments, simply adding more women does not necessarily change the dynamic, but equal outcomes for women are unlikely without

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8. Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004) (observing that “traits such as over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical self-deception are favored in corporate promotion tournaments.”).

9. See, e.g., Emily Grijalva et al., Gender Differences in Narcissism: A Meta-analytic Review, 141 PSYCHOL. BULL. 261, 283 (2015)(indicating that men are more likely to be narcissists than women and that men are even more likely to be the type of narcissists drawn to positions of power and authority and feeling justified in running roughshod over others in order to advance themselves).

10. See Jennifer L. Berdahl, et al., Work as a Masculinity Contest, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 422, 430 (2018) (describing the dynamics involved in masculinity contests and characterizing the competition as “zero sum”). Id. at 433 (describing how work environments that emphasize internal competition also tend to produce higher rates of sexual harassment, bullying, and unethical behavior).

dismantling the practices associated with toxic masculinity and corporate misfeasance.\footnote{12}

This article draws on the recent example of Wells Fargo’s fraudulent accounts scandal – a scandal with a prominent woman overseeing the misconduct and documented gender disparities in the consequences – to provide a more in-depth evaluation of the interactions between biological sex, gendered traits, and corporate dynamics.\footnote{13} Wells Fargo has been the subject of a corporate scandal characteristic of the shareholder primacy era.\footnote{14} The bank appeared to emerge from the Great Financial Crisis unscathed, becoming the third largest bank in the United States,\footnote{15} with soaring share prices, which grew in response to the bank’s reported success.\footnote{16} By 2016, however, it became apparent that Wells

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\item For a fuller review of these issues, see Naomi Cahn et al., The Instrumental Case for Corporate Diversity, 40 J.L. & INEQ. (forthcoming 2021); June Carbone et al., Women, Rule-Breaking, and the Triple Bind, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2019) [hereinafter The Triple Bind] (“[C]ompanies use intensely competitive bonus systems to produce insular ‘young boys’ clubs’ that promote a culture of rule-breaking; that is, the management systems deliberately and instrumentally select for alpha males who will flout the laws that stand in the way of these otherwise profitable business models.”); Kristin N. Johnson, Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity Improve Financial Firms’ Risk Oversight?, 70 SMU L. REV. 327, 376 (2017) (describing the value of diversity in valuing groupthink).
\item Shareholder primacy has been criticized, among other things, for an excessive focus on short-term increases in share price to the detriment of longer-term interests, including longer term shareholder interests. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 104, 112–13 (maintaining that “[o]ptimism bias—the proclivity of corporate managers to overestimate the success probability of their own projects may lead corporate managers to overinvest in long term projects); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 316 (2012) (arguing that the emphasis on short-term returns is “associated with cultures that are prone to unethical behavior which includes the behavior of individuals who seek individual short-term gains at the expense of the wellbeing of their firms as a whole.”); cf. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Short and Long Term Investors (and Other Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, 397–402 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016) (arguing that shareholders differ in their orientations toward shorter and longer term perspectives, orthodox economic theory maintains that short-term and long-term perspectives are not necessarily in opposition, and the debate is, in any event, more complex because of uncertainty). This article focuses less on “short-termism” per se than on how the ability to profit from apparent short-term gains, whether accurate or gamed, promotes certain management practices. For a more detailed account, see June Carbone & William K. Black, The Problem with Predators, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 441 (2020).
\item See Claudia A. Restrepo, The Need for Increased Possibility of Director Liability: Refusal to Dismiss In re Wells Fargo & Co. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, A Step in the Right Direction, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1689, 1713 n.129 (2019) (on the centrality of cross-selling to Wells Fargo’s business model and how the fake accounts “gamed” the system).
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Fargo had gamed the metrics that created the illusion of success. The bank had long celebrated “cross-selling,” defined in terms of the number of Wells Fargo products it sold to each household.\footnote{Emily Glazer, How Wells Fargo’s High-Pressure Sales Culture Spiraled out of Control, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-wells-fargos-high-pressure-sales-culture-spiraled-out-of-control-1474053044 (last accessed Jan. 8, 2022).} Upper management brought enormous pressure to bear on its employees to increase the bank’s cross-selling metrics,\footnote{See S’holder Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 2, at 4 (pointing out that Wells Fargo’s goal in stressing a demanding cross-selling strategy was “to show steady quarterly growth in the opening of customer accounts, maintain the Company’s industry leadership in cross-selling, and most importantly, drive up the Bank’s share price.”).} and the employees responded by creating millions of fake accounts that customers had not authorized and often did not know existed.\footnote{Uri Berliner, Wells Fargo Admits to Nearly Twice as Many Possible Fake Accounts—3.5 Million, NPR (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/31/547550804/wells-fargo-admits-to-nearly-twice-as-many-possible-fake-accounts-3-5-million [https://perma.cc/VDA4-FCCD].} While the fraudulent accounts generated relatively little income, the bank, its shareholders, and its top executives benefitted handsomely through the increased share prices that followed announcement of the cross-selling increases.\footnote{See, e.g., J.S. Nelson, Paper Dragon Thieves, 105 GEO. L.J. 871, 931 (2017) (observing that “Wells Fargo’s share price soared based on how the fraudulent accounts ‘goosed’ the bank’s stock” and that Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf “cashed $155 million in stock options between 2012 and 2015 alone.”).} For years, upper management looked the other way in the face of employee complaints about the fraudulent practices, dismissing the reports as isolated incidents.\footnote{See S’holder Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 21, at 7 (alleging that directors “turned a blind eye” to red flags regarding illegal activity as early as 2007).} When the scandal broke, the Wells Fargo Board produced an extensive internal report\footnote{Indep. Dirs. Rep., supra note 12.} and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) conducted an investigation\footnote{OCC Rep., supra note 12, at 5 (finding that the Board had received Audit & Security reports on a regular basis since 2005 informing them that the majority of the calls to the internal “EthicsLine” and employee firings were connected to sales violations).} that documented the misconduct and the Wells Fargo corporate culture that produced it. In addition, an empirical study of terminations in the financial industry found that Wells Fargo had the highest gender gap in the industry.\footnote{Mark L. Egan et al., When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23242, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23242/w23242.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7Z7-CDGJ].} Although women committed less misconduct than the men and their misconduct caused the bank smaller losses, the women were substantially more likely to be fired.\footnote{Id.}

This article uses the accounts of the Wells Fargo scandal to untangle the relationship between management practices and gender diversity. First, it will assess the status of women in corporate management, showing that while women have gained access to entry level positions, they are less likely than similarly
qualified men to receive the promotions that provide access to rising income at the top of corporate hierarchies. This section will argue that in the shareholder primacy era, corporate executives have benefitted from “rent-seeking” that concentrates disproportionate rewards in top positions. The new system increases the competition for these positions, reduces supervisory accountability, and does so in ways that work to women’s disadvantage.

Second, the article will use the Wells Fargo example to show the role of gender in implementing these practices. Wells Fargo executives, in implementing the practices that led to the fake accounts scandal, adopted short-term reductionist metrics that boosted share prices. They also met those metrics through an emphasis on sales quotas and performance pay that encouraged immediate results while looking the other way at the methods used to produce the results. The system thus rewarded performance without accountability. This section maintains that these practices work to women’s disadvantage – increasing the emphasis on long hours, rewarding the ambitious and the amoral, and looking the other way at managers’ in-group favoritism. In the modern era, this does not produce a wholesale exclusion of women; rather it produces statistical differences in pay, promotions, and terminations.


27. A rent is income received “in excess of what was needed to induce the person to supply labor and capital to these respective markets.” Lawrence Mishel & Josh Bivens, The Pay of Corporate Executives and Financial Professionals as Evidence of Rents in Top 1 Percent Incomes, ECON. POL‘Y INST. (June 20, 2013), https://www.epi.org/publication/pay-corporate-executives-financial-professionals/ [https://perma.cc/2X4U-WEC3]. See generally GERRIT DE GEEST, RENTS: HOW MARKETING CAUSES INEQUALITY (2018) (arguing that “since 1970-2015, the impact of marketing on the economy has steadily increased, transforming competitive markets into less competitive ones by making prices less transparent, splitting informed and uninformed consumers, making products incomparable, locking in consumers, or exploiting psychological biases. This has increased the amount of artificial profits in the economy—called ‘rents’ in economic jargon.”).

28. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 930–31 (discussing how top executives “insulate profitable fraud in the ranks of middle management to make as much money as they can from a scandal.”).

29. For a more extended discussion of the relationship between the increased gender wage gap after 1990 and changes in corporate management, see Naomi Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament: Reinventing Antidiscrimination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425 (2018); The Triple Bind, supra note 12; see, e.g., Johnson, supra note 12.


31. Id. ¶ 6, at 4.
Third, the article assesses the implications for diversity policies. The Wells Fargo Board had an unusually high number of women, which did not appear to affect any aspect of the outcome. It had a senior woman who oversaw the bulk of the abusive practices. Yet, neither the CEO at the time scandal occurred, John Stumpf, nor the head of the division in which the worst abuses occurred, Carrie Tolstedt, designed the system. Instead, they had risen through the ranks, succeeding in accordance with their abilities to produce the expected metrics. Systems that select for employees willing to rig the system can find qualified women if they choose to look. Even with such women, however, these systems still produce systematic gender disparities.

The article sheds new light on the social science findings that simply adding selected women to corporate boards or upper management is unlikely to have a major impact on corporate reform. It also supports the claims of the critics that upper management may be more important than corporate boards to both diversity efforts and corporate accountability. The most compelling findings about the relationship between the corporate culture and women’s advancement, however, are that the disparities become visible only with the collection of systematic data that shows the impact across large numbers of women. These results are often subtle and context dependent. To establish the role of gender in these disparities requires reliable data collection – something that largely does not exist in the absence of public mandates, or the in-depth investigations triggered by sex discrimination claims and corporate malfeasance. The article’s ironic conclusion, therefore, is that corporate abuses and gender disparities are likely to overlap even while the relationship between them is hard to establish precisely because the lack of transparency and accountability encourages the persistence of both. Reforms that mandate accurate reporting and make it harder to suborn internal controls are therefore important to both enhanced diversity and corporate reform efforts. On these issues, corporate diversity and management reform efforts operate in tandem.

32. See e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 860 (2011) (concluding that “while the business case for board diversity may prove rhetorically appealing, it is insufficient on its own to ensure a full commitment to board diversity.”).

33. See, e.g., Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equality Metrics, 130 YALE L.J. F. 869, 888 (2021) (observing that despite corporations’ “long-standing statements in support of diversity within their organizations, they have traditionally disclosed very little regarding the state of demographic diversity within their ranks.”).

34. For discussion of the relationship between corporate reform, risk management, and socially conscious investing, see Michal Barzuza et al., Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2020) (describing index fund support for gender diversity on corporate boards but not mentioning management diversity; then describing how “pursuing ESG priorities is actually value maximizing.”); Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Mizad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1401–02 (2020) (concluding that “[s]ocial risk has proven highly destructive for corporate value even when the company’s key failure is not violating laws, as the recent crises at Facebook and Uber demonstrate.”); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 398 (2020) (arguing that “risk-return ESG” analysis of a fossil
THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT

Women’s movement into the upper management ranks stalled during the nineties—the same period in which incomes in upper management soared. The two events are related, and they have meant that women have narrower pathways into top executive positions than men. These differences frame the roles women play on corporate boards and the potential impact of greater board diversity on gender equality. This section will examine these developments in two parts. The first will explain how the dynamic underlying the large increases in pay creates a form of rent seeking; the second maps the resulting disadvantages that narrow the pathways on which women can advance.

A. Rent-Seeking And Women

The most dramatic gains for women occurred in the eighties as women caught up with and then exceeded men in educational attainment. Better educated women joined men in the executive ranks and in the professions. The gendered wage gap narrowed, with female college graduates earning a higher percentage of the “male” wage than less educated women.

Then, starting in the nineties, something happened. While the overall gender gap in wages continued to narrow, in large part because of the declining fortunes of blue-collar men, the wage gap for college graduates began to grow and steadily increased. Since then, the gender gap in the higher reaches of the economy has widened and the growing female representation in the upper corporate ranks has stalled, though in the last three years the number of female CEOs has inched up to 8.1%. The lack of progress in women’s advancement

fuel company, for example, might conclude that the company’s litigation and regulatory risks are underestimated by its share price).

35. See De Geest, supra note 27 (defining “rents” as artificial profits).


38. See June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family Law Fails in a New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 872 (2011) (documenting this shift in the gendered wage gap); Jacqueline DeMarco, Study: College-Educated Women Face Larger Gender Pay Gap, Even If Women Are More Likely to Enroll and Graduate than Men, STUDENT LOAN HERO (Apr. 13, 2021), https://studentloanhero.com/featured/education-gender-pay-gap-study/ [https://perma.cc/83YK-2DZ7] (updating figures and showing that the decline for college graduates as a whole ended in 2013, but that gains for female college graduates with the economic recovery have not returned to the levels of the mid-nineties).


40. Id.

41. In the last three years, however, the number of female CEOs at fortune 500 companies has inched up from a record 6% in 2018 to another record of over 8% in 2021. Missing Pieces Report: The
into upper management is particularly striking. While 47% of entry level executive candidates are women, women comprise only 33% of senior managers, and only 21% of those make it to the C-Suite. Moreover, these numbers have changed relatively little over the last five years. The numbers for women of color are even more anemic. Attrition rates for women of color in the corporate ranks, for example, are dramatically higher than for white women or minority men; women of color constitute 18% of the entry level ranks, but only 9% of senior managers, and 3% of the C-Suite.

The striking thing about women’s stalling fortunes is that they have occurred as incomes in the upper reaches of the economy have accelerated. Indeed, one simple explanation for the increased gender gap wage among college graduates is that a disproportionate share of all increases have gone to those at the top and men disproportionately hold these positions. Since 1978, CEO pay has risen 940%, while average worker pay has grown only 12%. Together, financial professionals and senior executives “accounted for 58 percent of the expansion of income for the top 1.0 percent of households and an even greater two-thirds share (67 percent) of the income growth of the top 0.1 percent of households.” These changes frame the entry of women into corporate management and ultimately onto corporate boards.

Economists maintain that the dramatic increases in corporate pay have produced a form of “rent-seeking.” A rent is described as income received “in excess of what was needed to induce the person to supply labor and capital to these respective markets.” A clear example is CEO pay packages. When a board hires a new CEO, the board typically extends the offer and then deter-
mines the CEO’s salary. The CEO arranges for a compensation consultant paid to design a compensation package in line with other CEO salaries. Boards often rubberstamp the consultant’s report, particularly where the complexity of the package makes it hard to scrutinize.

As practical matter, this means that the CEOs who land top jobs have a major say in the design of compensation packages for themselves and their top lieutenants. They also are often in a position to manipulate the metrics that drive compensation formulas. This makes the positions particularly valuable and intensifies the competition to obtain them. In short, the winners of these


53. See Steven Clifford, How Companies Decide CEO Pay, ATLANTIC (June 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/how-companies-decide-ceo-pay/530127/ [https://perma.cc/MR5Q-NVW4] (describing consultants’ role in setting executive compensation); see also Francis & Fuhrmans, id. (indicating that “[t]he more complicated the scheme is, it’s less transparent to consumers and society . . . .”).


55. See, e.g., ROGER F. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT CAPITALISM CAN LEARN FROM THE NFL 29, 97 (2011) (detailing that during the Jack Welch-era, General Electric was able to meet or beat earnings forecasts an unbelievable 96% of the time, with earnings from 89% of those quarters hitting analysts’ forecasts to the exact penny. This earnings record pushed GE’s share price higher, increasing the value of Welch’s stock options). Since the Welch era, CEOs have shifted to use of stock buybacks to boost share price (and executive compensation). See Nitzan Shilon, Stock Buyback Ability to Enhance CEO Compensation: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications, 25 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 303, 308 (2021) (producing empirical results suggesting that “the potential of buybacks to pump up long-term incentive awards has dramatically increased” and that while “in the mid-2000s buybacks could immediately improve measures responsible for an average of only 5% of CEO pay, today buybacks can enhance performance yardsticks responsible for an all-time high amount, averaging one-third of CEO pay, or almost $4 million per CEO.”); see also Nicholas M. Guest et al., Why Do Large, Positive Non-GAAP Earnings Adjustments Predict Abnormally High CEO Pay?, SSRN (Jan. 6, 2021), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3039053 (indicating a significant portion of CEO incentive “seems attributable to opportunistic non-GAAP reporting” but that the overall impact is limited.)

competitions are in a position to extract “rents,” that is, particularly lucrative, above-market compensation associated with the position. The classic critique of rent-seeking argues that it involves:

situations where individuals expend time, money, and other resources competing for a fixed amount of wealth, in effect squabbling with each other over the size of their individual pieces of a fixed group pie. Because rent seeking itself is costly, the net result is to reduce total wealth available for distribution.

In the corporate context, this focuses upper management attention not just on securing an advantageous position, but on maximizing the metrics such as reported earnings or changes in share price that drive compensation. To do so, CEOs need to be able to gain control quickly of what may be a large bureaucratic organization. Often, they respond by bringing in their own loyalists from outside the company. But many CEOs also use incentive pay to prioritize the results that management values. In the same period in which women’s fortunes have declined, incentive pay has spread through the executive ranks, producing large differences in compensation. In short, within these systems, competition for these lucrative positions becomes more intense, and the goal of corporate tournaments becomes promoting the “new boys” allied with the CEOs and oth-
er managers calling the shots. 64 This has consequences for the ability of women and other outsiders to thrive in corporate America. 65

B. Rent Seeking And Gendered Pathways

The consequences of rent-seeking involve the following overlapping factors:

First, the terms of the competition take forms that disadvantage women because of their greater family responsibilities. 66 These competitive environments often place a premium on the willingness to work long hours, and women are more likely than men to cut back after the birth of a child, limiting their ability to compete. 67 Goldman Sachs provides a particularly dramatic example of long hours, with young bankers working 95 hours a week, and getting 5 hours of sleep a night. 68 They responded by asking for a limit of eighty hours a week. 69 Gender theorists argue that, in some workplaces, the long hours become an end in themselves; they become a way of demonstrating commitment to the job and stereotypical masculinity “by showing no weakness, demonstrating a single-minded focus on professional success, displaying physical endurance and strength, and engaging in cut-throat competition.” 70 Econometric studies find that the differences in hours is a significant factor in gender differences in pay for young professionals, particularly in finance. 71

Similarly, the modern economy, which places more emphasis on plotting the next move and less on career ladders, disadvantages those unwilling or unable to move. At the height of the managerial era, promotions typically took place

64. For a recent example, see Austin Weinstein, ‘We Need to do More:’ Seven High-Ranking Black Women Leave Wells Fargo, ENTERPRISE (Oct. 15, 2020), https://enterprise.vnews.com/2020/10/15/we-need-to-do-more-seven-high-ranking-black-women-leave-wells-fargo/ [https://perma.cc/SV84-DLP4] (describing the departure of top Black women executives after CEO Charlie Scharf brought in white males with whom he had worked previously to staff top positions and attributed it to the lack of African-American talent in finance).

65. See The Triple Bind, supra note 12 (describing corporate cultures that promote rule-breaking).

66. It is important, however, to distinguish the existence of competition from the combination of competition and rent-seeking. Increased competition, particularly in the form of long hours, may in itself disadvantage workers with family responsibilities in circumstances in which long hours are a necessary part of the job. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand et al., Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the Financial and Corporate Sectors, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 228, 240 (2010). Beyond that, however, increased competition can also serve to prime employees to accept unethical workplaces and to discredit those who object. See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 56, at 110–17 (explaining how this dynamic contributed the financial crisis).

67. See, e.g., Bertrand et al., supra note 66, at 240 (finding that both career interruptions and hours worked explain significant portions of the gender pay gap among young professionals).


70. Berdahl et al., supra note 10, at 433.

71. See, e.g., Bertrand et al., supra note 66.
from within.72 Career ladders were more established and secure and differences in pay were relatively small.73 Today, in many industries the best way to get ahead is to move, switching divisions, companies, and cities.74 Women’s family ties make moves more difficult and increase the biases associated with perceptions that women are not as career oriented as men.75

Second, more competitive workplaces tend to be more toxic and to select for managers who are more likely to discriminate.76 A review of incentive pay following the Enron scandals found that systems that use rankings to justify large disparities in compensation encourage greater emphasis on self-interest, higher levels of distrust that undermine teamwork, greater homogeneity in the selection of corporate management, less managerial accountability, and more politicized decision-making.77 Although advocates claim that the bonus systems were meritocratic, critics charge that they protect insiders at the expense of outsiders.78 In these environments, managers often look for allies in internal com-

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74. Id.

75. See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Family and the Market at Wal-Mart, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 759, 759–60 (2013) (discussing Walmart’s policy that management trainees sign an agreement indicating willingness to move and the impact of such policies on women). The data on moves, however, is limited. In 2014, one survey reported that “[m]ore than half of men – 54% – responding to an Accountemps survey said they felt switching jobs frequently would benefit their careers. Only 31% of women held the same belief.” Emma Crawford Hampel, Men More Likely to ‘Job Hop’ Than Women, Study (with Infographic), BIV (Dec. 18, 2014), https://biv.com/article/2014/12/men-more-likely-job-hop-women-study-infographic [https://perma.cc/UT2V-QTVL]. On the other hand, some studies find that women change jobs more frequently than men, at least in part because women are more likely to be employed in industries such as media and entertainment where switching jobs is more common. See Guy Berger & Gloria Yang, Millennials Job-Hop More than Previous Generations, but They’ll Slow Down Eventually, LINKEDIN (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/millennials-job-hop-more-than-previous-generations-guy-berger-ph-d- [https://perma.cc/6LH5-4CYN]. These factors illustrate the interaction of biological sex, which contributes to women’s greater family responsibilities, and gendered perceptions that men are more moveable than women.


77. Lynne L. Dallas, Psychology of Enron, supra note 11, at 37 (describing how Enron management used its bonus system to reorient company behavior in counterproductive ways).

78. Companies with such systems tend to recruit ambitious (and relatively young) new hires who “want to make a lot of money fast.” Id. at 50. The new employees, especially if they have limited experience elsewhere, more readily buy into shifts in corporate orientation directed from the top. Id. at 49.
pany competitions rather than advancing the best interest of the company. In the process, they become more likely to favor those they see as like themselves.

These results occur for several reasons. For one thing, in institutional cultures that think of themselves as meritocratic, the managers “show greater bias in favor of men over equally performing women.” For another, high stakes competitive pay tends to select for managers who are low in empathy and high in narcissism. Such workplaces tend to produce higher turnover, lower employee morale, and a greater incidence of sex discrimination, sexual and racial harassment, and bullying. In addition, managers in such environments may have good reasons to feel insecure and may be wary of those they see as most likely to challenge their authority.

Third, the classic double bind makes in-group favoritism more pernicious. Studies still routinely find that women may be treated harshly for engaging in the same behaviors that are viewed as an advantage for men. Thriving in a competitive environment requires ambition, the ability to exert dominance, and the willingness to do what it takes to win. Women and minorities, however, are much more likely to be disliked if they display such traits, requiring that they walk more of a tightrope in advancing than white men. Eighty-four percent of

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80. See Berdahl et al., supra note 10, at 428–29, 435 (observing that masculinity contests become more intense when managers need to repeatedly prove themselves, leading to more abusive managers, who identify with workers who have the same traits they see in themselves, and who exploit others’ weaknesses); Carbone et al., supra note 29, at 429 (describing gender dynamics of corporate “tournaments.”).


83. Peter Glick et al., Development and Validation of the Masculinity Contest Culture Scale, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 449 (2018).

84. See Berdahl et al., supra note 10, at 435 (observing that managers may also feel the need to constantly prove themselves increasing their mistreatment of subordinates).


86. Berdahl et al., supra note 10, at 432.

87. Id.; see Peggy Klaus, Neither Men nor Mice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/jobs/07preoccupations.html [https://perma.cc/UCM2-MS6F]; see also DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 68 (2007) (noting women starting to climb the corporate ladder are actually “walking a tightrope” because they must be sufficiently aggressive to excel, but not overly aggressive because they will be perceived as pushy).
women surveyed in Silicon Valley, for example, reported having been told they were “too aggressive,” a quality typically prized in the men.\(^8\) Female CEOs are about 45% more likely to be fired than are their male counterparts.\(^9\) The study found, moreover, what while weak company performance correlated strongly with men’s dismissals, company performance did not explain the women’s terminations.\(^9\)

The double bind, however, becomes a dramatically greater liability in workplaces that value getting results without paying close attention to how the results are accomplished. In the financial industry, for example, a recent study found striking gender disparities in dismissals. Overall, “roughly 7% of financial advisers have a past record of misconduct,” a relatively high number for an industry.\(^9\) Yet male advisors are more than three times as likely to engage in misconduct, and more than twice as likely to be repeat offenders as their female counterparts.\(^2\) The offenses the male advisors commit are 20% costlier for their employers to settle. Once the misconduct is reported, though, the female advisors are 20% more likely to be fired, and 30% less likely to find a new job in the industry compared to the men.\(^3\) The gender differences in forgiveness largely disappear, though, if women are in charge.\(^4\) What these results suggest is that in industries where pushing the limits of acceptable behavior is the norm, women who engage in such tactics are at greater risk of dismissal than men, perhaps because the women who do are defying gender stereotypes and perhaps because they are less likely to have protective superiors. Sixty percent of modern sex discrimination complaints involve dismissals and, if the dismissals involve allegations of misconduct, they make it harder to prevail on discrimination claims.\(^5\)

Mark Egan, et al., also found that “the gender punishment gap is roughly twice


\(^2\) Id.

\(^3\) Id.

\(^4\) See generally id. at 12, 30. For the men, customers initiate 55% of the misconduct complaints compared to 28% by their employers. For the women, employer-initiated instances of misconduct are almost as common as customer-initiated complaints (41% versus 44%). Id. at 4. These findings are consistent with the study’s finding that firms with more women owners and managers reduce the gender disparities. See generally id. at 4–5. Still, the study does not indicate whether women owner do not produce smaller disparities because they do not discriminate against women or because they do not tolerate misconduct from anyone.

\(^5\) Egan, et al., supra note 24, at 3. Also note that discrimination in terminations, particularly where the misconduct is verified, make claims of discrimination “sound hollow” and the patterns harder to detect that discrimination in hiring or compensation. Id; see also Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Ends Investigation over Bias Against Women, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-ends-investigation-over-bias-against-women-1541759400 (last accessed Jan. 8, 2022).
as large at financial advisory firms with a history of sexual harassment.\textsuperscript{96} Gender bias linked to unequal dismissals may be associated with other forms of discrimination and harassment.\textsuperscript{97}

Fourth, this shift toward more individualized determinations in hiring, compensation, and retention makes it harder to prove discrimination claims.\textsuperscript{98} The Supreme Court has made it more difficult to certify class actions, even in cases in which managerial discretion may be used to cloak inappropriate conduct.\textsuperscript{99} Statistical cases, moreover, are hard to establish without a sample size of a least one hundred.\textsuperscript{100} Individual disparate treatment cases require a “comparator,” holding a comparable position and having qualities equivalent to the plaintiff in substantial ways, a difficult requirement to meet where every employee, especially in upper management, may have a unique or shifting set of responsibilities.\textsuperscript{101} Moreover, showing discriminatory dismissals may be even harder than showing disparate treatment in hiring or compensation.\textsuperscript{102}

Finally, these factors narrow the pathways into upper management as more intense competition increases the disadvantages associated with gender stereotypes. CEO tenure rates have been shortening,\textsuperscript{103} and corporate boards that commit to large compensation packages seek “superstars.”\textsuperscript{104} Studies repeatedly


97. \textit{Id.} Both in-group favoritism and sexual harassment also tend to increase in masculinity contests. See Berdahl, et al, supra note 10, at 432 (describing women and minorities as more likely to be disliked and punished if they display the ambition, ruthlessness, and domination required to succeed in masculinities contests).

98. See generally Carbone et al., \textit{ supra} note 28, at 429 (explaining why competitive corporate workplaces make it harder to prove discrimination claims).

99. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 342 (2011) (dismissing certification of the largest class action in history); see also \textit{The Triple Bind}, supra note 12, discussion at 1130-38 (arguing that Walmart, which micromanaged store practices except for personnel matters, used managerial discretion to cloak illegal and unethical practices such as wage theft).

100. Lucas Loafman & Andrew Little, \textit{Race, Employment, and Crime: The Shifting Landscape of Disparate Impact Discrimination Based on Criminal Convictions}, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 251, 303 (2014) (indicating “that results are not credible unless the sample size is well over one hundred and that many companies simply do not have that many employees in a given position.”).


102. Egan, et al., \textit{ supra} note 24, at 3. Egan, et al., also noted that discrimination in terminations, particularly where the misconduct is verified, makes claims of discrimination “sound hollow” and the patterns harder to detect that discrimination in hiring or compensation. \textit{Id.}


show that when groups lack leaders, they place more emphasis on dominant personalities rather than the type of leadership that comes from expertise or from assuming an institutional mantle of authority. Steve Jobs, a cofounder of Apple, for example, was lauded for his ability to produce a “reality distortion field,” in other words, an aura of such confidence that not only did he believe he could make the impossible happen, he was able to convince his followers that they could too. Such qualities may be particularly important in new fields or start-ups, where personal drive is seen as a critical factor for success.

Even in less rarefied settings than Silicon Valley, hiring decisions often turn on the ability to establish authority and command over a room. Creating a strong initial impression may reflect physical dominance – height, a deeper voice, and the projection of confidence. Indeed, increased height correlates with higher salaries for both men and women, and CEOs with the deepest voices demand salaries $187,000 a year higher than other CEOs.

Humans have bigger gender differences in voice ranges than any other primate, and deep voices correlate strongly with perceptions of dominance, particularly among men assessing the dominance of other men.
In the lower ranks, the greater importance of moves also places more emphasis on initial impressions. While men and women who rise through the ranks will both have colleagues in a position to evaluate their effectiveness, the ability to move depends more on networks outside the company. This can disadvantage women in male dominated occupations, both by reducing networking opportunities and by making moves more perilous. A study of women in finance, for example, found that men fared better than women when they sought to advance by switching jobs. The authors suggested that “gender may become more salient when people have a shorter work history with a company,” limiting women’s ability to advance laterally. Yet, in more dynamic environments, where pay often depends on the ability to navigate a system based on favoritism, the ability to move may be critical to career advancement.

For all these reasons, modern corporate workplaces, particularly those that prize internal competition that pits employees against each other, narrow the opportunities for women to rise to the top in pyramid-like corporate hierarchies. Indeed, statistical studies show that incentive pay generally increases gender disparities. A 2015 study looking at thousands of executives concluded that:

[M]en benefit disproportionately from incentive pay. Female executives receive a lower share of incentive pay relative to their male counterparts, and this difference accounts for 93 percent of the gender gap in total pay. Performance pay also disproportionately rewards male executives. Researchers found that every $1 million increase in firm value generates a $17,150 increase in firm-specific wealth for male executives, but only a $1,670 increase for their female counterparts.

A major factor in this study was the fact that women were less likely to be in positions where they benefitted from the ability to determine the metrics governing compensation. Another reason, however, is that high stakes bonus systems change company dynamics in ways that disadvantage women, heightening

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112. See Debra Carreau, The Ugly Truth Behind Why Men Are More Likely to Get Noticed by Job Recruiters, According to New LinkedIn Study, CNBC (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/08/linkedin-study-reveals-why-men-are-more-likely-to-get-noticed-by-job-recruiters-than-women.html (indicating the referrals are important to lateral moves and men are more likely to ask for them).


114. Id.

115. Bidwell, supra note 72, at *3–4 (suggesting that highly skilled employees gain through lateral moves).


118. Id.
the importance of male identified traits such as narcissism and over optimism bias and increasing distrust and in-group favoritism. One female executive, who had “spent 30 years in Fortune 500 companies, rising to the C-suite, the pool from which the next chief executive may be chosen,” thought she had succeeded: business doubled under her leadership. But as she grew ever closer to the top, she explained that although she had not felt handicapped before she made it to the C-suite, “the next rungs of the ladder depend not only on results but also on prevailing in an environment where everyone is competing for a chance at the top job.” Rent-seeking encourages corporate “tournaments” where coming out on top may be the only thing that matters and where winning the competition may depend on a particularly male identified form of dominance rather than proven results.

III

Wells Fargo: A Case Study in Rent-Seeking Corporate Culture

Wells Fargo emerged from the Great Financial Crisis as one of the more admired large banks in the country, but since, it has been tarnished by scandal which has focused attention on its corporate culture. Between 2011 and 2015, regulators charged that Wells Fargo staff members “opened roughly 1.5 million bank accounts and applied for 565,000 credit cards that may not have been authorized by customers.” That number later rose to 3.5 million accounts. Some customers complained because of unexpected fees or because debt collectors called them about accounts they did not recognize, but most went unno-

119. For a more general critique of the difficulties that women and minorities face in moving beyond mid-level positions, see Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based Inequality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2890 (2008) (arguing that as companies hire larger numbers of women and minorities, bias increases at the senior levels); see also Ribstein, supra note 56 (describing the “new breed” of executives as “Machiavellian, narcissistic, prevaricating, pathologically optimistic, free from self-doubt and moral distractions, willing to take great risk as the company moves up and to lie when things turn bad, and nurtured by a corporate culture that instills loyalty to insiders, obsession with short-term stock price, and intense distrust of outsiders.”).


121. See CHAMORRO-PREMUZIC, supra note 105, ch. 2, at 56–58 (2019) (describing how modern corporations select for male identified traits such as narcissism, charisma, and above all confidence despite the fact that such traits do not make for better leaders); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004) (observing that “traits such as over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical self-deception are favored in corporate promotion tournaments.”);


ticed because Wells Fargo employees routinely closed the accounts shortly after opening them or used fake emails to identify the customers so that they would not receive notices from the accounts. The scandal occurred because Wells Fargo had created a sales culture that put unrelenting pressure on its employees to cross-sell; that is, to get its existing customers to open as many accounts as possible. Still, the bank profited from the activity less from the accounts themselves than from the effect their sales reports had on the price of Wells Fargo shares. The scandal provides a well-reported example of the new corporate model and how that model creates the factors that shape women's roles.

The Wells Fargo scandal, of course, is unusual; fake bank accounts are not the norm. In addition, Wells Fargo is unusual in modern corporate scandals in that a woman, Carrie Tolstedt, had a substantial role in producing the results. Still, the way the scandal unfolded – and the role of women in facilitating it – demonstrates how gender shapes the pathways within the company and in some cases out of it. Moreover, while fraudulent accounts are unusual, cross-selling and high-pressure sales environments are not; Wells Fargo could have benefited from the use of cross-selling to exploit its customers without using fake accounts to game its numbers and most of the corporate dynamics at play would be largely the same. The attention that the scandal focused on Wells Fargo, however, has produced a more detailed record of standard corporate practices than is ordinarily available. Finally, the scandal underscores a more general lesson for women and corporate boards – women need not be all that different from men for statistical differences in their experiences to emerge.

This section will use Wells Fargo as a case study to discuss how high stakes, competitive environments that game numbers to advance bottom line metrics disadvantages women in distinctive ways.

A. Wells Fargo And Rent Seeking

The Wells Fargo scandal provides an example of rent seeking in that Wells Fargo executives used manipulation of an ethically dubious metric – cross-selling – to make the bank appear as one of the most successful banks in the country in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis, and that appearance of success artificially pumped up its share price, enriching top executives at the expense of the institution’s longer-term stakeholders. When Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf testified before Congress in 2016, Senator Elizabeth Warren ac-

124. Corkery, supra note 122. Wells Fargo estimated that 190,000 of the unauthorized accounts incurred charges and fees. Id. The bank also reported that of the 565,000 unauthorized credit card accounts, roughly 14,000 incurred fees totaling over $400,000 for annual fees, interest charges, and overdraft-protection fees. Matt Egan, 5,300 Wells Fargo Employees Fired Over 2 Million Phony Accounts, CNN Bus. (Sept. 9, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/wells-fargo-created-phony-accounts-bank-fees/ [https://perma.cc/F9XS-2KWL].
125. Glazer, supra note 17.
126. See, e.g., S'holder Complaint, supra note 15 (alleging that Wells Fargo inaccurately reported its cross-selling metrics in order to influence share price).
cused Stump of increasing the value of his compensation127 “thanks in part to the bank’s success in selling tons of products to customers that they didn’t need.”128 Warren asked Stumpf to resign,129 stating, “You squeezed your employees to the breaking point so they would cheat customers and you could drive up the value of your stock and put hundreds of millions of dollars in your own pocket.”130 Had the scandal not erupted, Stumpf would have been able to walk away with a fortune worth $200 million.131 Instead, Wells Fargo announced his retirement shortly after the Congressional hearings.132 He has since been banned from the banking industry for life, was forced to forfeit stock awards of $41 million and his 2016 salary, and faced a $28 million clawback and a $17 million fine.133 While claw backs of this sort are rare,134 top management compensation tied to manipulable metrics is not.135


128. Matt Egan, Elizabeth Warren’s Epic Takedown of Wells Fargo CEO, CNN BUS. (Sept. 21, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/20/investing/wells-fargo-elizabeth-warren-resign-criminal-investigation/index.html?tid=EL [https://perma.cc/V6MY-NS77]; see also S’holder Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 383–84, at 130 (alleging that Stumpf “sold or otherwise disposed of 7,067,446 shares of Wells Fargo common stock for a total of $343,638,237.78,” and “netted over $51.8 million in gains” from the sale of an additional 5,432,400 shares he sold to Wells Fargo at an artificially inflated price using his employee stock options.”).

129. Egan, supra note 128.

130. Id.


133. Id.; Gabrielle Olya, Former Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Banned from Banking Industry and Ordered to Pay $17.5 Million, GO BANKINGRATES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.globankingrates.com/net-worth/business-people/wells-fargo-john-stumpf-money/ [https://perma.cc/7EZ2-N6H2]; see also Sanjai Bhagat & Charles M. Elson, Why Executive Compensation Clawbacks Don’t Work, HARV. BUS. REV (Mar. 22, 2021) (arguing that while clawback provisions are increasingly common in executive compensation packages, “if executives cash in their compensation and then leave the company, clawbacks can be almost impossible to enforce.”).

134. The clawbacks were the largest in banking history. Cowley & Kingson, supra note 127; see also Claudia A. Restrepo, The Need for Increased Possibility of Director Liability: Refusal to Dismiss In re Wells Fargo & Co. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, a Step in the Right Direction, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1689, 1693 (2019) (arguing that corporate directors “are rarely held personally liable for their actions (or inactions).”).

Wells Fargo was dubbed in the banking industry the “the king of cross-sell” because cross-selling, defined by “the number of products sold per household,” was central to its business model. The more Wells Fargo products (checking accounts, credit cards, mortgages, etc.) a household had, the greater the customer loyalty to the bank and the greater the bank’s profits from that household. Particularly in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis, when more sophisticated financial products had crashed and burned, Wells Fargo billed itself as “the bank of the real economy”; it took pride in its “retail banking for everyday folks, not trading or investment banking for sophisticated investors.”

CEO John Stumpf had emphasized the cross-sell metric as an indicator of the bank’s success and a reason for continuing share price increases. Carrie Tolstedt, who ran the Community Banking division at the heart of the fake accounts scandal, said explicitly in 2011, that the “Street rewards us for . . . cross-sell and HH [household] cross-sell [s]o expects us to excel here.”

From 2009 to 2015, the height of the fake account practices, Wells Fargo was at the top of its peer group in producing equity returns for its shareholders.

These activities constitute a form of “rent-seeking” in at least three respects:

First, cross-selling (even without fake accounts) attempts to create a form of positional advantage in an otherwise competitive market. Cross-selling, per se, is not illegal. There is nothing wrong with asking a bank customer who opens a checking account if they would like to obtain a credit card at the same time. The reason cross-selling is profitable, however, is that it increases customer loyalty. Customers with multiple accounts at a bank are less likely, for example, to switch to another credit card simply because an alternative card company offers better terms. This allows banks to offer less competitive (and therefore more profitable) terms and still increase sales by offering the products to a “sticky” group of customers unlikely to switch to another provid-
The more Wells Fargo products a particular household had, the greater the bank’s profit from that household. Persuading customers to buy products they did not need or to do so on unfavorable terms then involved exploitation of the loyalty the bank had cultivated at the customers’ expense. And, of course, opening fake accounts on their behalf, often disguised in ways unlikely to be discovered by the customers, was worse both legally and ethically. Thus, cross-selling at its core involves conflicts of interest between the bank and its customers, though these conflicts are on a continuum from the relatively benign (unnecessary accounts) to the unconscionable (redundant auto insurance for customers who do not know that they are already covered by a different policy).

Second, the activities involve a form of rent-seeking by top executives. Stumpf had negotiated his compensation package with the Wells Fargo Board at the time he was hired as CEO. That package tied some of his compensation directly to the cross-selling metric. He benefitted in greater (and less direct) ways, however, from his ability to exercise stock options whose value rose with Wells Fargo’s increases in share price. When Wells Fargo announcements about how well the bank met cross-selling goals boosted share price, Stumpf and other top executives benefitted personally. Moreover, Stumpf made a point of exercising unvested stock options before agreeing to a settlement with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; while he lost his unvested equity interests after his resignation, he retained shares that had vested earlier. Stumpf was later subject to fines and claw backs, but he is still a wealthy man and the...
major part of his wealth reflected terms that the Board could not have accurately valued at the time he became CEO. 158 If Stumpf, like his predecessor Richard M. Kovacevich, the former Wells Fargo CEO who designed the corporate culture that led to the scandal, 159 had retired long enough before the discovery of the fake accounts, or if Wells Fargo had boosted the cross-sell metric without reliance on unauthorized accounts, he would have kept close to $200 million on the basis of a compensation package he shaped and whose metrics he manipulated to inflate the return from his CEO position. 160

Third, the refusal to scrutinize the unauthorized activities involved rent-seeking in that senior executives advanced their own self-interest at the expense of the interests of longer terms stakeholders and the institution itself. 161 The earnings from the accounts were negligible; 162 their value was their role in boosting share price. 163 Any immediate benefit to Wells Fargo from the accounts, moreover, was entirely disproportionate to the loss of customer confidence and billions in fines that resulted when the fake accounts were discovered. 164 The executives who promoted these practices effectively appropriated corporate reputation to advance short term objectives in ways that damaged the value of that reputation for Wells Fargo’s longer term stakeholders. 165

158. See Bahler, supra note 151 (observing that the “[b]oard may have had no choice but to pay Stumpf that vast amount, as severance packages are typically negotiated as part of a CEO’s hiring contract” and that “company boards may not know the exact value of the compensation they’re providing executives, largely because they don’t account for how valuable stock options can be.”); Hill & Painter, supra note 56, at 47 (observing that executives typically diversify their holdings and investments outside of their companies are typically unaffected by their misdeeds).


160. See OCC Notice, supra note 30 ¶ 65, at 17.

161. Whether institutions have “interests” beyond those of their shareholders is a complex and controversial issue. See Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015) (arguing that corporations serve a variety of interests that go beyond those of their shareholders). Top executives profiting at the expense of long-term shareholders can also be described as “agency costs.” Both agency costs and rent-seeking involve the use of positional power to “redistribute wealth among different groups without creating new wealth.” John A. Conybeare, “The Rent-Seeking State and Revenue Diversification,” 35 WORLD POLITICS. 25 (1982).

162. Egan, supra note 24 (estimating Wells Fargo’s earnings at $400,000 in fees from the fraudulent accounts).

163. OCC Notice, supra note 30 ¶ 6, at 4.


The Wells Fargo fake accounts scandal involves particularly egregious actions, but this form of rent-seeking can occur without illegality. For example, in the years after the scandal, Wells Fargo, like other companies, has used stock buybacks\textsuperscript{166} and changes in its loss reserves to boost share price.\textsuperscript{167} These more prosaic actions also benefit top executives (and short-term shareholders) in ways that may or may not necessarily be good for the longer-term interests of the corporation.\textsuperscript{168}

Taken together, these actions have two immediate effects on women relevant to this article. First, they demonstrate that women, like Carrie Tolstedt, are fully capable of being involved in implementing and benefitting from such schemes. Second, as this article will explain below, implementing the Wells Fargo cross-selling system disadvantaged women in less direct ways.

B. The Wells Fargo Culture And The Lack of Accountability

Wells Fargo became the “king of cross-sell”\textsuperscript{169} and prompted the fake account scandal through a culture that prized bottom line results without accountability for anything else. Its sales metrics were a dominant feature of the corporate culture and had a series of important ancillary effects on the banks’ operations. Those metrics influenced everything from senior executives’ stock options whose value increased when Wells Fargo met or exceeded its cross-sell goals\textsuperscript{170} to the threat of dismissal held over the heads of low-level employees when they did not meet their production quotas.\textsuperscript{171} Wells Fargo employees were judged by how they measured up relative to these goals, and they were ranked against one another with their incentive compensation and promotional opportunities dependent on their performance, creating intense pressure to meet


\textsuperscript{169} OCC Notice, supra note 3o ¶ 60, at 16.

\textsuperscript{170} See discussion supra at Sec. II.A.

\textsuperscript{171} “Bankers in branches who hit sales targets could earn bonuses of $500 to $2,000 per quarter, while district managers could get $10,000 to $20,000 a year, according to six Wells Fargo employees. Bonuses made a big difference in the paychecks of branch employees, whose base salaries often were about $30,000 a year.” Glazer, supra note 17.
sales quotas. In valorizing these metrics, Wells Fargo imposed little accountability for how the metrics were accomplished.

When John Stumpf testified before Congress, he emphasized in Wells Fargo’s defense that the bank cared about “results, not process.” The lack of attention to process was deeply embedded in the bank’s institutional culture. An investigative report by the Independent Directors of the Board of Wells Fargo & Company observed that the corporate structure was decentralized. CEO Stumpf had a long relationship with Carrie Tolstedt, the head of Community Banking and he “left her on her own to run her department.” Department heads like Tolstedt were told to “run it like you own it.” Practically, this meant that the department heads were granted broad authority, not just to determine business lines but to structure staff and control functions such as risk management; they could “shake off questions from superiors, subordinates or lateral colleagues.” The fact that Tolstedt had a demonstrated record of success in meeting sales metrics increased the deference accorded her.

Tolstedt, in turn, oversaw an operation designed to increase cross-sell metrics, no questions asked. Described as the “most powerful woman in banking,” she understood that sales metrics were what Wells Fargo rewarded, and she pushed her far-flung divisions to increase those sales. She bragged that when an underling suggested a 4% increase, she insisted the increase had to be in the double digits—every year. Tolstedt took the position that “[a] whole bunch of management gurus say you need BHAGs—bold, hairy, audacious

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173. And, indeed, one of the criticisms of high-pressure evaluation systems is that it undermines managerial accountability. *See Psychology of Enron, supra* note 78, at 37; *see also* Nelson, *supra* note 21, at 930–31 (discussing the role of middle management in orchestrating frauds that benefit upper management.)
175. *See Ind. Dirs. Rep., supra* note 13 (identifying Wells Fargo’s self-identified sales culture, improper sales models, and decentralized corporate structure as leading to an atmosphere that prompted “low quality sales” and “unethical behavior”).
176. *Id.* at 4.
178. *Ind. Dirs. Rep., supra* note 13, at 19; *see also* GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIOR, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 397–400 (2d ed. 2001) (observing that organizations with a closed systems may be more susceptible to having silos or other spheres in which centralized influence is limited.).
180. *Ind. Dirs. Rep., supra* note 13, at 19 (observing that “while Wells Fargo’s decentralized model naturally afforded Tolstedt significant independence in that position, her record of success and strong financial performance enabled Tolstedt to maintain and enhance her authority.”).
181. *See OCC Notice, supra* note 30 ¶ 6, at 4 (“The Bank tolerated pervasive sales practices misconduct as an acceptable side effect of the Community Bank’s profitable sales model, and declined to implement effective controls to catch systemic misconduct.”).
182. *Tayan, supra* note 139.
184. *Id.*
goals.” According to these gurus, it is effective “to give troops a goal that looks unattainable and flog them heavily. And according to that line of thought, you will do better chasing a BHAG than you will a reasonable objective.” 185 She accordingly set goals she knew were unattainable. Within the bank, they were referred to “as 50/50 plans, meaning that there was an expectation that only half the regions would be able to meet them.” 186 The regions were nonetheless compared to each other in terms of how well they performed. 187

The result created unrelenting pressure on the Community Bank as a whole, increasing legitimate sales. 188 Employees faced with impossible demands, however, also discovered that unauthorized accounts were an effective way to deal with that pressure within a culture that did not inquire too closely into how they made their numbers. 189 The OCC Notice alleges that the “Bank had better tools and systems to detect employees who did not meet unreasonable sales goals than it did to catch employees who engaged in sales practices misconduct.” 190 Indeed, while misconduct was pervasive, “the Bank intentionally designed and maintained controls to catch only the most egregious instances of the illegal conduct.” 191 The OCC concluded, “In short, Bank senior executives favored profits and other market rewards over taking action to stop the systemic issuance of unauthorized products and services to customers.” 192

Wells Fargo, of course, had mechanisms for ferreting out such misconduct, including human resources departments that deal with employee dismissals and turnover. Yet, “there was no coordinated effort by HR, either within the Community Bank or in Corporate HR, to track, analyze or report on sales practice issues.” 193 This allowed Wells Fargo to treat the individual allegations of misconduct that surfaced as isolated incidents. 194 Over the years, Wells Fargo fired thousands of low-level employees when reports of fraudulent practices surfaced without taking action to stem the misconduct. 195

The result allowed the practices associated with unauthorized accounts and the sale of unneeded or inappropriate products to persist. It also allowed a vari-

185. Id. ¶ 82, at 20.
187. Id. at 20.
188. OCC Notice, supra note 30 ¶ 6, at 4 (“The Community Bank’s business model was highly profitable because it resulted in a greater number of legitimate sales than would have been possible without the unreasonable sales goals and sales pressure.”).
190. OCC Notice, supra note 30 ¶ 6, at 4.
191. Id.
192. Id.
194. Id.
ety of other practices to arise that management did not track or address. As the next section shows, these practices magnified the impact on women.

C. The Consequences For Women

What took place at Wells Fargo had dramatic consequences for all its employees, increasing stress, turnover, and discomfort with customer treatment. The OCC described employees as caught in a vise:

The Community Bank’s business model . . . presented a stark dilemma to employees every day for 14 years: they could engage in sales practices misconduct—much of which was illegal—to meet their goals, or they could struggle to meet their goals and face adverse consequences, including losing their jobs.196

Even before the scandal surfaced, Wells Fargo had turnover rates of 30%, much higher than for most banks.197 Wells Fargo has not released the gender breakdown of the employees who left. Still, the high-pressure corporate culture had consequences for women that were distinct from and greater in effect than those for men. These consequences followed from the institutional culture associated with unrelenting pressure as a deliberate tactic, the lack of accountability for managerial behavior, and the toleration of illegal and unethical behavior. They illustrate practices that persist in less extreme corporate environments.

1. Family Responsibilities

High pressure sales positions treat jobs as the first priority; family obligations are not allowed to become a reason for failing to meet goals.198 Wells Fargo encouraged a competitive environment that compared employees to each other in terms of how well they met sales metrics.199 While long hours were not an end in themselves, employees were encouraged to do whatever it took to meet the metrics.200 Moreover, discrimination suits against Wells Fargo suggest that the company did not enforce worker protections. In 2010, for example, Wells Fargo fired Yesenia Guitron after she complained about the fake accounts. Guitron alleged that, despite the fact that she was a single mother, the

196. OCC Notice, supra note 30 ¶ 7, at 4.
197. Ind. Dirs. Rep., supra note 13, at 27 (reporting the 30% rate and noting that Wells Fargo compared itself to other retail operations, which typically have high turnover rates, rather than other banks).
198. See Berdahl et al., supra note 10, at 435 (observing that masculinity contests become more intense when managers need to repeatedly prove themselves and that the contest often take the form of the willingness to work long hours).
200. Doreen McCallister, Wells Fargo CEO Discusses Secret-Accounts Scandal in Senate Hearing, NPR (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/20/494680201/wells-fargo-ceo-to-address-accounts-scan/scandal-before-senate-panel [https://perma.cc/373E-D22J] ("Managers often tell employees to do whatever it takes to reach their quotas. Employees who do not reach their quotas are often required to work hours beyond their typical work schedule without being compensated for that extra work time, and/or are threatened with termination."); Chris Arnold, Former Wells Fargo Employees Discuss Toxic Work Culture, Even at HQ, NPR (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/10/04/496508361/former-wells-fargo-employees-describe-toxic-sales-culture-even-at-hq [https://perma.cc/GDT7-CALP].
bank scheduled required meetings in the mornings before the bank opened and required her to take calls from customers during the evening. It also refused her requests for legally mandated family leave, and penalized her when she was even a few minutes late because of childcare responsibilities. Home Mortgage Consultant Raena Krestovnikov, who filed suit for sex discrimination in 2020, alleged that her superiors routinely required her to work more than eight hours a day and 40 hours per week—hours that entitled her to overtime pay at one and half times her regular hourly rate. Yet, her supervisors encouraged her not to report the extra hours; she learned that if she did report them, her managers could get into trouble. Employees with family responsibilities were thus on their own in juggling work with other responsibilities, even when family leave and wage and hour legislation existed to protect them. Employees who were dependent on the jobs, with limited ability to switch employers, felt stuck.

2. Toxic Management

Wells Fargo during this period became a symbol of a toxic managerial culture. One former employee described the pressure to sell as so disturbingly intense that the employees “were all miserable, and it was just soul crushing to walk in every day.” The OCC complaint asserted that:

Community Bank management intimidated and badgered employees to meet unattainable sales goals year after year, including by monitoring employees daily or hourly and reporting their sales performance to their managers, subjecting employees to hazing-like abuse, and threatening to terminate and actually terminating employees for failure to meet the goals.

Managers were subject to pressure similar to the employees. The OCC complaint described, for example, how Community Bank officials had multiple daily calls with management to discuss sales performance. They, too, were
compared to each other, subject to ridicule in front of their peers, and threatened with termination.\textsuperscript{210}

In this environment, there is little indication that upper management scrutinized the behavior of managers who led in cross-selling when they tolerated unauthorized accounts – or other forms of misconduct.\textsuperscript{211} Former Wells Fargo employees report retaliation against those who questioned the sales practices or other management activities.\textsuperscript{212} An investigation by Shearman and Sterling could not establish a pattern of retaliation, but many of the individual suits brought against Wells Fargo alleged retaliation,\textsuperscript{213} and, once the scandal broke, at least one employee received a multi-million dollar award.\textsuperscript{214} Of course, one reason for the failure to establish a pattern of retaliation is that Wells Fargo did not collect or analyze dismissals and resignations in ways that would provide insights into the motivations of the employees who left or were not promoted.\textsuperscript{215}

Upper management simply accepted high turnover as the norm for sales operations, and it treated dismissals for cause as evidence that the bank had addressed individual instances of misconduct.\textsuperscript{216} It thus did not inquire (or collect data) on either the unauthorized accounts or what might have been patterns of managerial abuse involving other issues.\textsuperscript{217}

Studies of other institutions have found that these patterns – the emphasis on high pressure tactics, managerial autonomy, and reductionist metrics – tend to produce abusive managers who play favorites, increasing the risk of in-group favoritism.\textsuperscript{218} Given that the majority of managers were male, there is every reason to expect that Wells Fargo would have a culture that rewarded favoritism and punished whistleblowers.

\textsuperscript{210} Id.

\textsuperscript{211} See \textit{OCC Rep.}, supra note 13, at 7 (observing that Wells Fargo “did not have an effective business process to ensure whistleblower cases were properly researched, analyzed (both individually and systemically), and resolved.”).


\textsuperscript{213} See, e.g., Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 201; Complaint, supra note 203.


\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Ind.Dirs. Rep.}, supra note 13, at 6–7, 12, 27 (describing how the bank treated established cases of misconduct as individual issues resolved by the termination of the employee involved; then noting acceptance of and lack of inquiry into high turnover rates).

\textsuperscript{216} Id.

\textsuperscript{217} Id. at 6–7, 12 (describing failure to inquire into patterns or causes of turnover and misconduct). In addition, given the high turnover, the managers were often inexperienced, further weakening their ability to resist the practices. \textit{Ind.Dirs. Rep.}, supra note 13, at 28.

\textsuperscript{218} See discussion supra at Sec. I. Indeed, employees complained in 2010 that the Wells Fargo practices “guarantees high turnover, a managerial staff of bullying taskmasters, [and] bankers who are really financial molesters [and] cheaters . . . .” \textit{OCC Notice}, supra note 30 \S 39, at 11.
son to believe that these factors disproportionately affected women; the data to make that case, however, has emerged only in the study of dismissals described in the next section.

3. The Double Bind

The Wells Fargo anecdotal accounts involve abusive male and female managers, male and female employees who participated in misconduct,\(^\text{219}\) male and female whistleblowers, and the termination of male and female employees, both for misconduct and in retaliation for whistleblowing.\(^\text{220}\) The one arena where a detailed empirical examination of gender differences exists is with respect to termination for misconduct, and this study indicates that Wells Fargo’s gender disparities were the worst in the industry.\(^\text{221}\) While 41% of men committing misconduct were fired or resigned after they were accused of wrongdoing, 69% of women were fired or resigned – a higher gender firing gap than for any other entity.\(^\text{222}\) This finding suggests that the double bind that existed for all workers – push the envelope on unethical practices or risk failing to meet your production quotas – had particularly negative consequences for women.\(^\text{223}\)

The authors of this study noticed that of the 44 firms studied, Wells Fargo Advisors, an arm of Wells Fargo providing brokerage services, had the highest rate of female workers leaving during the period between 2005 and 2015.\(^\text{224}\) Second was A.G. Edwards, also a division of Wells Fargo.\(^\text{225}\) The researchers looked more closely and concluded that terminations were a major factor in the gender disparities.\(^\text{226}\)

The Intercept followed up with more recent data, replicating that academic study. It found that in 2019, 42% of the men with records of misconduct left the

\(^{219}\) The gender breakdown of those fired for opening unauthorized accounts has not been released. But those fired were overwhelmingly low-level employees. See Rothacker, supra note 196.

\(^{220}\) See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 200 (interviewing both male and female former employees); OCC Notice, supra note 30 (detailing wrongdoing by male and female executives). Indeed, one employee explained how everyone at Wells Fargo faced a double bind, reporting that “Wells Fargo is playing a shell game – they are rewarding employees for fake accounts and will terminate them if they find out this is the case. . . . The termination ax is suspended over our head one way or another; meet unreasonable goals or you will be terminated, cheat to meet the unreasonable goals and you will be terminated when caught.” OCC Notice, supra note 30 ¶ 40, at 11–12.

\(^{221}\) The study is possible because of the mandated reporting of misconduct involving financial advisors. See Egan et al., supra note 24 (describing available information).


\(^{223}\) In addition, at the senior level, four of the five executives Wells Fargo fired directly because of the fraudulent accounts scandal were women. Jen Wieczner, How Wells Fargo’s Carrie Tolstedt Went from Fortune Most Powerful Woman to Villain, YAHOO! NEWS (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.yahoo.com/news/wells-fargo-carrie-tolstedt-225240189.html [https://perma.cc/3S3Z-973K].


\(^{225}\) Id.

\(^{226}\) Id.
company compared to 72% of the women.\textsuperscript{227} It also found that “75 percent of women who had negative disclosures resulting in a termination or resignation did not find work in the industry again, compared to 59 percent of the men.”\textsuperscript{228}

Yet, of the 25 employees that caused the bank the largest dollar losses in the 2005-2015 period, 24 were men.\textsuperscript{229} And in 2019, more than half of the men found to have committed misconduct – in comparison with only a quarter of the women – ended up with third party settlements against them, again suggesting that the conduct they committed was more serious.\textsuperscript{230} In addition, the male brokers who faced settlements had average settlement amounts of more than double those against the women.\textsuperscript{231} Accordingly, the study established that the men committed worse misconduct, yet were treated more leniently.

What produces the disparities? According to Egan and his co-authors, their “evidence suggests that the gap arises because of in-group tolerance by managers, who are more forgiving of missteps among members of their own gender/ethnic group.”\textsuperscript{232} The term “in-group tolerance” describes the statistical conclusion of their study; the authors did not interview those involved in the decision-making.\textsuperscript{233} Their conclusion could therefore include three possible, related explanations:

The first is traditional sexism; high stakes competitive cultures produce more misogynist managers and more politicized decision-making than other workplaces.\textsuperscript{234} Male managers may protect workers they identify with (i.e., aggressive, competitive men) while more seriously punishing women, either because they are an outgroup\textsuperscript{235} or because the women engaged in misconduct are acting against gender stereotypes.\textsuperscript{236}

The second involves opportunistic retaliation. In an environment where misconduct is rife, managers may feel compelled to take action against some employees to show that they are cracking down and they may also fear the po-

\textsuperscript{227} See Egan et al., supra note 91 (describing study methodology, which involved examining statistic records).
\textsuperscript{228} Id.
\textsuperscript{229} Id.
\textsuperscript{230} Id.
\textsuperscript{231} Id.
\textsuperscript{232} Egan et al., supra note 24; Egan et al., supra note 96; Glazer, supra note 95.
\textsuperscript{233} Id.
\textsuperscript{234} See Berdahl, et al., supra note 10, at 429 (observing that masculinity contests are “most prevalent—and vicious—in male-dominated occupations where extreme resources (fame, power, wealth) or precarious resources . . . are at stake . . . .”); Psychology of Enron, supra note 100, at 37 (explaning how internal competition contributes to more politicized decision-making).
\textsuperscript{235} See, e.g., Complaint, Terrazas v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 04-275 (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 2017) (alleging that plaintiff was fired because her district had an unusually large number of fraudulent accounts while men who had similar records were not fired).
\textsuperscript{236} See, e.g., Berdahl, et al, supra note 10, at 432 (describing women and minorities as more likely to be disliked and punished if they display the ambition, ruthlessness, and domination required to succeed in masculinity contests).
potential whistleblowers in their ranks. Raena Krestovnikov alleges, for example, that she was fired for misconduct because she complained about sex discrimination in the award of office benefits. The misconduct for which she was fired was relatively minor; she alleged that men in the office had committed far worse infractions without being fired, and that her termination was a pretext cloaking the retaliatory reasons for her dismissal.

The third is managers seeking to protect their star performers. John Stumpf, for example, protected Carrie Tolstedt long after allegations of unauthorized accounts surfaced because she had been so successful in producing the cross-sell metrics that Stumpf (and Wells Fargo) valued. Lower-level managers may protect the employees who most help them meet their sales metrics while letting go less valued employees to give the appearance that, in fact, they were clamping down on misconduct.

Whatever the reasons for the gender disparities, the result in corporate environments like Wells Fargo is that women have to walk more of a tightrope than the men to succeed. Practically, it was almost impossible to thrive in the Community Bank without in some way being complicit in a system where employees felt that they could only meet sales quotas by engaging in illegal or unethical activities. Yet, women who engaged in such misconduct were at greater risk than the men that such activities would end their careers.

237. A former Well Fargo HR specialist admitted that the bank tracked down whistleblowers and often fired them for minor infractions. Matt Egan, I Called the Wells Fargo Ethics Line and Was Fired, CNN BUS. (Sept. 21, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/21/investing/wells-fargo-fired-workers-retaliation-fake-accounts/index.html [https://perma.cc/4C9P-FQGP]. Other companies, feeling pressure to show they were cracking down on employee misconduct, would choose managers they wanted to fire for other reasons rather than those committing the worst abuses. See Carbone & Black, supra note 14, at 453 nn.62–63 (describing Walmart’s practice of firing managers who failed to keep labor costs low); see also Julia Menasce Horowitz, Views on Leadership Traits and Competencies and How They Interact with Gender, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2018/09/20/2-views-on-leadership-traits-and-competencies-and-how-they-intersect-with-gender/ [https://perma.cc/A4UP-VY8G] (finding that to the extent the public perceives a difference between men and women, women are more likely to be seen as honest and ethical, a disadvantage in some corporate contexts).

238. Complaint, supra note 203 ¶¶ 18, 22, at 7–8.

239. Id.; see also Guitron v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 13-16023 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2012), aff’d, 619 F. App’x 590 (9th Cir. 2015) (involving an early whistleblower who was fired when she complained about fraudulent accounts because she failed to meet her sales quotas and was “insubordinate” to her manager).

240. Ind. Dirs. Rep., supra note 13, at 10 (describing how Stumpf was slow to recognize complaints about Tolstedt because he had known her for years and admired her performance).


242. See BRANSON, supra note 87, at 68 (noting that women starting to climb the corporate ladder are actually “walking a tightrope” because they must be sufficiently aggressive to excel, but not overly aggressive because they will be perceived as pushy).


244. Egan, et al., supra note 24.
4. Discrimination

Beyond the Egan study, the only comprehensive data on Wells Fargo’s diversity metrics is what Wells Fargo has chosen to provide. Since the scandal, the company has issued annual diversity reports that show it in a favorable light, including data indicating that a majority of its employees are female, and that once appropriate controls are introduced, the wage gap between male and female employees who hold the same jobs in the same regions is negligible. These statistics, however, do not consider promotions, dismissals, or turnover rates; while approximately 57% of Wells Fargo employees are women, for example, women constitute only 27% of upper management. Nor do the given statistics address whether women and minorities are concentrated in low paying positions – or whether incentive pay awards are comparable. Accordingly, there has been no comprehensive public review of how the factors discussed in this article affect workforce composition and compensation.

The best evidence of gender disparities has tended to come from class action sex discrimination cases or from studies based on mandated reporting. The Supreme Court, however, has made such actions more difficult to bring and the many actions that result in settlements typically produce only a limited public record. Wells Fargo, for example, has faced a number of allegations of dis-

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247. Id.


249. Bus. Standards Rep., supra note 246, at 25 (“For 2018, we expanded our analysis to include certain of our global locations and other elements of pay, including base pay, discretionary cash incentives, and long-term incentive awards. After accounting for factors such as role, tenure, and geography, the most recent results of our analysis show that female team members at Wells Fargo earn more than 99 cents for every $1 earned by their male peers.”). This statement, however, gives no indication of its methodology.

250. Egan, et al., supra note 24. The study indicates that examination of termination rates is also unusual and constitutes an overlooked area of gender discrimination. Id.

251. See, e.g., Brad Seligman, Patriarchy at the Checkout Counter, 14 NEW LAB. F. 40 (2005) (describing how the lawyers in the Walmart class action reviewed 1.3 million documents and interviewed hundreds of women).

252. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 222 F.R.D. 137, 142–43 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d sub nom Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh’g, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), on reh’g en banc sub nom Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (reversing the trial court’s eighty-four page opinion describing the statistical disparities in Walmart’s promotion patterns and narrowing
crimination, retaliation for protected activity, and wrongful termination, without producing a comprehensive analysis of the bank’s practices or implementing substantial changes.

The EEOC brought the farthest-reaching case against Wells Fargo, alleging race and sex discrimination in hiring entry level employees in its on-line banking centers. It settled the case in 2020 for $7.8 million dollars. As part of the settlement, Wells Fargo agreed to hire 580 of the applicants who were the subjects of the EEOC action, as tellers, personal bankers, customer sales and service representatives, and administrative support professionals. The settlement, which primarily addressed racial discrimination, only involved low-level hiring in a limited part of Wells Fargo’s operations.

In 2018, Wells Fargo also conducted an internal investigation into allegations that women in its Wealth Management Division had been marginalized. Jay Welker, president of Wells Fargo’s private bank and head of the wealth-management division since 2003, had made remarks suggesting that women should be home taking care of children. Twelve of the forty-five regional managing directors were women who felt that qualified women had been rejected for top jobs that went to men. When the women questioned the decisions, they said that they “felt ignored.” Wells Fargo’s internal investigation found no indications of sex discrimination, but Welker’s retirement was announced at the conclusion of the investigation and the women did not file suit.


254. Id.

255. Id.

In addition, any number of individual women, including at least one of the women fired for failing to address fraudulent accounts in the division she managed, have sued for sex discrimination, but none of the actions have produced reported opinions or published findings.261

Taken together, these actions suggest that discrimination suits have not been a significant vehicle for addressing women’s roles at Wells Fargo. The only case to address systemwide issues involved hiring, and then it alleged more pervasive issues of racial than gender bias.262 The factors that disproportionately affect women, in contrast, are deeply embedded in the bank’s high-pressure sales culture. To the extent that the culture disproportionately affects women, the larger issue is the legitimacy of the culture itself. As the Guitron case demonstrates,263 it is difficult to address factors such as irregular hours or retaliatory harassment if impossible sales quotas and the excesses they produce are treated as legitimate.

5. Pathways Into The Corporate Suite

Any analysis of the role of gender in Wells Fargo’s culture has to acknowledge the central role Carrie Tolstedt played. Tolstedt oversaw the Community Bank where Wells Fargo’s worst excesses occurred.264 She personally pressed her employees to increase cross-sell metrics and insulated the results from review.265 Tolstedt demonstrates that it is certainly possible for women to be complicit in corporate wrong-doing, and that simply adding women to upper management ranks does not eliminate either that wrongdoing or the forces that skew gender outcomes.266 Her rise in the corporate ranks, however, also illustrates several patterns that persist more generally and that narrow women’s opportunities for advancement.

At Wells Fargo, the most telling comparison is not between Carrie Tolstedt and John Stumpf, the CEO to whom she reported. Instead, it is the comparison of Tolstedt and Stumpf with Richard M. Kovacevich, the Wells Fargo CEO who proceeded Stumpf and put in place the corporate culture that led to the scandal.267 Kovacevich represents the trajectory of the modern, driven CEO, who takes over an organization from the outside, and recreates it to dramatically in-


262. Nagele-Piazza, supra note 253 (indicating that the case focused on more pervasive issues of racial discrimination than sex discrimination and that the remedy involved simply hiring a few hundred additional workers minority or female workers at a time of widespread layoffs).

263. Guitron v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra note 239 (upholding whistleblower dismissal on the grounds that she failed to meet the sales quotas she had complained were impossible to meet without unethical practices).


266. Cahn et al., supra note 8.

267. Mclean, supra note 40.
crease its earnings and share price. Stumpf and Tolstedt, in contrast, worked their way up through the ranks, internalizing and implementing the corporate culture Kovacevich created. The contrast between them illustrates the different possible routes into the corporate suite.

Kovacevich, like Tolstedt and Stump, came from a modest background. His father worked in a sawmill 20 miles outside of Tacoma, Washington. The comparisons, however, largely stop there. Kovacevich, a star pitcher, turned down an offer from the New York Yankees to accept a scholarship to Stanford. A shoulder injury derailed any professional ambitions, but Kovacevich graduated with a degree in industrial engineering, and eventually an M.B.A. from Stanford Business School. He started his career at General Mills, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, then moved after two years to Cincinnati, Ohio, to become general manager of General Mills’ toy division. After a few years, he took over a small photography business in New York started by former General Mills executives. Three years later, Citibank recruited him for its consumer division and within two years, he was in charge of the bank’s branch system in New York City. When another man was promoted ahead of him for a position Kovacevich wanted, he moved back to Minneapolis and joined Norwest, then a small regional bank. He quickly advanced, becoming chief operating officer and then president, within a few years of joining the company. Kovacevich’s repeated moves gave him valuable experience, and he knew how to make an immediate impression, gaining rapid promotions. With each step, he sought the ability to impose his personal stamp on the organization he headed and when he hit roadblocks or saw new opportunities, he switched jobs, cities, and companies.

269. Id. (quoting a former Wells Fargo employee that “what Dick Kovacevich implemented was John Stumpf’s downfall.”).
272. Kovacevich, Dick, supra note 268.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Kovacevich has been described “inspiring employees, sometimes resorting to theatrical antics to fire up team spirit.” Id.
279. Id. (emphasizing that initially Kovacevich did not want to be a banker because he “preferred a less hierarchical business, where he would have more responsibility for key decisions.”).
As the head of Norwest, Kovacevich emphasized two things:

First, cross-selling became central to his business model. He explained in an interview in 1998 that he saw bankers as “salespeople” “whose job was to ‘cross-sell,’ which meant getting ‘customers’—not ‘clients,’ but ‘customers’—to buy as many products as possible.”

A former Norwest executive commented, “It was a religion. It very much was the culture.”

Signs of “gaming” or rigging the numbers underlying the cross-sell metrics appeared while Kovacevich was CEO. There was no follow-up effort to root out the misconduct.

Second, Kovacevich spearheaded Norwest’s continual expansion into new products (consumer finance, insurance, and mortgages), new branches (1400 new branches in the early nineties), and growth through mergers, including Norwest’s 1998 acquisition of the smaller, but better known, Wells Fargo. The banking industry journal American Banker chose Kovacevich as its banker of the year for 2003. He stepped down as CEO in 2007 but stayed on as Chairman of the Board for an additional period to oversee Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia and its emergence as the third largest bank in the United States.

While Kovacevich has been hailed as “a larger-than-life CEO,” Stumpf and Tolstedt were closer to the midcentury model of the “organization man.” They worked their way up through the ranks, absorbing and administering the
corporate ethos Kovacevich created. Stumpf grew up as one of eleven children on a dairy farm in Minnesota. He shared a room with his brothers until he married. He was an indifferent high school student, who eventually earned a B.A. from St. Cloud University. His first job in banking was as a “repo man,” repossessing the assets of those who failed to pay their debts. Six years later, in 1982, he joined Norwest, and stayed with the company through his retirement in 2016, thirty-four years later. Forbes describes him as rising “in lockstep—he ran various regions” until Dick Kovacevich called him to San Francisco and put him in charge of community banking. Stumpf endorsed Kovacevich’s cross-sell model as his own. A financial blog commented that the “result of Dick Kovacevich’s approach to build the plumbing in Wells Fargo is that he enabled troopers like John Stumpf to come up from the ranks to feel like the organization belongs to them.”

Carrie Tolstedt also grew up in the Midwest and also came up through the ranks at Wells Fargo. Like Stumpf, she prospered at Wells Fargo only because she absorbed the corporate ethos. Her father owned a bakery in the small town of Kimball, Nebraska. She left to attend the University of Nebraska. She went to work for Norwest in 1986, while she was still in her twenties, and stayed there until she was forced out as a result of the fraudulent accounts scandal, rising to become head of community banking in 2007, after Stumpf became CEO. She was known at Wells Fargo as “a tireless worker, spending nights and weekends on the job and poring over even small details.” The Independent Directors of the Board of Wells Fargo & Company Report described her as someone who ran a “tight ship” with everything “buttoned down.” It also faulted her for maintaining “an ‘inner circle’ of staff that supported her, rein-

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289. Mclean, supra note 140.
292. Id.
293. Mclean, supra note 140.
296. Id.
297. Id. (indicating that she started at Northwest in 1986); see also List: Most Powerful Women 2014, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/most-powerful-women/2014/carrie-tolstedt/ [https://perma.cc/SLSR-GD3F] (listing her age as 54 in 2014). The Wall Street Journal, however, stated that she had been with the bank 27 years in 2016. Id.
forced her views, and protected her.”301 Emily Glazer of the *Wall Street Journal* reported that Tolstedt’s obsession with day-to-day operations and failure to delegate is one of the reasons she was not considered CEO material at Wells Fargo.302 The strengths that allowed her to rise through the ranks as a woman – her ability to get the job done without challenging those above her – limited her ability to be seen as a potential CEO in line to succeed Stumpf had not both their careers been derailed by the scandal.

What these career pathways illustrate is the evolution of gendered pathways for advancement. Kovacevich represents the new breed of executives, who master the corporate tournament, reaching for new opportunities and switching jobs when they reach roadblocks. Their goals involve a mix of self-promotion and the opportunity to shift institutions toward new models that will boost profitability and establish their mark on an industry.303 Wells Fargo, ironically, was a corporate culture that hired more from within, valuing those who internalized the companies’ culture values – the “troopers” who seek to perpetuate business models identified with the company.304 “The problem is that those who buy into institutional values have nowhere to go when those values prove bankrupt.

**D. Wells Fargo’s Morality Tale**

Wells Fargo illustrates the modern state of gender equity in large financial firms. On the one hand, women are now included in the company and even sometimes hold prominent roles. On the other hand, the nature of Wells Fargo’s corporate culture intensified factors associated with women’s disadvantages in corporate America. Prominent among them are the roller coaster nature of advancement. A *Forbes* cover in 2012 hailed Wells Fargo as “the bank that worked.”305 The article concluded that “Stumpf has at once made Wells exceedingly profitable—for 2011 the bank’s net income jumped 28% to $15.9 billion, on $81 billion in revenue—and extremely safe.”306 The following year, the *Los Angeles Times* broke the scandal on the unauthorized accounts, with the scandal ultimately tarnishing Wells Fargo’s corporate image and leading to billions in fines.307 In such an environment, top executives were in the same posi-

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301. *Id.*
305. Touryalai, supra note 291.
306. *Id.*
tion as many lower level employees: it was impossible to advance within the company without being complicit in unethical practices, but when the scandal broke, their careers might be over.308

Within this environment, what should be made of Carrie Tolstedt? Some commentators have argued that she was treated more harshly than Stumpf because she was a woman;309 he was allowed to resign while the Wells Fargo Board retroactively fired her. In addition, he reached early settlements that left her as the senior official contesting the results.310 She continues to battle SEC and OCC actions that leave her with greater exposure than Stumpf’s settlements.311 While the Board treated Tolstedt more harshly than it treated Stumpf, Stumpf’s loyalty to Tolstedt was remarkable. His only hope when the scandal broke was to quickly clean house, and that would have meant firing Tolstedt. Instead, he rejected such advice in December 2015312 and praised her at her retirement in September 2017, which occurred shortly before his own retirement in October 2016. He criticized her performance only after he stepped down, as part of the settlements he engineered to extricate himself from the ongoing investigations of Wells Fargo’s misdeeds.313 The Wells Fargo Board faulted him for moving too slowly to address the scandal and Tolstedt’s role in it.314
Stumpf’s treatment of Tolstedt contrasts with the treatment of many women during the financial crisis. The CEOs of Morgan Stanley and Bank of America both deflected criticism of their handling of the crisis by firing the top women under them, individuals who at the time were among the highest ranking women in banking. In those cases, the women were less culpable for what had happened than Tolstedt, but culpability was not the issue. Instead, the CEOs saw an opportunity to buy time for themselves by casting the blame on someone else. At lower levels within Wells Fargo, the same thing happened. Prominent women were terminated while similarly culpable men were not, either because the women had attracted negative publicity or because their terminations helped protect others. The issue was not whether they bore some responsibility for the results; often executives like Morgan Stanely’s Zoe Cruz did. Instead, it was that given the narrow pathways women have had into the C-Suite, they had less ability to protect themselves. Wells Fargo at least replaced Carrie Tolstedt with another woman, Mary Mack. The overall representation of women in finance fell with the dot.com and financial crisis busts and with the mortgage-backed securities bubble. Boom-bust cycles have not been good for women.

315. See Ciaran Walker, The Role of the Regulator in Supervising Culture in Financial Services Firms, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN IR.: L. & POL’Y 103–05 (Joe McGrath ed. 2018) (discussing individual accountability; then explaining role of firm cultures in tolerating misconduct).


317. Hagan, id. (describing Cruz’s efforts to limit the bank’s exposure to mortgage backed securities as warning signs appeared).

318. Id.

319. See, e.g., Terrazas v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 04-275 (alleging that plaintiff was fired after a negative article in the Wall Street Journal while men who had similar or worse records were not fired).

320. See Hagan, supra note 316, at 120 (“[As] Mack interviewed the parties involved, it became clear that the blame was coalescing around Cruz.”); Story & Dash, supra note 316 (describing Brinkley’s resignation as a response to federal pressure to improve risk management at a time when she was the bank’s chief risk officer).

321. See Hagan, supra note 316, at 34 (describing how some of the men were gleeful that Cruz was gone); see also Christine Şarlarata Chung, From Lily Bart to the Boom-Boom Room: How Wall Street’s Social and Cultural Response to Women Has Shaped Securities Regulation, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 175, 177–80 (2010) (describing Cruz’s firing and the narrow pathways available to women in finance).


The stories of the small number of top women in banking are inevitably anecdotal. The most telling accounts lie in the statistics. At lower levels than Tolstedt’s, Wells Fargo’s women bore a disproportionate burden in its fake accounts scandal.324 We know that, however, only because of the independent reports keeping track of misconduct charges and dismissals.325 With respect to Wells Fargo’s record in awarding commissions, incentive pay, and the benefits that enhance career prospects, there is no comprehensive data, only identification of the factors that drive gender disparities – factors that multiply in a high pressure environment without accountability for anything other than bottom line results.

IV

CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BOARD DIVERSITY

What are the implications of the Wells Fargo example for board diversity? The immediate answer would seem to be very little. In the shareholders’ derivative action brought against the Wells Fargo Board for its failure to detect and address the unauthorized accounts scandal, seven of the sixteen defendants were women.326 Critics have faulted the “pliant board” that never inquired closely into the company’s operation;327 the Board was critical of the information Wells Fargo executives provided, but did not follow up on its own until late in the scandal.328 Having seven women on a sixteen member board did not transform board practices, nor did it operate to address the misconduct. Simply having a critical mass of women on Wells Fargo’s Board neither strengthened Wells Fargo compliance practices nor its anti-discrimination efforts. And while Wells Fargo did have women like Carrie Tolstedt in upper management, it did not have female successors to Richard Kovacevich, that is, leaders who remade the institution to reflect their personal vision or values. Tolstedt, for better and definitely for worse, was selected and promoted to the degree she implemented Kovacevich’s model, not her own.

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325. Id.
327. Sheffert, supra note 304.
328. See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2135, 2205 (2019) (describing the board’s role and noting that board members were “highly critical” of the initial management presentation yet relied on management to deal with the issue).
A more effective model would combine diversity and corporate reform objectives. The current system allows those who “seize the day” to enrich themselves, their boards, and short-term shareholders by producing immediate results. The appearance of success in turn reduces scrutiny, and the evisceration of effective third-party oversight makes suborning internal controls less risky.\textsuperscript{329} This, in turn, increases the pressure to select for the Richard Kovacevichs who project confidence and the ability to transform institutions. It also contributes to the creation of pressured workplaces where “traits such as over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical self-deception” are advantages,\textsuperscript{330} advantages linked to stereotypically male attributes.\textsuperscript{331} The goal of diversity efforts ought to be to strive for something more than an equal right to profit from corporate misconduct. Such efforts ought, instead, to be more aware of the subtle interactions between the celebration of internal competition and the exacerbation of gender stereotypes tied to ambition, overconfidence, and amorality. Such efforts may benefit from the following lessons from the Wells Fargo scandal.

First, adding women and “stirring” does not in itself transform corporate practices. The social science literature has reviewed the various claims that diverse boards improve corporate performance and reduce the incidences of various types of fraud, earnings management, and accounting irregularities.\textsuperscript{332} The most rigorous studies indicate the effects – when they happen – do not come from the presence of women per se, but rather that the presence of women and improved performance may both reflect other factors such as greater transparency or the inclusion of women board members more committed to diverse stakeholders.\textsuperscript{333} The Wells Fargo example underscores the conclusion that board composition may not matter if board members are not willing to look behind management representations and play a more active oversight role.\textsuperscript{334} Instead, more diverse boards may matter only if the diversity occurs together with greater pressure for board engagement – or perhaps the threat of greater board liability.\textsuperscript{335}

\textsuperscript{329.} See Donald C. Langevoort, \textit{Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls}, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 295 (2004) (observing that if the CEO produces strong initial returns, that “creates greater autonomy by both enhancing his bargaining position over time and increasing the cognitive commitment of the board to him.”).

\textsuperscript{330.} Id. at 288.

\textsuperscript{331.} CHAMORRO-PREMUZIC, supra note 105 (arguing that these traits lead to the greater selection of male leaders).

\textsuperscript{332.} See Douglas J. Cumming et al., \textit{Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud}, 58 ACAD. MGMT J. 34 (Feb. 9, 2015), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2562399 (analyzing China Securities Regulatory Commission data from 2001 to 2010, including 742 companies with enforcement actions for fraud, and 742 non-fraudulent companies for a control group).

\textsuperscript{333.} For a review of this literature, see Cahn et al., supra note 8.

\textsuperscript{334.} Gadinis & Miazd, supra note 328, at 2207 (commenting on the historic difficulty of establishing board liability).

\textsuperscript{335.} Id. (suggesting that the growth in compliance efforts also increases the likelihood of board liability because compliance reports establish board knowledge of corporate red flags); John Armour et
Second, greater board diversity may contribute to building networks that promote diversity more generally. Diverse board members may lobby for more management diversity; they may also encourage pathways that allow women to move more easily from company to company. When Wells Fargo finally brought in an outside CEO, Charles Scharf, at least seven of the senior African-American women at Wells Fargo left, believing that their path to further advancement would be blocked. Media accounts emphasized that Scharf tended to hire executives with whom he had worked previously – he installed his own team at Wells Fargo – and those executives were white males. A number of the women who left went to companies with more diverse senior management. Diverse boards expand the networks that increase the movement across companies; they can also inspire women within the company to believe that pathways to advancement are open to them.

Third, board diversity is easier to accomplish than management diversity. Kovacevich saw banking in a negative light early in his career because it was too hierarchical; he preferred to be in a position where he would have more authority to make key decisions. What he probably saw was that, as a regulated industry, banking had too many rules. He achieved his Wells Fargo successes at the beginning of a deregulatory era. Still, most corporate hierarchies are pyramids. As one rises closer to the top, there are fewer positions available. Choosing one candidate for a top position is at the expense of others who, often, as the Wells Fargo example demonstrates, leave as a result. Boards in contrast are more horizontal, and board members are not necessarily competing with each other for advancement. Moreover, boards have the power to engineer greater turnover through term limits or other means that ensure a steady flow of new members. Board diversity is therefore an easy substitute for upper management diversity, but the greatest changes come from management reform.

336. For example, Hillary Clinton on the Walmart board.
338. Id.
Fourth, boards can nonetheless be avenues for corporate reform. Board liability is a powerful weapon. And bringing in new, truly independent board members can be a way of increasing scrutiny or prioritizing new developments or greater attention to stakeholders such as customers or employees. One of the more powerful tools a board has is the ability to inquire into the dark shadows that cloak or minimize corporate wrongdoing. The Wells Fargo scandal would never have occurred if the extent of the problem had been visible or if it had been closely monitored when the warning signs first appeared. The fact that women tend to be disproportionately penalized in corporate scandals means women have more to lose when they become complicit in corporate misconduct.

More diverse boards can thus be instruments to facilitate closer examination of the practices that link gender disparities and corporate malfeasance – but only where there is a will to look and acknowledge the results of greater board activism. Otherwise, the new board members will be in the position of Carrie Tolstedt – or Elaine Chao, who left the Wells Fargo Board just as the scandal was breaking to become Secretary of Commerce. Neither had the will to confront what appeared to be one of the most successful banks in the United States. Had they done so, they could have accomplished reform only by questioning the very foundation of the company in which they were embedded. Systematic reform, in contrast, requires changing the dynamic that allows the few to profit handsomely at the expense of everyone else.

At the core of these challenges is the ability to profit by breaking the rules and getting away with it. The ability to profit by defying legal or ethical re-
straints resets the terms of the marketplace for everyone else. As this article has demonstrated, women may find that, like Carrie Tolstedt, they cannot advance without engaging in misconduct, but that they also are significantly less likely than the men around them to get away with it. That makes women important allies in the movement for corporate reform; sustaining greater diversity and promoting corporations as “law abiding citizens” are inextricably linked.

349. George Akerlof, *The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism*, 84 Q.J. ECONS. 488 (1970) (arguing that the ability of used car dealers to disguise the quality of their products created a “Gresham’s dynamic” or a race to the bottom in which honest companies find that they cannot compete with ethically compromised ones).

350. See *The Triple Bind*, supra note 8 (arguing that in fact women face a triple bind in that they are also more likely to be driven out of such marketplaces).

351. Strine et al., *supra* note 343, at 1922.