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Private Law Beyond the State?
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization*

Although the changing relation between private law and the state has become the subject of many debates, these debates are often unsatisfactory. Concepts like "law," "private law," and "globalization" have unclear and shifting meanings; discussions are confined to specific questions and do not connect with parallel discussions taking place elsewhere. In order to initiate the necessary broader approach, this article brings together the pertinent themes and aspects from various debates. It proposes a conceptual clarification of key notions in the debate—"private law," "state," "Europeanization," "globalization," and "privatization"—that should be of use beyond the immediate purposes of the rest of the article. It also suggests how one should analyze and categorize both the problems the modern developments create and the solutions that these problems might call for. It does not attempt to analyze which solution is the best one. But in unveiling common structures, both within and between the various debates, this article should help significantly in providing the further discussion of these solutions within a more rational framework.

I. Theme

Europeanization, globalization, and private governance mean different things to different people, but one thing seems clear: they change the role of the state in the world. Legal scholars have analyzed at length the impact these developments have on the law. Most of these studies focus on public, especially constitutional, law; they ask how democracy and proper governance structures can be recreate-

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ated or replaced outside the state. The impact on private law, by con-
trast, has received comparably less attention, with two exceptions: the (somewhat unspecific) claim that globalization transcends the
distinction between public law and private law in a new way,¹ and the (public-law inspired) question to what extent private arrange-
ments can compete with or substitute for the state.²

The reason for this relative neglect of private law in comparison
to public law may lie in two irreconcilable assumptions. The first as-
sumption, frequent among students of globalization, is that private
law is not different from public law (“all law is public law”), so private
law is automatically included in any analysis of law under globaliza-
tion. The second assumption, frequent among private-law scholars, is
that private law is already independent from the state, so any change
in the role of the state has no impact on private law. Both assump-
tions are plausible, but they are mutually exclusive: private law can
be bound to the state like public law or be separate, but not both.³

More importantly, both assumptions have different implications for
private law: if private law is public law, then a changed role of the
state implies a change for private law; if private law is independent of
the state, no such change ensues. This suggests that it matters which
of the assumptions (if any) is correct, and that the impact of global-
ization, Europeanization, and private governance on private law de-
serves special attention. To what extent is the state the blind spot in
our thinking about private law? Is private law beyond the state still
“law”; is private law within the state still “private”? To what extent
does private law presuppose the state; to what extent is it irreconcil-
able with the state? To what extent can private law in the “postna-
tional constellation” learn from its experience before and within the
state?

This article, together with a companion piece,⁴ addresses these
questions by looking at American and German concepts and views, in
particular. This is no easy task. Core concepts are unclear; several
debates exist with no clear connection to each other; normative and
analytical perspectives are confused. In this situation, these two arti-
cles cannot provide definite answers to the various questions in-
volved. Their more modest, but all the more important, aim is to

¹. For more thoughtful analyses making this point, see Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181, 184 (1996); Paul Schift Berman,
From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 485,
518-23 (2005).

². In this specific sense, “private law is a central subject in globalization dis-
course.” Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization,
38 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1, 3 (2006). For discussion, see infra, part III.C.

³. These are two endpoints of a continuum: private law can be more or less
independent.

⁴. Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Private Law and the State: Comparative Percep-
tions and Historical Observations, 71/2 Ramses Z (forthcoming 2007).
survey and organize the separate discussions and unveil internal connections between them, so the questions raised can be addressed in a more comprehensive and productive manner. Whereas the other article provides a historical and comparative analysis of the issues involved, this article will collect, analyze, and structure the different debates in legal theory and comparative law concerning the effects Europeanization, globalization and privatization have on private law.

The article is organized as follows. Part II shows traditional views of the relation between private law and the state. It demonstrates how traditional definitions of, and relations between, the central concepts “private law” and “state” differ, both within and between U.S. and German legal discourses; it also discusses the thesis of the simultaneous rise of the state and decline of private law. Part III describes the developments that have called the traditional views into question, grouped under three headings: Europeanization, globalization, and privatization; it also discusses the counter-thesis of a simultaneous decline of the state and rise of private law. Part IV describes four issues that arise because of these developments that would have seemed less problematic under the traditional views: the validity, method, legitimacy, and autonomy of private law. Part V describes various responses to these issues and groups them into types of answers according to the respective role of the state. Although the point of this article is not how one should respond, some important insights that should shape future debates do emerge; these are distilled in Part VI.

This is a survey article, an effort to map a number of debates and viewpoints; it is not a position paper. Many views are presented because they are relevant or prominent in debates, not because we share them; we take no position on their value. The extensive footnotes in this article serve not only as references for statements in the text, but also as entry points into different aspects of the academic debate. In addition, the article makes three contributions. First, this article brings together the various themes and aspects connected with the topic of private law and the state under the influence of Europeanization, globalization, and privatization. Although individual aspects have often been discussed in different places, this is the first attempt to combine them in one framework. Second, we suggest that most of the writing on this topic can best be understood in terms of the issues that the article distinguishes and describes. Too many discussions suffer from participants inadvertently using different or unclear concepts. While it is not necessary (or even desirable) to confine debate to only one meaning, awareness of the different meanings is necessary to avoid misunderstandings. To this end, the article proposes a conceptual clarification of key notions in the debate—“private law” and “state,” as well as “Europeanization,” “globalization,” and
“privatization”—that should be of use beyond the immediate purposes of the rest of the article. Third, this article suggests how one should categorize both the problems the modern developments create and the solutions that these problems might call for. It does not attempt to analyze which solution is the best one. But in unveiling common structures both within and between the various debates, it should help significantly in rationalizing the further discussion of these solutions.

II. Concepts

Even within the Western legal tradition,5 the relationship between private law and the state is not uniform. Not only has it changed over time, but it is also viewed differently among different countries. A comparison between U.S. and German approaches, especially, reveals enlightening similarities and differences, since both the state and the idea of private law have been differently defined and have played different roles in German and American legal discourses.

A. Private Law

Comparatists have found that the concept of private law, and its distinction from public law, play a far greater role in Europe than in the United States, and they have sought historical and institutional reasons for this.6 However, they have widely avoided a logically prior issue: what is meant by private law in the U.S. and in Germany, respectively.7 When we speak of private law, we often assume, implicitly, the existence of a universal core meaning for the term, one typically focused on contracts and contract law. Yet beyond such a

5. Both the state and private law are originally Western concepts that were exported elsewhere; a discussion focusing on societies beyond Europe and North America would raise numerous additional issues beyond the scope of this article.


core meaning, it is not even clear whether private law always means the same thing within one legal tradition, let alone among different traditions.

Traditionally, private law rests on the law of obligations (both contractual and non-contractual), the law of property (including succession law), and the law of persons (including family law). It includes those areas of commercial law that extend the law of contracts (e.g., the law of unfair competition), the law of property (e.g., intellectual property) and the law of persons (e.g., corporate law). It excludes those areas that are not based on such extensions and are therefore seen as (merely) regulatory public law (e.g., antitrust law). This traditional definition holds, generally, for most purposes in American and German law. However, once scholars on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean went further and formulated criteria to define private law, usually in opposition to public law, they found important differences. These criteria are important in two ways. First, they define the object of private law debate—what counts or does not count as private law. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they define what makes private law specific—what its inner rationalities are. In fact, a comparative survey reveals no less than seven different concepts, and shows their respective roles are different in Germany and the U.S.

1. Private Interests. In the 3rd century A.D., Ulpian defined private law as the law that concerns private, as opposed to public, interests. In Germany, this is still one of the most frequently articulated distinctions between private and public law. In the U.S., Ulpian’s def-

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10. For the purpose of this article, we neglect the U.S. concept of “private laws” as laws for the benefit of specific individuals, as opposed to “public laws” applicable to all individuals. The term and its definition can be found in Blackstone, I Commentaries 85 (1st ed. 1765); its origins go back to the earliest times of statutory law. For much of the 19th century, this was the nearly exclusive meaning of the term in American judicial opinions.

11. Dig. 1.1.1. (Ulpian); Inst. 1.1.4 (Ulpian); for an early use in an English language treatise, see John Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland I.9 (1773); for the history of the idea in Germany, see Michael Stolleis, Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht im Prozeß der Entstehung des modernen Staates, in Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht als wechselseitige Auffangordnungen 41, 45-59 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem & Eberhard Schmidt-Abmann eds., 1996). Ulpian was a late classical lawyer and one of the most influential officials in the Roman Empire; for a biography and evaluation, see Tony Honore, Ulpian: Pioneer of Human Rights (2002); see id. 98 on public and private law.
inition is rarely found as such, but a similar criterion appears whenever private law is defined as that part of the law that protects and enforces private rights. The practical use of the distinction is limited, since it is widely accepted that all laws serve both private and public interests.

2. Corrective Justice. A second definition gives the first more analytical bite: Private law is the body of those rules aimed at corrective justice, as opposed to rules of public law aimed at distributive justice. This may explain how tort law can be viewed as public law in the United States (where its function is seen more in the distribution of risks than in the compensation of harm) and as private law in Germany (where the emphasis is on compensation). At the same time, the example suggests why this definition of private law is problematical, at least as an a priori definition without further elaboration. Most areas of the law are hard to place—tort law is only one example, even contract law is ambiguous. Institutions frequently serve both distributive and corrective justice, and it may be artificial if not outright impossible to somehow separate the one from the other. Indeed, some think private law always fulfills both corrective and distributive purposes.

12. But see, for a use of the distinction based on Ulpian, Frederick Pollock, Divisions in the Law, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 187, 192-93 (1894); see also Ludwik Ehrlich, Comparative Public Law and the Fundamentals of its Study, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 623, 631-32 (1921).

13. This point is not new; Azo made it as early as ca. 1210 in his Summa Codicis, Inst. I.I, no. 12, in opposition to the strict distinction of private and public law proposed by Placentinus.


16. See Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 11.6. Arguably, private law is structured by principles of corrective justice that may be complemented by considerations of distributive justice. This corresponds with how individuals typically assess tort claims; see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, An Empirical Inquiry into the Relation of Corrective Justice to Distributive Justice, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 421 (2006).


3. Relations between Private Parties. According to a third distinction, private law concerns relations between private parties, whereas public law concerns relations that include the state in its role of sovereign (rather than that of a market participant). Although this distinction exists in both legal systems, it seems to have a stronger hold in Germany. Only the German legal system seems to conclude that all relations to the state acting as sovereign are part of public law. For example, contracts between governmental agencies and individuals are, in Germany, undoubtedly part of public law, even if some private law provisions apply to them by analogy. By contrast, in the U.S., the rise of the “contracting state” signals transcendence of the public law/private law distinction: when the state regulates by contract, it makes use of private law.

4. Horizontality. A fourth distinction generalizes the third: private law is characterized by horizontal relations of equality; public law is characterized by a vertical relation of subordination and dominance. Whether the state acts through private or through public law depends on whether the partner on the other side is treated as a coequal or as a subject. More importantly perhaps, this theory makes it possible to characterize relations between private parties as public law if they are characterized by subordination and dominance, as in, for example, employment contracts. As a consequence, public law restraints on government action can be applied to powerful private actors—corporations in particular—as well. The theory is usually modified to exclude this possibility, but the integration of public law considerations into imbalanced private relationships is still discussed.

5. Private Ordering. A fifth tradition equates private law with private ordering. Since private ordering concerns the distribution of goods, services, and capital through contracts, contracts and property are the core elements of private law in both the U.S. and Germany. But private ordering can encompass other areas of the law as well, and this is where the definition plays out differently in these two legal systems. In Germany, it is used to define private law in a general sense as areas of the law that are typically open to private ordering. The U.S. definition, by contrast, looks at individual rules and relations. This makes for a subtle but important difference: In the U.S. legal system, the core of private law is the contract. In consequence,

20. For an (unsuccessful) attempt to import it into U.S. law, see Ernst Freund, Private Claims against the State, 8 Pol. Sci. Q. 625, 640-51 (1893).
all matters become private law once they can be regulated through party autonomy. In this reading, mandatory norms of contract law are not private law, whereas consensual agreements between citizens and public entities are; family law is private law to the extent it rests on private agreements. By contrast, the core of German private law is not the contract but the law of contract. In consequence, private law encompasses all other areas of the law that are closely related to contract law—the law of non-contractual obligations, property law, and—though for somewhat different reasons—family law and the law of successions. Whether the norms in these areas are mandatory or not is irrelevant to their classification as private law. On the other hand, contracts with the government are public law.

6. Privately Made Law. A related sixth distinction exists between privately made law—norms created by private parties—and publicly made law—norms created by the state. In U.S. literature, such privately made norms are now repeatedly referred to and discussed as law. By contrast, German scholars predominantly confine the notion of privately made "law" to law made on the basis of powers delegated by the state.

23. For an isolated adoption of such a view in Switzerland, see Walther Burkhardt, Die Organisation der Rechtsgemeinschaft. Untersuchungen über die Eigenart des Privatrechts, des Staatsrechts und des Völkerrechts 16-20, 27 (1927); see also Helmut Coing & Heinrich Honsell, Einleitung zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, in J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, no. 113 (2004).

24. This definition existed already in Roman law; see Dig. 2.14.38 (Papinian), "ius publicum quod privatorum pactis mutari non potest" [public law is that which cannot be changed through agreements by the parties]; see Max Kaser, 'Ius publicum' und 'ius privatum', 103 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte—Romanistische Abteilung 1, 75-88 (1986).


26. The contract itself is not viewed as a source of law; see already Friedrich Carl von Savigny, I System des Römischen Rechts 12 (1840); more generally, see Gesetz und Vertrag II. 12. Symposium der Kommission "Die Funktion des Gesetzes in Geschichte und Gegenwart" (Okko Behrends & Christian Starck eds., 2005).


28. For debate of whether these norms are "law," see David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 371, 403-20 (2003).

7. Jurisdiction of General Courts. A seventh distinction is not jurisprudential but jurisdictional: in Germany, private law matters are dealt with in ordinary courts, whereas public law matters go to special courts.\(^{30}\) Whether an issue belongs to private law or public law is thus a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction; in turn, the definition of private law can draw on whether the general courts assert jurisdiction.\(^{31}\) In the U.S., by contrast, suits in general courts against the government have been an important part of the common law for a long time (although so-called administrative law judges, quasi-judicial agencies established outside the judicial branch, hear many disputes between government agencies and those affected by decisions of these agencies).\(^{32}\) Thus, the question of jurisdiction creates a difference between Germany and the U.S., but its impact is not absolute, especially regarding the procedural treatment of private and public law. On the one hand, the German principle of a unitary legal order (\textit{Einheit der Rechtsordnung})\(^ {33}\) requires like treatment of public and private law when appropriate, so significant parts of Germany's procedural law are similar for general and for administrative courts. On the other hand, public law can trigger special sets of procedure in the U.S. even though no special public law courts exist.\(^ {34}\)

It should be clear that these concepts, although they overlap (and it would be interesting to analyze in what ways they are interconnected), must be held apart if debates are to be fruitful. Even more important for the purpose of this article may be the finding that, although all these differentiations appear both in U.S. and in German legal discourse, they appear in very different ways. This suggests not only that Americans and Europeans often mean different things

\(^{30}\) For the history, see Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at II.6. (text accompanying notes 252 et seq.).

\(^{31}\) There are exceptions. For example, although the general courts have jurisdiction over government liability, pursuant to Basic Law, Article 34 (2), such claims are nonetheless considered part of public law.

\(^{32}\) HAY, supra note 8, at 44, n.92; Ralf Michaels, Gerichtsverfassung und Verfahrensstrukturen in föderalen Gemeinwesen, 66 RABELSZ 357, 363 (2002).


\(^{34}\) L. Harold Levinson, The Public Law/Private Law Distinction in the Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1579 (1989). Levinson defines public law for his purpose as "any litigation to which a government or a governmental official is a party"; id. at 1580. Whether the courts must, in patent law, defer to legal determinations by administrative agencies (the so-called Chevron doctrine) is said to draw on whether patent law is a matter of administrative law or general private law: Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2000).
when they use a term like *private law*; it suggests a different understanding in Germany and in the U.S. of law in general and the place of private law within it. Grossly simplified, in Germany, the core of the law is private law and the rest is contingent politics;\(^{35}\) in the U.S., the core of the law is public (regulatory) law and the rest is contingent private ordering.\(^{36}\) As a consequence, the difference between private and public law is in Germany largely defined from the side of private law;\(^{37}\) and in American common law from the side of public law. Public law in Germany appears as that part of the law that the state makes (other than the mere restatement of private law in the form of codification). By contrast, private law in the U.S. refers not to a separate body of law but rather to a private *sphere* that the state either willfully grants or in which it must not interfere under some constitutional or natural-law principles.

Although such a general statement is too broad to apply to every instance, some examples\(^{38}\) may illustrate the thesis. For example, when Robert Ellickson describes the informal relations and agreements between neighbors as "order without law,"\(^{39}\) much of this is, from a German perspective, law without enforcement—that the neighbors do not resort to courts or written agreements does not mean that their relations are not governed by (private) law. Similarly, when Stuart Macaulay describes a number of informal agreements and enforcement measures between business people as "non-contractual relations in business,"\(^{40}\) a German lawyer would view many of these relations as contracts. It appears that U.S. discourse,


\(^{36}\) See also Caruso, supra note 2, at 23-29.

\(^{37}\) With the exception of subject matter jurisdiction (the sixth distinction supra), which is discussed in administrative law more than in private law.

\(^{38}\) One may object that both examples concern outside perspectives on the law, from economics and sociology, respectively. We would respond that both examples are core texts within American legal discourse; that they take an interdisciplinary approach merely reflects the more interdisciplinary character of U.S. legal studies.


\(^{40}\) Stuart Macaulay, *Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study*, 28 Am. Socio. Rev. 55 (1963). Macaulay's definition of contract requires two elements: (a) Rational planning of the transaction with provision for as many future contingencies as can be foreseen, and (b) the existence or use of actual or potential
in focusing on the enforcement of law, has a more limited concept of law (especially of private law) than her German colleague to whom enforcement is not a necessary element of private law.

The main reason is that law and its enforcement are separated in a much stricter form in Germany than in the common law. This means that German jurists can focus on the law regardless of its enforcement, making it a true private law detached from the state. By contrast, in the common law tradition, the partial conflation of law and enforcement, of rights and remedies, adds at least one necessary element of “public” law into “private” law: its enforcement.

A second explanation for the difference concerns the respective role of judges and academics in U.S. and in German private law traditions. German legal science developed in times of frequent changes of the political landscape; in such a setting, public law was ever-changing, while private law was a continuum apt for academic studies. By contrast, the common law developed largely in the hand of judges, who were long more interested in matters of pleading and procedure than in a coherent underlying substantive private law. This can also explain why private law plays a lesser role in the United States in general.

B. State

There is a third plausible reason why private law has different roles and meanings in the U.S. and in Germany: the state has a different role and meaning as well. With the caveat accompanying all generalizations, when Germans speak of “the state,” they refer to the comprehensive whole, the collective entity that transcends the particulars. Debates over the law largely take place within the state framework. By contrast, Americans speak of government rather than of the state; the idea of the all-encompassing state is far less frequent in American debates. The distinction is significant: unlike the state, government is undoubtedly separate from society, and it is also separate from the law. Government may restrict the freedom within society (in a Hobbesian construction) or enable it (in a Lockean construction), but society could exist without it. By contrast, the idea

legal sanctions to induce performance of the exchange or to compensate for non-performance; see id. at 56.
41. “Öffentliches Recht vergeht, Privatrecht besteht” [Public Law elapses, Private Law remains] (Gustav Boehner). The more frequent version of the quote is “Verfassungsrecht vergeht, Verwaltungsrecht besteht” [Constitutional law changes, administrative law remains]; OTTO MAYER, 1 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT vi (3d ed. 1924).
42. “State” refers to the political institution in general, not to the states within the United States in particular—in this sense, the United States is a state, too.
43. Cf. ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, GESCHICHTE DER REchts- UNd STAATSPHilosophie 4-6 (2002).
that a society requires a state is more plausible, and indeed more common, in Germany. Similarly, the government is not only separate from the law but indeed is bound by it, not unlike private citizens. In the U.S., this means that the government (and its members) can be sued in the same way (and before the same courts) as private individuals; where they are protected by sovereign immunity, this protection is based on their functions, not their nature. By contrast, whether "the state" is bound by the law is a more difficult question—if the state is all-encompassing, then by definition it encompasses the law as well.45

Neither the distinction nor its significance should be overrated. First, the meaning of state and government is ambivalent in both discourses: Germans will sometimes refer to government as state; Americans will sometimes use state in the broader meaning that it has in German discourse. Second, the distinction is not relevant everywhere: when Germans advocate a weak state and Americans a weak government, they mean the same thing. Nonetheless, the distinction is real and has implications on the view of the law’s relation to the state. In German discourse, even where state and law are not synonymous (as they were for Kelsen)46 they are very close.47 Ideals of law are discussed under the idea of Rechtsstaat — even terminologically, the idea of a legal order is bound to the state.48 By contrast, when American authors call the relation between state and law a perennial theme,49 they usually refer to European debates. Here, two practical questions are more important: whether the government is bound by the law, and whether individuals can appeal to institutions (courts) for protection of their rights. U.S. discourse has two equivalents to the German Rechtsstaat reflecting roughly these two issues: the rule of law (a concept terminologically focused on the government—the ruler—rather than on the state)50 and due process (a concept focused

45. The state can be sued in Germany, too, as a legal person. The idea of "the state" discussed here goes beyond this legal personality.
46. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, supra note 35, at 319-20 [Pure Theory of Law 318-19]. In the U.S., by contrast, synonymy exists between law and rule of law; see Herman Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern Government 922 (rev. ed. 1949): "The law and the rule (of law) cover the same ground."
47. See also Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 11.
50. For comparative analyses, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 162-204 (1972); Rosenfeld, supra note 48; Michael Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, 2 Int'l J.
on protection of the individual against any kind of power). Rechtstaat is typically confined to "state under the rule of law"; by contrast, translations of "rule of law" into German (Rechtsstaatsprinzip, Rechtsstaatlichkeit) are always linked to the state.

What does this mean for the relation between the state and the private sphere? With all caveats, in Germany, the state was long viewed not as separate from society but rather as its fulfillment. The widespread view that German liberalism of the 19th century established a separation of state and society\(^{51}\) can be misleading: It conceals the 19th-century notion of co-originality rather than separation of state and society; the state was viewed, then and now, as a creation of society, rather than an antinomy to it.\(^{52}\) More precisely, the so-called separation between state and society signifies in fact a separation between the political sphere and the private spheres of market and family.\(^{53}\) This means that the general idea of the state can remain constant even if the relation between political and private spheres within the state shifts. The change from the 19th-century liberal state to the 20th-century welfare state concerned not the relationship between society and state, but that between the political and the private spheres within the state. Both the liberal state and the welfare state are compatible with the idea, prominent in German thought, that the state is the general representative of collective concerns. The difference is that the liberal state grants a large sphere of autonomy while the welfare state interferes more in this sphere for the greater good, but in both cases the private sphere and its extent are defined by, and exist within, the state.

The situation is different in the United States, where the state is contingent on society. The main achievement of the American Revolution was to get rid of a state (England), and a prime idea be-

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\(^{51}\) For debates of this relation, see, e.g., Staat und Gesellschaft (Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde ed., 1976); Hans Heinrich Rupp, Die Trennung von Staat und Gesellschaft, in Handbuch des Staatsrechts § 28 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhoff eds., 1987).

\(^{52}\) See, e.g., Erich Angermann, Das Auseinanderstreben von "Staat" und "Gesellschaft" im Denken des 18. Jahrhunderts, in Staat und Gesellschaft, supra note 51, at 108 (originally in 10/2 Zeitschrift für Politik 89 (1963)). Angermann defines the state as a bureaucratic institution (id. at 112) and society as all non-state group structures (at 113). Under these definitions, state and society are necessarily co-original: society can only exist if there is a sphere outside the state, and the state under this definition requires a separate society.

\(^{53}\) Niklas Luhmann, Die Unterscheidung von Staat und Gesellschaft, in Luhmann, 4 Soziologische Aufklarung 69 (3d ed. 2005); Zumransen, supra note 21, at 20-23; see also Dieter Grimm, Der Staat in der kontinentaleuropäischen Tradition, in Grimm, supra note 35, at 53, 59-60; Stolleis, supra note 11, at 45.
hind the foundation of individual states and (to a lesser extent) the Union was to protect the private sphere and private rights. This history may explain the restricted view and function of the state; it may also provide one explanation why ideals of anarchy and a society without government and even without state are more common than in Germany (though of course they still represent a minority view.)

In a sense, the American view of government is almost the flip-side of the German view of the state: whereas the German view places particular interests in the members of society and collective interests in the state, Americans frequently view government as run by special (particular) interests, while general interests are protected only within a society free from the state.

These theses, overly broad as they may be, provide a glimpse of how differently Germans and Americans tend to see the relationship between the state and private law, a difference that mirrors and reinforces the differences between the relation in each nation of public and private law. In Germany, the validity of private law is undoubtedly linked to the state, but this in itself has no implications for whether public or collective concerns play out in private law. The state both guarantees freedom and autonomy and protects against the effects of this freedom, especially on weaker parties; private law performs both of these tasks simultaneously. In the United States, by contrast, private law is traditionally viewed as that part of the law that is separate from the state—the common law that has developed largely outside the state, in the courts and in society. As a consequence, the state is viewed as a danger to this freedom, at least when it goes beyond its (allegedly unpolitical) role of enforcing private law.

C. The Rise of the State and the Decline of Private Law?

The rise of the welfare state in the 20th century challenged the substantive autonomy of private law from the state both in the U.S. and in Germany. However, since both private law and state mean different things in the two systems, this challenge has played out differently.

In the United States, few would still defend the autonomy of private law; it is commonplace that the public/private distinction is an

54. E.g., ALBERT JAY NOCK, OUR ENEMY, THE STATE (1935); BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE (1990); FOR AND AGAINST THE STATE, NEW PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS (John T. Sanders & Jan Narveson eds., 1996); see also MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY & LIBERTY 53-59 (1982). Anarchy goes beyond libertarianism, which sees a minimal role for the state; cf. e.g., RICHARD NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 133-37 (1974). It may be more than a terminological coincidence that these mostly American authors want to abolish or restrict the state altogether, whereas a former judge at the German Constitutional Court merely wants to hand it back to society: PAUL KIRCHHOFF, DAS GESETZ DER HYDRA. GEHT DEN BÜRGERN IHREN STAAT ZURÜCK! (2006).

55. See, in more detail, Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at I.1.
illusion. Early in the 20th century, the legal realists dismissed the traditional view of contract and property as private rights that the state must accept and enforce as it finds them, and reinterpreted these rights as public powers vested in rightholders to engage the state's help in enforcing their interests.\textsuperscript{56} This reinterpretation influenced both the political left and the political right.\textsuperscript{57} Critical legal studies (CLS) scholars made the debunking of the public/private divide a centerpiece of much of their thinking and a cornerstone in their argument, if not for a strong state, then at least for a treatment of (apolitical) "private" law as (political) public law.\textsuperscript{58} Conservative law-and-economics scholars looked at supposedly private law through public eyes, namely through the eyes of overall welfare maximization.\textsuperscript{59} And they were also critical of the state's role in administering private law, though their criticism went against the regulatory and redistributive state, not against the state that provides and enforces private law.

In this well-known story on the decline of the public/private distinction, four important elements illuminate the peculiar relationship between private law and the state that underlies much of the debate and that is relevant to the themes of this article. First, if the underlying concept of private law is that of private ordering, then what is at stake is not the autonomy but the very existence (or possibility) of private law so defined. A private law instilled with public considerations, so termed, would be a self-contradiction; this conceptual peculiarity may explain much of the harshness in the debate. Second, the public/private distinction is not really transcended (in the sense that each side of the dichotomy is overcome) but rather resolved on the side of public law: all private law is, "really," public law because it implies public interests and distributive considerations.\textsuperscript{60} Third, be-


\textsuperscript{60} For realists, see Morris R. Cohen, \textit{Law and the Social Order}, supra note 56, at 46 ("property as sovereign power"), 104 ("...the law of contract may be viewed as a subsidiary branch of public law"); for Critical Legal Studies, see Morton J. Horwitz, \textit{The History of the Public/Private Distinction}, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1427-28 (1982); for law and economics, see Gerhard Wagner, \textit{Prävention und Verhaltenssteuerung durch Privatrecht—Anmaßung oder legitime Aufgabe?}, 206 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS (AcP) 352, 422-23 (2006). But see Freeman, supra note 22, at 564-65 ("Critical legal scholars, building on legal realism, successfully exposed the
cause these interests and considerations are located in the state, all private law is state law; the focus lies on its role for the regulatory state and on the role of adjudication as effective lawmaking. It follows, fourth, that all the different attacks on the public/private divide come with a certain critique of the role of the state with regard to the law, be it a critique of its laissez-fare ideology, the superstructure it provides, or its undue interference with the free interplay of markets. The left and the right seem to agree not only on private law being on the political right and public law being on the political left, but also on the crucial role of the state in this debate. The critique of private law's autonomy presumes a certain role for the state; the critique of the state's role in private law presumes a certain idea of private law.

In Germany, the public/private divide and its decline have played out differently. Remarkably, the realists' insight that all private law is public law, because the state necessarily intervenes in private relations with its decision to enforce or to abstain from enforcement, had been formulated earlier in Germany but with little effect. The insight had less subversive potential than in the U.S., because the realists' credo that "all private law is really public law" translates, in the German context, into the idea that all private law is really state law—law made and enforced by the state. This is hardly more than a truism for the prevailing German view of the relation between state and law.

In Germany, the debate deals less with the distinction of public and private spheres and its impact on law than with the distinction between private and public law. One relevant debate deals with the role of governmental policies and social values in private law. After early calls for adding "a drop of socialist oil" to the assumed liberal structure of the Civil Code remained at first unheeded, the Third

incoherence of the public/private divide, revealing that a purely private realm exists only as a legal construct. The flip side of that argument—that a purely public sphere is also illusory—proves equally true, and has gone relatively unnoticed in administrative law.).

61. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics 281-84 (1975); Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 835, 836 (1985). ("As long as a state exists and enforces any laws at all, it makes political choices. The state cannot be neutral or remain uninvolved, nor would anyone want the state to do so."). What happens if the condition in the beginning of this sentence is not met?


63. E.g., Julius Binder, Rechtsnorm und Rechtspflicht 27-28, 38-45 (1912); Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre 83 (3d ed. 1914); Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, supra note 35, at 285-87 [Pure Theory of Law 283-84].

64. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at 1.1.

65. The quote is from Otto v. Gierke, Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts 10 (1889); on the general debate at the time (including similar calls by, e.g., Anton Menger), see Tilman Reppgen, Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts. Eine Grund-
Reich and the German Democratic Republic attempted to put these calls into practice by abolishing the distinction between private and public law, with little success. Postwar West Germany took a different path—instead of abolishing the distinction, it enriched traditional private law with substantive values (most notably in consumer and labor law). Ironically, this strengthened rather than weakened the autonomy of private from public law—once these values are developed within private law, outside interference from public law becomes unnecessary. At the same time, this means that private and public law are now able to serve as functional equivalents and mutual residual regimes. The legislature may choose a private law or a public law regime to deal with the same problem: accidents, for example, may be dealt with through tort law (arguably private law) or through insurance schemes (arguably public law), but this functional equivalence helps maintain the distinction.

A second development concerns the intrusion of Constitutional basic rights into private law. The idea of “indirect third-party effects” of the Constitution gave Constitutional judges a flexible instrument to install Constitutional restraints into private law, notably the protection of the weaker party and non-discrimination in contract law. Although some private lawyers violently oppose these influences out of concern for the autonomy of private law, others have welcomed it as a means to fulfill the promises of private law—private autonomy,


67. ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND PRIVATRECHT ALS WECHSELSITIGE AUFFANGSORDNUNGEN (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem & Eberhard Schmidt-ßmann eds., 1997).


70. See, e.g., Uwe Diederichsen, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als oberstes Zivilgericht—ein Lehrstück für die juristische Methodenlehre, 198 ACP 171, 243-56 (1998); see also Jan Smits, Private Law and Fundamental Rights: a Skeptical View, in CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF PRIVATE LAW 9 (Tom Barkhuysen & Siewert Lindenbergh eds., 2006).
liberty—in a fuller sense than a libertarian private law could by itself. Indeed, one may doubt whether basic rights are still specifically public law or whether they are rather fundamental principles that transcend the public/private distinction and permeate the whole legal order.\footnote{71}

This creates two differences between Germany and the United States and one common development. The first difference concerns autonomy from public law: in the U.S., private law (understood as private ordering) lost its autonomy by turning into public law; in Germany, private law (understood as contract, tort, and property law) maintained its autonomy by incorporating public concerns. The second difference concerns the relationship to the state. Whereas critique of private law in the U.S. entails critique of the state that produces and enforces this law, critique of private law in Germany takes the state for granted and takes place within it.\footnote{72} The common development often goes overlooked: 19th-century private law was thought to be autonomous from the state: it was conceivable as a transnational body of law; and indeed, foreign law was frequently used in private-law adjudication.\footnote{73} By contrast, when private law turned into public law or state law, it became domestic law. Now, the framework for debate and reasoning was the state, and foreign law was relegated into comparative law, a separate discipline without immediate normative relevance.

\section*{III. Developments}

The traditional views of private law pointed out in Part II are diverse, but they share certain traits: they all depend on the idea that private law is part of a coherent legal system owing its validity and legitimacy to the fact that it is conceived as a coherent whole and enacted or enabled by the state. This Part describes how recent developments call the traditional view into question. To the extent that the European Union shapes private law, private law is not the product of a state, at least in the traditional sense.\footnote{74} Where private law is created within the plurality of legal orders shaped by globalization, it is

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\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{71} This view has long existed in the German discussion; see, THORSTEN HOLLESTEIN, DIE VERFASSUNG ALS \textquoteleft ALLGEMEINER TEIL\textquoteright \ (2006) (on Hans Carl Nipperdey).
\item \footnote{73} MICHAEL H. HOEFELICH, \textit{ROMAN \& CIVIL LAW \& THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE} (1997).
\item \footnote{74} Europeization could best be compared to federalization of private law in the United States. However, apart from the Uniform Commercial Code, the trend has gone towards defederalization of private law, most importantly through the rejection of a broad notion of federal common law; see Jansen \& Michaels, \textit{supra} note 4, at 11.5; Koen Lenaerts \& Kathleen Gutman, \textit{\"{F}ederal Common Law\" in the European Union: A Comparative Perspective from the United States}, \textit{54 AM. J. COMP. L.} 1 (2006).
\end{itemize}
not the product of one state. When private actors or agencies make and enforce their own law, this law is not the product of any state.

A. Europeanization

Europeanization of private law has three different meanings that sometimes overlap but must be held apart for analysis, since the role of private law and the state is different in each of them.

1. European Union. One meaning concerns the growing importance of the European Union,\textsuperscript{75} which has recently, after originally dealing with other areas, focused on private law. The view the European Union takes of private law is clearly instrumental—European private law must serve the common market.\textsuperscript{76} This has different consequences. First, differences between member-state private laws are said to require supranational harmonization of conflict of laws rules.\textsuperscript{77} Second, private-law norms of member states can violate E.U. law if they interfere with the free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital. This is so not only for mandatory norms\textsuperscript{78} but even, as has been argued, for non-mandatory, “truly” private, norms.\textsuperscript{79} Third, because private law is considered relevant for the functioning of a common market, the E.U. has begun to harmonize substantial parts of market-oriented private law through directives.\textsuperscript{80} Some even argue that differences between the member-state private-law norms require general unification of private law, through either a real codification\textsuperscript{81} or a legislative instrument \textit{sui generis}: a common frame of reference.\textsuperscript{82} Defendants of state private law invoke the cultural heri-

\textsuperscript{75} See Maarten Vink & Paolo Graziano, \textit{Challenges of a New Research Agenda, in EUROPEANIZATION: NEW RESEARCH AGENDAS 1, 1-26} (Paolo Graziano & Maarten Vink eds., 2006).

\textsuperscript{76} See Leone Nigla, \textit{The Transformation of Contract in Europe} (2003); Jansen & Michaels, \textit{supra} note 4, at 1.3 et seq.


\textsuperscript{81} For a skeptical overview, see Nils Jansen, \textit{European Civil Code, in Elgar ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW} 247 (Jan Smits ed., 2006) with bibliography.

tage represented in the member states’ own private laws or argue that unification is unnecessary in practice.\(^8\) Sometimes, U.S. federalism is invoked as a model of non-unified private law, although the situations are not fully comparable, since similarities of legal cultures and styles between the U.S. states are greater than between E.U. member states.\(^8\)

The impact on private law and the state is ambivalent. On the one hand, this institutionalized Europeanization reduces the importance of the member states and their private law because they must yield sovereignty to the European Union. On the other hand, the European Union itself in many ways resembles a state, functionally and structurally, whether it is called a state or not.\(^8\) In this sense, institutionalized European private law partly replicates state private law on a higher level. The result is a system of shared sovereignties and overlapping private law systems, regardless of whether the European level is viewed as superior, subordinated, or equal to the state level.

2. Transnational Legal Science. A second meaning of Europeanization of private law goes beyond the E.U. and refers to European identity building; it concerns the revival of a pan-European legal science and exchange between judges.\(^8\) There are several variants of

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such an academic “European” private law: a reinvigorated *ius commune* as basis of, or model for, an academic transnational private law, restatements, networks, pan-European casebooks, and research on a common core. In addition, courts seem more willing than before to look at the courts of other European states for guidance in private-law cases. A widely shared hope is to keep private law relatively free from instrumental concerns and allow it to maintain its own logic and rationality. Unsurprisingly, E.U. directives are mostly frowned upon and European codification is widely opposed; if at all, it should be performed by academicians with as little political influence as possible.

3. Regulatory Competition. Finally, a third meaning of Europeanization of private law refers not to unification but to greater interde-

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pendence resulting in regulatory competition. Proponents hope for a pluralist private law that is autonomous not only from the state but also from judicial and academic interventions, a private law created by, and developing under, the forces of the market. The hypothesis is that states cannot maintain regulatory laws that are inefficient (as is often assumed in the area of private law, where many favor market autonomy over centralized state power), since this would put their corporations at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign participants and might encourage these corporations to relocate. This competitive effect is intensified by party autonomy in choice of law, which gives parties the ability to choose the private law applicable to them and thereby opt out of unfavorable private-law rules. (However, internationally mandatory norms, often the most relevant norms, remain applicable despite a choice by the parties; here, regulatory competition requires parties to relocate physically.)

These three concepts of Europeanized private law imply very different relations between private law and the state. Proponents of academic Europeanization defend a private law that is largely independent of instrumental considerations, a private law with its own logic and rationality. By contrast, the view the European Union takes of private law is not only instrumental—European private law must serve the common market—but also bound to the state-like regulatory functions of the E.U. Regulatory competition presupposes an instrumental private law as well, but with the important difference that the goals are set not by states or the Union but by the inner rationality of the market for legal rules. Not surprisingly, the tensions between these views of Europeanized private law are becoming more and more visible.

B. Globalization

Attempting to define globalization in the abstract would be less fruitful than identifying where globalization discourse addresses changes in the role of the state that are relevant for private law. Many of these developments—supranational regulation, international unification, regulatory competition—bear some similarity to those under Europeanization. However, since an organization comparable to the E.U. is lacking on the global plane, any concept of global

private law will likely be plural and therefore significantly different from private law within the state.

1. World State. Many authors think that globalization leads to a decline of the state,⁹⁷ but this is far from certain. A world state, the closest analogy to the European Union on a global plane, underlies two interpretations of globalization in political science. A neo-Kantian interpretation sees a world government without a world state,⁹⁸ made up of different supranational branches (the WTO as world legislator, the International Court of Justice as world court, etc.)⁹⁹ or of networks between the different branches of national governments—one network of legislators, one of judges, etc.¹⁰⁰ This would place the production and adjudication of private law in a framework that is familiar from historical experience with the nation states.¹⁰¹ A neo-Marxist interpretation holds that the western state will globalize into a global state or empire¹⁰² that would resemble the liberal state opposed by Marx, with a clear delimitation of the public and the private spheres.¹⁰³

Such political theories may or may not be convincing: what is undeniable is that global organizations are in fact exerting pressure on state private laws. The World Bank, for example, requires developing countries to adopt functioning private-law regimes, frequently

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¹⁰¹. It is thus the private law side of the call for a global constitution: Jürgen Habermas, Eine politische Verfassung für die pluralistische Weltgesellschaft?, in Jürgen Habermas, Naturalismus und Religion 324 (2005) [A Political Constitution for the Pluralist World Society? http://ptw.uchicago.edu/Habermas01.pdf].
¹⁰³. For application to law, see Susan Marks, Empire's Law, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 449 (2003); Antonio Negri, Postmodern Global Governance and The Critical Legal Project, 16 Law & Critique 27 (2005).
modelled after American law, in return for loans. In addition, it has begun to rank legal systems of all states according to their efficiency—with devastating results for some civil-law countries.\textsuperscript{104} That French scholars now protest against the methods involved and invoke the cultural and social values of their national private law\textsuperscript{105} highlights the tension between global regulation and regulatory competition on the one hand and state control over private law on the other.

2. Treaties. Absent a world state, the main tool for unifying private law is the treaty.\textsuperscript{106} So far, the dream of global private law unification has never been realized.\textsuperscript{107} Even the most important international text on private law, the U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), although it treats an intensely international field and is based on extensive preparatory studies in comparative law, has gained relatively marginal importance in legal practice and theory.\textsuperscript{108} Undeterred by such developments, the then-Secretary of UNCITRAL proposed work towards a Global Commercial Code.\textsuperscript{109} Whether such a global, relatively uniform private law can be created without strong global regulatory institutions remains to be seen.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{See} http://www.doingbusiness.org.


\textsuperscript{106} Jürgen Basedow, \textit{Vie Universelle, Droit National? À Propos de la Mondialisation du Droit, in De Tous Horizons, supra note 99, at 223, 229-32.}


\textsuperscript{108} This is true especially for the U.S.: Mathias Reimann, \textit{The CISG in the United States: Why It Has Been Neglected and Why Europeans Should Care}, 71 RABELSZ 115 (2007); for a recent overview, see \textit{The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond: Cases, Analysis, and Unresolved Issues in the U.N. Sales Convention} (I CILE Studies, 2005). In Europe, there is more case law and academic writing, but many lawyers still exclude the CISG regularly from international contracts.

3. Regulatory Competition. While these developments could lead to uniformity, global competition between private law regimes would require a plurality of private laws. Such competition differs from that in Europe on a crucial point: an overarching regulatory institution like the European Union is lacking in the global sphere; regulatory competition is unregulated. This means that states that are strong enough can apply their laws extraterritorially and thereby hamper the possibilities for private parties to opt out of their laws, whether through party autonomy or through physical relocation. We see this in the conduct of the U.S. and the E.U., both of which are unwilling externally to submit themselves to the regulatory competition they require internally from their respective member states. Similarly, the effect of party autonomy is more dramatic than in the European Union. On a global level, party autonomy turns the hierarchical relationship between the state and the individual upside down. In the traditional view, the individual is subordinated to the state, even in the realm of private law. By contrast, party autonomy subordinates the state and its private law to private parties and their choices. Parties are not confined to using the autonomy granted to them by the legal order; rather, they have the autonomy to choose the very legal order that grants this autonomy. All of this means that global private law will likely remain pluralistic and non-hierarchical, an important difference to a hierarchical state-based private law.

4. Americanization. Competition between private laws does not necessarily occur on a level playing field, for better or worse. If students of globalization often speak of “the state,” this is too general. Arguably, globalization strengthens big powerful states like the United States (and the E.U.), while weakening midsize states. In accordance with this view, some view globalization as an increased

110. Although the World Trade Organization is sometimes equated to the European Union, its impact is far smaller; this is true in particular with regard to private law. See also Josef Drexl, WTO und Privatrecht, in Vereinheitlichung und Diversität des Zivilrechts in transnationalen Wirtschaftsräumen 333-64 (Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schäfer eds., 2002); Christian Joerges, Constitutionalism in Postnational Constellations: Contrasting Social Regulation in the E.U. and in the WTO, in Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation 491 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Ptersmann eds., 2006).


113. Globalization can strengthen also small states, since it enables them to derive disproportionate revenues from lucrative transnational business like banking or registration of offshore corporations.
Americanization of the law in the world, including private law.\textsuperscript{114} Some private-law projects in Europe can be viewed as a reaction; they aim, implicitly or explicitly, at protecting European private law with its social aspects against such Americanization,\textsuperscript{115} while at the same time promoting European (and German) private law as a model for other states. If globalization weakens the power of mid-size states, then both the strengthening of the European Union and the Europeanization of private law can be viewed as reactions to globalization.\textsuperscript{116} The tension between U.S. and German private law is then also a tension over the role of specific states in private law, not just of the state in the abstract.

C. Privatization

All these developments concern the shift of state power to other states or global institutions. Yet, perhaps the most important development of globalization is the shift away from states altogether towards the private sphere. In a globalized world, in addition to states, an increasing number of non-state institutions—NGOs, multinational corporations, and individuals—are relevant international or transnational actors.\textsuperscript{117} In various ways and degrees, these have all become not only subjects and objects of international law, but also creators and shapers of law. Since these organizations are private, the resulting law is a kind of privatized private law that is independent from the state to the extent that the state does not interfere and is not required for its enforcement.

1. Transnational Legal Science. One consequence could be the emergence of a transnational legal science with a global academic debate and a worldwide community of courts. While some such developments can be observed in the human rights sector,\textsuperscript{118} similar developments in private law are made more difficult by the relative lack of common intellectual and cultural roots worldwide; even com-


\textsuperscript{118} See Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at I.3.
munication between German and U.S. law is sometimes riddled with misunderstandings. Nonetheless, one such development is occurring in the area of commercial law, in the form of academic restatements or private codifications of private law. Modelled after both European national codifications and the American Restatements, several different and sometimes competing private codifications exist on the global level. Whereas European private codifications offer themselves, at least in part, as models for a possible future European codification and thus for incorporation into the political system, worldwide models remain permanently outside the structure of states. They serve either as mere academic constructions or as potentially applicable law for international contracts, most importantly (up until now) in arbitration. Formally similar to "official" codifications but lacking a legislator's authority, they present a challenge to traditional concepts of private law: their character as "law" is disputed; their functions oscillate between potential and actual description and prescription.

2. Privately Created Orders. More controversial is the idea of privately created legal orders. Although various kinds of such orders are often presented indiscriminately, closer analysis identifies these orders as reflections of four different themes of globalization. The primacy of economy and markets, a favorite globalization topic, is reflected in the idea of a new lex mercatoria (law merchant), a transnational body of substantive rules created not by states but by the needs and practices of commerce and applied and developed by international arbitration. A second globalization theme, technolog-

121. MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW 273-300 (3d ed. 2005); but see supra note 109.
123. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
tical advances and the rise of the internet, corresponds to the conceptualization of private law created within the internet community. A third group of private laws substitutes community trust created by close religious or ethnic ties for the state's enforcement scheme and thereby exemplifies a move in globalization from territoriality to community affiliation. A fourth group, finally, contains private legal orders that are specific to certain functional sectors of world society; they reflect the move towards global functional systems: a transnational sport law (lex sportiva), a transnational construction law (lex constructionis), etc.

Both the existence and the legal character of all these orders are disputed. Much of the debate is inconclusive: it confounds conceptual analysis with questions of validity and legitimacy, and throws together issues of general acceptance, legal validity, intrinsic quality, and of definition. Obviously, privately created private law can only be called "law" if the concept of law is not confined to state-created orders; whether such a definition is useful depends on the context.

131. Many opinions are more absolute. Legal pluralists insist that restricting the notion of "law" to state law is unacceptable; e.g., Brian Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society 192 (2001). Opponents insist that definitions must include the state if they are to have any explanatory power; see Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68 MOD. L. REV. 1, 13-17 (2005) For a thorough analysis, pointing out that the answer depends on the purpose for which law is to be determined, see Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who's Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 37, 39-42 (2002); see also Ralf Michaels, The Re-
More important is the actual relation of these private orders to the state, especially the question whether they provide the applicable norms in a choice-of-law analysis. Traditionally, states have been unanimous in rejecting the applicability of non-state private laws in choice of law; demands to the contrary have so far remained unheeded. This attitude may be changing at least for quasi-official private codifications: a recent proposal for a European regulation on choice of law in contracts would allow parties to choose private codifications like the UNIDROIT Principles over state law as the law applicable to their contracts. This would be a triumph for privately made, non-state law, which could achieve an equal footing with state-made private law. However, it would also be a victory (not yet realized by all) for state-made private law as the model for what can be accepted as law: privatized private law will only be recognized when it appears as a code, sufficiently similar, in form and substance, to state law.

D. The Decline of the State and the Rise of Private Law?

What broader effects do these developments have for private law? Harold Koh convincingly argues that what he calls transnational legal process “breaks down two traditional dichotomies that have historically dominated the study of international [and, one could add, domestic] law: between domestic and international, public and private.” However, whereas Koh follows the legal realists’ example and breaks the dichotomy for the benefit of a broadened con-

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Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1224-27, 1258-59 (2005). A yet unresearched question is whether there is a parallel between state-based conceptions of law and an emphasis on public law on the one hand, and between non-state-based conceptions of law and an emphasis on private law on the other hand.

132. Michaels, supra note 131.


136. Koh, supra note 1, at 184; similarly BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 83-84 (2d ed. 2002).

137. Supra note 60.
cept of public law, it may be more plausible to turn the realist project on its head and break the dichotomy on the other side: In the domestic sphere, all law may really be public; in the global sphere, all law is, arguably, really private. The legal realists had to assume, tacitly, that the state is strong enough to regulate all ostensible private law as public law. To view the abstention from intervening in the private sphere as a form of regulation, as Robert Hale did, makes sense only when this abstention is the result of a political (public) decision, not of inability. Yet inability is exactly what globalists now argue characterizes the state: states are so weak, compared to other, non-state actors on the world scene, that they yield much of their sovereign power to the forces of the market—regulatory competition, public-private partnerships, privatization, etc. All domestic law may become public law, but all international law becomes transnational private law. It is especially the relative independence from government traditionally enjoyed by private law that makes it a likely candidate for the supranational situation without a government.

Such a rebirth of autonomous private law is reminiscent of the autonomous private law of 19th-century liberalism, but it differs in a crucial way. Then, the autonomy was possible because a strong state was willing and able to grant this autonomy. Now, the monolithic state that could grant this autonomy has given way to a multitude of public and private actors, and the new autonomy of private law takes place not in the presence and under the protection of a state but rather in, and due to, its absence. This makes the idea that private law can remain essentially unchanged both implausible and unattractive. That private law could remain essentially free of “public” values has always been an illusion, but it had at least a grain of plausibility when the provision of such values and control could be exterior.

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139. Supra note 56.


141. The literature on this question is expansive. For two critical analyses, see Klaus Günther, (Zivil-)Recht. Kann das Zivilrecht im Zuge der Globalisierung das öffentliche Recht ersetzen?, in Rechtsverfassungsrecht. Recht-Fertigung zwischen Privatrechtsdogmatik und Gesellschaftstheorie 295 (Christian Joerges & Günther Teubner eds., 2002); Christoph Möllers, Transnational Governance without a Public Law? in Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism 329 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004).

142. This in turn represented an inheritance of earlier times when private law had been largely beyond the reach of public domination; Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4. See also Michaels, supra note 131, at 1236-37.
nalized to the state and to public law. Such externalization has now become more difficult. In the European Union, the task of providing “social values” can be assigned from the member states to the E.U. level, or vice versa, from the E.U. to the member states. On a global level, since there is no state to provide essentially “public” values, it is unclear where the public values to enrich and legitimize private law should originate.

This does not mean that globalized private law cannot contain any values beyond those of the market. Perhaps, the new private law must develop the necessary values within itself, as genuine private law values. Along these lines, proposals have been made to constitutionalize global private law—not in the traditional sense of constraints from an external (state) constitution, but rather, in accordance with the idea of a constitution beyond the state, in the sense that private law must itself turn into a constitutional order. Whether globalized private law can develop the necessary values within its own rationality is perhaps the most pressing question.

IV. Issues

It should have become clear that private law requires rethinking, especially with regard to its connection to the state. That being so, much of our traditional conception of private law is called into question: its validity as an enactment of the state or a national tradition, its method as a coherent and hierarchical structure, its legitimacy through democratic enactment or as an embodiment of private rights protected by the state, its autonomy as a distinct branch of law.


These issues—validity, method, legitimacy and autonomy of globalized law—are frequently debated with regard to globalization, but typically with a focus on public law. This section highlights the special role of private law with regard to these issues and proposes structures for addressing these issues.

A. Validity

The first question is central especially to German legal thinking: what counts as valid private law. Three concepts must be distinguished: juridical validity requires issuance in the duly prescribed way by a duly authorized organ; sociological validity requires that law is effectively obeyed and enforced; ethical validity requires that law is morally justified. Juridical validity of law, including private law, has traditionally been based on the state’s authority; even if the state does not create the substance of private law, it is law only because the state accepts it as such. This poses obvious problems when private law moves beyond the state.

1. Sociological Validity. One answer is to substitute sociological or ethical for juridical validity. Legal pluralists suggest that we recognize privately made norms as law because of their sociological effectiveness. This suggestion is not entirely new—historically, non-state normative orders have long posed a challenge to the state. Nor does it necessarily lead to radically different outcomes—states have always effectively recognized non-state normative orders even though they denied them the character of “law,” notably through incorporation, deference, and delegation. What makes this answer radical is the suggestion to give up the traditional concept of juridical validity and replace it with sociological validity. This has always been perceived as risky, as is evidenced by the historical desire in centuries past to find for the law’s validity a juridical criterion of authority beyond effectiveness and correctness, however fictional. One reason is that social effectiveness is difficult to determine empirically. In addition, to consider a norm legally binding because it is practically effective requires a problematical is/ought crossover.

2. Ethical Validity. Other authors propose a quasi-natural concept of private law beyond the state, based on practical reasoning and

149. Michaels, supra note 122, at 612-22.
150. See, e.g., Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at II.2 (lex mercatoria).
151. Michaels, supra note 131, at 1231-37.
152. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at II.3.
moral principles, and thereby suggest effectively substituting ethical for juridical validity. Such an idea of reasoning underlies not only some proposals for a new *ius commune*; arguably, a similar idea is implicit in proposals for a global private law based on economic efficiency or global utility maximization as objective goals. Although economics and natural law have vastly different values, both agree that law should be shaped by objective values extrinsic to the lawmaker's description. If private law is autonomous from political considerations, then dispensing with juridical validity may be less problematic than for public law, where a disentanglement of validity from the political process appears more unattractive. Whether private law is, or should be, autonomous in this sense is a different and prior question.

3. *Rethinking Juridical Validity.* Another answer is not to replace juridical validity but to rethink it. If juridical validity is defined through issuance in the duly prescribed way by a duly authorized organ, then it is not necessarily tied to the state—supranational or non-state organs may be duly authorized as well. However, the criterion of a duly authorized organ raises an immediate follow-up question, both within and outside the state: According to what standard is the organ duly authorized? And how does this standard in turn achieve validity? Obviously, juridical validity leads into infinite chains of justification. There are three ways to break such chains: they can be continued into infinity; they can be broken at some point where a foundation is simply assumed as an axiom; or they can become circular.

Can the chain of justification for private law be continued into infinity? While infinite reasoning is logically impossible, a fiction of infinity is frequently found. The common law, at least in its English version, adopts a variant when its validity is based on tradition since time immemorial. Similarly, when the justification for a new *ius commune* is sought in the long European intellectual tradition, this is based on the fiction of an infinite chain of justification.

More frequent are attempts to break the chain of justification at one point that is used as an axiom. For state private law, this axiom lies typically in the state—in either a Kelsenian *Grundnorm* or a Hartian rule of recognition. However, there is no good reason why the only *Grundnorm* or rule of recognition should exist within the state—


155. Under English common law, customs could be recognized as law if they had existed since "time immemorial." Although this appears to represent an infinite chain of justification, in fact the chain was broken more or less arbitrarily for the year 1189 by the English Statute of Westminster in 1275.
especially for private law, which is already relatively independent from the state. For Europe, some have already argued for an interplay of two Grundnorms—one of the European Union, the other of the member states.156 Moreover, once we establish the Grundnorm as a mere analytical tool, there is no intrinsic reason why it should be confined to traditional states.157 The same is true for Hartian rules of recognition. If legal pluralists are correct in stating that people owe allegiance to numerous different normative orders, this suggests the existence of various rules recognition that can validate both state and non-state laws.158 The result is a situation with multiple overlapping private law orders, arguably not an inadequate conceptualization of global private law.

Finally, circular chains of justification are gaining new attraction for globalization. Autopoietic theory holds that law, in particular private law, is able to create and maintain itself through a self-recurring, autopoietic process.159 This process gains special force for non-state law. Since autopoietic theory makes it possible to conceive of various legal orders that establish themselves outside the state, it has, not surprisingly, welcomed globalization discourse (albeit typically under the heading of world society).160 The law is no longer con-


158. But see Massimo La Torre, Legal Pluralism as Evolutionary Achievement of Community Law, 12 Ratio Juris 182 (1999) (arguing that legal pluralism in the E.U. requires a single rule of recognition).


ceived as a hierarchical structure; rather, different legal systems interact in a network. At the same time, this theory, based in sociology, may be open to the same criticism as the criterion of social effectiveness—an is/ought crossover.

B. Method

If private law is plural, this poses challenges for our methods, many of which have been developed in the context of state private law. A debate has begun on whether these methods are still appropriate for private law beyond the state, especially in the European context, but much remains to be done.

1. Beyond Domestic Law. A first challenge to traditional methods goes against their domestic character—not only in Germany, where the highest methodological criterion is typically the legislature’s real or hypothetical will, but also in the U.S., where the common law is viewed as the expression of a sovereign’s will rather than a pie in the transnational sky. This domestic focus must obviously be adapted for binding supranational law. Especially in Europe, this presents challenges regarding the relationship and manifold conflicts between E.U. and national private law. However, even beyond such supra-

national law, scholars argue that the interdependence among states and their legal systems makes the use of comparative law mandatory—not only for harmonized law in the European Union, but in general. This use can rest on an (implicit) assumption that a pan-European, or even global, private law exists, but even a pluralist conception of global private law requires exchange.

2. Coherence. Another issue concerns the question of coherence of legal systems, dear to German private law in the 19th and 20th centuries, but far less important in the United States. Some consider systematic private law irreconcilable with the ethical pluralism of our postmodern time. Yet, the opposite view seems at least equally plausible: only a systematic and coherent law can mediate between the otherwise irreconcilable and incommensurable ethical positions of our pluralist society. National societies were hardly more coherent in the 19th century, the age of codification and systematic legal thought, than today’s global society. One difference was that states were able to bring coherence through their highest courts; this was true for England since the late 12th century and for Germany in the 19th. However, the absence of central courts beyond the state does not rule out the creation of coherence altogether. One possibility is codification, in the form of treaties or an official global commercial code, or, following the model of Restatements in the U.S., in the form of unofficial restatements that try to create the same degree of coherence. A second possibility is the “global com-

europäischen Privatrecht, in REchtsverfassungsrecht, supra note 141, at 213 [IN-
Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning,
11 EUR. L.J. 766 (2005)].
164. See supra note 83.
165. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at I.3, also for English cases.
166. Michaels, supra note 21, with references.
168. Thomas Wilhelmssohn, The Ethical Pluralism of Late Modern Europe and Cod-
ification of European Contract Law, in THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW,
supra note 83, at 121, 136, 141; but see also William N.R. Lucy, The Crises of Private
Law, in FROM DISONANCE TO SENSE, supra note 138, at 177, 180-95 (such an argu-
ment is “seriously under-developed”).
169. Erhard Denninger, Recht und rechtliche Verfahren als Klammer in einer mul-
tikulturellen Gesellschaft, in Summa. Dieter Simon zum 70. Geburtstag 117 (Rainer
Maria Kiesow et al. eds., 2005); see also Robert Chr. van Ooyen, Der Staat der
(2d ed. 1988); Elmar Wadle, Hüter der Rechtseinheit: Aufgabe und Last des Reichsge-
richts im Lichte der kaiserlichen Verordnung vom 28. September 1879, in VERFAH-
RENDSRECHT AM AUSGANG DES 20. JAHRRUNDERTS. Festschrift für Gerhard Lüke
ZUM 70. Geburtstag 897 (1997); see also Heinz Mohnhaupt, Rechtseinheit durch
Jahrhundert in Deutschland, 19 RÄTSHISTORIIKA STUDIERT 117 (1993).
171. See Ralf Michaels, Three Paradigms of Legal Unification: National, Interna-
172. Supra note 109.
173. Supra notes 89, 120.
munity of courts”—a dialogue between different courts that see themselves as world courts.174

A third possibility is the development of a transnational legal science that supplements comparative law with doctrinal analysis in order to formulate adequate transnational legal concepts and rules. A new transnational legal science would first identify and adequately describe common normative structures even where legal systems disagree on specific rules and decide concrete cases divergently. It could then, in a second step, reconstruct the divergent doctrinal approaches as different answers to common legal problems. These problems, together with these divergent approaches, would become the basis of transnational legal knowledge, and possibly of a transnational legal doctrine.175

3. Pluralism. To the extent that coherence and uniformity cannot (or should not) be brought about, private law method will have to deal with plurality and the lack of a hierarchical system. Here, U.S. law, which has long dealt with plurality of lawmakers and judiciaries, may provide useful experience that German law, with its traditional emphasis on coherence, is lacking. Additional experience can come from conflict of laws, which has long dealt with plurality of legal systems—provided it can be developed to deal adequately with the challenges of globalization.176 Indeed, some methodologies of European and global private law explicitly endorse conflict of laws methods.177

C. Legitimacy

Legitimacy is not the same as validity. Legitimacy implies there is a reason for respecting a body of law other than the authority by which it was created, be it the authority of tradition or that of enactment. One reason for regarding private law as legitimate is that it protects private rights against usurpation by the state. A different reason is that it represents the judgment of a democratic state of the proper scope of private rights and the requirements of the common good. New developments have weakened one of these reasons and strengthened the other.

1. Substantive Legitimacy. As long as the legitimacy of the state with its monopoly of creation and administration of law were unquestioned, all private law authorized by the state was automatically le-

174. Slaughter, supra note 100, at 29, 231-35 (2004); Michaels, supra note 128, at 53.
175. See Jansen, supra note 88.
gitimate (with exceptions for fully ineffective or repulsive law).\textsuperscript{178} Whether state private law remains legitimate beyond the state is more doubtful. First, state law is typically aimed at domestic situations; arguably, this makes it inappropriate for transnational situations and transactions. Second, if regulatory competition has reduced the states' legislative discretion, states can no longer provide certain norms deemed desirable, for example norms aimed at the protection of weaker parties. This loss of discretion weakens the legitimacy of state private law.

Is private law beyond the state more legitimate? Supranational and transnational private law can take nondomestic concerns into account; this is one reason why many consider treaties like the CISG and private legal orders like \textit{lex mercatoria} intrinsically superior to domestic private law. Also, since supranational law can provide a framework for regulatory competition between state laws, it can guarantee the protection of the weaker parties. E.U. law, for example, guarantees a certain degree of mandatory consumer protection throughout Europe and thereby isolates it from the effects of competition.

2. \textit{Democratic Legitimacy.} A general criticism voiced against law outside the state is that such law lacks democratic legitimacy. To some extent, the democratic idea that everybody who is affected by a rule should have a say, at least indirectly, in its creation, can be transferred to the transnational sphere.\textsuperscript{179} The binding force of transnational contracts between the parties, for example, can be legitimized even without a state; the same is true for the application of \textit{lex mercatoria} to the community of merchants, provided \textit{lex mercatoria} is truly a creation of the community of merchants.\textsuperscript{180} However, large areas of law are not rooted in close communities; without a democratic mechanism, it is difficult to ensure that all parties affected by certain norms have a chance to be heard in their creation. Here, disputes over the legitimacy of norms must be resolved by other means—market solutions or ethical discourse.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{178} ALEXY, \textsc{Begriff und Geltung des Rechts}, \textit{supra} note 147, at 201 [\textsc{The Argument from Injustice} 89-94].


\textsuperscript{180} Teubner, \textit{supra} note 160.

\textsuperscript{181} For such an attempt, based on Habermas's discourse theory, see Klaus Günther, \textit{Legal Pluralism and the Universal Code of Legality: Globalisation as a Problem of Legal Theory} 13-17 (2003), http://www.law.nyu.edu/clplt/program2003/readings/gunther.pdf; see also Jens Steffek, \textit{Sources of Legitimacy Beyond the State: A View from International Relations}, in \textsc{Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism}, \textit{supra} note 141, at 81.
These are important challenges, but arguably, the lack of democratic legitimation presents fewer new problems for private law. At least from a historical perspective, the legitimacy of private law was never fully linked to democracy. Even within the state, the substance of most private law is determined by experts rather than by popular will.\footnote{182. Grafl-Peter Calliess, Weitgehende Übereinstimmung und laufendes Programm. Zur Legitimation von Privatrecht im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, in Rechtsangleichung. Grundlagen, Methoden und Inhalte, 115 (Karl Riesenhuber & Kanako Takayama eds., 2006).} Moreover, private law has always retained some autonomy from state control: the common law developed largely outside the government's control, and even codifications have always consisted, to a large degree, of mere restatements of legal developments and ideas developed outside the structures of the state. The codification grants these developments and ideas legislative authority, but it does not prevent subsequent development of the law, which, again, is largely at the hands of courts and scholars. In this historical view, that the new private law lacks democratic legitimacy may seem shocking but is nothing novel. Even in the democratic state, much private law has always drawn at least part of its legitimacy from substantive considerations developed by jurists and judges outside democratically legitimized lawmaking. Remembering this should help address the legitimacy of globalized and privatized private law.

D. Autonomy

A final issue concerns the autonomy of private law—from public law and values, from the state and from politics, and from non-legal disciplines and rationalities.\footnote{184. See, in more detail, Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4.} Moving beyond the state has ambivalent results for all three aspects.

On the one hand, there are clear indications that "classical" private law has lost its traditional autonomy. Its autonomy from public law has long been lost in the United States;\footnote{185. Gunther Teubner, Nach der Privatisierung: Diskurskonflikte im Privatrecht, 19 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 8 (1998) [After Privatization? The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 51 Curr. Leg. Probs. 393 (1998)].} in Germany today, this autonomy is based largely on contingent sociological factors, such as the organization of the judiciary and academia, rather than on intrinsic differences of legal values.\footnote{186. Supra part II.B.} Europeanization and globalization may restrict the states' impact on private law, but similar activities are now moving up to transnational bodies, be they the European Union or the World Bank, so autonomy from the political sphere is still not achieved. Finally, doctrine is increasingly relying interdisciplinarily on other sciences, especially on the economic

\footnote{183. Jansen & Michaels supra note 4, II.6., at n.252 et seq.}
analysis of law;\textsuperscript{187} thus, private law scholarship may lose its autonomy vis-à-vis other academic disciplines.\textsuperscript{188}

On the other hand, counter-developments may result in an increase of the law's autonomy. For example, if it is true that \textit{lex mercatoria} and international arbitration serve only individual, private interests,\textsuperscript{189} then this form of private dispute resolution leads to a strict autonomy against all third-party interests and against the public sphere.\textsuperscript{190} In addition, the emergence of international principles of private law and of transnational legal discourse favors a new autonomy of private law against the state. Once legal knowledge and doctrinal arguments become transnational, they transcend their origin in state laws and become independent not just from individual states but from the state in general. Finally, increasing interdisciplinarity of legal doctrine creates a new kind of autonomy: if economic reasoning now occupies the position that traditional legal doctrine had to give up,\textsuperscript{191} it also inherits the autonomy previously maintained by doctrinal private law. Legal arguments based on economic analysis make it difficult for the government to interfere with private law, since it is constrained, both in its lawmaking and in the interpretation of its acts, by considerations of economic efficiency.

V. Beyond the State?

If private law is no longer regarded as autonomous, valid, legitimate, and doctrinally coherent for the same reasons as in the past, we must ask what form it will take in the future. Although the questions and answers collected up until now are diverse, the answers to

\textsuperscript{187} This is true even for Germany; see Roland Kirstein, \textit{Law and Economics in Germany}, in 1 \textit{Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, 160 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000); Wagner, supra note 60; but see Christian Kirchner, \textit{The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany}, 11 \textit{Int'l Rev. L. & Econ.} 277 (1991). At the same time, law and economics starts to spur more disillusionment in the U.S.; see Anita Bernstein, \textit{Whatever Happened to Law and Economics}, 64 Md. L. Rev. 303 (2005).


\textsuperscript{190} This corresponds to ideas behind the classical will theory of contract law, similarly developed for a private law autonomous from the state and collective interests. James Gordley, \textit{The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine} 109-10 (1991); Reinhard Zimmermann, \textquoteleft{}Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter . . .\textquoteright{} 193 AcP (1993) 121, 129 et seq.; see also Jansen, supra note 86, at 25-26 with further references; Charles Fried, \textit{Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligations} (1981); Duncan Kennedy, \textit{From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller\textquotesingle{}s \textquoteleft{}Consideration and Form\textquoteright{}}, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 94 (2000).

the various questions can be grouped along the different roles the state plays in them.

A. Revolution

A first possibility is the end of private law, at least as deriving its validity, method, legitimacy, and autonomy from the state. Private transactions might be structured by entirely different means. This first possibility, here called revolution, adopts the (early) views of globalization as decline of the state and rejects concepts of private law insofar as they are based on the state. If Europeanization and globalization lead to a new paradigm of law, then private law can and should be rethought from the ground up. One prognosis in this camp is that law will cease altogether and that private transactions will be structured entirely by non-legal means.\textsuperscript{192} The idea of private law, especially, must yield to instrumental concerns.\textsuperscript{193} Another prognosis is that we should stretch our understanding of what constitutes private law beyond traditional boundaries. One example can be found in the idea, prominent for some time in the 1990s, that an entity like the internet not only requires new law but in fact itself constitutes its own legal order, since it regulates and structures private conduct in the same way as private law.\textsuperscript{194} In this view, the internet is viewed as autonomous and independent from the state, indeed as "sovereign"—the state cannot, nor should it, regulate it; the internet regulates itself. Instead of doctrine, the internet uses technological architecture for its creation and maintenance, but this architecture is analogous to legal doctrine:\textsuperscript{195} access rights are property rights, computers can enter into contracts as agents,\textsuperscript{196} and so on. Legitimacy and validity of this autonomous internet lie in an anarchical (i.e., non-state) ideal of self-determination and self-regulation, and in its opportunities for the creation of transnational communities. The virtual worlds of the internet create their own law.\textsuperscript{197}

Some may see great creative potential in such debates; others may dismiss them as plainly absurd. Regardless of these evaluations,

\textsuperscript{192} Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex Perschbacher, \textit{The End of Law}, 84 B.U.L. Rev. 1 (2004); see also the final sentence of Luhmann, supra note 35.

\textsuperscript{193} Brian Tamanaha, \textit{Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law} (2006).

\textsuperscript{194} See the discussion in Michaels, supra note 131, at 1215-18; for similar ideas for markets, see Peter Dombrowski & Richard Mansbach, \textit{From Sovereign States to Sovereign Markets?, in Global Society in Transition} 111 (Daniel N. Nelson & Laura Neack eds., 2002); Werner F. Ebke, \textit{Märkte machen Recht—auch Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht}, in \textit{Festschrift für Marcus Lutter} 17 (2000).

\textsuperscript{195} Lawrence Lessig, \textit{Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace} 6 (1999) with further references.


it is worth remembering that revolutionary fervor often turns into restoration and that predictions that the law is coming to an end have been made again and again in history and so far failed to come true; this makes current predictions for an end of law less likely.\textsuperscript{198} Perhaps all that comes to an end is a certain way of thinking about the law. Similarly, ideas about an autonomous internet as its own normative order have become less plausible once it became clear that traditional law can, and does, regulate the internet. Even the virtual worlds of online games have their ultimate impact in the real world.

\textbf{B. Resistance}

A second possibility is that we may once more regard private law much as we did traditionally. This is the flipside of revolution—resistance, the continuance of private law theory and practice under the state paradigm as before. Resistance is less ignorant than it is sometimes presented. Globalization is not unavoidable or predetermined; it may prove to be overrated.\textsuperscript{199} Especially its impact on the content of private law may be minimal—either because private law has always been detached from the state and is therefore already optimal for globalization, or because a state-based concept of private law can deal perfectly well with the challenges of globalization. The state already has norms for dealing with transnational private law in its rules on conflict of laws; the globalization of conflict of laws (or the use of conflict of laws for globalization) could be a way to keep substantive private law intact. After all, globalization is to no small degree shaped by the conduct of states, and states may well succeed in re-domesticating issues that are currently thought to escape regulation through individual states' private law.\textsuperscript{200} Furthermore, the jury is still out as to whether state private law is really less attractive than globalized private law, whether state courts are really less attractive than either arbitration\textsuperscript{201} or potential supranational


\textsuperscript{199} See Hannes Lacher, Putting the State in its Place: the Critique of State-Centrism and its Limits, 29 Rev. of Int'l Studies 521 (2003).


courts. The state might well survive globalization and take its private law with it.

Resistance of traditional private law to globalization may be possible. What seems no longer possible, however, is to conceive of private law as state law as though this were a natural or necessary connection. One irreversible result of globalization and Europeanization discourse is that we can no longer equate law with state law without justification. The forceful defense of national codifications in Germany and France against the possibility of a European codification is a sign that the need to justify state private law is being recognized.

C. Regression

A third possibility is to deal with the challenges of post-state private law by regressing to the model of pre-state private law. Private law was once independent from the state—if only because there was no state in the modern sense. Several different concepts of pre-state private law, explored at more length elsewhere, offer themselves as models for postnational private law. Roman law contains two: a doctrinal private law that exists essentially separately from the state, and *ius gentium* that exists separately even from the Roman society and represents a general private law of the world. Medieval European law seems another attractive candidate—the multiplicity of overlapping legal orders and claims to jurisdiction is a feature some find again in globalization, as is the lack of a clear distinction between private and public law. The *ius commune*, the learned law of the European Continent that combined secular and canon law and transcended boundaries and local statutes, is used as a model for our contemporary private law in Europe. The *lex mercatoria*, the legal rules created in and by international trade, (alleg-

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204. Pensee juridique francaise et harmonisation europeenne du droit (Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2003).
207. Although the development of the law lay in the hands of an official, the prae-
tor, his actual role for the development of private law was limited: Jansen & Michaels, *id*.
208. Harold J. Berman, *Is Conflict of Laws Becoming Passé?*, in BALANCING OF IN-
ERESTS: LIBER AMICORUM PETER HAY ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 43-48 (Hans-Eric Rasmu-
sen et al. eds., 2005).
www.bepress.com/gi/advances/vol2/iss1/art1.
211. *Supra* note 88.
edly) independently from state laws, have found proponents for a rebirth.212 Finally, the common law may offer itself as a model.213

If these old ideas can be used for our times at all, they require modification. Some of the historical models are themselves doubtful. Whether a substantive lex mercatoria ever existed has become dubious;214 the ius commune was a common academic language rather than a uniform set of rules applied uniformly before courts.215 In addition, some of the historical models were based on presumptions and presuppositions that are no longer valid. Natural law has become doubtful because we can agree neither on one transcendent norm-giver (let alone on the rules such a norm-giver would create), nor on principles of rationality that are both universal enough to apply to all humanity worldwide and specific enough to create more than just abstract and general principles. Similarly, the faith in the norm-generating force of tradition, underlying both the common law and the historical school in Germany, has been shattered by the ruptures of revolution and perversion of the law. Nevertheless, all these concerns notwithstanding, the detailed historical experience with old versions of non-state private law should be invaluable for a possible new version of non-state private law.

D. Reproduction

A fourth possibility is to reproduce on a supranational level the form of state-based private law with which we are already familiar.216 One example is the return of codification. The proclaimed age of “decodification,” in which codes became less important and the emphasis of law moved to regulatory statutes, gave way to a recodification: numerous countries are either codifying their private law for the first time, or even reforming their codifications. The European Union for some time seemed willing to codify private law; now it prefers a frame of reference whose only function would likely be to provide a doctrinal and conceptual background for European private law thinking. The World Bank proclaims the “rule of law” as a necessary requirement for economic success, and often this requires the implementation of legal rules. But codification is taking place outside of states and “official law” as well. The lex mercatoria, whose main quality was once said to be its flexibility and independence from doc-


214. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at II.2; Michaels, supra note 124, both with references.

215. Id., text accompanying note 154.

trinal concepts, is now being codified—either as relatively static codifications of unclear normative force or as "creeping codification." The Code, once thought quintessential to private law in the state, is translated into realms outside the state.

Reproduction can be unconscious when scholars apply their traditional understanding without asking to what extent it is based on the state. Yet, reproduction can also be a conscious attempt at translating this understanding to a new environment. Conscious reproduction is frequent in the realm of Europeanization. Since the European Union performs many of the same functions as the nation state on a higher level, it is not surprising that much debate on European private law repeats debates of private law within the state. Sometimes such repetition comes explicitly, for example when the codification debate between Thibaut and Savigny is reinvoked (which itself was in no small part a debate over the role of the state in the creation of private law). More often, it comes only implicitly, when expectations directed at private law in the European Union mirror those we are used to from the state, without any consideration of the possibly different framework.

Reproducing state-based concepts of private law is not automatically inappropriate beyond the state; the experience from state-based private law is undoubtedly valuable. However, it must be kept in mind that certain background conditions existing within the state are lacking beyond the state, for example a centralized court system, a common legal heritage, and so on. As a consequence, reasoning that makes perfect sense within the state may lose its justification beyond the state. Naïve reproduction is likely to be inadequate.

E. Renovation

The four possibilities just mentioned are based in different ways on experience of the past. A fifth possibility is renovation: although the past shapes the future in some way, history will take us in a direction that does not resemble the past and which we cannot envision entirely on the basis of our past experience. In this category of an-

217. Michaels, supra note 122.
219. Supra note 85.
swers, the state is just one stage in the development of the world;\textsuperscript{221} codification is just a ripple in the stream of legal development.\textsuperscript{222} The common law has always reacted gradually to changes in its environment (even if such change was not always immediately visible).\textsuperscript{223} Likewise, the civil law develops over time through judicial and scholarly interpretation—before the code, under the code, and, potentially, after the code.\textsuperscript{224} Our experience with the state makes a simple return to a pre-state situation implausible, but in turn our experience with a pre-state situation may save private law against a possible decline of the state. Within this category of responses, it should be possible to combine experiences from \textit{ius commune} and from codification, from traditional common law and from the legislation of the New Deal, and to use them towards mastering the challenges from globalization and privatization.

Undoubtedly, there are problems with evolutionary models. One model is evolutionary determinism that makes a certain development look like a necessity, be it a trajectory via the European Union\textsuperscript{225} to some kind of world state\textsuperscript{226} and via European law towards world law,\textsuperscript{227} be it a trajectory through ever-growing privatization towards an ever-growing multitude of overlapping legal orders, or be it a steady decline of western law and law in general.\textsuperscript{228} Such evolutionary determinism has rightly been criticized for importing a teleological element into a predictive theory of law.\textsuperscript{229} Another model is critical rationalism, in which learning from the past and its mistakes helps us create law that comes ever closer to the ideal, although we can never know that ideal.\textsuperscript{230} Such a model can be criticized as overestimating the potential of reason, especially in the highly complex world and law of Europeanization and globalization. A third model of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{221} van Creveld, \textit{supra} note 97, at 415.
  \item \textsuperscript{223} S.F.C. Milsom, \textit{A Natural History of the Common Law} (2001).
  \item \textsuperscript{224} The best study on the evolution of (civil) law is Marc Amstutz, \textit{Evolutorisches Wirtschaftsrecht: Vorstudien zum Recht und seiner Methode in den Diskurskollisionen der Marktgemeinschaft} (2002).
  \item \textsuperscript{226} \textit{Supra} part III.B.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{227} For example, E.U. law is sometimes viewed as a model for WTO law; see, e.g., \textit{The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade?} (Joseph H.H. Weiler ed., 2000); Joerges, \textit{supra} note 110.
  \item \textsuperscript{228} \textit{Supra} note 198 with references.
  \item \textsuperscript{230} Karl Popper, \textit{Logik der Forschung} (1934); \textit{The Logic of Scientific Discovery} (1959); Albert, \textit{supra} note 154.
\end{itemize}
evolution comes from systems theory, which describes the evolution of law as neither predetermined nor intrinsically good, but rather as a contingent development, in which how exactly the future takes place before the background of the past is unpredictable.\textsuperscript{231} This model has been criticized as politically conservative and for leaving insufficient room for individual actions.\textsuperscript{232}

Despite these methodological concerns, renovation is in many ways the most plausible development for private law. Part of this plausibility derives from its breadth and the variety of actual developments possible within it. But although its general core may sound banal, it is relevant and not obvious: the future of private law is unpredictable in its details. It likely will not look like it's past nor like a negation of that past. Nonetheless, it will be shaped by that past, and knowledge of that past will be helpful to master its challenges.

\section{VI. Conclusion}

The primary aim of this article has been one of organization—to draw together and structure disparate and fragmented debates, and to raise questions that come to light from this organization. Nonetheless, some more general results have emerged.

First, the two assumptions listed in the introduction are both unhelpful; it has become clear that private law requires rethinking, since its roots in the state can no longer be assumed as self-evident. This is obvious for private law outside the state—supranational or non-national, "privatized," private law. However, such rethinking is necessary for the state's private law, too. The state can no longer (if it ever could) be viewed as an all-encompassing entity; it stands in a complex relation with other institutional and social orders, supranational and non-national. This insight makes it hard to argue that private law must ultimately be legitimized and validated entirely by the state. At the same time, seeing how different state private law is from non-state private law makes it hard to argue that private law can be discussed without reference to the state.

Second, the challenges for private law are at least in part different from those for public law. On the one hand, some concerns, like the validity and legitimacy of non-state-law, are less pressing than in public law, because private law is not concerned only with issues of regulation and government. On the other hand, the fact that private law is so often discussed without explicit regard to the role of the state makes it difficult to discuss private law beyond the state. In contrast to public lawyers, who are used to arguing explicitly within the state and therefore know well which of the state's structures

\textsuperscript{231} Supra note 224; see also the contributions to “Debatte” in Vols. 1 & 2 of RECHTSGESCHICHTE.

\textsuperscript{232} Allan C. Hutchinson, Evolution and the Common Law (2005).
should be replicated or avoided beyond the state, private lawyers have yet to learn which state structures matter.

Third, private law beyond the state is bound to be less coherent and hierarchical, at least to some degree, than private law within the state. This raises new problems for those who seek clear and predictable answers. At the same time, it creates opportunities for those who advocate solutions based on a variety of sources: once private law overcomes its necessary connection with the state, arguments from comparative law, ethics, even economics, present fewer intrinsic problems than within the legal positivism of state private law. Whether freeing private law from the state is an advantage or a disadvantage for private law will ultimately depend on whether satisfactory methods for dealing with the new pluralism can be developed; this is not yet the case.

Fourth, knowledge about the history of private law will be especially helpful for mastering future challenges, beyond the general usefulness of such knowledge. History not only helps in understanding the contemporary relation of private law and the state, which is contingent yet real. Furthermore, experiences with private law, both before the state and under the state, provide us with structures in which we can think fruitfully about private law today; they can also provide a background against which we can evaluate how we should think about private law beyond the state.

These insights are general; they do not resolve more specific questions and problems of private law beyond the state. At the same time, we are convinced that these specific questions and problems cannot be addressed adequately without a clearer conception of what private law beyond the state might be about. This article is a plea for a more general, all-encompassing debate of the effects of Europeanization, globalization, and privatization on the law in general and private law in particular. It should start, not end, such debates.