EUROPEAN VERSUS AMERICAN LIBERTY: A COMPARATIVE PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF ANTITERRORISM DATA MINING

FRANCESCA BIGNAMI*

Abstract: It is common knowledge that privacy in the market and the media is protected less in the United States than in Europe. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it has become obvious that the right to privacy in the government sphere too is protected less in the United States than in Europe. This Article brings alive the legal difference by considering the case—real in the United States, hypothetical in Europe—of a spy agency’s database of call records, created for the purpose of identifying potential terrorists. Under U.S. law such an antiterrorism database might very well be legal. But under European law the very same database would clearly be illegal. Numerous barriers to transatlantic cooperation on fighting terrorism and cross-border crime have been created by this legal difference. The Article considers the reasons for the transatlantic difference—surprising in view of the common wisdom that Americans are more suspicious of government interferences with individual liberty than are Europeans. Based on the transatlantic comparison, this Article concludes with a number of recommendations for the reform of U.S. information privacy law, chief among them being the creation of an independent privacy agency.

INTRODUCTION

On April 9, 1940, the Nazis occupied Norway.¹ In May 1944, seeking to bolster the German army in the face of the mounting Allied offensive, the Nazis decided to conscript Norwegian men of fighting age into the army.² Men born in three different years were to be sent to the Eastern Front.³ For this purpose, Norwegian government files

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² See id.
³ See id.
containing names, addresses, the sex, dates of birth, and other personal information on the population were to be used.4 When the Norwegian resistance learned of the plan, they attempted to destroy the files, unsuccessfully.5 So these resistance fighters turned to machines that were to be used to sort, by age cohort, the files—only two of which existed in Norway.6 They destroyed both.7 Without the ability to tabulate the population data, a Norwegian draft was too difficult to put into effect and the Nazi plan had to be dropped.8

This story and countless others, with less-happy endings, underpin the law of information privacy in Europe today. The dangers of any large-scale government effort to collect, catalogue, and manipulate information on individuals are never far-fetched. Preventing them is the object of European privacy law.

Americans have never suffered the same disastrous abuses of their personal records as did Europeans during World War II. Perhaps that is why American law is so much more complacent than European law in the face of massive government databases of personal records. One recent illustration of this transatlantic difference is the revelation, in May 2006, of a National Security Agency (“NSA”) database with the phone records of millions of ordinary American citizens.9 Ever since September 11, 2001, the NSA has been receiving the call records of at least one major telecommunications provider for purposes of an antiterrorism data-mining program.10 Even though the discovery provoked public uproar, whether the law was broken is entirely unclear.11 In most European countries, had such a data-mining program come to light, the outrage would have been not only political but also legal: the spy agency would be acting in flagrant disregard of the law.12

In Europe, such a program would have to be authorized by a public law or regulation. It would have to be reviewed, in advance, by an independent privacy agency.13 Even though a European spy agency

4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See Bing, supra note 1, at 114–23.
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at A1.
10 See id.
11 See infra notes 134–137, 160–168 and accompanying text (discussing the legality of the NSA call records program).
12 See infra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.
might be permitted access to the same type of call data, it would not be allowed to store the data for as long as the NSA has—over five years now. The data could be mined only for certain statutorily prescribed “serious” threats and, in the case of terrorism, only if there were an “imminent and specific endangerment” from the threat. It could be passed on to law enforcement agencies only if a certain factual threshold had been met for suspecting an individual of having committed, or planning to commit, one of those serious offenses. The same independent agency would have enforcement and oversight powers to guarantee that the program was being run in accordance with the law. Individuals would have a right—albeit subject to numerous exceptions—to check on their personal data, to ensure that it was being used lawfully.

This Article explores the European law of data protection and explains why a government data-mining program like the NSA’s would run afoul of that law. The comparative exercise serves many purposes. By taking the same set of facts and comparing how those facts would fare in two different legal systems—American and European—the differences between their laws are brought into sharp focus. Considering a concrete set of facts is especially valuable in this area of law because many European data protection rules are framed in such abstract terms that it is difficult to appreciate how, in the hands of regulators and courts, they serve to curb government action.

Beyond description, this comparison has far-reaching ramifications for transatlantic cooperation on fighting crime and protecting national security. This Article draws out the many points of difference between information privacy law in Europe and the United States. Because of
the difference, European authorities are prohibited, by law, from sharing intelligence on a routine basis with their American counterparts.\textsuperscript{20} Only an agreement between Europe and the United States, under which the United States commits to an equivalent level of data protection, can overcome the legal barrier to information exchange.\textsuperscript{21} And to date, it has been impossible to reach such an agreement.\textsuperscript{22} Not only has transatlantic cooperation been stymied, but predictions of regulatory convergence between Europe and the United States have failed, quite spectacularly, in this area.\textsuperscript{23} Conflicts between regulatory systems have not resulted in convergence, but rather have been resolved through ordinary territoriality principles: when the territory or resource to which access is sought is American, American rules prevail; when it is European, European rules prevail.

The last aim of this comparison is to encourage critical reflection on American law. When it comes to information privacy, liberty is protected more in Europe than in the United States. This observation goes against the grain of recent privacy scholarship: in that view, American privacy law protects individual liberty against the state while European privacy law promotes dignity in interpersonal relations.\textsuperscript{24} But, as this Article’s analysis demonstrates, privacy law in Europe also protects liberty and, in the context of antiterrorism data mining, does so more than American law. The difference is even more striking in light of the near-identical statutes adopted on both sides of the Atlantic in the early 1970s—a single regulatory solution to what, at the time, was considered to be a common policy problem of protecting individual privacy in the age of information technology.\textsuperscript{25} A number of factors have contributed to this progressive divergence: the absence of an agency committed to privacy policy in the American regulatory scheme; the rise of executive levels.


\textsuperscript{21} See, e.g., Federal Data Protection Act § 4c(2).

\textsuperscript{22} See infra notes 363–422 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{24} See infra notes 446–451 and accompanying text; see also James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 Yale L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004).

power in the United States at the very same time that the power of national executives in Europe is being checked, more and more, by the law of multiple Europe-wide political communities; and the influence of the Nazi experience on contemporary European human rights law.

By expanding the realm of legal possibilities, comparison can serve as an impetus for legal change at home. Wholesale borrowing from Europe would be misguided; a full-fledged constitutional right to information privacy and a cross-cutting law regulating information privacy in both the private and public sectors would be unlikely to achieve the desired result of curbing government data mining. Rather, this Article recommends a number of changes to the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974. Although the intent of its drafters was to curb information privacy abuses by government actors across the board, the recent experience with data-mining programs demonstrates that the original ambition has been disappointed. Amending the Privacy Act would increase the transparency of data mining, enhance the public debate on the privacy costs of government programs, place some fairly modest limits on the government’s use of personal data, and improve oversight and enforcement. The European experience sheds light on what, in the original transatlantic regulatory scheme, has worked well and deserves—once again—to become part of American privacy law.

The rest of this Article is organized as follows. In Part I, the NSA call database is described in more detail. This is followed by an overview in Part II of three sets of legal categories that are relevant, albeit in different permutations, to the analysis on both sides of the Atlantic. Part III considers the applicable U.S. constitutional and statutory law and concludes that the President might very well have lawfully authorized the call database. Part IV sets out the European law that would apply to that same data-mining program if conducted by a European spy agency, and reveals how the program would come into conflict with the law. Finally, Part V explores the consequences of the comparison, both for transatlantic relations and for understanding American privacy law.

27 See infra notes 32–62 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 63–83 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 84–168 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 169–340 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 341–529 and accompanying text.
I. THE NSA CALL RECORDS PROGRAM

These are the details of the NSA call records program that have been revealed so far.\textsuperscript{32} Immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NSA approached the country’s major telecommunications carriers, asking them to hand over their customers’ calling records and to update those records periodically. The NSA sought information on all calls made and received: to whom, from whom, when, and for how long. Customers were identified only by their phone numbers, not by their names, but a quick search of any public directory readily matches the phone number with the name. It is uncertain which of the telecommunications companies complied with the request because of the secrecy of the program. From the newspaper accounts, however, it appears that AT&T, the largest American telecommunications company, cooperated, as did Verizon’s subsidiary MCI. If this is true, the database contains information on tens of millions of Americans. The NSA has been “mining” the database to identify possible terrorists.

Databases can be put to many different uses. Most simply, a database can organize large amounts of information so that, at a later time, that information can be retrieved easily. Statistical software can be applied to the data in the system. Data mining is probably one of the most sophisticated, technologically speaking, of the possible uses of data. In the words of one helpful explanation for nonspecialists:

Many simpler analytical tools utilize a verification-based approach, where the user develops a hypothesis and then tests the data to prove or disprove the hypothesis. For example, a user might hypothesize that a customer who buys a hammer, will also buy a box of nails. The effectiveness of this approach can be limited by the creativity of the user to develop various hypotheses, as well as the structure of the software being used. In contrast, data mining utilizes a discovery approach, in which algorithms can be used to examine several multidimen-

sional data relationships simultaneously, identifying those that are unique or frequently represented. For example, a hardware store may compare their customers’ tools purchases with home ownership, type of automobile driven, age, occupation, income and/or distance between residence and the store. As a result of its complex capabilities, two precursors are important for a successful data-mining exercise; a clear formulation of the problem to be solved, and access to the relevant data.\footnote{Jeffrey W. Seifert, Cong. Research Serv., Data Mining and Homeland Security: An Overview 2 (2006).}

For the hardware store, the problem is picking out those consumers likely to buy hammers and nails. For the Department of Health and Human Services, it is detecting welfare fraud. And, for the NSA, it is spotting likely terrorists.

Mining the data is only one part of the process. The data must first be collected, generally from many different databases. It must then be cleaned, to improve the quality of the data. This can involve the removal of duplicate records, normalizing the values used to represent information in the database (e.g., ensuring that “no” is represented as a 0 throughout the database, and not sometimes as a 0, sometimes as a N, etc.), accounting for missing data points, removing unneeded date fields, identifying anomalous data points (e.g., an individual whose age is shown as 142 years), and standardizing data formats (e.g., changing dates so they all include MM/DD/YYYY).\footnote{Id. at 17.}

Care must be taken to render different databases and data-mining software interoperable. Only then can data mining be expected to generate valid results.\footnote{Id. at 2, 17–18.}

How the call records are being mined by the NSA is unclear. According to some reports, only calls involving known or suspected Al Qaeda affiliates are targeted.\footnote{Id. at 2. \textit{supra} note 32.} By analyzing suspected terrorists’ call records, the NSA can gain insight into their activities, learn of possible terrorist plots, and identify other individuals who might be collaborating with Al Qaeda. The possibility, however, that more general criteria are being used to mine the data has not been ruled out. For instance, the NSA might analyze phone numbers with calls to or from

\begin{footnotes}
\item[34] Id. at 17.
\item[35] Id. at 2, 17–18.
\item[36] See Page, supra note 32.
\end{footnotes}
the Middle East and located in geographic areas known to be Muslim communities.

What happens afterwards with the phone numbers identified as likely terrorist numbers is also unclear. One possibility is that the information is used by the NSA or other government agencies to undertake more intrusive surveillance, for instance, eavesdropping on phone lines. Another possibility is that the pool of suspects is further narrowed by matching the suspicious phone numbers with other records such as credit card histories, financial information, and airline passenger records. Given the secretive nature of the database, these are, at best, informed guesses; the NSA’s data-mining methods are unlikely to be revealed anytime soon.

The NSA call records database is just one of many antiterrorism data-mining initiatives that have come to light since September 11.37 The most notorious is “Total Information Awareness,” later renamed “Terrorism Information Awareness” in response to public criticism and ultimately defunded by Congress.38 The goal of Total Information Awareness was to combine all electronic information available on individuals—like Internet purchases, airline passenger data, and driver records—to single out terrorism suspects.39 Others include the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (“CAPPS II”), now called Secure Flight, designed to match airline passenger records with other data to stop likely terrorists from boarding airplanes;40 the Multistate Antiterrorism Information Exchange (“MATRIX”) Pilot Project, which seeks to combine information from a variety of databases, including state law enforcement records, to assist with criminal investigations;41 and the Department of the Treasury’s acquisition, for data-mining purposes, of all records on international money transfers held by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”).42 In the interest of brevity and clarity, the comparative legal analysis in this Article focuses on a call records program undertaken by a spy agency. But the analysis is also relevant to the many other antiterrorism data-mining programs that have surfaced in the past couple of years. To be sure, the

37 See Seifert, supra note 33, at 5–17.
39 See id. at 604–05.
40 See Seifert, supra note 33, at 7–11.
41 See id. at 11–15.
statutory and constitutional specifics differ, especially in the United States, but the fundamental principles of the two legal systems and their points of contrast remain the same.

Based on what legal authority did the NSA embark on its data-mining mission? The agency was created by a secret executive memorandum in 1952.\textsuperscript{43} It was to be the sole foreign intelligence agency responsible for intercepting communications, what is generally called signals intelligence in contrast to human intelligence.\textsuperscript{44} The NSA was also placed under the organizational umbrella of the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{45} In the years since 1952, the NSA has become a critical element of the intelligence community. It has extraordinarily powerful and sophisticated computing facilities, with the capacity to intercept and analyze any type of communication, anywhere in the world.\textsuperscript{46} The NSA is the agency responsible for some of today’s most notorious spy programs: ECHELON,\textsuperscript{47} warrantless wiretapping of international phone calls,\textsuperscript{48} and, of course, the call database.

Originally, the NSA was exempted from all regulation curbing the government’s intelligence activities.\textsuperscript{49} In the aftermath of Watergate, however, Congress enacted legislation specifically targeted at the NSA’s intelligence gathering—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA").\textsuperscript{50} Later, in Executive Order 12,888, President Reagan set down surveillance guidelines for the entire intelligence community,


\textsuperscript{45} See id.

\textsuperscript{46} See Keeffe, supra note 43, at 8.

\textsuperscript{47} Lawrence D. Sloan, ECHELON and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A Need for Reevaluation, 50 Duke L.J. 1467, 1471 (2001).


including the NSA.\textsuperscript{51} Some of these restrictions are explored below. As this Article shows, however, they are largely ineffective against collection and use of personal data that do not entail the interception of wire or electronic communications.

As for the call records program, it was most likely authorized by a secret presidential directive. The President has not yet spelled out the legal grounds for the directive, but they are likely to be similar to those advanced in support of the warrantless wiretapping program uncovered in December 2005.\textsuperscript{52} In a white paper submitted to Congress, the administration made two legal arguments in support of warrantless wiretapping: it was a lawful exercise of the President’s constitutional powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution and it was authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force (the “AUMF”), enacted by Congress in the immediate aftermath of September 11.\textsuperscript{53} According to the administration, the President’s constitutional duty to serve as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and to prevent armed attacks against the nation includes the power to conduct warrantless surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.\textsuperscript{54} In the AUMF, Congress authorized the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorists attacks” of September 11 to prevent “any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.”\textsuperscript{55} The administration maintains that Congress intended for the statute to cover not only conventional military operations but also domestic electronic surveillance: such activity is necessary to identify the enemy and to foil future terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{56} Both of these arguments can also be made in support of the call

\textsuperscript{52} In July 2006, Michael Hayden, Director of the NSA at the time that the call database was created, was confirmed by the Senate for the position of Director of the CIA. In his confirmation hearings, he was asked about the legality of the call database. Hearing of the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence on the Nomination of General Michael V. Hayden to Be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 109th Cong. 35 (2006) (statements of Sen. Carl Levin and Gen. Michael Hayden). Hayden said that the program was vetted by the NSA’s General Counsel and the Inspector General, and that both had said that the program was within the President’s Article II powers. See id. at 35, 53. Hayden, however, did not recollect any discussion of the AUMF. See id. at 25.
\textsuperscript{53} See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President (2006), reprinted in Cole & Lederman, supra note 48, at 1374.
\textsuperscript{54} Id. at 1380.
\textsuperscript{56} U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 53, at 1384–85.
database: by ordering the creation of the call database, the President furthered his constitutional duty to protect national security and took the steps necessary to prevent "any future acts of international terrorism," as instructed by Congress in the AUMF.57

Since the discovery of the call records program, a number of lawsuits have been filed in federal court against the telecommunications providers and the government.58 In addition, complaints against the providers have been filed with telecommunications regulators in over twenty states.59 The telecommunications companies and the government, however, have already successfully defended two of these cases by invoking the state secrets privilege.60 This privilege protects information related to national security from disclosure because of the possible harm to national defense and to the success of future intelligence-gathering operations.61 In the two cases in which the courts have found in favor of the privilege, the plaintiffs' claims had to be dismissed because, without court-ordered discovery, it would be impossible for them to prove any of their claims.62 Thus, it might very well be that, as a result of the state secrets privilege, the lawfulness of the call records program will never be decided by the courts.

II. SOME INITIAL TRANSATLANTIC COMPARISONS

How convincing is the President’s legal defense of the NSA call database? As we shall see, plausible. But before launching into a detailed discussion of the legal framework, a few distinctions, important to the analysis on both sides of the Atlantic, should be borne in mind.

The first is the difference between the content of communications and the incidents of communications. Incidents of communications include facts such as who was called, when, and for how long. This is significant for examining the government’s interference with privacy in the United States, but considerably less so in Europe. In the United States, the content of, say, a telephone call or an email message is ex-

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57 See AUMF § 2.
61 See Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 908; ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
tensively protected under constitutional and statutory law, but the incidents are not, especially when gathered after the communication has occurred. In Europe, the collection of both types of data is considered an interference with the fundamental right to privacy. Even in Europe, however, government surveillance is generally considered more intrusive in the case of content data and therefore more difficult to justify in the face of a legal challenge.

The second distinction is the one drawn between communications data and all types of personal data. Because letters, phone conversations, emails, and other types of communications are believed to be more revealing of one’s self than a decision to purchase a book on the Internet, for example, the government’s ability to obtain the former kind of personal data is covered by separate, more stringent regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. Where Europe and the United States part ways is on their treatment of “all types of personal data.” With respect to personal data processing by government actors, the U.S. legal framework is far less demanding than the European one. As for the private sector, an all-encompassing category for “all types of personal data” does not exist in the United States. Rather, uses of specific types of personal data are regulated, including health information, video store records, financial information, and so on. By contrast, in European law, all personal data processing is treated as potentially problematic, even when undertaken by private actors.

The last important distinction regards not the type of personal data collected, but the government purposes for which it is collected. The law in both the United States and Europe treats information gathering for purposes of law enforcement differently from information

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64 See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 2(a).
65 See id. art. 6.
67 See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 2(a) (defining “personal data” as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual”).
70 See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 3.
gathering for purposes of protecting national security. The former is regulated more stringently than the latter because of the different aims and consequences of the two types of government activities. Criminal investigations are relatively narrow in scope—their focus is a specific past or imminent future event. By contrast, agencies charged with protecting national security must monitor a wide, inchoate range of individuals and activities that might, sometime in the future, threaten the well-being of the population. Furthermore, the purpose of a criminal investigation is to prosecute and convict individuals, with draconian consequences for their life and liberty interests. By contrast, criminal prosecutions are tangential to what national security agencies do. They do not have arrest powers, but instead must refer cases to the police if a plot is so far advanced that arrest and prosecution are warranted. The mission of such agencies is to thwart the most dangerous types of threats—often turning a blind eye to routine crime—and to do so using a variety of tactics. The targets of national security surveillance, therefore, are not as likely to be detained and imprisoned as are those of police investigations. Their rights are clearly compromised, but not as directly as with criminal investigations.

Again, Europe and the United States differ as to how they further parse the categories. On the national security side, European legal systems are designed to ward off two types of threats: domestic and foreign. One agency is responsible for gathering intelligence abroad on threats posed by foreign governments—in the old days, the Soviet Union. Another agency is charged with gathering intelligence at home, on activities sponsored by foreign powers (counter-intelligence) as well as on home-grown security threats.


\[72\] See id. at 173–75 (describing difference between law enforcement and national security functions).

\[73\] See id. at 170 (discussing the role of MI5 agents in England).

\[74\] See id. at 174 (characterizing intelligence as “threat—rather than case—oriented” as compared to criminal investigations).

\[75\] In Germany, there are two main sets of national security agencies: the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or “BfV”) and the BfV’s counterparts at the Land (state) level, responsible for domestic intelligence; and the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst or “BND”), responsible for foreign intelligence. See Shlomo Shpiro, Parliamentary and Administrative Reforms in the Control of Intelligence Services in the European Union, 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 545, 550–51 (1998); see also François Thuillier, L’Europe du Secret: Mythes et Réalité du Renseignement Politique Interne 18 (2000). The structure of the security services in France is even more complicated. Intelligence on home-grown security threats is handled by a department of the Na-
threats came from extremist and separatist terrorist groups like the Bader Meinhof and the Irish Republican Army; today, they include radical-Islam terrorist cells. Both sets of agencies operate under far less cumbersome procedural guidelines than do the police. Oversight is generally entrusted not to the judiciary but to the legislative and executive branches. Specifically, both sets of agencies are covered by the more permissive surveillance regimes discussed in Part IV on European law—permissive, that is, compared to police surveillance for purposes of criminal prosecutions. \(^76\)

By contrast, in the United States, national security is perceived mostly as security from foreign powers abroad, not from internal threats, and especially not from home-grown internal threats. On the bureaucratic level, there are no domestic counterparts to the country’s foreign intelligence agencies—the Central Intelligence Agency (the “CIA”) for human intelligence and the NSA for signals intelligence. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”) is charged with both criminal investigations of violations of federal law and domestic intelligence operations. \(^77\) Those domestic operations, moreover, are directed against activities sponsored by foreign governments or groups, not by domestic ones. The rules for national security surveillance, set down in FISA, are largely responsible for this institutional state of affairs. \(^78\) As the name suggests, the statute applies only when the government seeks to obtain foreign—not domestic—intelligence within the United States: its rules are triggered when the target of the investigation is a “foreign power” or an “agent of a foreign power.” \(^79\)

In fact, until recently, the FBI’s paradigm for both domestic intelligence operations and criminal investigations has been a more rights-abiding law enforcement model, not a national security model. \(^80\) This is

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\(^76\) See infra notes 169–340 and accompanying text.

\(^77\) See Posner, supra note 71, at 176 (discussing the hybrid nature of the FBI).


\(^79\) 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a).

the product of the organizational culture that developed in the 1970s in response to congressional investigations into the FBI’s secret surveillance of civil rights leaders and other political activists. As Jacqueline Ross explains, under the FBI guidelines crafted in the 1970s for domestic security investigations

the FBI [was] to restrict domestic intelligence operations to the investigation of individuals or groups who not only violate civil rights or seek to interfere with or overthrow the government, but who do so through activities that “involve or will involve the violation of federal law” as well as “the use of force or violence.” Thus the standard for proper covert operations in the intelligence arena became the criminal standard—requiring some indication that criminal offenses were in the offing.

Compared to Europe, more government investigations are regulated as policing than as defending against national security threats. This is true even today, notwithstanding all the revisions that have been made since September 11 to the FBI guidelines and FISA.

The Nixon-era reluctance to allow national security operations to be directed against primarily domestic conspiracies also makes sense of a fundamental anomaly, as seen at least in European eyes, of the NSA call database: why is a program involving primarily individuals within the United States being handled by an agency created to gather foreign signals intelligence? Most of the calls, even the suspicious ones, involve individuals living in the United States whose formal ties to the United States are likely to be at least as strong as, if not stronger than, their ties to a foreign organization. In other words, the threat that one might hope to discover with such data mining is as likely to be a threat coming from fundamentalist Islamic groups established inside the country, as from Al Qaeda operatives abroad. The answer to this puzzle is that the architecture of the legal system does not fully contemplate such investigations. In a place with one or more domestic security agencies, like Germany, France, or the United Kingdom, such a program would be handled by one of those bodies. But in the United States, the NSA was the only viable institutional candidate.

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81 See id.
82 Id. at 37.
83 Id. at 38. For a description of the changes to FISA made by the USA PATRIOT Act and the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, see Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 288–309.
III. THE UNITED STATES: LEGAL PLAUSIBILITY

Now for a detailed consideration of the law on the American side of the Atlantic. The law regulating data privacy is both constitutional and statutory. One statute in particular, the Privacy Act of 1974, requires close scrutiny.

A. U.S. Constitutional Law

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, generally the first line of defense against intrusive surveillance, does not apply in cases like the NSA call database.84 Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law, a person must have a reasonable expectation of privacy before the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures and the related warrant requirement will apply.85 In 1967, in Katz v. United States, the Court held that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their telephone conversations.86 But over a decade later, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court held that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from their telephones.87 Why? According to the Court, individuals know that the numbers dialed from their lines can be recorded by their providers and that, indeed, these numbers are routinely recorded for legitimate business purposes such as billing.88 Because callers know of this exposure to third parties, the Court reasoned, they cannot expect their dialing information to remain secret.89 In making telephone calls and doing business with telephone companies, subscribers “assume the risk” that their records will be exposed to others, including the police.90

This case law is the source of the distinction between content and incidental, or “envelope,” communications data.91 What is written in a letter—today, an email—and what is said in a telephone conversation are considered private. Warrantless government intrusions are believed

84 See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
86 Id. at 352.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 744. The assumption of the risk rationale was first used by the Supreme Court to deny Fourth Amendment protection to customer account information held by banks. See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
to be obnoxious. By contrast, individuals cannot claim a privacy interest in those identifiers that are necessary for the communication to occur—the mailing address, the routing information, and the telephone numbers. That information is too “prosaic” for a constitutional privacy right to attach.92 Because the call records collected by the NSA fall into the noncontent category, they are not covered by the Fourth Amendment.

Nor would such information be protected under the Supreme Court’s substantive due process doctrine. The Supreme Court has long recognized that certain types of personal decisions are constitutionally protected from government interference, as part of the right to “liberty,” even though they are not specifically listed in the Bill of Rights. The most notorious of these personal decisions, of course, is abortion.93

In 1977, in Whalen v. Roe, the Court suggested that personal information might also be constitutionally protected as a liberty interest.94 The Court considered a challenge to a New York statute requiring physicians to report to the state Department of Health all prescriptions written for drugs with both medical and recreational uses—drugs like opium, cocaine, and marijuana.95 The Court rejected the challenge, but not before elaborating on the harm that disclosure of such medical information might cause patients and reviewing the various safeguards in place to prevent disclosure except when necessary to stop illegal drug abuse.96 Since Whalen, however, the Supreme Court has been silent on the so-called “constitutional right to information privacy” and the federal circuits have come down differently on the very existence, as well as the contours, of the right.97 Even setting aside this uncertainty, information on one’s phone calls would most likely not count as part of such a right. The Fourth Amendment case law on the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy is especially damning on this point.98

In sum, even if there were an established right to information privacy, it is highly unlikely that call data would be covered by the right, and, even if it were covered, it is unlikely that the security measures in place to protect against unwarranted disclosures were so deficient as to render the NSA database unconstitutional.

92 Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 592–96.
96 Id. at 593–95.
97 See Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 400–02.
98 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
B. U.S. Statutory Law

Some of the lacunae in the Supreme Court’s case law have been filled by legislative enactments. Even though, therefore, the incidents of communications are not constitutionally shielded from government scrutiny, they do receive some protection under statute—albeit less protection than afforded the contents of communications.

Surveillance conducted for law enforcement is regulated separately from surveillance conducted to protect national security against foreign powers.\(^99\) The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (the “ECPA”) of 1986 covers the former, and FISA the latter.\(^100\) Both have been amended significantly since their original enactment, most recently by the USA PATRIOT Act.\(^101\) The ECPA consists of three separate acts: the Wiretap Act applies to the interception of the contents of communications like telephone calls and emails, as the communication is occurring;\(^102\) the Stored Communications Act applies to communications in electronic storage—for instance, an email on a server—as well as customer records held by telephone companies and Internet service providers;\(^103\) and the Pen Register Act applies to the installation of devices that capture information on outgoing calls (pen registers) and incoming calls (trap-and-trace devices), as well as the use of “processes” that capture similar information on Internet users.\(^104\) The type of surveillance contemplated by FISA parallels to some extent the ECPA’s scheme: the interception of communications\(^105\) and the installation of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices, as well as their Internet equivalents.\(^106\) FISA also sets down standards for a number of other types of information gathering, including physical searches of premises\(^107\) and access to physical records like library borrower lists.\(^108\)

\(^{99}\) For an overview of the electronic surveillance law discussed in this section, see Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 267–97.


\(^{107}\) Id. §§ 1821–1829.

\(^{108}\) Id. §§ 1861–1862.
Collecting call data, quite obviously, is different from the interception of the contents of a communication, either in transmission or in storage.\textsuperscript{109} Neither did the NSA install pen registers and trap-and-trace devices on individual phone lines to obtain the call data. The NSA used a far more efficient method: it piggy-backed off telecommunications providers, requesting that information already gathered in the course of routine business operations be transferred to the government.\textsuperscript{110} Hence, the one piece of federal electronic surveillance law that does apply, squarely, to the kind of data involved in the NSA program is that part of the Stored Communications Act on customer records.\textsuperscript{111}

The Stored Communications Act bans companies from disclosing customer records to the government,\textsuperscript{112} but then creates a number of exceptions to that ban.\textsuperscript{113} If the government obtains a warrant, a court order, or for certain categories of customer information, a specific type of administrative subpoena, then disclosure is permitted.\textsuperscript{114} The warrant and court order procedures must be used for ordinary criminal investigations, whereas the speedier administrative process may be used “in an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”\textsuperscript{115} This type of administrative subpoena is known as a National Security Letter.\textsuperscript{116} If the Director of the FBI or his designee certifies that the customer records are being

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[109]{The following discussion was informed by blog commentary by three experts on surveillance law. See OrinKerr.com, http://www.orinkerr.com (May 12, 2006, 03:30 EST); Posting of Peter Swire & Judd Legum to Think Progress, http://thinkprogress.org/2006/05/page/6 (May 11, 2006, 18:25 EST).}
\footnotetext[110]{See Cauley, supra note 9; Page, supra note 32.}
\footnotetext[111]{See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); see also Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2000) (requiring telecommunications carriers to keep their customer information confidential). The duty of confidentiality, however, is subject to any disclosures required by law and therefore the analysis is similar to that under the Stored Communications Act.}
\footnotetext[112]{See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). The lawyers for the NSA might quibble that the NSA did not obtain information on a "subscriber to or customer of [an electronic communication] service," 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(c)(1)–(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), because it only obtained data on phone numbers, without the names of the customers using those phone numbers. But the NSA request certainly comes within the spirit of the statute, given that the name of a subscriber can easily be identified based on her phone number and that the intent of the Act is to protect customer privacy.}
\footnotetext[113]{See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c).}
\footnotetext[114]{See id. §§ 2702(c)(1), 2703(c)(1)–(2). The scheme for government access to financial records and credit reports is quite similar.}
\footnotetext[115]{Id. § 2709(b). This is the standard for federal administrative subpoenas. The statute, however, also contemplates administrative subpoenas issued by state entities and governed by state law. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(c)–(d).}
\footnotetext[116]{Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 728–29.}
\end{footnotes}
requested for an investigation “to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,” the telecommunications provider must hand over the information.\textsuperscript{117} Government access to customer data, therefore, replicates the more general, two-track approach to surveillance—one track for law enforcement, the other for national security. Yet even though the call data was requested by the NSA for national security purposes, administrative subpoenas were not used. At first blush, therefore, it appears that the NSA, along with the telecommunications providers that collaborated with the NSA, violated the Stored Communications Act.\textsuperscript{118}

What would be the consequences of such a violation? As it turns out, they are fairly paltry as compared to those for other types of violations, such as illegal wiretapping or illegal access to stored communications. There are no criminal penalties for breaching the customer data provisions.\textsuperscript{119} Against the telecommunications providers, individuals have a civil right of action for injunctive relief and damages, set at a statutory minimum of $1000 per individual.\textsuperscript{120} Against the government, there is a right of action for money damages, set at a minimum of $10,000 per person.\textsuperscript{121}

Why, though, is this a violation only at first blush? Because the legal analysis must take into account the President’s inherent constitutional power, under Article II, to authorize the call database.\textsuperscript{122} And, as with the constitutional case law, the different treatment of the content of communications and the incidents of communications, in this case customer records, is critical: the legislative scheme is comprehensive with respect to the former, patchy on the latter. The President’s authorization, therefore, might very well save the NSA program.

On this aspect of the legal analysis, it is useful to consider another NSA surveillance program—the warrantless wiretapping of telephone calls between individuals in the United States and individuals abroad. A

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\textsuperscript{117} 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b).

\textsuperscript{118} The other circumstances under which a communications provider may lawfully disclose customer records are set out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(c)(2)–(6) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). From the information available in the media, it does not appear that the actions of the telecommunications providers would be covered by any of these provisions. As for the government, the statute contemplates two other means of obtaining the customer data, see id. § 2703(c)(1)(C)–(D), neither of which is relevant here.

\textsuperscript{119} 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (defining an offense as “access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage”).

\textsuperscript{120} Id. § 2707.

\textsuperscript{121} Id. § 2712.

\textsuperscript{122} See U.S. Const. art. II.
group of legal scholars has mounted a forceful argument against this program. They claim, for good reason, that the warrantless wiretapping program is illegal. Their argument rests on Congress’s comprehensive regulation of content-based surveillance in the ECPA and FISA—both of which require a warrant. The argument: Because these statutes, by their express terms, cover the entire universe of government wiretapping, the President has no other legal avenue for authorizing such wiretapping. He cannot rely on Congress’s later-in-time AUMF because nothing in the broad, vague language of that statute suggests that Congress intended to override the explicit terms of the earlier surveillance statutes. Neither can the President rely on his Article II powers. According to Justice Jackson’s classic tripartite scheme of presidential powers in *Youngstown Tube & Sheet Co. v. Sawyer*, the President’s authority to act turns, in large measure, on whether Congress has acted. In Justice Jackson’s famous words:

1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.

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124 Indeed, the first federal court to decide the issue has held the program to be illegal. See *ACLU v. NSA*, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006).


126 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2000) (“Procedures in this chapter [Wiretap Act] or chapter 121 [Stored Communications Act] and [FISA] shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.”). The definition of both “electronic surveillance” and “interception of . . . communications” turns on access to the content of the communication.

127 See *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006). In *Hamdan*, the Supreme Court held that the AUMF could not be construed as overriding the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s requirements for military commissions. Id.


2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. . . .

3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.\textsuperscript{130}

Thus, in light of Congress's express instruction to the government to obtain a warrant—from an ordinary court in the case of criminal investigations and from the FISA court in the case of foreign intelligence—the President is at the "lowest ebb" of his powers in authorizing the warrantless surveillance program.\textsuperscript{131} To save the program, he must show that Congress exceeded its constitutional powers, an uphill battle, indeed, in view of Congress's repeated and long-standing regulation of wire communications among states and between the United States and foreign nations under the Commerce Clause.\textsuperscript{132} The President must also convince the Supreme Court that his national security and foreign relations powers extend to activities at the core of the Fourth Amendment—telephone conversations conducted by Americans in the privacy of their homes.\textsuperscript{133}

Justice Jackson’s analytic framework can also be applied to the NSA call records program. With this program, the administration is on firmer ground because of the different statutory and constitutional treatment of call records.\textsuperscript{134} Although Congress has comprehensively regulated the various circumstances under which the government can

\textsuperscript{130} Id.

\textsuperscript{131} See July 14, 2006 Letter, \textit{supra} note 123, at 4, 8; see also \textit{Youngstown}, 343 U.S. at 637–38.

\textsuperscript{132} See July 14, 2006 Letter, \textit{supra} note 123, at 6–7 (explaining Congress’s authority to enact statutes dealing with wire and electronic communications systems).


listen to what is being said in telephone calls, it has not done the same for all the other information revealed by those calls. There is no equivalent provision on customer data that says the statutory procedures are to be “the exclusive means” of government access to such data. In addition, government access that flouts the statutory procedure is not criminalized. Thus, the President’s inherent constitutional power to authorize the call database is stronger than his power to authorize warrantless wiretapping. In the former, he is acting in the less suspect “zone of twilight.” Moreover, in authorizing the collection of call data, the President does not interfere with a constitutionally protected right to privacy. This difference is another reason why the call records program might survive a legal challenge even if the warrantless wiretapping program does not.

This is not to say that, even under the less-demanding constitutional scrutiny of the “zone of twilight,” the President would have the authority to order the transfer of call records from private telecommunications providers to the government. After all, the NSA database contains information on millions of telephone calls, the vast majority of which involved U.S. citizens and occurred entirely within the United States. This type of government initiative is a far cry from what has been traditionally understood as a power incident to the President’s duty to protect the nation from foreign threats. But it is worthwhile to note the consequences of the Supreme Court’s and Congress’s complacency in the face of government access to customer records, records that sometimes can be just as revealing to government investigators—and as private to citizens—as what is actually said in the telephone conversation.

C. The Privacy Act of 1974

Before concluding this discussion of U.S. law, one more piece of legislation should be mentioned. Once the calling records were transferred to the NSA, they were put in a database and mined for terror-

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136 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
137 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
138 See Page, supra note 32. Unfortunately, because the government has not disclosed any information on the program and has invoked the state secrets privilege in litigation challenging the program, it is impossible to confirm these details. Cauley, supra note 9.
139 For an overview of what has traditionally been considered inherent in the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers, see generally The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 108-17, at 459–92 (2d Sess. 2002).
ists. The first place to which a European privacy advocate would turn, faced with a similar European data-mining program, would be her data protection law. In the United States, the analogue statute is the Privacy Act of 1974. The Privacy Act regulates the federal government’s collection, use, and disclosure of all types of personal information. It imposes a number of duties on government agencies. First, the responsible agency must alert the public to the existence of a personal records system by publishing a notice in the Federal Register. When information is collected from individuals, they must be told of the nature of the government database. The agency may gather only such information as is relevant and necessary to accomplishing the agency’s legal purposes set down by statute or executive order. Personal information must be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. This information cannot be transferred to another government agency without the consent of the person concerned. Technical measures must be adopted to guarantee the security and confidentiality of the information. Lastly, individuals have the right to check their personal information and, if necessary, demand that their information be corrected.

Compared to the law on government surveillance canvassed earlier, the reach of the Privacy Act is broader. It applies to the government’s collection of all kinds of personal data, not just data related to one’s telephone conversations, and a couple of other types of data protected under separate statutes, such as bank account information. What is more, in contrast with the focus on government collection of information in surveillance law, the Privacy Act regulates the government’s use of personal data from start to finish: collection, storage, use and analysis, transfers to other parties, and modification to accommodate changes over time.

140 See Cauley, supra note 9; Page, supra note 32.
143 Id. § 552a(e) (4).
144 Id. § 552a(e) (3).
145 Id. § 552a(e) (1).
146 Id. § 552a(e) (5).
148 Id. § 552a(e) (10).
149 Id. § 552a(d).
150 Id. § 552a(a) (4).
151 See id. § 552a.
As will become evident, many of these guarantees parallel those of European privacy law. Yet the actual scope of individual rights under the Privacy Act is far more limited than under European laws. Most of the government’s duties are purely hortatory due to the limited enforcement mechanisms; a number of exceptions have been written into the Privacy Act; and the Privacy Act only applies to a narrow subset of what can be done, by the government, with personal information. Consequently, what would be a European privacy advocate’s first line of defense against a government program involving such massive amounts of personal information turns out to be an entirely ineffective last resort in the United States.

Some more detail on the limitations of the Privacy Act: The primary enforcement mechanism is a civil action in federal court, generally for damages. Yet individuals have a very difficult time establishing the injury necessary to recover for most violations of the statute—what court would award damages because a government agency asked too many questions, and too many irrelevant questions? Moreover, the Privacy Act is riddled with exceptions. Disclosure of information to other agencies is permitted even without consent if the public is notified up-front, when the record system is created, that such disclosure constitutes a “routine use” of the information. This is defined as a use that is compatible with the main purpose for which the information was collected. Even without advance notice of a “routine use,” personal information may be transferred to another agency if the transfer is for law enforcement purposes and is requested by the agency’s head.

Records held by law enforcement agencies and the CIA may be exempted from most of the requirements of the Privacy Act (“general exemptions”) if the agency head publishes a notice to that effect. Records held by any agency may be exempted from some of the requirements of the Privacy Act (“specific exemptions”) if the agency head likewise publishes a notice to that effect and if the records fall into one of a number of categories—investigatory material, statistical records, matters whose secrecy is in the interest of national defense or foreign

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152 For examples of exceptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (k).
153 See Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 586; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2000) (detailing civil remedies available for violations of the Privacy Act).
154 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
155 Id. § 552a(a)(7).
156 Id. § 552a(b)(7).
157 Id. § 552a(j).
policy, and more.\textsuperscript{158} Finally, personal data held by the government is not considered a “system of records” covered by the Privacy Act unless the system is used by the agency to retrieve information about specific individuals using the names, social security numbers, or other identifying particulars of those individuals.\textsuperscript{159}

The call records program is a perfect illustration of the limitations of the Privacy Act. Unlike the FBI and the CIA, the NSA does not qualify for a general exemption.\textsuperscript{160} In theory, therefore, the agency must comply with the bulk of the Privacy Act’s requirements.\textsuperscript{161} But Federal Register notices of NSA records systems generally take advantage of the specific exemptions for national security records.\textsuperscript{162} Plus, even without specific mention in the Federal Register, the NSA may share personal information with other government agencies if requested to do so for law enforcement purposes.\textsuperscript{163} Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this analysis is the question of whether the call database would even count as a “system of records” under the Privacy Act.\textsuperscript{164} Is a phone number, without a name attached, an “identifying particular” assigned to an individual? If so, then it seems that searching the system by the phone number of an Al Qaeda suspect, to obtain information on her activities or to identify other possible suspects, would count as retrieving information about her. But what about using the country code for Afghanistan as a search term? Or, as is most likely the case, combining these and other criteria as part of complex algorithms to discover new relationships among the data and to generate presumably a better, more accurate pool of terrorists and terrorist activity? The few courts to have decided the question of what is a “system of records” have reached different, inconsistent conclusions.\textsuperscript{165} And most of them have defined the term quite narrowly.\textsuperscript{166} Absurdly, therefore, a database containing per-

\textsuperscript{158} Id. § 552a(k).
\textsuperscript{159} See, e.g., Williams v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 104 F.3d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 1997).
\textsuperscript{162} See id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2).
\textsuperscript{163} 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7).
\textsuperscript{164} For instance, a report issued by the Congressional Research Service assumes that the Privacy Act does not apply to data mining and suggests that Congress consider “the possible application of the Privacy Act to these [data-mining] initiatives.” See Seiffert, supra note 53, at 19.
\textsuperscript{165} See, e.g., Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 423 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2005); Williams, 104 F.3d at 675; Henke v. Dep’t of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 1459-62 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
\textsuperscript{166} See Williams, 104 F.3d at 675; Henke, 83 F.3d at 1459-62.
sonal details on millions of citizens might fall entirely outside Congress’s data privacy scheme.\textsuperscript{167} And again, following the logic of Justice Jackson’s concurrence in \textit{Youngstown}, the President would have a respectable argument that the database comes within his inherent constitutional authority to protect national security.\textsuperscript{168}

\section*{IV. Europe: Legal Impossibility}

In Europe, a secret government data-mining program like the NSA’s would be clearly illegal. Why? To summarize the rather complicated analysis that follows, such a data-mining program would violate two different types of privacy guarantees—procedural and substantive. Procedurally, government data mining, even for national security ends, would have to be authorized by a public law or regulation that specified the purposes of the personal data processing and the limits on that data processing, to minimize the government’s interference with private life.\textsuperscript{169} Before the program could be enacted, an independent government body would have to be consulted and, while the program was in operation, that same government body would need to have oversight and enforcement powers.\textsuperscript{170} These procedural requirements improve the prospect that the privacy ramifications of new government initiatives will be fully debated and widely understood at the outset. During the life of the government program, these procedures improve the chances that privacy violations will be detected and remedied.

Substantively, the reach of a European data-mining program would be narrower than that of the NSA call database. Although a spy agency might be allowed access to all call information held by national telecommunications providers, it would not be allowed to retain the personal data as long as the NSA has—over five years now.\textsuperscript{171} Furthermore, the type of analysis performed on the data, as well as the uses of the

\textsuperscript{167} In practice, given the far-reaching exemptions that apply even if the personal data is considered part of a system of personal records, this simply means that the NSA is not obliged to publish a notice in the Federal Register. \textit{See} 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (2000) (detailing numerous exemptions).

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{See} \textit{Youngstown}, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{See} Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BVerfGE 518/02 (para. 132) (F.R.G.) (providing an example of how government data mining was analyzed under the program’s authorizing statute).


\textsuperscript{171} Data Retention Directive, \textit{supra} note 14, arts. 3, 6.
results of the analysis, would have to be carefully circumscribed. The government would be permitted to use only search terms, statistical models, mathematical algorithms, and other analytical processes designed to uncover serious threats.\textsuperscript{172} Under German law, for instance, an international terrorist attack is considered serious, while counterfeiting abroad is not.\textsuperscript{173} And, under German law, before the government may engage in data mining there must be an “imminent and specific endangerment” (\textit{konkrete Gefahr}) of a serious offense, not simply an “abstract endangerment” of international terrorism, such as that existing in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{174} A spy agency in Germany would be allowed to pass on to law enforcement the names of individuals obtained through such data-mining techniques only if those individuals were suspected of planning to commit, or having already committed, a serious offense, and only if sufficient reasons existed for entertaining that suspicion.\textsuperscript{175}

Another substantive difference would be the right, under European law, of individuals to check on their information. This right of access enables individuals to ensure that their information is factually correct and is being handled in accordance with the guarantees of privacy law.\textsuperscript{176} Finally, to switch the focus briefly from the government to the private sector, the same amount of call data in the hands of telecommunications providers would not have been available to a European government. Under European law, telecommunications companies are prohibited from retaining personal data in the same quantities and for the same length of time as is routine—and legal—in the American business world.\textsuperscript{177}

\textbf{A. The Liberal Justifications for Information Privacy}

Although, as will be discussed below, some of the substantive guarantees of European law are quite technical, at the roots of these substantive guarantees are values easily recognizable to the members of any

\textsuperscript{172} See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BVerfGE, para. 158; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], July 14, 1999, 1 BVerfGE at 84–85.


\textsuperscript{174} See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BVerfGE, para. 158.

\textsuperscript{175} Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, BGBl. I at 904, § 6(1) (F.R.G.); Council of Europe Convention, \textit{supra} note 18, art. 8.

liberal democracy. The most fundamental is what the legal philosopher Stanley Benn calls “respect for persons.” At the core of liberalism is the free, rational, equal person. The social contract rests upon this vision of individual autonomy—at one and the same time a product and promoter of this choosing being. From the observer’s perspective, acknowledging the privacy of another is respect for the choice made by that person to keep something for herself or her close circle of confidants. From the perspective of the observed, the right to keep certain matters private and make others public is critical to developing one’s identity as an autonomous person who freely chooses one’s own life projects. When the observer is the state, the failure to respect the choice for privacy has special consequences for liberty because of the substantial means at the disposal of the state. The total surveillance of George Orwell’s 1984 could only be achieved by the state. Collecting, combining, and manipulating information about people is the digital equivalent of gazing at them without their consent. This liberty interest underpins the law of information privacy.

A second reason for shielding individuals from the gaze of others—and from the unfettered collection, storage, analysis, and retrieval of data about them—is to prevent all the possible illegitimate uses of this knowledge. In the United States, suppression of speech and political protest is one of the most repugnant of these illegitimate uses. The attempt to draft Norwegian men into the German army using information collected originally as innocent census data is another example. Discrimination based on religion, race, or ethnic origin is yet another harmful use of knowledge of others. Again, although individuals and the government can commit these wrongs, the dangers are greater when the government is involved because of the tremendous resources at its command. Antiterrorism data mining, which makes heavy use of terrorist profiles based on sex (male), age (eighteen–forty years), religion (Muslim), and country of origin (country with significant Muslim population), quite obviously triggers these discrimination and speech concerns.

179 See id. at 22.
180 See id.
181 See id. at 11.
182 See id. at 24.
183 See generally George Orwell, 1984 (1948).
184 See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
185 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BVerfGE, para. 26.
The other reasons for information privacy are somewhat more remote from what is traditionally considered the core of privacy. One of these reasons is the theft of personal data for fraudulent or other criminal purposes, which is more likely with electronic data than paper records because of the ease with which such data can be collected and copied. In the case of antiterrorism data mining, however, the foremost of these reasons is the danger of inaccuracy. Because of the ease with which electronic data can be gathered, stored, and combined in the age of information technology, the accuracy of that data is difficult to guarantee. This is not simply because it is often recorded incorrectly through human error. When different data sets are combined, their different coding and software systems can lead the information in one of the data sets to be wrongly interpreted, based on the other data set's coding and software system. What is more, electronic data is so easy to store that it can remain long after it has become inaccurate because the facts on the ground have changed. A valid data-mining process, as described earlier, is dedicated in large part to fixing these inaccuracies. The questionable quality of electronic data is cause for concern because of the great reliance placed on such data by all types of actors in making a vast number of decisions with adverse consequences for the individuals concerned. When data is being mined to detect terrorists, these consequences are especially grievous: being wrongly surveilled, detained, prosecuted, or even convicted.

B. Information Privacy as a European Fundamental Right

Before going any further, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by “Europe.” Personal data processing for purposes of national security and law enforcement is covered by two Europe-wide instruments—the European Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”) and the Council of Europe Convention on Personal Data Processing. It is also covered by individual national laws. This Article focuses on the laws of Germany and France because of their longstanding influence at the European level and, through instruments at the European level, on other national legal systems. The law of another Europe-wide organization—the European Union—has not historically played much of a role in this area because of the limitations on the organization’s powers. The European Union, until recently, has been responsible for creating a common market, not for policing or protecting national security.

186 Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18.
That constitutional structure is gradually changing, in the face of the expanding powers of the European Union, but the basic point is still valid. This discussion, therefore, only raises EU law selectively, for the few issues on which it is germane.

In European law, the main line of defense against data mining is general data protection law, not sectoral legislation as in the United States. The call records in this hypothetical are considered a subset of personal data—albeit a more protected subset of personal data than, say, one’s home address. For the very same set of facts, the source of government duties and individual rights is the law of telecommunications surveillance in the United States, while it is the general law of data privacy in Europe.

Of course, there is telecommunications law in Europe. At the constitutional level, however, only in Germany is the privacy of communications and data related to communications afforded protection under a separate article of the Constitution and a separate line of cases. And even there, the constitutional reasoning is, for all intents and purposes, identical to the reasoning in the data privacy cases. At the statutory level, the law regulating telecommunications surveillance—which in Europe squarely includes the collection of noncontent data—always requires an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing before the communications data may be intercepted by, or transferred to, the government. The one exception to this requirement is German legislation

187 See id.
188 Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 10 (F.R.G.). Article 10 says: “The confidentiality of letters, as well as the confidentiality of post and telecommunications is inviolable.” Sabine Michalowski & Lorna Woods, German Constitutional Law: The Protection of Civil Liberties 293 (1999). In 1999, the Constitutional Court explained that Article 10 includes both the content of communications and noncontent data (called “connection data”):

The protection of fundamental rights, however, is not restricted to shielding the content of an act of communication against the state taking note of it. The protection of fundamental rights also covers the circumstances of communication, particularly including: (1) information about whether, when and how often telecommunications traffic has taken place or has been attempted; (2) information about the individuals between whom telecommunications traffic has taken place or has been attempted; and (3) information about which subscriber lines have been used. The state cannot, in principle, claim to be allowed to take note of the circumstances of acts of communication. The use of the medium of communication is supposed to remain confidential in all respects.

Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], July 14, 1999, 1 BVerfGE at 51–52 (citations omitted).
189 In France, electronic surveillance, including the monitoring and collection of noncontent data (données techniques), is regulated differently depending on whether it is con-
on foreign intelligence surveillance, which contemplates not only individualized surveillance but also “strategic surveillance.” Strategic surveillance is similar to data mining in that large numbers of telephone calls and other forms of communications are intercepted, without a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing, and then screened using certain search terms. Strategic surveillance is only permitted, however, for communications with foreign nations and only to prevent international terrorist attacks and other types of national security threats. Purely domestic phone calls are excluded. In sum, the general provi-
sions of telecommunications law could not be used to authorize the massive transfer of customer data to the government for data-mining purposes. Rather, in Europe, a government initiative like the NSA’s would require a new law or regulation and that law or regulation would have to satisfy both fundamental rights standards on data privacy as well as the requirements of general data protection legislation.

The privacy of personal information is considered a fundamental right at both the European and national levels. It is protected by the right to respect for private and family life in the ECHR,194 the right to informational self-determination195 and the privacy of communications196 in Germany, and the right to respect for private life in France.197 All information that is about a specific person is considered personal and therefore deserving of privacy. If the government wishes to interfere with this right, it must do so based on a law that is accessible to the public and that contains provisions precise enough to curb arbitrary government action and to put citizens on notice of possible incursions into their private sphere.198 The purpose of the interference

195 This constitutional right is based on the right to human dignity (Article 1) and the right to free development of one’s personality (Article 2.1). GG [Constitution] arts. 1, 2.1 (F.R.G.); see Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 323, 324–25 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the Census Act Case).
197 See CC decision no. 94-352, Jan. 18, 1995 (Loi d’orientation et de programmation relative à la sécurité); CC decision no. 2004-499DC, July 29, 2004, Rec. 2 (Loi relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel). The respect for private life is recognized by the Constitutional Council as one of the liberties protected under Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens of 1789, which is considered part of the French Constitution of 1958 by virtue of the reference to the Declaration in the preamble to the Constitution. CC decision no. 2004-499DC, Rec. 2.
198 This is the interpretation given by the European Court of Human Rights to the requirement, under Article 8, that “there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of his right [to private life] except such as is in accordance with the law.”
with privacy must be legitimate. Protecting “national security,” guaranteeing “public safety,” and preventing “disorder or crime” are specifically listed as legitimate purposes under Article 8 of the ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights has consistently ruled in favor of government legislation with such aims. Likewise, the German and French constitutional courts have repeatedly found preventing crime, fighting terrorism, and protecting national security to be legitimate public reasons for impinging upon individual rights.

Fundamental rights law requires that the government’s legitimate interference with privacy be proportional. The proportionality test pervades the case law of all the European courts under consideration on all rights, not simply the right to privacy. Proportionality generally turns on three related inquiries: (1) Can the government action achieve the stated purpose? (2) Is the government action necessary for accomplishing the stated purpose, or are there alternative means of accomplishing the same purpose that will burden the right less? and (3) When a noneconomic right is at stake, even though there might be no alternative means for accomplishing the same purpose, is the burden on the right nonetheless intolerable, requiring the law to be withdrawn? Of course, this formulation greatly simplifies the doctrine of proportionality. The test differs not only among courts, but as between different cases decided by the same court. Moreover, the burden of...
justification on the government varies tremendously depending on the right at stake and the public interest being pursued: the more important the right, the higher the burden on the government; the more important the public purpose, the lower the burden on the government. Nevertheless, it is useful to establish a least-common-denominator point of reference.

C. Statutory Requirements: The Council of Europe Convention and National Data Protection Laws

When the privacy right is data privacy and when the government interference is for purposes of law enforcement or national security, more specific conditions must also be met: the terms of the Council of Europe Convention and national data protection laws. Whereas the former sets down general data protection commitments, the latter give effect to, and elaborate extensively upon, those commitments. In 1981, the members of the Council of Europe concluded the Convention on Personal Data Processing (the “Convention”). The Convention is critical to understanding European data protection. Of all the Europe-wide instruments on data protection, it has the broadest coverage, both regarding subject matter and geography. The Convention, unlike EU data protection laws, applies to all types of personal data processing, by both government and private actors. It has been ratified by thirty-eight of the forty-six members of the Council of Europe and it has been signed, but not yet ratified, by six more member states. That is a considerably broader group of nations than the membership of the European Union. Furthermore, because of the Convention’s age, it has been influential in developing data protection legislation everywhere in Europe. National latecomers to the policy area like the United King-
dom copied the terms of the Convention into their domestic data protection legislation at the time of implementation.\textsuperscript{211} The European Union has used the Convention’s general principles as the framework for the more detailed provisions of its data protection law governing market actors.\textsuperscript{212} Other EU data protection rules are copied directly from the Convention.\textsuperscript{213}

The data protection laws of Germany and France also have particular significance. National data protection legislation is generally categorized according to historical vintage: the first generation, enacted in the 1970s; the second generation, dating to the 1980s and adopted to implement the Convention; and the third generation, adopted in the late 1990s and early 2000s to fulfill the requirements of membership in the European Union.\textsuperscript{214} The German and French laws belong, squarely, to the first generation.\textsuperscript{215} Because of their early vintage, they were influential blueprints for the Convention. And, as a result of Germany’s and France’s extensive regulatory experience, their legal instruments—and their data protection officials—continue to exercise influence, both on novel questions of data protection and on countries in the process of adopting their first data protection legislation.

In Germany, the Federal Data Protection Act was originally enacted in 1977, and significantly amended in 1990 and 2001. It covers private actors throughout Germany,\textsuperscript{216} including telecommunications companies and federal public bodies, such as Germany’s federal law

\textsuperscript{211} See, e.g., Data Protection Act, 1984, c. 29 (Eng.). For a history of the U.K. legislation, see Colin J. Bennett, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States 89–94 (1992).


\textsuperscript{214} See Bennett & Raab, supra note 207, at 126–27.


\textsuperscript{216} Federal Data Protection Act § 27.
enforcement and intelligence agencies. An independent agency, known as the Federal Data Protection Commissioner, has been established to enforce federal data protection law. In addition, a special oversight system has been established for telecommunications surveillance—including surveillance of noncontent data—conducted by domestic and foreign intelligence agencies; an independent commission (the “G10 Commission”), appointed by the parliamentary committee responsible for oversight of Germany’s intelligence services, reviews individual surveillance orders as well as the administrative rules governing strategic surveillance. Each Land also has its own Data Protection Act. These acts set down the data protection rules that discipline state government. They create Land data protection authorities to enforce both the Land rules and the Federal Data Protection Act’s provisions on market actors. Land data protection rules are also pertinent to intelligence gathering for purposes of preventing terrorism. The Länder all have their own police forces, governed by Land data protection laws, and responsible not only for criminal investigations but also for protecting public order against future offenses such as terrorist acts (“preventive policing”).

In contrast with federal Germany, France is a unitary system. This greatly simplifies the legislative scheme—it has only one data protection law and one data protection law enforcer. The Law on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties (“Law No. 78-17”) was enacted in 1978 and significantly amended in 2004. It regulates data processing throughout the economy and throughout government, in-
cluding the police and national security agencies. An independent agency, the Commission Nationale de l’Information et des Libertés ("CNIL"), is entrusted with extensive enforcement powers. It is charged with registering and authorizing certain types of data processing operations, with promulgating interpretive regulations, with conducting inspections and imposing administrative sanctions, and with advising the government on legislative and regulatory measures affecting privacy.

Fundamental rights law is the basic framework for the Council of Europe Convention and the German and French legislation. The Convention and the legislation contain a specific set of conditions designed to satisfy the requirements of legitimacy and proportionality in those instances in which the right to data privacy is burdened. Paralleling the fundamental rights doctrine on the need for an authorizing law, personal data should be processed fairly and lawfully. Because a fundamental right is at stake any time an individual’s personal data is processed, such data must be stored for specified and legitimate purposes and should only be used in accordance with those purposes. The amount of the data processed should be no more than necessary to accomplish the purpose. Neither should the time during which the data is stored be any longer than necessary to accomplish the purpose. The data must be accurate and, whenever necessary, kept up to date—otherwise, how would such data processing be able to achieve the stated purpose? Types of personal data that are believed to be especially sensitive—for instance, data revealing racial origin, religious beliefs, and health conditions—must be afforded “appropriate safeguards.” Those who process personal data must put into place “appropriate security measures” to ensure that personal information will

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224 Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 2.
225 Id. art. 5.
226 Id. art. 11.
228 Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 5a. Even more precise is the German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, BGBl. I at 904, § 4(1). It says: “The collection, processing and use of personal data shall be admissible only if permitted or prescribed by this Act or any other legal provision or if the data subject has consented.” Id.
229 Id. art. 5b.
230 Id. art. 5c.
231 Id. art. 5e.
232 Id. art. 5d.
233 Id. art. 6.
be revealed only to those for whom it is intended. As a special safeguard for the burdened privacy right, individuals should have the right to check their personal data to make sure that it is accurate and that, in all other respects, their personal data is being processed in accordance with the law. All these guarantees can be found in the German and French data protection laws, albeit in more detailed incarnations.

The state parties are allowed to derogate from the Convention’s provisions in the interests of “protecting State security, public safety, the monetary interests of the State or the suppression of criminal offences.” These are interests clearly at stake in our hypothetical. Such derogations, however, must be detailed in the state party’s national law and must be necessary, meaning that they must be carefully justified like any other government interference with the right to privacy. Both the German and the French legislation take advantage of this possibility; exceptions exist for data processing for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. In neither case, however, is such data processing, by the relevant government agencies, entirely or even mostly exempt from the safeguards of national data protection law.

Another distinguishing feature of European data privacy law is the enforcement system. Independent agencies responsible for the enforcement of data protection law have been established in all European countries. To these national agencies, add the supranational bodies responsible for overseeing compliance in the European Union: the European Data Protection Supervisor with jurisdiction over EU institutions responsible for common market regulation, the Joint Supervisory Body with jurisdiction over personal data exchanged through Europol, and the Joint Supervisory Authority with jurisdiction over per-

234 Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 7.

235 Id. art. 8.


237 Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 9.2a.

238 See id.

239 See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 41; Federal Data Protection Act § 19(3)–(4).

240 See Bennett & Raab, supra note 207, at 133, 136–37.

241 See generally Council Regulation 45/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 8) 1 (on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data).

242 See Article K.3 Convention, supra note 213, art. 24. Europol is located in The Hague, Netherlands. It was established by the Member States to support their police forces and other national law enforcement authorities, such as customs agencies, immigration
sonal data exchanged through Schengen.\textsuperscript{243} The powers of these national and supranational privacy agencies vary, but most, including the German and French data protection authorities, have the power to review proposed laws and regulations with a data protection impact, to conduct inspections of private and public data processors, and to commence administrative proceedings against violators which may result in injunctive orders or administrative fines.\textsuperscript{244} Because many violations of national laws are considered criminal offenses, such agencies also have the power to bring prosecutions directly or to refer privacy violations to public prosecutors for further action.\textsuperscript{245}
A final important aspect of European privacy law is the application of the law to public and private actors alike. At the level of fundamental rights, the guarantees of the ECHR and the German Basic Law have been applied to privacy violations committed by private actors, not only by the government. At what might be termed in the European hierarchy of legal norms, the statutory level, data protection guarantees are binding on both public and private users of personal data. Thus, in the Council of Europe Convention, no distinction is made between the duties of private and public actors. Given the greater specificity of legislation at the national level, the French and German laws do separate public from private public from private data processing, but only for purposes of stipulating special duties that apply to certain types of data processing, such as that involving national identification numbers.

D. Application of European Law to the NSA Call Records Scenario

Now to apply European law to the facts of our hypothetical. As discussed above, fundamental rights law requires first that the law be accessible to the public, containing precise provisions to limit governmental discretion and provide notice to citizens. Second, the interference with privacy must be legitimate. Finally, the interference must be proportional. After satisfying these fundamental rights standards, the specific requirements of the Council of Europe Convention and national data protection laws must still be met.


247 Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 3.

248 See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, arts. 25–29; Federal Data Protection Act §§ 12–21 (governing data processing by public bodies); id. §§ 27–38a (governing data processing by private bodies and public law enterprises participating in competition).

249 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.

250 See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.

251 See supra notes 202–205 and accompanying text.

252 See supra notes 206–248 and accompanying text.
1. Application of European Principles of Fundamental Rights

Would a secret presidential directive count as a “law” for purposes of the fundamental rights analysis? No. By definition, a secret directive is not accessible to the public. It cannot put citizens on notice of how their government is interfering with their basic rights. Nor can it curb potential abuses of government power, because no one but those government officials know the limits placed on their power by the directive.

European law, of course, permits exceptions to data privacy rules based on national security concerns, though surely not on the scale suggested by the U.S. President, who has claimed that any disclosure of the NSA call database threatens national security. One useful indicator of how such a claim would be addressed in Europe is a German constitutional case involving the G10 Law. That law, enacted in 1968, provides for wide-ranging surveillance by Germany’s domestic and foreign security agencies to “ward off dangers which threaten the free democratic order, the existence or the safety of the Federal Republic of Germany or of one of the German Länder.” Two types of surveillance are contemplated by this law: individual monitoring and strategic surveillance. Strategic surveillance closely resembles the NSA’s data mining: the Federal Intelligence Service screens phone traffic between Germany and certain foreign nations based on search terms related to the national security threats set down by statute.

When the G10 Law was amended in 1994 to expand the list of threats warranting surveillance, a constitutional challenge was brought against the provisions on strategic surveillance. Part of the challenge involved the program’s lack of transparency. The basic conditions for conducting strategic surveillance were set down in the statutory amendments and responsibility for developing specific search terms

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254 See generally Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], July 14, 1999, 1 BVerfGE.

255 Id. at 9 (translating Section 1.1 of the G10 Act).

256 Id. at 5.

257 Id. at 27.

258 Id. at 15–16.

259 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], July 14, 1999, 1 BVerfGE at 15–20.
was delegated to the administration.\textsuperscript{260} Those search terms were subject to review and possible cancellation by the independent body dedicated to overseeing intelligence gathering involving telecommunications (the “G10 Commission”). Such review, however, did not satisfy the Court. The Court held that the G10 Commission also had to have the power to review the other aspects of the Federal Intelligence Service’s personal data processing: the transfer of personal data to law enforcement and domestic intelligence agencies, the destruction of personal data, and the steps taken to notify individuals that they had been the target of surveillance.\textsuperscript{261} The challenge also involved the provisions setting down the government’s duty to notify individuals singled out as a result of strategic surveillance.\textsuperscript{262} The Court struck down an exemption from the duty of notification for data destroyed within three months of the date of acquisition on the grounds that this exemption impermissibly circumscribed the individual’s right to know.\textsuperscript{263} Given this reasoning, it is highly unlikely that the German Constitutional Court would approve of keeping an entire surveillance program secret. Any slight advantage that the government might gain from keeping secret a database involving the personal data of millions of citizens not individually suspected of terrorism would almost certainly be outweighed by the harm to the fundamental right to privacy.

The good news for the call database is that it would satisfy the second requirement of European fundamental rights law: collecting call data and mining it to protect against terrorist attacks is, most certainly, a legitimate purpose. But what about proportionality? Can a database with the calling records of tens of millions of citizens be necessary to fight terrorism? European courts and privacy officers show considerable deference to their intelligence services in making this kind of determination.\textsuperscript{264} They are acutely aware of their limits in understanding how to combat terrorism, as compared to the seasoned professionals in their national spy agencies. But, in Europe, to satisfy the first prong of the proportionality test, an argument would have to be made that data collection was capable of reducing the terrorist threat.

One good illustration of the case that would be expected from a European government is the debate leading up to the EU Data Reten-
tion Directive of March 2006 (the “Directive”).\(^{265}\) Under the Directive, providers of electronic communications services and networks are required to keep traffic data related to phone calls, emails, and other communications for a period of six months to two years, depending on the Member State.\(^{266}\) Such data must be made available to the national police and, via the national police, to police officers in other Member States.\(^{267}\) The purpose of the Directive is to fight serious crime, most notably terrorism.\(^{268}\) Notwithstanding this purpose, the Directive applies to market actors and it was therefore adopted as a common market measure. In proposing the Directive, the national governments in the Council of Ministers put forward a study based on the experience of the British police showing that call data older than six months was often useful in investigating serious crimes.\(^{269}\) This evidence was subsequently questioned by the independent data protection officers called upon to examine the proposed directive.\(^{270}\) Notwithstanding this skepticism, a data retention requirement of six months to two years was ultimately passed.\(^{271}\) But what is significant for purposes of this discussion is that the Council of Ministers had to produce some evidence in support of the data processing. It could not simply order the collection of call data based on entirely unsubstantiated speculation that the scheme might accomplish the crime-fighting purposes.

Under the second prong of the proportionality test, the government would need to show that the data-mining program was necessary for protecting national security.\(^{272}\) In practice, this means that the government would have to refute claims that alternative, less privacy-burdensome programs could accomplish, just as effectively, the same antiterrorism aims. This issue is directly related to the amount of data collected and the length of data retention and therefore is discussed below, in conjunction with the Council of Europe Convention.\(^{273}\)

\(^{265}\) See generally Data Retention Directive, supra note 14.

\(^{266}\) Id. art. 6.

\(^{267}\) Id. art. 4.

\(^{268}\) See id. art. 1.

\(^{269}\) European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion, supra note 194, at 3.


\(^{271}\) Data Retention Directive, supra note 14, art. 6.

\(^{272}\) Kommers, supra note 195, at 48.

\(^{273}\) See infra notes 293–298 and accompanying text.
The last part of the proportionality analysis requires the government to demonstrate that the benefit to the public security ends of the call database outweighs the harm to the privacy right—or, seen from the individual’s perspective, that the burden on the right is “proportionate” to the government purpose being pursued.274 This question turns entirely on the magnitude of the harm to the individual right as compared to the benefit to the public interest. When data mining is conducted for national security purposes, the privacy interest is strong because of the risk that the individual might be wrongly investigated, detained, prosecuted, or even convicted. It is stronger than when, say, personal information is used to distribute welfare benefits. The importance of the public interest depends on which types of threats to national security and what level of suspicion serve as the trigger for data mining. In the case of the NSA call records program, we do not know; this extreme secrecy is part of the problem for European privacy law. But according to the German Constitutional Court, not all threats warrant intelligence-related searches of telecommunications data: international terrorist attacks, international proliferation of weapons, and the illegal introduction of a not-insignificant quantity of narcotics from abroad, yes, but international counterfeiting, no.275 More to the point, the Constitutional Court has recently held that a general fear of terrorism in the wake of September 11 is not good enough to trigger antiterrorism data mining.276

On April 4, 2006, the Constitutional Court found that police data mining carried out after September 11 to identify Islamic sleeper cells was unconstitutional.277 In Germany, antiterrorism data mining was first used in the 1970s to fight the Red Army Faction, a left-wing terrorist group.278 The German version of antiterrorism data mining (Rasterfahndung) appears to be less ambitious technologically than the American version.279 Terrorist profiles are first created, based on characteristics generally believed to be associated with terrorism.280 Those profiles

274 KOMMERS, supra note 195, at 46.
275 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], July 14, 1999, 1 BVerfGE at 84–85.
276 See generally Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BVerfGE.
277 See generally id.
278 See id. para. 3.
279 See Note from German Delegation to Article 36 Committee on Europe-Wide Computerised Profile Searches, Doc. No. 6403/02 (Mar. 8, 2002) (available in register of documents of the Council of Ministers of the European Union).
280 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BVerfGE, para. 2 (describing the data profiling method).
are then used to search public and private databases. This results in a list of individuals who are then subject to examination by the police to establish whether they do indeed pose a threat to public safety. In the wake of September 11, the police forces of the Länder undertook a coordinated effort to collect and search various data sets based on a common terrorist profile: male, age eighteen–forty, student or former student, Islamic faith, and citizenship or birthplace in a country with a predominantly Islamic population. The results of these searches were transmitted to the Federal Police Office, which matched the names against other data sets containing information on other characteristics associated with terrorism, and thereby narrowed the pool. The names of suspects were then sent back to the Länder police for further review and possible surveillance and questioning. These activities were authorized by specific provisions of Land police acts that allow the police to collect and analyze data for purposes of state security or for protecting the “life, health, or freedom of a person.”

In a complaint brought against the state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, the German Constitutional Court found that the data-mining program was unconstitutional. The Court reaffirmed its earlier case law on the right of informational self-determination: the right protects against the police’s collection, transfer, storage, and processing of personal information. Moving to the proportionality inquiry, the Court found that the national security purpose of the program was legitimate and that the data mining was a suitable and necessary means of obtaining that goal. But the Court concluded that the burden on the right of informational self-determination was not proportionate to the public ends being pursued. Such data mining, with such grave consequences for constitutional rights, would only be acceptable if there were actual facts demonstrating an “imminent and specific endangerment” (konkrete Gefahr) of a terrorist attack. In this instance, police

281 See id.
282 See id.
283 See id. para. 26. It should be remembered that, in Germany, the police have so-called “preventive” powers to thwart future threats as well as “repressive” powers to investigate crimes that have already been committed.
284 See id. para. 31.
285 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BVerfGE, para. 63.
286 See id. paras. 5–6.
287 Id. paras. 68–75.
288 Id.
289 Id. paras. 81–86.
290 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BVerfGE, para. 68.
291 See id. para. 158.
data mining had been triggered by a general fear of terrorism following September 11—for the Constitutional Court, this was not reason enough to intrude upon the privacy right.292

2. Applying the Council of Europe Convention and the National Laws of Germany and France

At this point, the data protection inquiry turns to the more specific requirements of the Council of Europe Convention and national laws. Is the call data being used by the government only for purposes of identifying possible terrorists and thwarting future terrorist attacks? This is one more difficulty with the secretiveness of the NSA program: no assurances have been given that the call data is not being used for more banal purposes—for instance, for identifying ordinary bank robbers and turning over their names to law enforcement officials.

Is the amount of data being processed no more than necessary to accomplish the terrorism-fighting purpose? Curiously, at least for a European audience, when certain U.S. Senators learned of the call database, they complained that it contained too little data—not too much.293 If the purpose is to foil terrorist plots on American soil, the Senators reasoned, shouldn’t the NSA have information on all the calls made and received by all Americans, not just clients of AT&T and Verizon? But, in Europe, the amount of call data would probably be considered excessive. Again, the debates on the recent EU Data Retention Directive are instructive. Under the Directive, the police may obtain electronic communications data from providers only “in specific cases”294 and only for purposes of fighting “serious crime.”295 A program giving the government routine, indiscriminate access to all traffic data of all customers would probably involve an excessive amount of data under European law.296

As for the time of data retention, that also would be too long. From the press accounts, it appears that the NSA began collecting call data immediately after September 11, 2001.297 There does not seem to be any requirement to erase the data. That means that some of the in-

292 See generally id.
293 See Page, supra note 32.
294 Data Retention Directive, supra note 14, art. 4.
295 Id. art. 1.1.
296 The Data Retention Directive, however, only applies to access by national police for “purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime.” Id. It does not cover access by security services. Therefore, the analogy to the NSA program is not exact.
297 See Cauley, supra note 9; Page, supra note 32.
formation is over five years old. In the European Union, even the most hawkish of Member States—the United Kingdom, France, Ireland, and Sweden—only pushed for a three-year data retention period, after which call data would have had to be destroyed.\textsuperscript{298} Five years is far beyond anything ever imagined for the European Union.

The accuracy requirement, however, would probably be satisfied. Because the purpose of the NSA program is to track individual behavior, not, say, award benefits, it is not critical that the personal data in the system be routinely checked and updated. Call data, moreover, does not generally reveal sensitive personal characteristics such as religious affiliation, and therefore it would not require additional safeguards under European law. It seems safe to assume that the “appropriate security measures” have been adopted. The NSA, probably the most technologically sophisticated of all U.S. government agencies, has most likely taken the necessary steps to protect the call data from unauthorized disclosures.

That being said, individuals have absolutely no right to check on their personal data being used by the NSA. On this last step of the data protection analysis, European systems differ considerably. Some have made more extensive use of the national security exemption than others. Neither Germany nor France, however, categorically bars individuals from exercising their right of access in cases of national security data processing.\textsuperscript{299}

Under German law, access to one’s personal data and the correction, erasure, or blocking of such data count as the “inalienable rights of the data subject.”\textsuperscript{300} National security agencies may, on a case-by-case basis, deny access if disclosure would “impair public safety or order or otherwise be detrimental to the Federation or a Land.”\textsuperscript{301} Even these agencies, however, must give reasons for denying such a request, either to the individual directly or to the Federal Commissioner for Data Pro-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{300}] Federal Data Protection Act § 6.
\item[\textsuperscript{301}] Id. § 19(3).
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tection, unless giving reasons would itself jeopardize “public safety or order or otherwise be detrimental to the Federation or a Land.” The federal police, by contrast, are never exempted from their duty to give access, although the information may be communicated to the Federal Data Protection Commissioner rather than to the individual. Land regulation of their police forces varies, but the Hessian legislation is illustrative. The Hessian police are not given a blanket exemption from disclosure. Rather, the Hessian Data Protection Act states that the statutory provisions on access shall not apply where after balancing the rights accorded to the data subject against public interest in data secrecy . . . the latter interests prevail. The decision shall be made by the head, or his designated deputy, of the data storage agency. If the data subject is denied information or the right to inspect records, he shall be informed of the major reasons on which the denial is based and of his right to complain to the Hessian Data Protection Commissioner.

Under the French data protection law, the right of access is indirect “where processing involves State security, defence or public safety,” meaning that an individual cannot approach the intelligence agency directly but must proceed via CNIL, the independent privacy commission. The procedure for so-called “indirect access” is as follows:

The [CNIL] receives the access request and appoints one of its members, who is or has been a member of the “Conseil d’Etat” [highest administrative court], the “Cour de Cassation” [highest civil court] or the “Cour des Comptes” [independent body responsible for auditing government accounts],

303 Federal Data Protection Act § 6(2).
305 Id. § 18(5).
306 Id.
to carry out the necessary investigations and have the necessary modifications made. An officer of the commission may assist the appointed member of the commission. The applicant shall be informed that the verifications have been carried out.

Whenever the commission establishes, with the agreement of the data controller, that the disclosure of the data does not undermine its purposes, State security, the defence or public safety, these data may be disclosed to the applicant.308

By contrast, the default rule for personal data held by law enforcement agencies is direct access. The regulation authorizing the data processing, however, may provide for indirect access:

The [right of indirect access] shall apply to processing carried out by public authorities and departments and private legal entities entrusted with a public service mission for the prevention, investigation or proof of criminal offenses, or the assessment or collection of taxes, where the [authorizing regulation] provides for this right.309

In sum, notwithstanding all of the exceptions for national security and law enforcement, the NSA call database would violate the European right of access, too.

The principal institution of European privacy law—an independent watchdog agency—is also missing in the United States.310 The NSA did not first consult an independent privacy agency before undertaking the call records program. In France or Germany, by contrast, a government proposal for data mining, even intelligence-related data mining, would have to be submitted to an independent privacy regulator for review.311

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308 Id.

309 Id. art. 42.

310 This is a slight oversimplification. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 requires that each agency create a “data integrity board,” entrusted with overseeing privacy in computer matching projects. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(u) (2000). However, the members of such boards are appointed by the agency head and their mandate is limited. The Department of Homeland Security has a privacy officer, but, again, the privacy officer is appointed by the administration and therefore is not independent. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 222, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 142 (Supp. III 2003 & Supp. IV 2004)). Moreover, she only has jurisdiction over the activities of the Department of Homeland Security and her powers are limited.

311 See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 11(4)(a) (establishing general duty to consult CNIL on “any bill or draft decree relating to the protection of individuals in relation to automatic data processing”); id. arts. 11(2)(a), 26 (establishing specific duty to obtain “reasoned and published” opinion of CNIL on ministerial order (arrêté) authorizing “the
Such review would entail a wide-ranging proportionality analysis—along the lines of this Article—and would result in a finding on the lawfulness of the program, as well as recommendations for limiting the government’s interference with the right to privacy. This institutional requirement is not designed solely to improve the privacy quality of the program by ensuring that the necessary safeguards are in place to prevent government abuses. Scrutiny by an independent regulator also improves public awareness of government intrusions in highly technical policy areas in which the burden on privacy can be obscure to the average citizen. In sum, the involvement of a privacy agency, coupled with the requirement of a detailed, accessible authorizing law, gives rise to a vigorous public debate on the privacy costs of government initiatives that may—or may not—be necessary in a post-September 11 world.

A European privacy agency would also have the power to make sure that intelligence officers running a data-mining program were complying with basic privacy safeguards. In France, this takes the form of a standard administrative enforcement scheme. CNIL has the power to inspect government programs, and, if it finds violations, to impose sanctions. In data processing related to national security and law enforcement, these powers are quite soft, but they exist nonetheless. Data processing related to “state security” can be insulated from CNIL’s inspection powers at the time that the program is authorized. If CNIL learns of privacy breaches in government programs involving processing of personal data carried out on behalf of the State and: (1) which involves State security, defence or public safety; or (2) whose purpose is the prevention, investigation or proof of criminal offences, the prosecution of offenders or the exception of criminal sentences or security measures); Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, BGBl. I at 904, § 26(2)–(3) (F.R.G.) (establishing general power of Federal Data Protection Commission to give opinions and recommendations on government measures); Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz [Hessian Data Protection Act], Nov. 11, 1986, BGBl. I at 309, §§ 24(1), 25, 29 (F.R.G.) (establishing duty to inform Hessian Data Protection Commissioner of “new procedures and techniques in data processing as well as of any preliminary draft proposals on the automated processing of personal data” and power to give opinions and recommendations).  


314 Id. art. 45.I.

315 See id. art. 44.IV.

316 Id.
“state security” or “criminal offenses,” it has the power to issue warnings
and order the termination of such breaches.\textsuperscript{317} If the order is ignored,
CNIL may publicize the privacy breach.\textsuperscript{318} When the violation of privacy
rights is “urgent,” CNIL has the power to “notify the Prime Minister so
that he may, if necessary, take measures to stop the violation . . . . The
Prime Minister shall inform the commission of the steps he has taken
within fifteen days of receiving the notification.”\textsuperscript{319} And in the case of a
“serious and immediate” violation, CNIL’s chairman may “ask, in summary
proceedings, the competent jurisdiction to order, if necessary applying a daily penalty, any security measure necessary for the protection
of these rights and liberties.”\textsuperscript{320} Finally, private actors and public officials
may be criminally prosecuted under the French data protection
law.\textsuperscript{321}

In contrast with the French system of privacy enforcement, the
German system relies more on consultation and persuasion than on
hard sanctions. This is also the case when data processing is conducted
for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. Thus, in Germany, each
public and private body—including intelligence agencies—must ap-
point an internal “data-protection official” responsible for overseeing
compliance within the organization.\textsuperscript{322} Internal data protection officials
must notify the responsible data protection agency of any violations.
\textsuperscript{323} The Federal Data Protection Commissioner is responsible for “moni-
tor[ing] compliance”\textsuperscript{324} and the Land authorities for “monitor[ing] implementation”\textsuperscript{325}
within their respective jurisdictions. Thus, in the case of a suspected privacy violation by an agency like the Federal Intel-
ligence Service, the Federal Commissioner would have the power to
inspect documents; to obtain answers to questions; to advise on steps
for improving data protection; and, in the case of a breach, to file a
complaint with the head of the agency and to require a response from
that agency outlining its remedial measures.\textsuperscript{326} Should compliance not

\textsuperscript{317} Id. art. 45.I.
\textsuperscript{318} Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 46.
\textsuperscript{319} Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 45.II(3), J.O. [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7,
2004, p. 227, amended by
\textsuperscript{320} Id. art. 45.III.
\textsuperscript{321} Id. art. 50.
\textsuperscript{322} Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, BGBl. I at
904, §§ 4f–4g (F.R.G.).
\textsuperscript{323} Id. § 4g.
\textsuperscript{324} Id. § 24(1).
\textsuperscript{325} Id. § 38(1).
\textsuperscript{326} Id. §§ 24–26.
be forthcoming, the Federal Commissioner is authorized to report the matter to Parliament.\footnote{327} This is the standard operating procedure for monitoring all agencies. Data protection commissioners in the Länder, responsible for overseeing their government administrations, including their police forces and domestic security agencies, have similar powers of inspection and persuasion.\footnote{328}

Only two exceptions are made for intelligence and law enforcement agencies. First, inspections must be conducted by the Federal Commissioner in person or by assistants specially designated by him.\footnote{329} Second, when the agency is a federal intelligence agency and the personal data is telecommunications data, as in our hypothetical, primary responsibility for oversight rests with the parliamentary G10 Commission.\footnote{330} The Federal Commissioner may be requested by the G10 Commission to investigate and report on such data processing, but he does not have independent powers.\footnote{331} The same is the case when the agency is a Land intelligence agency and the personal data is telecommunications data—oversight is the task of the Land parliament, not the Land data protection commissioner.\footnote{332}

The last aspect of the NSA episode that is puzzling to the European observer is the availability of so much personal data in the hands of private firms, ready to be transferred to the government whenever it so requests. As explained earlier, European data protection law covers both the public and private sectors.\footnote{333} To collect personal data, private actors must have a legitimate purpose and must use such data only in accordance with that legitimate purpose.\footnote{334} For commercial operators, the legitimate purpose is generally providing a good or service to customers and collecting the payment due for the good or service. Only personal information relevant to this contractual relationship can be gathered.\footnote{335} And once the contract has been fulfilled—the good or service provided and the payment rendered—the personal data is to be

\footnote{327} Federal Data Protection Act § 26.

\footnote{328} See, e.g., Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz [Hessian Data Protection Act], Nov. 11, 1986, BGBl. I at 309, §§ 27, 29–30 (F.R.G.).


\footnote{330} Id. § 24(2).

\footnote{331} Id.

\footnote{332} E-mail from Alexander Dix, Berlin Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, to Francesca Bignami, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Oct. 6, 2006, 21:05:45 EST) (on file with author).

\footnote{333} See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 3.

\footnote{334} Id. art. 5(b).

\footnote{335} See id. art. 5(c).
erased. It cannot be kept and used for other purposes. The most common American counterexample—aside from helping out the NSA—is using personal data collected for a contractual relationship to market unrelated goods and services.

Providers of electronic communications services are not only governed by these general principles of European law. For them, there is a specific EU law requiring that a subscriber’s communications data be erased once no longer necessary for connecting the communication or for obtaining payment on the bill. The law allows for some exceptions. For instance, if the subscriber gives her consent at the time of signing up for the service, the provider may use the subscriber’s personal information for purposes of marketing additional services. Member States may require, by law, that their electronic communications providers retain subscriber data and make that data available for legitimate government purposes. Such data retention requirements have been enacted in most Member States to enable their police forces and intelligence agencies to obtain communications data necessary for investigations. As a matter of fact, the EU Data Retention Directive was designed to harmonize some of these very different data retention requirements at the Member State level. In Europe, therefore, telecommunications providers do keep personal data to assist with intelligence and police operations, much as AT&T and Verizon kept the call records that were later transferred to the NSA. But, unlike their American counterparts, European telecommunications providers can keep personal data after performance on a subscriber contract only because specific laws instruct them to do so, setting down the type of data to be retained, the time when the data must be erased, and the conditions under which the data may be requested by government agencies.

V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMPARISON

These differences between European and American privacy law have several ramifications. Politically, the legal differences have strained relations between Europe and the United States and have frustrated

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336 See id. art. 5(e).
338 Id. art. 6.3.
339 Id. art. 15.1.
340 See Data Retention Directive, supra note 14; supra notes 265–271 and accompanying text.
transatlantic cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The comparison can also prompt law reform in the United States. It reveals that, notwithstanding the common transatlantic commitment to information privacy in the early 1970s, today the European system protects privacy more effectively than the American one. Those parts of the European statutory scheme that have contributed to this outcome should inform the U.S. Congress’s attempts to legislate more effective information privacy law.

A. Obstacles to Transatlantic Cooperation on Fighting Terrorism

The practical consequences of these legal differences are dramatic. Transatlantic cooperation on national security has already been strained by differences in privacy law. The latest string of revelations related to the NSA’s activities can only make cooperation more difficult. The U.S. government might wish to obtain information held by European spy and law enforcement agencies for purposes of preventing terrorist attacks. Yet because the way it handles personal data is so out of line with European law, it is increasingly unlikely that it will be able to get that data.

The dilemma for any European government is simple: how can it transfer information on its citizens to the U.S. government when, in all likelihood, the information will end up in a database that would clearly be unlawful if created by that same European government—especially when the information might be used, at some future point in time, to wrongly detain, prosecute, convict, or even execute a European citizen? This reluctance is not simply a matter of moral scruples or political survival. In many European countries, it is the law of data protection. The government can transfer personal data only to countries with an “adequate” level of data protection.341 And by this point it should be clear that the United States would not count as one of those countries.342


342 The adequacy of U.S. law for purposes of EU personal data transfers has been the object of extensive study. See Shaffer, supra note 23, at 22–38. See generally Commission Decision 2000/520, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 71 (EC). The focus, however, has been on the adequacy of private sector—not public sector—data protection law. This is because the only EU (as opposed to national) adequacy requirement applies to market-based transfers of personal data, not to transfers related to government policing or national security. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 212, art. 25. As the European Court of Justice has recently held, third-country transfers of personal data to assist with law enforcement or national security fall outside the scope of EU data protection law. Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04, Eur.
1. Legal Obstacles to Intelligence Exchange

The law governing data transfers to the United States and other third countries is mostly national. On this subject, the Council of Europe Convention has little to say. Unfortunately, national laws vary even more than the usual in their treatment of third-country transfers for national security and law enforcement purposes. Both the German and French data protection laws, however, impose blanket bans on transfers to inadequate third countries; they create such limited exceptions to those bans that the routine exchange of intelligence with an inadequate country would be prohibited. Under the German data protection law, transfer [of personal data] to foreign [non-EU], supranational or international bodies . . . shall not be effected in so far as the data subject has a legitimate interest in excluding transfer, in particular if an adequate level of data protection is not guaranteed . . . .

The only exception to this prohibition is national defense or certain duties under international law:

[The prohibition] shall not apply if transfer is necessary in order to enable a public body of the Federation to perform its duties for compelling reasons of defence or to discharge supranational or international duties in the field of crisis management or conflict prevention or for humanitarian measures.

To obtain personal data from Germany, the U.S. government would have to argue that the data involved a security threat to both

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343 A protocol to the Convention, signed in 2001, would require the parties to allow transfers to third states only if such states provided an “adequate level of protection.” See Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Regarding Supervisory Authorities and Transborder Data Flows, art. 2.1, Nov. 8, 2001, E.T.S. 181. As of January 2007, however, this protocol had been ratified by only fifteen countries. Moreover, the parties are allowed to derogate from the adequacy requirement for a number of reasons including a “legitimate prevailing interest, especially important public interests.” Id. art 2.2(a).


345 Federal Data Protection Act § 4b(2).

346 Id.
Germany and the United States and that, as a result, the transfer would advance the purpose of defending Germany from foreign attack. The only other avenue available to the U.S. government would be an agreement with Germany promising that it will treat personal information in accordance with the basic principles of German privacy law. The German data protection law directs officials to assess adequacy “in the light of all circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or a category of data transfer operations.” An international agreement would count as one of those circumstances.

Likewise, under the French data protection law, personal data may not be transferred to a state outside the European Union if that state “does not provide a sufficient level of protection of individuals’ privacy, liberties and fundamental rights with regard to the actual or possible processing of their personal data.” There are a number of exceptions to this prohibition, the most relevant to intelligence gathering being a determination that a particular transfer would serve “the protection of the public interest.” Moreover, when personal data processing “involves State security, defense, or public safety,” or its “purpose is the prevention, investigation, or proof of criminal offences, the prosecution of offenders or the execution of security sentences or security measures,” transfers to inadequate third countries may be authorized by special government decree. Before promulgating such a decree, however, the government must solicit the opinions of CNIL and the Conseil d’Etat (France’s highest administrative body). The government must also be convinced that privacy rights will be afforded a “sufficient level of protection” in the receiving

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348 See id. § 4c(2).
349 Id. § 4b(3).
351 Id. art. 69(2).
352 Id. art. 69(1).
353 Id. art. 69(2).
354 Id. art. 69. In 2003, a law was enacted to improve internal security. Among its many provisions, the law specifically addressed exchanges of personal data between the French police and foreign police. It too requires adequacy before such exchanges may occur. Law No. 2003-39 of Mar. 18, 2003, art. 24, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 19, 2003, p. 476.
355 Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6., 1978, art. 69.
country.\footnote{Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 69, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7, 2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, and Law No. 2006-64 of Jan. 23, 2006.} Under French law, therefore, routine exchanges of intelligence-related personal data with the United States can only occur upon a finding of a “sufficient level of protection.”\footnote{See id.} Given the numerous discrepancies between the two systems of data privacy, such a finding could only occur through an international agreement of the kind discussed in relation to Germany.

In addition to German, French, and other national laws, a measure under negotiation in the European Union, once finalized, might also create difficulties for information exchange with the United States.\footnote{See generally Proposal for a Council Framework Directive on the Protection of Personal Data Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, Doc. No. 6450/5 REV 5 (2006) [hereinafter Proposal for a Council Framework Directive].} In this instance, the main impact would be on personal data sought to investigate past crimes or to prevent imminent offenses, a matter more for the police—the law enforcement side of the FBI—than a national security agency like the NSA.\footnote{See id. art. 1.} Since the early 1990s, the European Union has become increasingly active in promoting cooperation on criminal matters among national police forces, prosecutors, and criminal courts. To ensure that different levels of privacy protection do not make national authorities reluctant to exchange personal information amongst themselves, a Framework Directive is being negotiated that would set down common data protection standards for all European authorities responsible for “preventing and combating crime.”\footnote{See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 29, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 325) 1, 24.} Under the latest available draft, information sent by one Member State to another may not be transferred onwards to a third country unless consent to the transfer has been given by the original Member State and an adequate level of data protection exists in the third country.\footnote{Proposal for a Council Framework Directive, supra note 358, art. 15.1.} The only caveat to the adequacy requirement is for transfers that are “absolutely necessary in order to safeguard the essential interests of a Member State or for the prevention of imminent serious danger threatening public security or a specific person or persons.”\footnote{Id. art. 15.6.} As in the German and French laws, an international agreement with a third country, stipulating the conditions under which data will be processed, can con-
stitute grounds for an adequacy finding, even if the country’s domestic privacy law is unsatisfactory. Again, therefore, an international agreement would be the only way in which the U.S. government could obtain routine access to European personal data.

2. Bilateral Agreements to Exchange Information

A number of bilateral agreements do allow for information exchange between Europe and the United States. These agreements, known as treaties on mutual legal assistance ("MLATs"), guarantee access to information in connection with criminal investigations. MLATs, however, are not particularly useful to the American intelligence community. Under the terms of MLATs, before a state may request information on an individual, it must show that the individual is suspected of a crime or has been charged with a criminal offense. In other words, MLATs cover only criminal investigations, not national security programs designed to ward off future threats.

MLATs have another limitation: they contain numerous exceptions to the duty of cooperation. Many, including the French and German MLATs, do not require states to assist with requests for government records; such assistance is left to the requested state’s discretion. Furthermore, a state is allowed to deny a request for assistance or to attach conditions to such a request if "execution of the request would prejudice [the requested state’s] sovereignty, security, public order, or other essential interests." Data protection would be considered one of those essential interests, hence preventing cooperation. A recently negotiated MLAT between the European Union and the United States is specifically directed at removing the data protection impediment: it would bar European countries from routinely invoking data protection

364 See id. art. 9; U.S.-Fr. MLAT, supra note 363, art. 1.
365 See id. art. 1; U.S.-Fr. MLAT, supra note 363, art. 1.
367 U.S.-F.R.G. MLAT, supra note 363, art. 9; U.S.-Fr. MLAT, supra note 363, art. 20.
368 See U.S.-Fr. MLAT, supra note 363, art 6.1(b).
as grounds for denying U.S. requests for assistance. But because of this bar and other provisions, it is uncertain that the MLAT will be ratified on the European side. Some argue that, without guarantees from the United States, this provision would breach European human rights law.

Recently, the U.S. government has sought to move beyond information for criminal investigations and to obtain European personal data in connection with national security operations. Compared to the criminal context, vastly more information is needed in national security investigations to ascertain whether vague suspicions of possible future harms have some basis in fact or must be dismissed. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that agreement on this type of information exchange has been even more elusive than in the area of criminal investigations.

To date, the principal example of this type of cooperation on national security matters—or, more accurately, transatlantic friction—-is the transfer of European airline passenger data to the U.S. government. After September 11, the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (the “CBP”) began demanding access to European airline passenger data well before European airplanes took off from European airports to land in the United States. Part of the purpose was quite innocuous: to check for suspected terrorists and to require that they be stopped from boarding planes bound for the United States. But the other purpose—and the associated privacy risks—raised red flags for the European authorities: the data was to be used to identify individuals requiring surveillance while in the United States, either immediately or at a future time if their subsequent behavior gave rise to a suspicion of criminal activity. The method by which the passenger data was to be transferred to the CBP was through a so-called pull system: the CBP was to have direct access to the data contained in

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369 U.S.-EU MLAT, supra note 366, art. 9.2(b) (“Generic restrictions with respect to the legal standards of the requesting State for processing personal data may not be imposed by the requested State as a condition under subparagraph (a) to providing evidence or information.”).

370 See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, EU/US AGREEMENTS ON EXTRADITION AND MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE, 2002-3, H.L. 153, at 14, para. 35.


372 See id.

373 See id. at 863.

374 See id.

375 See id. at 864.
the airline passenger systems of European carriers—systems located in Europe, not the United States. This clearly constituted an extraterritorial exercise of regulatory jurisdiction by the United States. But these airplanes, of course, must eventually land in the United States, at which point they come squarely within the reach of U.S. jurisdiction. Practically speaking, this meant that if the airlines failed to cooperate with the CBP’s earlier demands, entry of their passengers to the United States could be denied or delayed and civil fines could be imposed.

Despite these enforcement tools, European airlines did not accede to U.S. demands immediately. Why was cooperation not forthcoming? This is even more surprising given that the punitive measures were actually imposed in some instances: passengers on European carriers were sometimes stuck for hours on U.S. runways, waiting to be allowed entry into the United States. The airlines did not cooperate for some of the same reasons that the transatlantic exchange of personal data between spy and police agencies has been so difficult: under European law, such transfers would have to be authorized by a specific piece of regulation and could not occur absent a finding of the adequacy of the data protection guarantees in the receiving country. In other words, by satisfying the demands of the U.S. government, the airlines would be breaking European law. The airlines, faced with this dilemma, went to the European Commission seeking action that would allow them to operate their transatlantic flights in compliance with the law on both sides of the Atlantic. It took almost three years of diplomatic wrangling for the United States and the European Union to come to an understanding. Finally, in the spring of 2004, the two sides signed an agreement specifying the type of passenger data that could be gathered from


Under the terms of this agreement, the CBP is allowed access to thirty-four out of thirty-nine fields contained in airline reservation systems under an individual’s passenger name record (“PNR”) number.\footnote{Commission Decision 2004/535, \textit{supra} note 378, at 15 annex.} This includes the individual’s address, email address, telephone number, travel itinerary, round-trip or one-way ticket purchase, and payment information.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 22 attachment A.} If the information is never manually accessed, it must be erased after three-and-a-half years; otherwise, it must be erased after eight years, with an exception for information that was used in a government investigation.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 17 annex.} The purposes for which the personal information may be used are limited to “preventing and combating” the following crimes: terrorism and related crimes, other serious crimes—including organized crime—that are transnational in nature, and flight from warrants or custody for those crimes.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 11.} The CBP is barred from processing personal data considered, under European law, to be “sensitive data.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 12.} Only the CBP may access the data on a routine basis; it may transfer European passenger data to other law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies but only if it first determines that transfer of a particular passenger’s data would further the crime-fighting purposes outlined in the agreement.\footnote{Commission Decision 2004/535, \textit{supra} note 378, at 18 annex.} Those government agencies are held to the same standards as the CBP, including the restrictions on information sharing with other government agencies.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 18–19 annex.} Additionally, passengers are guaranteed access to their personal information under the Freedom of Information Act.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 19 annex.} Finally, the Chief Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland Security is recognized as exercising many of the same oversight functions as independent privacy agencies in Europe.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 18, 20 annex.}
From the perspective of European privacy advocates, this agreement was far from satisfactory.\textsuperscript{388} It did render unlawful, however, the kind of data mining and data sharing conducted as part of government programs like the NSA call database. But after only two years of operation, it appeared that the PNR agreement might unravel. On May 30, 2006, the European Court of Justice found the PNR agreement to be unlawful under European law.\textsuperscript{389} The grounds for the Court’s judgment had nothing to do with privacy. In fact, the Advocate General’s opinion that preceded the Court’s judgment had found that the agreement respected fundamental human rights guarantees on data protection.\textsuperscript{390} Rather, the Court found that the European Commission and the Council had exceeded their jurisdiction because they had concluded the agreement under the common market pillar, when the purpose of the data transfers was not to facilitate trade, but to prevent and investigate crime.\textsuperscript{391} Therefore, the European Union announced to the United States on July 3, 2006 that it was withdrawing and, on September 30, 2006, the agreement terminated.\textsuperscript{392}

The big question following the Court of Justice’s decision was what, if anything, would replace the PNR agreement. On the European side, the strategy was to sign an identical agreement between the same parties (the United States and the European Union, and not individual European countries as some had suggested), just under the correct pillar covering criminal matters.\textsuperscript{393} By the time the negotiations were con-


\textsuperscript{389} See generally Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04, supra note 342.

\textsuperscript{390} See generally Opinion of AG Léger, supra note 194.

\textsuperscript{391} See generally Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04, supra note 342.

\textsuperscript{392} See Note from Presidency to Coreper/Council on Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Doc. No. 13668/06 of Oct. 6, 2006, para. 2, p. 1 [hereinafter Note from Presidency to Coreper].

\textsuperscript{393} See EC Steps to Comply with ECJ Annulment of PNR Agreement, LEGISLATIONLINE, June 22, 2006, http://www.legislationline.org/?tid=219&jid=61&less=true (follow June 22, 2006 link on the right side). The official recommendation, sent by the Commission to the Council, is on the Council’s access to documents site, but the document is classified and the text cannot be downloaded from the site. See Council Doc. 10826/06, Termination of the Agreement Between the European Community and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of PNR Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection—Authorisation to Open Negotiations for an Agreement Between the EU and the United States of America on the Use of Passenger Name Records (PNR) Data to Prevent and Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Including
cluded on October 6, 2006, however, it was clear that this ambition had not been realized.394 The current agreement, which still must be signed and ratified by the Council, relies on the data protection undertakings entered into by the U.S. government in 2004 as part of the first round of negotiations.395 The undertakings implemented into U.S. law the terms of the PNR agreement based on the Department of Homeland Security’s (the “DHS’s”) statutory authority.396 These undertakings remain in effect.397 But they have been undermined by a new Letter of Interpretation that sets out how the DHS, the CBP’s parent agency, will interpret the undertakings.398 In the Letter of Interpretation, the DHS states that European passenger data may be shared with all agencies exercising counterterrorism functions, without any showing that such data is relevant to a specific investigation;399 that all the data contained in European passenger records systems may be requested, not only the thirty-four items specified in the undertakings;400 and that the data may be retained indefinitely.401

A similar set of demands for European personal data has been made by the U.S. government on the banking industry.402 In the summer of 2006, it was revealed that ever since the events of September 11, 2001, the Society for Worldwide International Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”) has been transferring massive amounts of data on international bank transfers to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.403 SWIFT is a cooperative, established under Belgian law, of financial institutions located throughout the world.404 It runs a network designed to execute international bank transfers.405 It has two operations centers,
one in Europe and one in the United States. All messages ordering payments between banks are stored, in duplicate, at these two operations centers for 124 days. After September 11, the U.S. Treasury Department began issuing administrative subpoenas for the data held in SWIFT’s U.S. operations center. Although the precise figures are secret for national security reasons, according to one report the data transferred to the Treasury Department in any given year could very well include all the messages sent via the SWIFT system, which in 2005 numbered 2,518,290,000.

After this came to light, a number of European data protection authorities called for action. Because much of the transactional information came from Europe, it was clear to all concerned that European privacy law was triggered. In fact, from the beginning, SWIFT knew that it was running the risk of violating European privacy law; it requested and received a “comfort letter” from the U.S. Treasury Department in which the Department pledged to support SWIFT in the event that it was later sued by foreign governments or third parties. The Belgian Data Protection Commission took the lead in the investigation because, under European data protection rules, it is the privacy agency with the strongest claim of jurisdiction over SWIFT. In the fall of 2006, the Belgian Commission categorically condemned SWIFT and, indirectly, the U.S. government. It is worthwhile repeating the Belgian Commission in full:

Considering that the recipient of the data (US Treasury) was never subjected to an appropriate level of protection in accordance with article 21 of the DPL [Belgian Data Protection Law] and Directive 95/46/EC [the EU Directive], the Commission is of the opinion that SWIFT violated . . . [the Belgian Data Protection Law]. It can be considered a serious error of judgement on the part of SWIFT to subject a mass quantity of personal data in a secret and systematic manner for years to the surveillance of the US Treasury without at the same time informing the European authorities and the Com-

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406 Id.
407 Belgian Data Protection Commission, supra note 402, at 3.
408 See id. at 5.
409 Id. at 6.
410 Id. at 2.
411 Id. at 6.
412 See id. at 2.
413 See Belgian Data Protection Commission, supra note 402, at 26–27.
mission in order to reach a solution under Belgian and European law.\textsuperscript{414}

3. The Relevance of Leverage

Although it is too early to tell with the bank transfer data, in the case of airline passenger data it does not appear that Europe has been able to exert much leverage over the United States. The state control over territory that has served traditionally as the basis for regulatory jurisdiction also influences which approach to privacy will prevail, American or European.\textsuperscript{415} European airlines wish to do business with the United States. To do so, they must land and deplane their passengers at U.S. airports. To enjoy this privilege, European carriers are forced to comply with the U.S. government’s requests for personal information. And Europe has few carrots or sticks to use in negotiating privacy guarantees for such information. A European privacy authority might threaten to bring prosecutions in its national courts against both European and American airlines for complying with the CBP’s information requests. But such prosecutions against national carriers would be difficult as a matter of domestic politics and the same prosecutions against American airlines would risk triggering retaliation from the American side.

The relative power of the United States and Europe in this type of situation suggests that the outcome of the SWIFT episode will be similar. To process transatlantic bank transfers, bank orders must be sent from Europe to the United States where, for good business reasons, they are stored for a certain period of time. Because the bank orders are in storage on American territory—and because SWIFT has significant economic assets in the United States associated with such storage—it is easy to compel compliance with any government order. Again, the European Union has few tools to pressure the United States to adopt better privacy guarantees. Because SWIFT is a cooperative with a significant European membership, a suit against SWIFT would encounter the same domestic opposition as a suit against a European airline. A European government might go after the financial institutions that are part of the cooperative, some of which are undoubtedly American, but that would carry all the same political risks as suing American airlines.

\textsuperscript{414} See id.

\textsuperscript{415} See \textsc{Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law} \S 204 (1987).
Another episode of transatlantic discord—involving personal data of particular value to the intelligence community—illustrates the different outcome when the territorial advantage is held by the Europeans. This time, the Americans sought access to the information on transnational crime contained in Europol’s central database. Because the two sides were so bitterly divided over data protection, the terms under which access would be permitted had to be negotiated in stages. First came an agreement, signed on December 6, 2001, on the exchange of strategic and technical information on matters such as the routes used by smugglers. This was followed, a full year later, by an agreement on the exchange of personal data. This second agreement requires that requests for information be made in writing and that such requests “provide a concise statement identifying the authority making the request, the matter under consideration, the reason for the request, and the nature of the assistance sought.” Such requests must be made in connection with “specific” criminal offenses or for “specific” analytical purposes. The agreement therefore does not contemplate wholesale access to information contained in the Europol database, as has been achieved in the case of airline passenger reservation systems. Most importantly, the parties retain full discretion to deny such requests for personal information and they may subject disclosure to various conditions, including privacy guarantees. The difference in privacy laws has effectively prevented the United States from obtaining routine access to the vast reservoir of information on transnational criminal activity held by Europol. Once, as is planned, Europol obtains access to the Schengen Information System, that pool of information will become even more extensive.

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416 For Europol’s internal data protection rules, see generally Council Act of 3 Nov. 1998, Adopting Rules Applicable to Europol Analysis Files, 1999 O.J. (C 26) 1.  
419 Supplemental Operational Agreement, supra note 418, art. 4.  
420 Id. art. 5.1(a).  
421 Id. art. 5.4.  
4. The Failure of Predictions of Regulatory Convergence

Thus the transatlantic difference persists, notwithstanding the burden on business and the interest of the U.S. government in obtaining more European police data to better fight crime and terrorism. This outcome defies predictions of regulatory convergence in some quarters.423 A couple of years ago, Gregory Shaffer observed that U.S. privacy standards were being "ratcheted up" to the level of data protection afforded under European law.424 Shaffer argued that the logic of trade, reinforced by nongovernmental advocacy networks, had produced this phenomenon and would continue to do so.425 Building on the work of David Vogel and others, Shaffer found that American firms that did business in Europe had an incentive to adopt the higher, more restrictive European privacy standard for all of their business, including their non-European operations.426 This they accomplished by self-regulation and by putting pressure on their American regulators to adopt standards that were compatible with the European ones.427 At the same time, because data privacy is a policy problem characterized by externalities, Shaffer hypothesized that European regulators would seek to influence foreign jurisdictions; data can be sent abroad in seconds, at which point privacy is at the mercy of foreign laws and regulators.428 In Shaffer’s account, these forces of globalization have combined with the advocacy efforts of privacy rights groups to produce higher privacy standards in the United States.429

There certainly is good evidence for Shaffer’s claims. The more recent experience, however, shows the limits of the argument. Even when the economic interests of big players in the global marketplace such as airlines and banks are at stake, a strong countervailing regulatory policy will trump the trade interest in convergence. In this instance, that opposing policy interest is government access to information to assist with law enforcement and national security. Furthermore, when an activity is entrusted to state—not private—actors, the pressure to develop a single modus operandi applicable in all jurisdictions is significantly lower. Policing and national defense are the prime examples

423 See generally Shaffer, supra note 23.
424 See id. at 82–83.
425 Id. at 55–80 (analyzing the effects of the EC directive in the United States).
426 Id. at 70–80 (discussing U.S. business reactions to increased pressure for privacy protection from the European Union).
427 Id. at 44.
428 See Shaffer, supra note 23, at 85 (discussing externalities).
429 Id. at 55–80.
of activities handled by government actors, not private firms. And the
resistance to convergence of such actors is evident in the continuing
difference in how police and spy agencies handle personal data in the
United States and Europe. This difference persists even though a rela-
tively small policy shift on the American side would produce significant
advantages in the form of easier access to valuable personal data, for
instance, information on Islamic extremists living in Europe.

B. Understanding American Privacy Law

To understand the possibilities of transforming American privacy
law based on European law, it is necessary to review the comparative
method and the critiques of the method. It is also critical to appreciate
the history of information privacy law. Originally, the two legal systems
appeared to share near-identical commitments to information privacy,
but, over time, they have diverged radically for reasons explored in this
Section. Mindful of the limits of the comparative method and informed
by the reasons for the transatlantic divergence, this Article makes a few
recommendations for the reform of American privacy law.

1. The Comparative Method

In some ways, this Article is a conventional exercise in comparative
law. It takes a presumed problem—safeguarding privacy in the face of
government programs like the call records program—and explores the
solutions to that problem in two different legal systems. The so-called
“functionalist” method has been employed in countless pieces of indi-

cidual comparative law research. It has also served as the framework
for a number of well-known collaborative projects, including Rudolf
Schlesinger’s project on the formation of contracts and the Common
Core Project being run out of the University of Trento, Italy.

This collaborative work is especially revealing of the details of the
functionalist method. Research design in such enterprises must be
made particularly explicit at the outset, to guarantee that the results
will be cumulative and will be able to serve as the basis for more gen-

430 See generally Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Law 339 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.,
2006).

431 See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 Am. J.

432 See Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative
Law Methodology, 4 Global Jurist Frontiers 1, 16 (2004).
eral conclusions. The starting point is a factual hypothetical, abstracted as much as possible from the law of any one country. Scholars from different legal systems are then asked how their system would handle the problem: how a judge would decide the case, and based on which rules, general principles, doctrinal reasoning, and, if relevant, rules and institutions outside that particular subject area, such as civil procedure and constitutional law. Those answers are then synthesized to discern the extent of commonality and difference among the many legal systems.

An example from the Common Core’s study on “Pure Economic Loss in Europe” will illustrate:

Case 1

While maneuvering his mechanical excavator, an employee of the Acme Road Works cuts the cable belonging to the public utility which delivers electricity to Beta Factory. The unexpected black-out causes damage to machinery and the loss of two days production. Beta Factory’s owner claims compensation from the excavator (Acme) not only for the damage to his machinery but also for the damage caused by the loss of production.433

Whether and for what reasons Beta Factory would be able to recover for loss of production, together with a number of other hypotheticals, was analyzed by scholars from thirteen different legal systems.434 Their country reports, together with a synthesis report and a historical chapter, were published seven laborious years later.435

This Article, in contrast to the Common Core, has only one hypothetical—a database of all the calls made and received by the clients of two major telecommunications providers is being used by an intelligence agency to detect terrorists. It only has two legal systems—the United States and Europe. Otherwise, the method is very similar.

This Article is at the same time an unconventional exercise in comparative law. The field of comparative law has long been dominated—some would say “obsessed”—by the problems of contracts, torts, and property. By contrast, this comparative analysis deals with a problem of public law.436 In the past, comparing constitutional and

433 Id. at 17.
434 Id. at 17–20.
435 Id. at 16.
administrative law was dismissed as fruitless. Such law, unlike private law, was believed to be so unscientific and value-laden that comparison would not be able to yield any useful insights.\footnote{437} Because public law was believed to embody the distinct historical and political experience of the nation state, comparing public law could not reveal any basic truths that could serve as the grounds for universal, international regulation of different areas of human activity—traditionally the main purpose of comparative law.\footnote{438}

Today, comparative public law is still seen as qualitatively different from comparative private law.\footnote{439} The institutional setting in which public law operates is still believed to be more historically and culturally contingent than the sphere of civil society relations in which private law applies.\footnote{440} As John Bell argues:

In public law, the core function of law is distinctive from private law. Public law is about defining and controlling the powers and activities of government. This is not the function of private law, which exists to provide frameworks within which individuals can undertake voluntarily, and to provide remedies when they exceed the bounds of the acceptable use of private power . . . . Now, to talk at a very high level of abstraction, one can discuss the basic principles of liberal democratic government and the control of abuse of power . . . . But if we are going to discuss the role of law, we need to descend into several layers of detail, so the question becomes: how do you govern in a liberal and democratic way in a society divided on linguistic grounds which has a relatively short history of independent government and which has a broadly French tradition of institutions (Belgium), as opposed to how do you govern a long-standing unitary state with religious divisions and with a distinct tradition of governmental institutions (Netherlands).\footnote{441}

\footnote{437} See \textit{Konrad Zweigert \& Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law} 3, 39–40 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing early ambition to create “common law of mankind” and continuing preference for “unpolitical” as opposed to political areas of the law).

\footnote{438} See generally \textit{John Bell, Comparing Public Law, in Comparative Law in the 21st Century} 235 (Andrew Harding \& Esin Örücü eds., 2002).

\footnote{439} See \textit{id.} at 236.

\footnote{440} See \textit{id.} at 240–43.

\footnote{441} \textit{Id.} at 236–37.
The greater cultural and historical embeddedness of public law, however, is no longer perceived as an obstacle to comparison. Indeed, comparing constitutional and administrative law is becoming standard fare in the academy.\textsuperscript{442} This Article is part of the academic trend to remedy the earlier “obsession” with private law.

Another point of departure from the conventional method is this Article’s emphasis on the difference between the American and European approaches to privacy in the face of government data mining. One classic start date for comparative law is the founding of the International Congress for Comparative Law by Edouard Lambert and Raymond Saleilles in 1900.\textsuperscript{443} Their ambition was to find, through comparison, a common law of mankind.\textsuperscript{444} And, over one hundred years later, this ambition still guides the comparative work of organizations such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. The cosmopolitan ideal explains, at least in part, the traditional ontological choice in favor of similarity: to see similar problems of social organization across all legal systems, and to see similar solutions to those problems, albeit accomplished through different types of rules, styles of reasoning, legal institutions, and social practices.\textsuperscript{445}

To be fair, this analysis of the NSA call records program is premised on a good deal of similarity across societies. After all, the United States and Europe share a common Enlightenment heritage. Privacy is valued by both Europeans and Americans. In both places, privacy is defined as a certain degree of freedom from the scrutiny of others and a certain amount of autonomy in making life decisions. And when a government acquires information about individuals, both Europeans and Americans feel that their privacy is threatened. Without privacy or a possible government harm, the hypothetical would have no meaning. The bulk of the discussion, however, is devoted to revealing how the solutions—the legal categories, the sources of law, and the outcomes—are all different.


\textsuperscript{443} Zwiegert & Kötz, supra note 437, at 2.

\textsuperscript{444} See id. at 3.

\textsuperscript{445} See Michaels, supra note 430, at 373–74.
2. The Difference: European Versus American Liberty

According to the legal historian James Whitman, European privacy law protects dignity, while American privacy law protects liberty.446 In Whitman’s view, the law in the two places is informed by two very different cultural values: protecting one’s reputation against the vulgarities of the market and the media in Europe, and protecting individual freedom from intrusions of the state, especially in one’s home, in America.447 This argument has intrigued and persuaded many privacy scholars. It explains one very puzzling difference between American and European privacy law: the apathy of American tort and constitutional law when confronted with even the grossest of privacy abuses if the offender happens to be a private actor, especially the media.448 It also fits with the very different rhetoric of the American and European case law. In American cases, the existence of a privacy interest turns on whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, an issue that is generally addressed by examining constitutional history and social practices—all of which point to the home as the place in which individuals have been traditionally allowed to conduct their affairs free from the gaze of others.449 By contrast, European privacy cases, especially the German ones, begin from the need to preserve human dignity and to develop personal autonomy.450 In pursuing these core values, the home is always protected, but so too are spaces and personal matters outside the home.

Although this analysis has considerable merit, Whitman obscures an important aspect of European privacy law. True, European privacy law promotes interpersonal respect among individuals. But it also protects privacy against the state. And it is not always true, as Whitman argues, that “state action will raise American hackles much more often than European ones.”451 Indeed, the argument of this Article is that, in the context of antiterrorism data mining, European law protects liberty interests more than American law. At least European spy agencies tell their citizens when their personal data is being collected and combined and, depending on the results, sent to the police for further action, a lot more than can be said for American spy agencies.

446 Whitman, supra note 24, at 1161.
447 Id.
448 See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (holding that a state could not sanction a reporter for disclosure of a rape victim’s name).
449 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 351, 357 n.8 (1967).
450 See Whitman, supra note 24, at 1161.
451 See id. at 1211.
How can this somewhat counterintuitive difference between American and European law be explained? This transatlantic difference is even more surprising in light of the specific origins of information privacy.

When individual privacy in the age of information technology first became a policy problem, American policymakers were every bit as active as their European counterparts. In fact, a case can be made that European privacy law was influenced by American law and policy. The book *Privacy and Freedom*, written by the American scholar Alan Westin and published in 1967, was one of the first systematic treatments of the impact of computers on privacy. It was widely read in both the United States and Europe. By the early 1970s, legislative and regulatory proposals were being floated on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the United States, this was the era of the Nixon scandals. The first data privacy proposal came from the Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"). In 1973, HEW issued an influential report on government databases of personal records. To assuage public distrust of such databases, the report recommended that all government departments adhere to a Code of Fair Information Practices. Many of these fair information practices were soon after incorporated in the Privacy Act of 1974. When, in 1980, a set of data protection guidelines was adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a number of the American legal principles were included. These guidelines, in turn, influenced the negotiations on the Council of Europe Convention. It is no wonder then that the terms of the U.S. Privacy Act sound awfully similar to those of the Council of Europe Convention.

Rewinding the tape again to the early 1970s, the first national data protection laws adopted in Europe and the United States displayed remarkable similarities. This is well documented by political scientist Colin Bennett in his study of data protection in the United States, Sve-
den, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In his study, Bennett found that the "problem" of privacy in the information technology age was similar in all four countries: it contained a humanistic dimension protecting individual dignity against the alienating aspects of mass society and information technology; a political dimension designed to prevent a tyrannical state from using information technology—and personal information—as a tool of oppression; and an instrumental dimension to advance other nonprivacy values, such as equality and accuracy. He also found that the national legislation was similar even though all countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom, were responding to their own internal politics and institutional concerns. The only real difference was in the regulatory styles used to advance the privacy goals—informal and negotiated in Germany and the United Kingdom, bureaucratic in Sweden, and legalistic in the United States. These early transnational similarities were reinforced by the focus, in both the United States and Europe, on public sector information abuses. Different from the U.S. Privacy Act, European laws also regulated private sector data processing. These provisions, however, were included almost as an afterthought. At the time, the principal organization with the resources, technology, and motive to process large amounts of personal data was the state.

What changed? For purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to consider the differences in private sector regulation in depth. Suffice it

460 See generally Bennett, supra note 211.


462 Bennett, supra note 211, at 45–94 (describing the politics of data protection in each of the four cases); id. at 95–152 (discussing and explaining the similarities of different national laws).

463 See id. at 161–70 (Sweden); id. at 170–79 (United States); id. at 179–85 (Germany); id. at 185–92 (United Kingdom).

464 A number of the congressional bills proposed in the run up to the U.S. Privacy Act would have regulated personal data processing in both the public and private sectors. See S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 201(a) (1974) (proposing restrictions on use of private information by government agencies as well as private parties), reprinted in Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, S. 3418 (Public Law No. 93-579): Source Book on Privacy, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. 9–29 (1976) (collecting all of the major bills leading up to the passage of the Privacy Act of 1974). Industry groups and privacy experts, however, successfully opposed such language on the grounds that it was too early to tell what kinds of privacy problems would emerge in the private sector. See S. Rep. No. 93-1183, at 170–73 (1976), reprinted in Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, S. 3418, supra, at 151–239. They also argued that the diverse circumstances of various economic sectors would be handled best in tailored sector-specific statutes, not in a cross-cutting piece of legislation. See id.
to say that, as the technology became more advanced, enabling a wide array of private actors to engage in data processing, the scope of European regulation expanded, too. The naturalness with which the primarily public sector framework was extended to the private sector can be put down to a number of factors: the original legislative choice to cover private data processing; the constitutional practice—different from the American constitutional framework—of applying rights to both government and private actors (horizontal effect or \emph{drittwirkung}); and the dignity values identified by Whitman.\footnote{See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 3; see also Whitman, supra note 24, at 1161.}

But why did the two systems diverge so radically in the public sector? After all, the laws contained similar sets of legal provisions.\footnote{See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18.} And compared to the private sector, the changes wrought by technology to government information collection and manipulation have not been nearly as radical. In other words, the contrast cannot be ascribed to protecting privacy in the face of new information technology, a new policy problem that might be addressed differently by the different societies. Rather, at least three institutional forces appear to have been at work, forces not tied directly to the substance of information privacy policy.

\paragraph{a. Enforcement}

As already noted, the first major difference separating American from European data protection laws is enforcement. In the American case, the primary enforcers are individual litigants; in the European case, they are independent privacy agencies.\footnote{For an illustration of the sparseness of European case law and the infrequency of cases brought by private individuals (as compared to cases brought by agencies), see generally \textit{Eighth Annual Report of the Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection} (2005), \emph{available at} http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/8th annual report_en.pdf (illustrating the major developments in data protection law in each EU Member State).} This is consistent with broader patterns of regulation in the two legal systems: Americans litigate in court and Europeans negotiate with government agencies.\footnote{See \textit{Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law} 3 (2001), See generally \textit{The Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects National Regulatory Policies} (David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2004).} The American choice, however, appears to have been particularly ill-suited to the realities of information privacy in the work of government.
agencies. The injuries suffered by individuals—not to speak of the pol-
ity—when the government secretly undertakes a program like that for
call records are generally not recognized by common law courts. When
spying occurs through unobtrusive methods and without visible conse-
quences like a criminal prosecution or civil action, it is almost impos-
ible to prove the injury element of a tort claim. In addition, suing the
government is almost always more difficult than suing private parties.469
Even though the Privacy Act lifts the government’s sovereign immunity,
it still benefits from a form of qualified immunity: most violations of the
Act must be proven “intentional or willful” before a plaintiff can re-
cover.470 A government agency with the authority to investigate other
agencies for privacy violations, to recommend changes if such violations
are found, and, in the last resort, to impose an administrative sanction
or to take an offending government official to court, is likely to be a
better enforcer than private attorneys general.

Administrative agencies and courts, of course, are not just enforc-
ers but also policymakers. And, as compared to generalist courts, ad-
mnistrative agencies have distinct advantages. Because their resources
and authority are committed to specific government policies, they de-
velop expertise, historical memory, and bureaucratic dedication in
their policy areas. When political and social realities change, adminis-
tative agencies stay put; they are there to promote the goals of earlier
legislative enactments. Indeed, privacy agencies in Europe would
probably describe themselves as policymakers first, enforcers second.
Their resources are devoted largely to vetting government proposals for
proportionality and making policy recommendations in the face of new
 technological threats to privacy.

The lack of a similar institution in the United States is a big part of
the explanation for transatlantic difference. There is no one to tell a
government agency that certain personal information—say, the toll re-
cords of all AT&T customers—is not really “relevant and necessary” to
accomplishing the agency’s purpose;471 that the agency does not review
its records often enough to make sure that they are up to date and ac-
accurate, hence avoiding adverse consequences for individuals;472 or that
what the agency considers to be a “routine use” of information which is
“compatible with the purpose for which it was collected” really is not

469 See, e.g., Terkel v. AT&T, 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2006); ACLU v. NSA,
470 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4).
471 Id. § 552a(e)(1).
compatible with such purposes, thereby precluding information sharing with another government agency.\textsuperscript{473} Indeed, it is unnecessary to go abroad to understand the impact of the absence of a privacy agency. In most other cases in which information privacy has been regulated by Congress, an administrative agency has been charged with implementation: the Department of Health and Human Services for health privacy, the Federal Communications Commission for telemarketers, the Federal Trade Commission for children’s privacy online.\textsuperscript{474} In none of these areas has privacy been deemed quite as roundly and unanimously to have failed as in the case of the Privacy Act.

b. **Executive Power**

The second part of the explanation for the transatlantic difference, especially since September 11, is the spectacular growth of executive power in the United States. This is a trend that began in the early 1980s with the Reagan administration, first with the theory of the “unitary executive,”\textsuperscript{475} then “presidential administration,”\textsuperscript{476} and now the “war against terror.”\textsuperscript{477} This is a well-documented phenomenon that cannot be explored in any depth here. It is critical to understand the rise of executive power, however, to understand the trajectory of information privacy. The President’s aggressive assertions of executive power—and the failure of Congress and the courts to react—have shaped many policy areas, including information privacy. The NSA call records program is one, obvious illustration of this institutional logic.

Since the early 1980s, the experience of European executive branches has been quite the reverse. As the discussion of the European law illustrates, national law enforcement and spy agencies cannot simply take heed of one national privacy agency or one set of national courts.\textsuperscript{478} They operate in three different—in the sense of not hierarchically related—yet at the same time overlapping, legal systems: their national constitutional systems, the Council of Europe, and the Euro-

\textsuperscript{473} Id. § 552a(a)(7).

\textsuperscript{474} See Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 379–80 (discussing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)); id. at 666–67 (discussing the Telephone Consumer Protections Act); id. at 667–69 (discussing the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act).


\textsuperscript{478} See supra notes 169–340 and accompanying text.
pean Union. The rise of Europe as a political and legal entity has been possible only by virtue of huge losses of national sovereignty. Although in some ways this might strengthen executive branches—when national ministers go to Brussels to negotiate EU laws, their national parliaments cannot exercise much oversight—on the whole, the integration process has brought more and more checks on national executive power. If a Ministry of Interior wished to push back against the broad reach of European data protection law, it would have to contend with a number of independent bodies: in the European Union, it would contend with other Member States, the Court of Justice, and the Working Party of Data Protection Commissioners; in the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights; and at the national level, its judicial branch and its independent privacy agency. By understanding this different configuration of executive power on the two sides of the Atlantic, we can better understand why an area of public policy that began with equal enthusiasm in both places fared so differently over time. In the United States, privacy met with effective opposition from the executive branch. By contrast, in Europe, once the momentum for privacy got going—and was institutionalized in the form of privacy commissioners and constitutional case law—it was very difficult for national governments to resist.

c. The Nazi Experience

A third element that should be mentioned in seeking to explain the transatlantic difference is the European experience with the Nazis during World War II, an experience that has no American equivalent. Human rights law in Europe today, including privacy law, has been shaped by this Nazi past. This is not to say that privacy law was fashioned simply as a reaction to that experience—national legal traditions were too solidly rooted to be swept away by fifteen or so years of history. But, as the historian Tony Judt puts it, for most of Western Europe, World War II was an experience in profound national humiliation, a period in which the entire apparatus of state and society was put

479 See William Wallace, The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox, 47 Pol. Stud. 503, 520 (1999) (explaining that, between the infrequent meetings of the heads of European governments, the normal business of European politics and government is “conducted across state boundaries by a great many other actors and agencies”).


481 See Whitman, supra note 24, at 1165.
at the service of a foreign occupying power.\textsuperscript{482} As for the Germans, at their feet lay responsibility for the atrocious human rights abuses of the Nazi regime.

Throughout Western Europe, it was widely feared that the manipulation of the state for tyrannical ends might occur again.\textsuperscript{483} This fear was not abstract or irrational. Not only was there the Nazi past, but there was also the threat of Communism, which it must be remembered materialized even before World War II had officially come to an end. Hence all of the references to the dangers of Nazism and Communism by the drafters of the ECHR.\textsuperscript{484} And hence the German Constitutional Court’s repeated references to the lessons learned from Nazism in its own case law—including its privacy case law.\textsuperscript{485}

It does not seem far-fetched to conclude that European rights, including the right to stop large state bureaucracies from collecting and instrumentalizing vast quantities of information about individual citizens, have been shaped by a particularly vivid understanding of the possible abuses of state power. In the United States, after President Nixon was forced to resign, Americans could forget how government power, including surveillance powers, could be used to subvert democracy and suppress rights. With the Nazis in their past and the Communists possibly in their future, Europeans found it harder to forget.

\section*{3. Critique and Reform}

By expanding the realm of legal possibilities, comparison can serve as an impetus for legal change at home.\textsuperscript{486} Comparison brings to light the historical contingency—as opposed to cultural destiny—that informs certain legal rules and categories. By demonstrating that our national, political, and social aspirations have been better served by the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{482} See \textsc{Judt}, \textit{supra} note 480, at 14, 41; \textsc{Robertson} \& \textsc{Merrills}, \textsc{Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European Convention on Human Rights} \textsc{3} (3d ed. 1993).
\item \textsuperscript{483} See \textsc{Judt}, \textit{supra} note 480, at 24; \textsc{Robertson} \& \textsc{Merrills}, \textit{supra} note 482, at 3.
\item \textsuperscript{484} \textsc{Robertson} \& \textsc{Merrills}, \textit{supra} note 482, at 3–5.
\item \textsuperscript{486} See \textsc{George P. Fletcher}, \textit{Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline}, \textsc{46 Am. J. Comp. L.} \textit{683}, \textit{695} (1998).
\end{itemize}
law abroad, comparison can sharpen our sense of disappointment with our own legal experience. And, looking to other liberal societies can provide a range of legal solutions—solutions that answer to the fundamental moral commitments of liberal societies but, at the same time, do not impose intolerable costs on those societies.

This exploration of European privacy law serves the agenda of legal change at home.\textsuperscript{487} By stressing that the point of departure, in the early 1970s, was very similar on both sides of the Atlantic, the contingency of privacy law in the United States today is revealed. In my analysis of European privacy law, I have attempted to show that, indeed, that law serves principles of transparency, democratic debate, and protection against overreaching government surveillance better than American law. And, in this Subsection, European law serves as a point of departure for improving American law.

\textit{a. Answering the Critiques of the Comparative Method}

From the outset, two objections to this constructive comparative enterprise should be mentioned. First, some might say that even though the United States and Europe are, roughly speaking, both liberal societies, because they do not share the same moral commitments and practical constraints, the privacy law of Europe cannot serve as a source of inspiration for the United States. But can it really be true that the United States is \textit{less} committed to liberty than Europe? Do American citizens not feel a need to know about government programs designed to monitor them, or to seek to confine such programs to the minimum necessary to protect them from terrorist threats? It might be, as argued earlier, that because of their different historical experiences, Americans today are less fearful than Europeans of abuses of government power. The story with which this Article began—the near-escape from conscription of Norwegian men into the Nazi army based on census records—is just that for most Americans. It is not lived history. But that good luck is not a particularly sound reason for safeguarding rights any less in the day-to-day practice of government surveillance.

Slightly more persuasive is the claim that European law has little to offer the United States because the practical constraints of the two societies are different. It is true that the United States, unlike Europe, is the world’s military hegemon. In threatening, or actually conducting,
military operations abroad, the intelligence needs of the United States are extensive. Moreover, because of such military operations, the United States might be more vulnerable to terrorist attacks at home, on American soil. Ultimately, however, such objections to comparison are unconvincing. It is difficult to understand the connection between unfettered data collection and data mining at home and military operations abroad. Not only is information gathering on individuals in the United States less likely than traditional military surveillance to garner intelligence on, say, Al Qaeda’s operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but the constraints placed by European law on personal data processing related to military operations abroad are mild, indeed. As for the threat of terrorist attacks on national territory, the United States might be a better symbolic target, but, logistically speaking, it is probably easier to organize and carry out such attacks in Europe. That difference has nothing to do with civil rights law and everything to do with the size and cohesiveness of European immigrant populations and Europe’s proximity to the Middle East.

A second objection to my constructive ambition is known in the comparative law literature as the “transplant problem.”488 Like the functionalist method, drawing on the results of comparison to make suggestions for law reform is a conventional use of comparative law.489 But, according to the postmodern critique of the past decade or so, it is also a dangerous use of comparative law.490 The critics point to the substantial barriers to cross-cultural communication.491 Different societies are constituted by radically different systems of meaning that are inaccessible to most outsiders, certainly to casual academic tourists such as comparative lawyers. This, of course, is a caricature of the postmodern view. It highlights, however, one of the important insights of the postmodern critique: the cultural distinctiveness and internal coherence of any system of legal rules, modes of reasoning, institutions, and social practices.

This radical pluralism complicates enormously the task of the comparative lawyer.492 It casts doubt on the ability of comparative law to identify any one area of social life to study across legal systems—to

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488 See generally Alan Watson, Legal Transplants (1974).
490 See Reimann, supra note 436, at 680.
491 See Örüçü, supra note 489, at 37–38.
492 See Palmer, supra note 432, at 5–6.
identify the functionalist “problem.” Assuming a researcher is able to narrow the field of inquiry, once she goes abroad, it is highly likely that she will misinterpret the foreign law, arriving at wrong conclusions as to the meaning and consequences of the law in that society. And, in the unlikely event that she is able to surmount all of those barriers, she will never be able to bring the foreign law back home. Even if foreign law appears to work better, it will never have the same effect in the different social and cultural terrain of home.

In some regards, I am proposing to transplant the European law of privacy into American soil. It appears, however, that caution rather than paralysis is the best lesson to take away from the disciplinary debates of comparative law. The European privacy solution has a number of different components: a fundamental right to information privacy and a statutory scheme regulating personal data processing in the public and private sectors. The suggestion of this Article is that Americans borrow only from the statutory scheme, and only from that part curbing the government’s use of personal information. In essence, the suggestion is not to transplant at all, but to reinforce the U.S. Privacy Act and, in doing so, to return to the original intent of 1974.

At the present time, an American constitutional right to information privacy is not worth pursuing. Such a constitutional right would trigger judicial review of government data-mining programs similar to the European proportionality inquiry, under the guise of substantive due process. Partly, this solution is unattractive because it is implausible; it is extremely difficult to imagine the current Supreme Court expanding so dramatically the constitutional right to privacy.

Pressing for a constitutional right to information privacy, however, might be unwise also for reasons of the broader institutional context. In Europe, the relationship between constitutional courts and legisla-


495 See, e.g., Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, arts. 1, 3.


497 See Kommers, supra note 195, at 46 (discussing the equivalence between German proportionality and American fundamental rights doctrine).

498 In this respect, the law reform proposed in this Article is more modest than what has been advocated elsewhere. See Paul Schwartz, The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: Towards an American Right of Informational Self-Determination, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 675, 701 (1989).
tures tends to be symbiotic. It is not necessary to look far for examples of this relationship. The decision of the German constitutional court proclaiming a right of “informational self-determination” prompted a slew of federal and state laws to come into compliance with the constitutional standards set down in that decision. Among these was an amended Federal Data Protection Act (“Act”), with the declaration, in the very first line, that the purpose of the Act was to “protect the individual against his right to privacy being impaired through the handling of his personal data.” A number of additional changes were made to this Act to further the new, constitutionally mandated criteria for lawful personal data processing. In the European Union, too, this mutually reinforcing relationship exists. The case law of the European Court of Justice is often incorporated, word-for-word, in subsequent legislation and serves as a springboard for positive legislative measures in favor of basic rights.

In the United States, according to a number of prominent accounts, this relationship is quite different: when the U.S. Supreme Court takes action, Congress does nothing. And vice versa, when the Supreme Court fails to act, Congress steps in with legislation. Thus, when the Court refused to protect bank records under the Fourth Amendment, Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act. When the Court denied Fourth Amendment protection to pen-register information, Congress enacted the Pen Register Act. In other words,

499 See Kommers, supra note 195, at 53–54.
502 Flaherty, supra note 218, at 46–47 (discussing the constitutional right to self-determination first established in 1983).
the risk is that if the Supreme Court finds a right to information privacy, Congress will not regulate government data mining. Indeed, Congress might test the limits of the right to information privacy by authorizing intrusive federal programs that might—or might not—be struck down by the Supreme Court.

Yet, in this technologically complex area, a fine-tuned regulatory scheme is more essential to protecting the right than the rather blunt device of judicial review. In addition, at least to begin with, legislative reform is a more legitimate mode of accomplishing change than judge-made law. The opportunities for democratic participation in the legislative process are more extensive. Legislation can be more easily revised over time; the difficulties of repealing a law pale in comparison with reversing Supreme Court precedent. The legislative branch, therefore, appears to be the venue best suited to a privacy reform agenda.

Nor would it be necessary for Americans to adopt a comprehensive data protection law, covering all data processing in both the private and public sectors. Without a doubt, European limitations on personal data processing in the market make government programs like the NSA call database vastly more difficult. This aspect of European data protection law also affords greater visibility and accountability to any such government initiative: there must be a law or regulation authorizing the government to request personal data and permitting private firms to keep personal data. A comprehensive U.S. data protection law, however, would require a radical change of the legal environment; market actors would be asked to limit their data processing operations across the board, not just in a few specific areas like health care, telecommunications, and financial services, as under the current system. Such a change, moreover, might not be particularly well-suited to a common law legal system. A wide range of firm activities that are currently subject to the tort and contract law of common law courts would be swept into a statutory scheme, subject to the different mode of deciding and


509 See Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 379–80 (discussing HIPAA); id. at 666–67 (discussing the Telephone Consumer Protections Act); id. at 667–69 (discussing the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act).
enforcing duties entailed by such a scheme.510 And all of this upheaval would produce relatively little benefit for the problem at hand: it would not directly curb data mining by the government.

b. Recommendations for Reform

A few changes to the U.S. Privacy Act would advance the cause of information privacy enormously.511 The ambition should be to close some of the gaps that have allowed for the divergence, over time, of the American and European systems. Many of these gaps, indeed, were not anticipated by the drafters of the Privacy Act but were produced by weak judicial enforcement combined with aggressive bureaucratic interpretation.

First, it should be made absolutely clear that the Privacy Act catches all government programs that involve large-scale personal data processing. The kind of Orwellian, Big-Brother abuses against which the Privacy Act was directed are just as likely with antiterrorism data mining as with systems designed to retrieve information on welfare recipients for purposes of determining their benefits. This broader coverage might be achieved by rewriting the statute to include a new definition of the statutory term "system of records" or substituting that term with a new one. This change could also be accomplished by the judicial branch. The legal uncertainty concerning the scope of the Privacy Act—and whether it covers data-mining programs like the NSA call database—is largely a product of the inconsistent case law of the federal courts.512 This shortcoming, therefore, could very well be fixed by those same courts.

Second, the Privacy Act’s exemptions for intelligence and law enforcement agencies and their activities should be narrowed considerably.513 These are the government bodies and public programs that are most dangerous to individual liberty. The potential for government abuse of private information is greatest when such information is col-

512 See Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 423 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 104 F.3d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 1997); Henke v. Dep’t of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 1459–62 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
513 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7), (j)–(k) (providing examples of exceptions to the Privacy Act).
lected by the police—or handed over to the police by government spies. No other organ of the state has the power to do as much harm to individual citizens. The very reason for these powers, of course, is the critical public safety mission with which the police are entrusted. Yet, the carefully constructed German and French exceptions for police forces and security agencies demonstrate that it is possible to strike a more reasonable compromise between individual privacy and public safety. The German and French examples demonstrate that it is not necessary to allow such agencies to go entirely unregulated.

Third, the exception in the Privacy Act for “routine uses” of personal data should be repealed. This exception has enabled federal agencies to share personal information with other federal agencies, as well as state and local bodies, virtually unchecked. If the routine use exception were not repealed, then much of the benefit gained from covering national security and law enforcement agencies would be lost; the restrictions on sharing private data with law enforcement agencies at the federal and state level would be laughable. Free-for-all information sharing is precisely what has been condemned by the German Constitutional Court. In the United States, it is also cause for concern in the more traditional area of wiretapping; the so-called FBI “wall” between law enforcement and intelligence officers was established to prevent criminal prosecutors from using national security surveillance to obtain information on all offenses, regardless of their seriousness. The danger of using the far-reaching powers of spy agencies to investigate mundane crimes like tax evasion, either for legitimate public or illegitimate political reasons, is as present when personal data is collected and analyzed. A person’s phone records, combined with information on her bank transfers, can be as revealing to the police as her actual conversations. Whenever authorizing a new government program, therefore, agencies should be required to specify, up front, exactly how personal data will be used and under what conditions it will be transferred to other government agencies.

515 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
517 See Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 307.
Last, the enforcement scheme in the Privacy Act should be amended to include an independent privacy agency. An independent privacy agency would offer a solution to some of the most serious deficits of the Privacy Act. This recommendation, of course, is inspired by the European institution, but it also has a solid domestic foundation. The original bill contained such an agency, but it was removed in the end as part of the compromise necessary to pass the Privacy Act. A later bill, proposed in 1991, would have established a Data Protection Board, with powers similar to those of European privacy agencies. The bill passed in the House of Representatives, but never made it through the Senate.

The consequences of the absence of an administrative agency have already been explored here in explaining the divergent paths of privacy law in the United States and Europe. For the present purposes of reform, however, the deficiencies of the current system should be reviewed with more precision. Under the Privacy Act, individuals have a right of action for injunctive relief and damages against the government. This remedy, however, is inadequate for a number of reasons. Injunctive relief is available for only two types of violations of the Privacy Act: the government refuses an individual access to her personal records or refuses to correct her personal records. Additionally, damages may be awarded for any other violation of the Privacy Act that has an “adverse effect” on an individual. The circumstances under which recovery is permitted, however, are limited. Plaintiffs must prove a “willful or intentional” violation of the Act. Plaintiffs must also show actual damages—and emotional damages alone generally do not count—before they can qualify for the Privacy Act’s minimum damages award of $1000. The real problem for enforcement, however, is that many privacy violations go undetected or do not result in injury traditionally recognized by the courts. If there were restrictions

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520 See H.R. 685.
521 See supra notes 310–332 and accompanying text.
523 Id. § 552a(g)(3).
524 Id. § 552a(g)(1)(D).
525 See id. § 552a(g).
526 Id. § 552a(g)(4).
on transferring personal data between intelligence and law enforce-
ment agencies, and these were breached, it is unlikely that an individ-
ual would ever learn of the breach. If she did, she would be able to 
show damages only in the extreme circumstances of intrusive surveil-
ance or an arbitrary detention. Because of this mismatch between data 
privacy injuries and the common law’s remedial architecture, an inde-
pendent body with oversight and enforcement powers is essential.

An independent privacy agency would also foster greater transpar-
ency, public debate, and, yes, privacy, at the drawing board phase, at the 
time that new government initiatives are designed. Under the Privacy 
Act, government agencies are already required to publish Privacy No-
tices in the Federal Register when they plan on creating or modifying a 
system of records.\(^\text{528}\) A Privacy Notice must contain information on the 
type of personal data in the system, the purposes for which the data will 
be used, the security measures in place to protect the data, the other 
agencies with which the personal data will be shared, and the proce-
dures available to individuals to access and correct their records.\(^\text{529}\) The 
otice requirements could very well be expanded to include the steps 
that had been taken by the agency to ensure the necessity, relevance, 
and adequacy of the personal data, as well as to consider less privacy-
intrusive alternatives to the proposed system of records. With the fewer 
exceptions envisioned above, agencies would be required to provide 
this detailed explanation for a wider range of activities. An independ-
ent privacy agency would be in a position to provide an expert, impar-
tial analysis of the privacy implications of the proposed program. Fur-
thermore, in areas of government activity such as national security—in 
which disclosure can sometimes defeat the purposes of the government 
program—scrutiny by an independent agency would serve as a proxy 
for public debate. In other words, if secrecy is absolutely necessary, an 
independent privacy body would bring an important outsider perspec-
tive to an area of government activity that, by definition, cannot draw 
on the valuable insights of broad-ranging public scrutiny.

\(^{528}\) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(4) (2000). The government must also conduct a privacy impact 
assessment before establishing a new program involving personal data. E-Government Act 
§ 208, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2000 & Supp. III 2003). The information, however, con-
tained in impact assessments is very similar to that in privacy notices. Furthermore, impact 
assessments are not required for national security systems. Id. § 202(i).

\(^{529}\) See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974: System of Records; Secure Flight Tests Records Notice, 
CONCLUSION

With the exception of an independent privacy agency, this Article’s proposed legal changes are modest. They draw on the European experience, yet they are thoroughly grounded in the text of the original Privacy Act. Even the creation of an independent privacy agency is consistent with current trends in American law. Since September 11, a number of special-purpose privacy watchdogs have been created by Congress to address civil liberty concerns: the Chief Privacy Office in the Department of Homeland Security,530 the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board in the Executive Office of the President,531 and the Civil Liberties Protection Officer in the Office of the National Intelligence Director.532 These civil liberties aims would be better achieved through a single privacy watchdog, with powers extending to the entire federal administration and with independence from the government officers in charge of privacy-burdening programs.

These improvements, in fact, would lead not only to better protection of privacy, but also to a more effective government response to the national security threat. In European eyes, such changes would constitute a satisfactory guarantee that the privacy of European personal information will be protected once transferred to American authorities. This would facilitate tremendously the transatlantic exchange of intelligence among government authorities. Thus, the borderless realm of twenty-first-century terrorism would be matched by public action also capable of overcoming the confines of the nineteenth-century nation state.

532 Id. § 1011(a) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-3d (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).