SYMPOSIUM
THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
FOREWORD

ROOKER-FELDMAN: WORTH ONLY THE POWDER TO BLOW IT UP?

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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is an oddity among limits on federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction. Named after generative cases decided six decades apart, it rests innocuously enough on the proposition that Congress has conferred appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments upon only one federal court, the Supreme Court of the United States. It proceeds from there to the main point for which it has come to stand, that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with the merits

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1 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The Feldman of the more recent case was Marc Feldman, a sometime law professor at Rutgers-Camden and Maryland, who died just last year. Prof. Jack Beermann's contribution to this issue gives some further details of Prof. Feldman's interesting career. See Jack M. Beermann, Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Why We Should Let State Law Be Our Guide, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1203, 1210 n.3 (1999).

of a judgment already rendered by a state court system, at least in an action involving the same parties.\(^3\)

The oddity arises because *Rooker-Feldman* is quite unlike the usual sort of limit on the original subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts. The doctrine can have effect only when a case brought in federal district court *is* generally within original federal jurisdiction—or would be, except for prior state court adjudication that is not supposed to be subject to review in any federal court other than the Supreme Court. The very fact that other state-court adjudication has taken place will often raise a barrier to the federal court’s reaching the merits, on nonjurisdictional grounds independent of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. Most commonly the barrier will be interjurisdictional preclusion (or, for those who prefer older terminology, state-federal res judicata), although the jurisdictional nature of *Rooker-Feldman* makes the doctrine’s bar unwaivable and subject to being raised by the court on its own motion.\(^4\) Depending on whether *Rooker-Feldman* applies only to *final* judgments of highest available state courts,\(^5\) other grounds such as “Our Federalism”\(^6\) or a different abstention

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3 *See Feldman*, 460 U.S. at 486–87. The Court noted:

[R]espondents’ . . . allegations . . . required the District Court to review a final judicial decision of the highest court of a jurisdiction in a particular case. These allegations are inextricably intertwined with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decisions, in judicial proceedings, to deny the respondents’ petitions. The District Court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction over these elements of the respondents’ complaints.

Id.


4 *See* 18 MOORE’S, supra note 3, § 133.30[3][b], at 133-22 to -23.

5 So limiting the doctrine’s applicability could make sense in light of its roots in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which grants the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction only over “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.” *See* supra note 2 and accompanying text; *see also* supra note 3 (quoting from Supreme Court’s *Feldman* opinion referring to impermissibility of federal district court’s reviewing “a final judicial decision of the highest court of a jurisdiction in a particular case”). But *see* 18 MOORE’S, supra note 3, § 133.30[3][a], at 133-21 (describing *Rooker-Feldman* as depriving lower federal courts of “jurisdiction to review state court judgments” without reference to finality in highest state court).

doctrine might also force at least a stay, if not a jurisdictional dismissal, of federal adjudication in light of a previously or even subsequently filed parallel state court proceeding.

Despite what might be considerable superfluity in light of this much overlap with other doctrines, and the lack of focused Supreme Court attention since the Feldman decision in 1983, the lower federal courts have come to invoke Rooker-Feldman—often to find no jurisdiction—with notable frequency. Such judicial use of the doctrine may be understandable, given proper subordination by the district and appellate courts to what they regard as binding Supreme Court precedent; but it leaves the major question whether and to what extent the doctrine serves valid independent purposes of its own. This and other issues concerning the Rooker-Feldman have received strikingly little treatment in academic commentary for a doctrine upon which the courts have come increasingly to rely.

The four articles that follow admirably fill this gap in the commentary, and the authors are especially qualified to speak on this subject: Suzanna Sherry is co-author of the casebook that includes the most extensive treatment of Rooker-Feldman in any book now on the market. Susan Bandes is author of the chapter covering Rooker-Feldman in the new third edition of Moore's Federal Practice. Barry Friedman (joined here by student co-author James Gaylord) and Jack Beermann are among the few scholars to have treated the doctrine in previous law review commentary.

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7 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 6, §§ 12.1–3, 14.1–4; Yackle, supra note 6, at 373–88.
8 See, e.g., 18 Wright et al., supra note 3, § 4469, at 529 (Supp. 1998) ("Although no substantial harm seems to have been done by the [Rooker-Feldman] jurisdictional cases, it would be better to go straight to the res judicata rules that justify preclusion.") (footnote omitted).
11 See 18 Moore's, supra note 3, § 123.30[3].
12 See Beermann, supra note 9; Friedman, supra note 9. Papers on which the Rooker-Feldman articles in this issue are based were presented in New Orleans in Janu-
I will not summarize the contributions here because Jack Beermann's commentary on the three principal papers does that admirably and would make a similar effort on my part duplicative. Instead, I will highlight two principal points of apparent agreement: First, despite the different positions taken—with Suzanna Sherry finding some virtue in Rooker-Feldman and Barry Friedman and Susan Bandes coming largely to bury the doctrine, not to praise it—I discern no claim even by Sherry that the doctrine makes a major contribution or difference beyond the effects of other limits on federal courts' exercise of their powers. That I take to square with the views of Friedman, Bandes, and Beermann.

Second, the proliferation of lower court case law with many different emphases and some highly questionable decisions suggests that the time may be nigh for the Supreme Court to take an opportunity to clarify the doctrine. Not knowing what the Supreme Court might do if it took a Rooker-Feldman case, I drop that hint with some trepidation; but the papers in this issue should give the Court much help if it chooses to do so. The academy has done its job, and it is now the Court's turn.

ary, 1999 at the annual session of the Association of American Law School's section on Federal Courts, for which I served as program chair. All the authors were a pleasure to work with, at long range and in person—prompt, cooperative, delightfully humorous, and scrupulous and respectful in disagreement. I want to take this opportunity to thank them publicly, and to wish other program chairs such superb panelists. Thanks also to Susan Bandes for originally suggesting the idea of the program, and to the Notre Dame Law Review for its interest in publishing the papers.

13 Beermann, supra note 1.
