INDEPENDENCE IN EUROPE: SECESSION, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

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INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2012, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of Barcelona, in the Spanish region of Catalonia. What began as a celebration of Catalonia’s national holiday turned into the largest display of Catalan nationalist sentiment in recent memory, with marchers
waving red, blue, and gold Catalan flags and carrying banners adorned with slogans such as “Independence Now!” and “Catalonia: the New European State.”

Almost overnight, Catalan independence went from an obscure nationalist dream to a real possibility, with ramifications for the futures of both Spain and the European Union (EU).

The demonstration in Barcelona was a striking example of the nationalism that has recently gained ascendancy in several of the EU’s most prominent stateless nations. In Belgium’s June 2010 elections, the separatist Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance, or N-VA) won the plurality of votes, triggering a record-setting political stalemate that left Belgium without a functioning national government for over 530 days and causing many observers to predict that the Belgian state would soon come apart at the seams. In May 2011, the Scottish National Party (SNP) won a majority of seats in the Scottish Parliament and immediately announced plans to hold a referendum on severing Scotland’s centuries-old union with England.

At first blush, the salience of separatist nationalism within the democracies of Western Europe might seem anomalous or even comical. Talk of secession in Europe calls to mind the deadly seriousness of the Balkan wars of the 1990s; by contrast, the ethno-linguistic division at the heart of Belgium’s political troubles has been characterized as “a (very) civilized war as told by Dr. Seuss, with the French-speaking Walloons on one side and the Dutch-speaking Flemings on the other.”

Underscoring the incongruity of these nationalist movements is the ongoing process of European integration, often viewed as having ushered in a “post-
sovereignty era” in which the significance of statehood is diminished. Why do Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalists seek separation in the midst of an integrating continent?

The paradox of separatism within the EU implicates “[t]he interrelated concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, and the territorial integrity of states” that “form a Gordian knot at the core of public international law.” Like their counterparts throughout the world, Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalists often couch their calls for independence in the language of the right to self-determination. Yet although self-determination has become a mainstay of nationalist political rhetoric, it possesses only limited utility as a legal right. Self-determination exists in tension with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that form the foundation of the international system of states. The international community has sought to resolve this tension by effectively eliminating the circumstances in which the right to self-determination equates with a right to secession and independence. Consequently, under current conceptions of international law, Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia do not possess a right to statehood.

But as notions of a post-sovereignty era suggest, the nature of statehood has undergone profound changes in recent decades, particularly in Europe. Those changes inform separatist politics in Europe’s stateless

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6. See, e.g., MICHAEL KEATING, PLURINATIONAL DEMOCRACY: STATELESS NATIONS IN A POST-SOVEREIGNTY ERA 27–28 (2001) (describing “post-sovereignty” as “the end of state monopoly of ultimate authority”); JANET LAIBLE, SEPARATISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NEW EUROPE: PARTY POLITICS AND THE MEANINGS OF STATEHOOD IN A SUPRANATIONAL CONTEXT 28–32 (2008) (“Post-sovering approaches agree with the proposition that the sovereignty of the modern state has long been challenged and compromised. Instead of claiming the monopoly on sovereignty, states in the contemporary global order, and most significantly in the EU, ‘must share their prerogatives with suprastate, sub-state, and trans-state systems.’”).


8. See, e.g., New-Flemish Alliance; NIEUW-VLAAMSE ALLIANTIE, http://archive.is/ST8EM (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (“[T]he N-VA stands for the right of self-determination of peoples, this being a fundamental principle of international law . . . . According to international law, Flanders meets all requirements to become a state on its own . . . .”). Fiona Govan, Catalonia Calls Snap Elections in Independence Drive from Madrid, TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 25, 2012, 9:05 PM BST, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/9566649/Catalonia-calls-snap-elections-in-independence-drive-from-Madrid.html (quoting Artur Mas, the nationalist leader of Catalonia’s regional government, as proclaiming that “[t]he time has come to exercise the right to self-determination . . . . We want the same instruments that other nations have to preserve our common identity.”); SNP in Glasgow, GLASGOW SCOT. NAT’L PARTY, http://www.glasgowsnp.org/SNP_in_Glasgow/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (“The [SNP] has been at the forefront of the campaign for Scottish self-determination for almost seventy years. The evolution of the SNP has been paralleled by the political evolution of Scotland herself – from an almost totally unionist country to a nation on the brink of independence.”).
nations and add a new dimension to the analysis of their self-determination claims. The SNP’s old campaign slogan, “Independence in Europe,” captures the essence of sub-state nationalist attitudes towards European integration: Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalists have tethered the traditional goal of sovereign statehood to the realities of an integrating Europe in which state sovereignty is constrained.

To be sure, the relationship between European integration and sub-state nationalism is complex and at times contradictory. While the EU provides avenues for the articulation and pursuit of nationalist objectives beyond the borders of the state, it also bolsters the significance of statehood by limiting full participation in its institutions to member states; while integration creates certain safety nets that make it easier for stateless nations to contemplate independence, the European dimension might also complicate the process of secession. Regardless of these complexities, however, the EU has become a critical component of sub-state nationalist aspirations. Accordingly, legal and political factors within the EU—most notably the respective roles of states and regions within the EU’s institutional structure, the rules governing membership in the EU, and the broader debates over the future of European integration occasioned by the “eurozone crisis”—have as much to say about the prospects for Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalism as do the state-centric principles of international law.

This article explores the meaning of “Independence in Europe” in light of the current parameters of the right to self-determination, which remains rooted in notions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the process of European integration, which has given rise to a more nuanced understanding of sovereignty and statehood. Part I provides background on Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders, paying particular attention to the ways in which the nationalist movements in these regions have been influenced by their unique identities, their acquisition of political autonomy, and economic disputes with their respective parent states. Part II addresses the scope of the right to self-determination in international law and demonstrates that Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia do not possess a unilateral right to secede. By applying the framework articulated by the Canadian Supreme Court in its advisory opinion on Quebec’s possible secession from Canada, however, this part describes how Europe’s stateless nations could negotiate independence from their parent states. Part III places Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalism within the context of international law.

9. See Laible, supra note 6, at 105–13 (tracing the origins of the SNP’s pro-Europe ideology and “Independence in Europe” slogan).
European integration and explores how the EU both encourages and places limits on self-determination claims. Finally, Part IV returns to the paradox of separatism in the midst of integration and suggests how international law and state practice might evolve to reflect new realities at a time when the building block of the international system—the state—is being challenged both from above and from below.

I. NATIONALISM IN EUROPE'S STATELESS NATIONS: IDENTITY, AUTONOMY, AND THE ECONOMY

The contours of present-day Catalan, Scottish, and Flemish nationalism have been shaped by three interrelated factors: identity, autonomy, and the economy. First, Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders are paradigmatic examples of stateless nations: they are well-defined territories with unique historical, cultural, economic, and political identities, and they have maintained their unique identities despite being incorporated for long periods of time within larger states.10 Second, consistent with the trend towards decentralization evident in many Western European states since the end of the Second World War,11 they have established autonomous political institutions, which have tended to reinforce their separate identities and prompt demands for even greater self-rule. Third, the nationalist movements in these stateless nations have been given impetus by economic disputes with their respective parent states—disputes that have been exacerbated by the eurozone crisis and that in many respects mirror the economic dilemmas faced by the EU.

A. Catalonia: Rising Separatist Sentiment

Prior to its gradual incorporation into the nascent Spanish state following the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469, Catalonia formed the dominant part of the Crown of Aragon, which controlled a powerful

10. See Montserrat Guibernau, Nations Without States: Political Communities in the Global Age, 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1251, 1254 (2003) (defining “nations without states” as “nations which, in spite of having their territories included within the boundaries of one or more States . . . maintain a separate sense of national identity generally based upon a common culture, history, attachment to a particular territory and the explicit wish to rule themselves”); see generally Keating, supra note 6 (examining politics in several stateless nations, including Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders).

trading empire that stretched throughout the Mediterranean. Even at this early stage, Catalonia exhibited characteristics associated with modern statehood, such as a common language and well-developed political, legal, and economic structures. As Madrid extended its authority, Catalonia maintained its own currency, tax system, and distinct culture rooted in the Catalan language. The vestiges of Catalan self-government were not fully extinguished until the early eighteenth century, after Catalonia backed the losing Hapsburg side in the War of Spanish Succession.

The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a revival of Catalan cultural and political awareness, as well as the growth of Catalan nationalism as an organized political movement. This renaissance coincided with the development of an industrial economy that made Catalonia more prosperous and advanced than the rest of Spain. For a brief period in the 1930s, Catalonia regained a measure of self-rule. Following the Spanish Civil War, however, General Francisco Franco established a centralized dictatorship that “was determined to put an end once and for all to the ‘Catalan problem.’” What followed was “one of the darkest periods of Catalan history,” during which Catalans “endured repression of individual and collective cultural rights, such as the prohibition of the use of the Catalan language, the public denial of the Catalan identity and the punishment [of] cultural expression.”

Catalan identity—and the quest for political autonomy—reemerged during the transition to democracy that followed Franco’s death in 1975. Article 2 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution proclaimed “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation” but also “recognize[d] and guarantee[d] the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is

13. KENNETH MCRIBERTS, CATALONIA: NATION BUILDING WITHOUT A STATE 13 (2001) (quoting PIERRE VILAR, LA CATALOGNE DANS L’ESPAGNE MODERNE 220 (1962)) (“Between 1250 and 1350, the Catalan principality was perhaps the European country to which it would be the least inexact or risky to use such seemingly anachronistic terms as political and economic imperialism or ‘natio-state.’”).
14. Id. at 14–16.
15. DAVIES, supra note 12, at 222–23.
17. Id. at 16–17.
18. Id. at 33–39.
19. Id. at 40.
composed.” The Constitution provided a framework for self-government for those regions “with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics”—Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia. A Statute of Autonomy enacted in 1979 established a Catalan regional government, the Generalitat de Catalunya. Ultimately, in an effort to downplay the uniqueness of its three “historic nationalities,” Spain also extended autonomous institutions to its other regions. As Michael Keating explains, “Spain’s system of autonomous governments is the result of contradictory pressures for differentiation, coming from the historic nationalities, and for uniformity, coming from the central state.” Despite its significant degree of decentralization, Spain has resisted outright federalization and remains (at least in formal constitutional terms) a unitary state.

For the most part, Catalan nationalists have been willing to work within the parameters of this political structure. Catalonia’s largest political party, Convergència i Unió (CiU), has been a strong advocate of Catalan autonomy but has typically stopped short of calling for secession. In recent years, however, increased tensions between Catalonia and the Spanish state have precipitated a spike in support for separation. The turn towards a more robust nationalism can be traced to June 2006, when Catalans voted in favor of an amended Statute of Autonomy that expanded the authority of the Generalitat—and, most contentiously, defined Catalonia as a “nation.” Spain’s leading conservative political party, the Partido Popular, challenged the constitutionality of the amended statute, particularly on the ground that the Constitution recognizes only one, 

23. Id. §§ 143–58.
25. See How Much Is Enough?: Devolution Has Been Good for Spain, but It May Have Gone Too Far, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 2008, at SS8, available at http://www.economist.com/node/12501023 (noting that the granting of autonomy to all of Spain’s regions is known as café para todos, or “coffee for all”).
27. See MCRoberts, supra note 13, at 66–72 (describing CiU’s moderate, pro-autonomy policies); id. at 86–87 (contrasting CiU’s policies with those of Catalonia’s smaller nationalist party, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), which has often taken a stronger pro-independence line).
Spanish, nation. In June 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court struck down several parts of the amended Statute of Autonomy, including those defining Catalonia as a nation and giving formal preference to the use of the Catalan language. The court’s decision sparked widespread nationalist demonstrations in Barcelona.

Indeed, the legal wrangling over the amended Statute of Autonomy took place against a backdrop of increased nationalist activity. Beginning in December 2009 and culminating in Barcelona in April 2011, Catalan nationalists staged a series of non-binding referendums in which the majority of voters expressed support for secession. Meanwhile, Catalonia’s successful campaign to ban the traditional Spanish pastime of bullfighting was widely viewed as a nationalist provocation.

Economic issues have long been a source of friction between Barcelona and Madrid. Catalonia is one of Spain’s wealthiest regions, but it does not control its own taxes; instead, Catalonia’s tax revenue goes to the central government, which then remits what Catalan nationalists argue is a disproportionately small amount of funds. The eurozone crisis has exacerbated disputes over this taxation arrangement. Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s Partido Popular government blames Spain’s economic woes on free-spending regional governments, in contrast, Catalonia


30. Id.


35. See Mats Persson, Spain Can’t Even Control Spending in Its Regions – So How Will Brussels Control Spending in Portugal, Spain, or Italy?, TELEGRAPH (London), May 31, 2012, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/matspersson/100017577/spain-cant-even-control-spending-in-its-regions-so-how-will-brussels-control-spending-in-portugal-spain-or-italy/ (“Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has blamed the regions for Spain’s failure to meet its EU-mandated debt and deficit targets. Over half of the country’s planned savings for this year – €18bn – are supposed to come from the comunidades autónomas. This ain’t gonna happen. In fact, Catalonia – Spain’s wealthiest region – has
attributes its deficit to its inability to control its own finances. In the wake of the nationalist rally in Barcelona on September 11, 2012, Prime Minister Rajoy rejected Catalan leader Artur Mas’s request for a new tax revenue distribution plan. The Generalitat responded by voting in favor of holding a referendum on Catalan independence and moved up regional elections to November 2012 in an effort to capitalize on anticipated nationalist support. Despite CiU’s disappointing showing in the November elections, nationalists still managed to capture the majority of seats in the Generalitat. In January 2013, the Generalitat adopted a “Declaration of Sovereignty” proclaiming Catalonia’s right to determine its political future in a referendum to be held by 2014—a move that the Spanish government has strongly opposed and characterized as unconstitutional.

B. Scotland: The Road to the Referendum

If Catalonia holds a referendum on independence, it will likely look to

already asked the central government to help repay €13bn worth of debt, putting further strains on the country’s public finances.

36. See Xavier Vilà Carrera, The Domain of Spain: How Likely is Catalan Independence?, WORLD AFF. J., Jan./Feb. 2014, at 80 (“The pro-independence forces claim that Catalonia’s fiscal imbalance with Spain’s national budget amounts to $20 billion (US dollars) per year, according to figures from the Catalan government’s finance minister. This office claims that Catalonia—origin of a quarter of Spain’s exports—suffers an insufficient investment and financial disadvantage since it generates nineteen percent of Spain’s GDP and receives back eleven percent in expenditure from the central government.”).


Scotland as a guide. Scotland’s existence as an independent state ended in 1707, when the Scottish parliament entered into the Treaty of Union with England. The Treaty dissolved the Scottish parliament and transferred ultimate political authority to London. One Scottish parliamentarian of the time lamented that the day on which the Treaty was put to a vote in the Scottish parliament was “the last day Scotland was Scotland.” But Scotland “entered the [United Kingdom] with a distinct institutional trajectory of its own,” and following the union it retained a robust civil society, including its own legal and educational systems, social welfare programs, and established (Presbyterian) church. Scots also made significant contributions to the British Empire, which “did not dilute the sense of Scottish identity but strengthened it by powerfully reinforcing the sense of national esteem and demonstrating that the Scots were equal partners in the great imperial mission.”

Although Scottish culture and identity flourished in the United Kingdom and the Empire, Scottish nationalism as a political force largely lay dormant until the 1960s, when the SNP surprised the British establishment by winning a parliamentary by-election. The discovery of oil in the North Sea in 1970 led many nationalists to argue for greater Scottish control over its own resources and revenues and to claim that Scotland could survive economically as an independent state. Diverting the flow of North Sea oil revenues from London to Edinburgh remains a central plank in the SNP’s economic platform.

During the 1970s, in an effort to co-opt Scottish national sentiment and maintain its position as the dominant political party in Scotland, the Labour Party announced plans for the devolution of political authority to Scottish institutions, but its proposal failed to obtain a sufficient number of votes in a 1979 referendum. The issue of devolution was shelved during

42. Id. at 6–16.
45. Devine, supra note 41, at 289–90.
46. Id. at 574.
47. Id. at 585–86.
49. Greer, supra note 44, at 50–51, 62.
the 1980s and early 1990s, when the Conservative Party governed the United Kingdom. The Conservatives followed an unabashedly pro-Union line, which alienated many Scottish institutions accustomed to being afforded a wide berth by London and in turn increased Scottish support for autonomy.\(^{50}\)

When the Labour Party returned to power under Tony Blair in 1997, it promised devolution of powers throughout the United Kingdom, in part to “lance the boil” of independence.\(^{51}\) In 1998, the Labour government introduced the Scotland Act, which provided for the creation of a local Scottish parliament.\(^{52}\) In contrast to the failed devolution referendum of 1979, Scottish voters enthusiastically backed the Scotland Act, and in 1999 the first Scottish Parliament since 1707 met in Edinburgh.\(^{53}\) Ultimately, the Scotland Act formed part of a broader pattern of devolution that also resulted in the establishment of a Welsh Assembly and, under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, a power-sharing government composed of unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland.\(^{54}\)

Although the Labour Party initially controlled the devolved Scottish Parliament, in the 2007 elections the SNP cut deeply into Labour’s majority, and the SNP’s leader, Alex Salmond, became First Minister in an SNP-led minority government.\(^{55}\) The SNP’s decisive May 2011 victory pushed independence to the forefront of Scotland’s political agenda. On January 25, 2012, the birthday of the Scottish national poet Robert Burns, Salmond announced plans to hold a referendum on Scottish independence in the autumn of 2014, which would coincide with the 700th anniversary of the victory of Scottish forces over English invaders at the Battle of Bannockburn.\(^{56}\) The government of Prime Minister David Cameron came

\(^{50}\) Id. at 69–88 (“Conservative governments of these years pursued policies and policymaking strategies that eroded Scottish organizations’ autonomy and stability. The organizations’ backlash took the form of support for devolution.”).


\(^{53}\) DEVINE, supra note 41, at 616–17.


out forcefully in opposition to Scottish independence. Nonetheless, in the Edinburgh Agreement reached on October 15, 2012, the British government granted the Scottish Parliament authority to hold a referendum, and the two governments agreed to the ground rules for the referendum process.

C. Flanders: Breaking Up the Most Successful Failed State of All Time

In 2008, a German newspaper dubbed Belgium “the most successful ‘failed state’ of all time.” This comment captures the contradiction at the heart of Belgian life: despite the deep divisions between its Dutch- and French-speaking communities, Belgium has remained peaceful and prosperous. The recent rise in support for Flemish separatism, however, has exposed the fragility of the Belgian political system and has increasingly led to talk of a possible breakup.

Unlike Scotland and Catalonia, Flanders has no history of independence. Instead, it coalesced as an identifiable territorial and political unit following the creation of the Belgian state. Belgium itself is a product of secession: in 1830, at the instigation of the local French-speaking bourgeoisie and with the support of the Great Powers, the Belgian provinces declared independence from the Netherlands, and a German nobleman, Leopold of Saxe Coburg Gotha, was installed as the first King of the Belgians.

Prior to 1830, “there was no shared sense of ‘Belgian’ identity, no

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60. See KRIS DESCHOUWER, THE POLITICS OF BELGIUM: GOVERNING A DIVIDED SOCIETY 42–43 (2009) (explaining that, unlike in Spain or the United Kingdom, “the Belgian regions and communities did not exist before Belgium was created”). The Flemish provinces were distinguishable, however, from neighboring areas of the Low Countries due to their use of the Dutch language (which separated them from the French-speaking Catholic areas to the south) and adherence to Catholicism (which differentiated them from the Protestant Dutch-speaking areas to the north). Id. at 18–19. Moreover, Flanders lay at the heart of the Kingdom of Burgundy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. DAVIES, supra note 12, at 128–43.

sense of a single people seeking nationhood. Even after independence, the fostering of a shared identity often proved difficult, in large part because the new state straddled a linguistic fault line separating the Dutch-speaking north (Flanders) from the French-speaking south (Wallonia). From the outset, the francophone minority dominated Belgium. French was the language of politics, commerce, and culture, and the capital, Brussels, gradually became a predominantly French-speaking city despite being located in Flanders. The mines and factories of Wallonia drove the economy and concentrated wealth in the south, while Flanders remained poor and agricultural. To the francophone elite, Dutch was a language “for domestics and animals,” and the Flemish themselves were “uneducated, backward peasants, suitable to do manual labor but little else.”

The roots of modern Flemish nationalism can be traced to the “Flemish Movement,” which during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sought greater equality in the area of language rights. Under pressure from the movement, the Belgian government gradually extended the official use of Dutch in legal, educational, and administrative matters. Yet “the national language policy essentially became one of dual monolingualism, based on the principle of territorial location, not bilingualism, with language rights attaching to individuals.” In other words, language rights were determined by where an individual lived rather than by the individual’s native tongue. By 1963, Belgium’s “language border,” separating Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia, had become fixed.

62. Id. at 157.
63. This fault line was historically entrenched. “Julius Caesar’s Gallica Belgica lay athwart the line that was to separate Gallo-Roman territories from the Franks and mark the boundary thenceforth demarcating Latinate, French-dominated Europe from the Germanic north.” JUDT, supra note 11, at 708 n.1.
64. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 157–59, 169.
65. Id. at 158.
67. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 158.
68. Id. at 159–60.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 160.
72. DESCHOIJER, supra note 60, at 46. Prior to 1963, the regional borders had been defined by a linguistic census conducted every ten years and thus had been subject to occasional modifications. Id.
Meanwhile, following the Second World War, the economic circumstances of the Flemish and Walloons were dramatically reversed: Flanders developed a modern economy and emerged as one of the wealthiest regions in Europe, while Wallonia, faced with decreased mining productivity and the shuttering of factories, suffered a sharp post-industrial decline. Wallonia became dependent on subsidies from the national government, which the newly prosperous Flemish often viewed as being unfairly paid out of their taxes. Financial transfers from Flanders to Wallonia remain a critical source of Flemish nationalist grievance: “the average Flemish person on the street resents the idea of substantial subsidies from Flanders to the Walloon region.”

The economic rise of Flanders was accompanied by sweeping changes to the Belgian political system. Beginning in 1970, a series of constitutional reforms reflecting the territorial-linguistic divide transformed Belgium from a highly centralized unitary state into a highly decentralized federal state. Broadly, the constitutional reforms established three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital) and three “language communities” (Dutch, French, and German), each with their own parliaments and areas of competency. Flanders and Wallonia are officially monolingual, while Brussels-Capital is officially bilingual, although the majority of its population speaks French. Only those residual powers not explicitly reserved for the regions or language communities belong to the federal government. Belgium is not a “coming together” federation like the United States or Switzerland, where smaller

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73. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 161.
74. See JUDT, supra note 11, at 708 (“Most of the former miners, steel-workers and their families in [Wallonia] now depended upon a welfare system administered from the country’s bi-lingual capital and paid for—as it seemed to Flemish nationalists—out of the taxes of gainfully employed northerners.”).
75. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 171–72; see also JUDT, supra note 11, at 710 (describing Flemish nationalism as the product of “two self-ascribed identities—pressed linguistic minority and frustrated economic dynamo”).
76. DESCHOUWER, supra note 60, at 48–54. In 1993, Article I of the Belgian Constitution was amended to declare Belgium a federal state composed of three regions and three language communities. Id. at 41.
77. Id. at 48–54. In addition to its Dutch- and French-speaking communities, Belgium has a small German-speaking population along its eastern border. See Richard Connor, Belgium’s German-Speaking Cantons Ponder Their Position, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.dw.de/belgiums-german-speaking-cantons-ponder-their-position/a-15890523 (describing the political position of German-speaking Belgians in the midst of the Flemish-Walloon divide).
78. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 169 & n.98.
79. DESCHOUWER, supra note 60, at 56.
political entities united for a common purpose;\textsuperscript{80} rather, it might best be described as a “falling apart” federation, where the federal components were created specifically to reflect differences and the centrifugal forces of federalism have hollowed out the national core.

To a far greater extent than either Spain or the United Kingdom, Belgium exhibits the hallmarks of an ethnic conflict. The Flemish and Walloons speak different languages, live in different areas, attend different schools, consume different media, and largely are governed by different institutions.\textsuperscript{81} Indeed, they may no longer even vote for the same political parties: between 1968 and 1978, the three major parties (the Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals) each splintered into French- and Dutch-speaking factions that only contest elections within their respective territorial and linguistic spheres.\textsuperscript{82} Where the two communities do come into regular contact, such as in the increasingly francophone Flemish suburbs of Brussels, relationships are strained by disputes over language use and voting rights.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{80} Id. at 42.

\textsuperscript{81} See Baum, supra note 5 (“After decades of snubs and bitter grudges, the two halves of Belgium have separate languages, political parties, schools and media. Some claim that even the birds of Flanders and Wallonia sing in different languages.”); Christopher Caldwell, Belgium Waffles: Two Nations, After All?, W KLY. STANDARD, Dec. 21, 2009, at 24, 24, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/327fsssq.asp (“French speakers and Dutch speakers inhabit different cultural universes. Most people have never heard of the major politicians, the major actresses, and sometimes even the major athletes on the other side of a country that is smaller than Maryland.”); Doug Saunders, For Bitterly Divided Belgium, the Future Looks Grim, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 26, 2007, at A3 (“[Belgium] has always been divided into twin solitudes of extraordinary isolation: The French-speaking Walloon minority and Dutch-speaking Flemish majority have long existed in isolated worlds. With no shared national media, few shared institutions and no form of bilingualism, forming governments has never been easy.”).

\textsuperscript{82} JUJT, supra note 11, at 712.

\textsuperscript{83} In particular, Flemish nationalists have opposed rules entitling francophones in many Brussels suburbs to municipal services in French, even though Flanders is otherwise an exclusively Dutch-speaking region, and have objected to the existence of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (“BHV”) electoral district, in which French-speakers, despite living in Flanders, may vote for francophone political parties from the Brussels-Capital region. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 169–71. Consequently, the Brussels suburbs have become flashpoints for ethno-linguistic tension. See Steven Erlanger, Seams of Belgium’s Quilt Threaten to Burst, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/world/europe/14belgium.html (describing the efforts of Flemish nationalist politicians in the Brussels suburb of Liegekerke to maintain the “Flemish nature” of the town in the face of an influx of French-speakers); Michael Kimmelman, With Flemish Nationalism on the Rise, Belgium Teeters on the Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008, at E1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/04/arts/04abro.html (describing linguistic tensions in the Brussels bedroom community of Linkebeek); Delphine Schrank, Belgians Limp Along, Hobbled by Old Language Barriers, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2008, at A10, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/29/AR2008012903286.html (noting the passage of regulations in the suburb of Zaventem restricting the sale of public land to those who speak Dutch or who demonstrate a willingness to learn it); Thousands of Flemish Separatists Stage March near Brussels, NAHARNET
Belgium’s recent national elections put its dysfunctional political culture on full display. Following the June 2007 elections, calls for greater Flemish self-rule triggered political deadlock that took over nine months to resolve. The N-VA’s unexpected success in the June 2010 elections precipitated an even longer crisis: in February 2011, Belgium set a record for the most number of days without a functioning national government, surpassing the previous record set by war-torn Iraq. Both the 2007 and 2010 national elections caused many observers to question whether Belgium would survive as a state.

Belgium only managed to form a coalition government in December 2011 and then only in the face of pressures stemming from the economic crisis, which had led to a downgrade of Belgium’s credit rating. Yet even this pact has failed to quell talk of a Belgian breakup. To form the coalition, Belgium’s political parties agreed to a further devolution of powers to the regional governments. Still, the N-VA refused to join the governing coalition and, as the leading opposition party, remains committed to eventual Flemish independence. Flemish regional elections in October 2012 confirmed the N-VA’s position as the largest party in Flanders, and its leader, Bart De Wever, was elected mayor of Antwerp. De Wever envisions the gradual breakup of the Belgian state through the continued transfer of powers to the regions; his goal is that “Belgium will be snuffed out slowly . . . like a candle, barely noticed by anyone.”

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86. Frequently, these observers compared the relationship between Flanders and Wallonia to an unhappy marriage and the potential breakup of Belgium to a divorce. For an extended use of the divorce metaphor, which serves as a concise overview of the Flemish-Walloon conflict, see Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 154–56. See also Caldwell, supra note 81 (“But the marriage of Flanders and Wallonia, never a love match, has in recent decades entered a thrown-crockery phase.”).
87. Chrisafis, supra note 2.
90. Buruma, supra note 66, at 36.
II. SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Of course, the breakup of Belgium—or the independence of Scotland or Catalonia—would hardly go unnoticed by the international community. Secession strikes at the twin pillars of the Westphalian state system: sovereignty and territorial integrity.91 A successful secession shrinks the territorial reach of the former parent state’s sovereign authority and establishes a new sovereign in its place.92 At its most extreme, one or more successful secessions might trigger the dissolution (i.e., the legal extinction) of the former parent state, as was the case with Yugoslavia in the 1990s.93 The Yugoslav example also points to another disruptive characteristic of secession: secessionist disputes often involve armed conflict and human rights abuses that pose a threat to international security.94

International law is frequently described as taking a neutral stance towards secession; acts of secession are evaluated under domestic law, while international law is only concerned with regulating secession’s consequences.95 Nonetheless, secession is clearly disfavored. Although


93. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 390–91 (2d ed. 2006). For a further consideration of issues pertaining to continuity and extinction, see infra Part III.B.


95. See CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 390 (“The position is that secession is neither legal nor illegal in international law, but a legally neutral act the consequences of which are regulated internationally.”); Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CTR. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2009) (“One cannot say that international law makes secession legal. If anything, international law is largely silent regarding secession, and attempted secessions are, first and foremost, assessed under domestic law.”).
international law recognizes a right to self-determination, such a right, if applied broadly to offer the possibility of statehood to the world’s myriad potential claimants, would result in “the radical undermining of State sovereignty and a dramatic reshaping of the present framework of the world community.” 96 Application of the right to self-determination therefore has been “selective and limited in many respects.” 97 In fact, in the post-colonial era, it would appear that the right to self-determination never amounts to a unilateral right to secede.

A. Unilateral Secession: Limits on the Right to Self-Determination

The modern concept of self-determination has its origins in U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points and similar pronouncements following the First World War. 98 Wilson’s vision of self-determination was expansive and idealistic: he argued that “well-defined national elements” should be given “the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new, or perpetuating old, elements of discord or antagonism.” 99 The potential perils of this vision were apparent from the outset. Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, recognized that given the innumerable “national elements” in the world and the impossibility of providing each one with its own state, self-determination would “raise hopes which can never be realized.” 100 Moreover, although the victorious Allies were happy to dismantle the defeated Central Powers at Versailles, they were far less willing to extend self-determination to the national minorities within their own borders or, even more unthinkably, to their colonial subjects.

Thus, as Antonio Cassese explains, “in the era after the First World War self-determination, although in vogue as a political postulate and a rhetorical slogan... was not a part of the body of international legal norms.” 101 In 1920 and 1921, the League of Nations tasked two expert commissions with determining the status of the Aaland Islands, which were
part of Finland but whose population was of Swedish descent, spoke Swedish, and wished to separate from Finland and unite with Sweden. The commissions rejected the notion of self-determination in favor of maintaining the territorial integrity of existing states. The first commission, the Committee of Jurists, declared that “Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish.” According to the second commission, the Commission of Rapporteurs, to recognize such a right “would be to destroy order and stability within states and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a territorial and political unity.” Rather than allow the Aaland Islands to separate from Finland and unite with Sweden, the League of Nations directed Finland to implement certain linguistic and educational measures to protect the Aaland Islanders’ cultural rights within the Finnish state.

The legal status of self-determination shifted when it was referenced prominently in several foundational United Nations (UN) documents following the Second World War. Article I of the UN Charter identified the development of “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” as one of the UN’s primary purposes. Similarly, Common Article I of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) declared that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” “The concept of self-determination definitively moved from an aspirational ideal to a recognized right” by means of its inclusion in the ICCPR and ICESCR.

106. U.N. Charter, art. 1, para. 2. The same language also appears in Article 55 of the UN Charter.
108. Borgen, supra note 95, at 7.
Yet despite its gradual acceptance as a legal right, self-determination has continued to suffer from a fundamental problem: nobody can agree on exactly what it means. Separatists throughout the world have taken a broad, essentially Wilsonian view of self-determination in an attempt to provide legal support for their claims; in the political realm, self-determination has become “a shibboleth that all pronounce to identify themselves with the virtuous.” But international law is, first and foremost, a set of rules made by and for states, and states unsurprisingly have been reluctant to condone a right that would justify their own dismemberment.

In the decades following the adoption of the UN Charter, self-determination became almost exclusively associated with the process of decolonization. Indeed, self-determination only inarguably amounts to a right to “external self-determination”—i.e., a right to independent statehood—when applied to overseas (or “saltwater”) colonies, such as those of the former European empires in Africa and Asia. The UN General Assembly first proclaimed the right of colonies to external self-determination in its 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) subsequently held that the right to external self-determination in the colonial context has achieved the status of customary international law. The granting of external self-determination to saltwater colonies was consistent with the preservation of the Westphalian state system: with few
exceptions, overseas colonies were not considered integral parts of the European states that governed them, and their loss, however painful, therefore did not threaten the sovereignty or alter the borders of the parent state.\textsuperscript{114}

There is little support for the proposition that a right to external self-determination exists beyond the colonial context. Even the former colonies, having achieved independence under the banner of self-determination, promptly rejected the notion that the right might be used to adjust their own borders.\textsuperscript{115} At most, only three non-colonial territories in the UN Charter era—Bangladesh, Eritrea, and most recently Kosovo—have successfully seceded without their former parent states’ consent.\textsuperscript{116} All three involved unique circumstances that arguably limit their precedential value.\textsuperscript{117} For example, in recognizing Kosovo’s 2008

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\item \textsuperscript{114} For example, France’s withdrawal from Vietnam was undoubtedly violent and politically difficult. See, e.g., Michael Burleigh, Small Wars, Faraway Places: Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World 211–43 (2013) (recounting the end of French colonialism in Vietnam, which culminated in the French military’s humiliating defeat by Viet Minh forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954). But Vietnam did not implicate the same issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity as Algeria, which had long been considered an integral part of France. See id. at 323 (“The French Premier Pierre Mendès-France, fresh from liquidating the French Empire in Indochina, declared that Algeria was different. ‘The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic,’ he said. ‘Between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession.’”). Indeed, the “Algerian Question” (i.e., whether and how Algeria and its Muslim majority could be made a full and equal part of the French state) was a constant source of tension in French politics, and Algeria’s bloody war of independence (1954–62) brought down France’s Fourth Republic, precipitated an open revolt by portions of the French military, and cost hundreds of thousands of lives. See Ian S. Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza 81–120, 239–301 (1993) (examining the difficulties that France faced in extricating itself from Algeria due to Algeria’s integration with the French state).
\item \textsuperscript{115} See, e.g., Organization of African Unity [OAU], Border Disputes Among African States, AGH/Res. 16(I) (July 21, 1964) (stating “that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissention” and committing its member states to “respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”).
\item \textsuperscript{116} Borgen, supra note 95, at 9–10. All other successful non-colonial secessions since 1945 were either achieved with the parent state’s consent (e.g., Senegal, Singapore, and the Baltic States) or were the result of the dissolution of the parent state (e.g., the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia). Crawford, supra note 93, at 416. The most recent example of secession with the parent state’s consent is South Sudan’s separation from Sudan in July 2011, pursuant to a peace agreement brokered with assistance from the United States. Jeffrey Gettleman, South Sudan, the Newest Nation, Is Full of Hope and Problems, N.Y. Times, July 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/world/africa/08sudan.html?_r=0.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Bangladesh achieved independence from Pakistan due largely to the Indian Army’s intervention on behalf of Bangladeshi separatists, which produced a fait accompli on the ground that the international community (including Pakistan) eventually accepted. Crawford, supra note 93, at 415–16; Hannum, supra note 99, at 46 (arguing that Bangladesh’s successful secession “was due more to the Indian army than to the precepts of international law”). Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia resulted from the overthrow of Ethiopia’s military regime and the installation of a Transitional Government that accepted Eritrean independence. Borgen, supra note 95, at 10 n.28. This leads James
declaration of independence from Serbia, numerous states, including the United States, characterized Kosovar independence as the sui generis result of a unique set of circumstances, specifically Serbia’s human rights abuses in Kosovo during the 1990s and the international community’s subsequent military intervention and administration of the province.118 By contrast, the vast majority of attempted non-colonial secessions have failed.119

The most common argument in favor of a right to external self-determination outside of the colonial context is that international law should condone “remedial secession” as a last resort where a group within the territory of an existing state is denied basic democratic freedoms and is subjected to severe human rights abuses.120 The concept of remedial secession finds support in the League of Nations reports on the Aaland Islands121 and, more recently, in the UN General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.122 But remedial secession is far from accepted by the international community. Kosovo, whose population suffered human rights abuses at the hands of the Serbian state, was perhaps the clearest recent example of a situation in which a right to remedial secession would apply. Nonetheless, in its 2010 advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia, the ICJ sidestepped the thorny issue of remedial secession altogether, choosing instead to confine itself to the narrower question of

Crawford, for one, to classify Eritrea as an example of non-colonial secession achieved with the consent of the parent state. CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 415–16.

118. See, e.g., Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y of State, United States, U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State (Feb. 18, 2008), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm (stating that “Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for any other situation in the world today”). Unlike the secessions of Bangladesh and Eritrea, which have gained universal acceptance, Kosovo’s secession remains disputed, with many states, including Serbia and Russia, refusing to recognize its independence. For a list of countries that have recognized Kosovo as an independent state, see KOS. THANKS YOU, http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).

119. See CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 403–15 (examining unsuccessful secession attempts in the Faroe Islands, Katanga, Biafra, Republika Srpska, Chechnya, Quebec, and Somaliland).

120. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 331–400 (2007) (presenting a comprehensive argument that “[i]nternational law should recognize a remedial right to secede” where “secession is a remedy of last resort against serious injustices”).

121. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 104, at 28 (“The separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part and its incorporation in another State can only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.”).

whether Kosovo’s declaration of independence violated international law. Accordingly, while acknowledging the “radically different views” of whether a right to remedial secession exists, the court determined that “it is not necessary to resolve these questions in the present case.”

By avoiding the issue, the ICJ’s opinion cast doubt on the viability of non-colonial external self-determination claims.

B. Negotiated Secession: Lessons from Quebec

Thus, where the people claiming a right to self-determination resides within the borders of an existing state, the most that the right can be said to guarantee is “internal self-determination,” which may be understood as basic human and democratic rights coupled with certain minority rights that are designed to recognize and protect the people’s culture and identity. This concept was at the heart of the League of Nations’ resolution of the Aaland Islands issue. More recently, in 1998—amidst ongoing debates over the possible secession of Quebec from Canada and following Quebecois separatists’ narrow defeat in a 1995 referendum on independence—the Canadian Supreme Court reaffirmed international law’s preference for internal self-determination.

In Reference re Secession of Quebec, an advisory opinion issued at the request of the Canadian government, the court examined whether Quebec possessed a unilateral right to secede under either domestic or international law. After finding that Canadian domestic law did not support a right to unilateral secession, the court explained that under international law, “the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and

123. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 83 (July 22). The question referred to the court by the General Assembly was: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?” Id. ¶ 1. The ICJ found, unsurprisingly, that international law does not prohibit declarations of independence. Id. ¶ 84.
124. Id. ¶¶ 82–83.
125. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
127. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 2. The Canadian government also posed a third question: whether, in the event of a conflict of authorities on the legality of Quebec’s secession, domestic or international law would take precedence. Id. Because the court held that both domestic and international law denied Quebec a unilateral right to secede, it did not reach this third question. Id. ¶ 147.
128. Id. ¶¶ 32–108.
cultural development within the framework of an existing state.” 129 According to the court, this reflects the fact that “[t]he international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states.” 130 Relying on its observation that numerous Quebecois have held prominent positions in the Canadian government and on an assertion that “[t]he international achievements of Quebecers in most fields of human endeavour are too numerous to list,” the court determined that the people of Quebec exercised their right to internal self-determination through their ability to “freely make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development within Quebec, across Canada, and throughout the world.” 131 Consequently, the court concluded that even if international law were to support a right to remedial secession, such a right was “manifestly inapplicable to Quebec under existing conditions.” 132

But the court went one step further, drawing on “the principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities” enshrined in the Canadian Constitution to outline a process of negotiated secession. 133 According to the court, although Canadian domestic law does not condone unilateral secession, the Constitution “is not a straitjacket”; thus, “a clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the other participants in Confederation would have to recognize.” 134 In other words, the democratically expressed will of the people of Quebec to secede would oblige the rump Canadian state to engage with Quebec in negotiations concerning possible separation. Although the court recognized that “[n]o one suggests that it would be an easy set of negotiations,” it nonetheless concluded that this process was the only way to ensure “the ultimate acceptance of the result by the international community.” 135

The court’s discussion of negotiated secession left two fundamental questions unanswered: what is a “clear majority,” and what constitutes a “clear question”? Regarding the former, the court obviously envisioned more than a simple majority of 50% plus one. 136 Developments subsequent

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129. Id. ¶126.
130. Id. ¶127.
131. Id. ¶¶135–36.
132. Id. ¶138.
133. Id. ¶148.
134. Id. ¶150.
135. Id. ¶¶151–52.
136. Particularly for purposes of this article, it is worth noting that in 2006, based on a proposal
to the court’s opinion provided guidance on the latter. During Quebec’s 1995 referendum, voters were asked: “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership, within the scope of the Bill Respecting the Future of Quebec, and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?” The perceived lack of clarity in this question was a major source of contention between pro- and anti-independence groups and is often identified as one of the reasons why the vote was so close. In 2000, the Canadian government passed the Clarity Act, which obliges Canada to negotiate with Quebec over the terms of a possible separation only following a referendum that sets forth a stark choice between either full separation or continued inclusion in the Canadian state. Accordingly, the Clarity Act prohibits any “referendum question that envisages other possibilities in addition to the secession of the province from Canada.”

The aim of this provision was to foreclose a referendum on “sovereignty-association,” a somewhat nebulous proposal often made by Québécois nationalists under which Quebec, though nominally independent, would retain some form of political and economic partnership with the rest of Canada.

Given the many similarities between Quebec and the stateless nations of Europe, the Canadian Supreme Court’s analysis of the right to self-determination has important implications for Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia. As a threshold matter, as with the Canadian Constitution, nothing in either the Belgian or Spanish constitutions allows for secession. Indeed, the Spanish Constitution not only expressly affirms


137.  KEATING, supra note 6, at 92 n.18.
138.  See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 126, at 291.
140.  Id. § 1(4)(b).
141.  See KEATING, supra note 6, at 89–90 (explaining that the nationalist Parti Québécois’ proposal for sovereignty-association would provide “for a Canadian common market, the continued use of the Canadian currency in Quebec, and joint executive and parliamentary institutions between Canada and Quebec to decide on matters of common interest. There would also be free movement of labour between Canada and Quebec and dual citizenship would be freely available.”); see also id. at 92 (describing the question posed in the 1995 referendum as “hovering between the sovereignty and sovereignty-association options”).
142.  See generally id. (characterizing Quebec as a stateless nation and analyzing its politics alongside the stateless nations of Europe).
143.  See C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, § 2, Dec. 29, 1978, translated at La Moncloa, GOBIERNO DE
the existence of a single Spanish nation but also vests exclusive competence for holding referendums in the national government and arguably authorizes the use of military force to combat any attempt at secession. For its part, the 1707 Treaty of Union does not contemplate separation but rather proclaims that “the two Kingdoms of England and Scotland shall . . . for ever after be united into one Kingdom . . . .” And like Quebec, Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia are neither saltwater colonies possessing a right to external self-determination nor victims of repression such that a right to remedial secession would apply. In short, Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia are only entitled to—and already possess—internal self-determination.

This leaves open the possibility of negotiated secession. The British government, despite its staunch opposition to Scottish independence, has thus far demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with Scottish nationalists. In language reminiscent of the Canadian Supreme Court’s advisory opinion, the Edinburgh Agreement states that a referendum will “deliver a fair test and a decisive expression of the views of people in Scotland and a result that everyone will respect.” Additionally, the Agreement’s approach to the referendum question reflects the Clarity Act’s view of what constitutes a “clear question.” The Agreement specifies that the referendum will be held on the basis of a single question, thereby thwarting the possibility of including two questions on the referendum ballot, the first addressing independence and the second gauging support for “devolution max,” a scenario similar to Quebecois “sovereignty-association,” in which Scotland would obtain virtually complete internal autonomy (including full fiscal powers) but would remain part of the United Kingdom for external purposes, such as defense and foreign affairs.


145. See id. § 8(1) (“The mission of the Armed Forces . . . is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain and to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order.”).

146. Union with Scotland Act, 1706, 6 Ann., c. 11; see also KEATING, supra note 6, at 108 (noting that “[t]here is no constitutional provision for the secession of Scotland” but that British politicians have largely conceded that “there would be no obstacles placed in Scotland’s way” if it chose to secede).

147. Edinburgh Agreement, supra note 58, pmbl.

148. Id. ¶ 6.

Whereas the British government has demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with Scottish nationalists over the contours of a referendum, the Spanish government has thus far refused to engage with Catalan nationalists in a similar fashion. In the wake of the Catalan government’s call for an eventual independence referendum, the Spanish government insisted that such a referendum would be illegal under the Constitution and vowed to prevent it.\(^{150}\) A serving colonel in the Spanish army even went so far as to warn that Catalan independence would only occur “[o]ver [his] dead body and that of many soldiers.”\(^{151}\) It remains to be seen whether Spain will adhere to its hard-line position in the event that Catalan nationalists push forward with their plans for a referendum.

Even if referendum-related issues were resolved and a clear majority vote demonstrated support for independence, Flemish, Scottish, or Catalan secession would require negotiations between the seceding region and the parent state. As in Quebec, this would not be an easy set of negotiations. For example, according to one constitutional scholar, the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992 required 30 treaties and 12,000 legal agreements.\(^{152}\) Similarly, Flemish, Scottish, or Catalan secession would require agreement not only on the format of the political process leading to separation but also on thornier issues such as the allocation of resources and debt.\(^{153}\) And in Belgium, negotiations following a referendum would almost certainly involve disputes over the fate of Brussels that would likely determine whether a state entitled to claim the mantle of Belgium’s legal personality would emerge following Flemish secession.\(^{154}\)

Regarding the right to self-determination in Quebec, “international law has already played (and will be playing) a role as a guiding standard” insofar as “it has presented the path to be taken regarding decisions about the destiny of a people, even where no legal entitlement to that people is granted by any specific legal rule.”\(^{155}\) The same may be said of

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\(^{153.}\) See Young, supra note 126, at 176–211 (identifying numerous issues that would likely be addressed as part of negotiations over Quebec’s secession from Canada).

\(^{154.}\) See infra notes 217–22 and accompanying text.

\(^{155.}\) CasseSE, supra note 96, at 254.
international law’s role with respect to possible Flemish, Scottish, or Catalan secession. International law does not grant these stateless nations a unilateral right to secede. At most, it delineates how independence may be achieved through referendum and negotiation. This position is consistent with international law’s inherent deference to state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Unlike in Quebec, however, the debates over Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan secession also occur within the context of the EU, which provides a unique setting in which to consider self-determination claims.

III. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A FORUM FOR SELF-DETERMINATION CLAIMS

European integration was not always popular among nationalists in Europe’s stateless nations. The SNP, for example, argued that integration amounted merely to the transfer of sovereignty over Scotland from one alien government in London to another in Brussels.156 Yet by the 1980s, the SNP had become a firm supporter of the European project and a proponent of “Independence in Europe.”157 Flemish nationalists have also embraced integration, and the N-VA describes itself as “an extremely pro-European party” that supports both “a stronger Flanders and a stronger Europe.”158 The centrality of the EU to Catalan nationalist discourse is evident in the banners carried by demonstrators in Barcelona calling for Catalonia to become a “New European State,”159 in the Declaration of Sovereignty’s assurance that “[t]he founding principles of the European Union shall be defended and promoted,”160 and in Artur Mas’s proposed wording for a future referendum question: “Do you want Catalonia to become a new state within the European Union?”161

It is overly simplistic to conclude that the EU encourages or discourages separatism or that it makes secession easier or more difficult. Nonetheless, European integration “affect[s] how the parties to a

156. See LAIBLE, supra note 6, at 84 (“SNP opposition to the [European Community] primarily involved sovereignty over Scottish affairs: . . . whether ‘rule’ from Brussels would be any better than ‘rule’ from Westminster . . . .”).
157. See id. at 105–13 (tracing the “Europeanization” of the SNP’s strategy, including its “Independence in Europe” campaign, during the 1980s).
159. Ortiz & Toyer, supra note 1.
160. DECLARATION OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 40.
Three aspects of the EU play a particularly important role in shaping Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan self-determination claims and considering how such claims might be addressed: the respective roles of states and regions in EU institutions, the rules governing EU membership, and the debates over the future of Europe in the wake of the eurozone crisis.

A. States and Regions

Although it is often obscured by considerations of the EU’s impact on sovereignty, the fact remains that the EU is in many ways governed “through cooperation among the governments of its member states” rather than by supranational structures with independent authority. States remain the primary actors within the EU system. Membership in the EU is limited to sovereign states that meet the EU’s admissions criteria and that are admitted through a unanimous vote by member states. Once admitted to membership, states participate directly in the EU’s primary governing institutions: the European Council (consisting of ministers from each member state), the European Commission (consisting of one commissioner from each member state), and the European Parliament (consisting of elected representatives from the member states). Thus, “[s]tatehood in the EU . . . retains meaning for nationalists because it still remains the sole means by which nationalists can be recognized as sovereign equals in the European political system.”

Attempts to establish formal channels for regional participation in EU governance have produced only limited results. During the 1980s and 1990s, it became popular to envision a “Europe of the Regions,” in which local governments would replace states as the primary building blocks of a more fully integrated Europe. Many regions established “information offices” in Brussels in an effort to access the emerging European policymaking structures. Bolstering the Europe of the Regions idea was the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993.

165. PINDE R & USHERWOOD, supra note 163, at 36–55.
166. LAIBLE, supra note 6, at 23.
167. Id. at 25.
168. Hopkins, supra note 11, at 26–27; see also Treaty of Maastricht on European Union,
enshrined the principle of subsidiarity (pursuant to which authority over any given area of competency should be vested at the lowest possible political level) in EU law, established a Committee of the Regions, and allowed regional ministers to sit on member state delegations in the European Council where the member state deemed such participation appropriate.\textsuperscript{169}

Yet on balance, the robust regional role that the Maastricht Treaty appeared to promise has never fully materialized. According to Laible, “many observers point not to the strength of regions in EU policymaking, but to their weakness. Even before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, analysts were suggesting that the notion of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ was premature; post-Maastricht developments have not altered this perception.”\textsuperscript{170} Indeed, the Committee of the Regions has come to symbolize the limitations on regional participation: its powers are essentially consultative, and the Commission and Council need not follow its recommendations.\textsuperscript{171} Furthermore, membership in the Committee is open to a wide range of local governments (including, for example, municipalities), which arguably dilutes its value as a vehicle for pursuing the interests of stateless nations with considerable domestic autonomy.\textsuperscript{172}

More recently, the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 provided notable, though modest, expansions of formal regional power.\textsuperscript{173} Consequently, it gained appreciable support from sub-state nationalists.\textsuperscript{174} The Treaty strengthens the Committee of the Regions by requiring the Commission, Council, and Parliament to consult it on matters concerning local or regional government, and it allows the Committee to challenge EU laws that it


\textsuperscript{169} Id.

\textsuperscript{170} LAIBLE, supra note 6, at 36.

\textsuperscript{171} Hopkins, supra note 11, at 27–29.

\textsuperscript{172} See id. at 28 (describing the Committee of the Regions as “a committee with a huge variety of local, regional, and national representatives. The idea that a Minister-President of Bavaria could talk meaningfully with a local councillor from the UK was farcical and there was soon a major split in the committee.”).


\textsuperscript{174} See Nick Meo & Patrick Hennessy, \textit{European Union’s Lisbon Treaty Fuels Flames of Dissent Across Continent}, TELEGRAPH (London), June 28, 2009, 8:30 AM BST, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/5664631/European-Unions-Lisbon-Treaty-fuels-flames-of-dissent-across-continent.html (“[L]eaders of some of Europe’s separatist movements are celebrating the progress of the treaty towards full ratification. They are convinced that the more powerful the EU’s own institutions become, the weaker the nation state—and the stronger the case for granting breakaway regions their independence.”).
believes run afoul of the subsidiarity principle in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Although it remains to be seen whether the Lisbon Treaty signals a shift towards greater formal regional participation in the EU, the Treaty’s guarantees for regions fall short of the direct authority afforded to member states and thus seem to provide only a glimmer of hope to those still dreaming of a Europe of the Regions.

Beyond the Committee of the Regions, the nature and extent of formal regional participation in EU affairs remains largely in the hands of individual member states. Consistent with its high degree of regional autonomy, Belgium often sends both Flemish and Walloon representatives to the European Council, although they must advance Belgian (rather than regional) positions. By contrast, Spain and the United Kingdom have been more reluctant to allow representatives of their stateless nations to participate formally in the EU. One consequence of the general lack of regional participation is the potential for a disconnect between powers devolved to regions within their respective parent states and competency areas falling under the umbrella of the EU: a region might have authority over a particular issue at the domestic level but be unable to fully participate in EU policymaking concerning that issue.

Yet despite the foregoing constraints on formal participation, regions have created informal networks to advance their interests. For example, Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalist members of the European Parliament have joined with representatives of other stateless nations to form the European Free Alliance, which “gathers 40 progressive, nationalist, regionalist and autonomist parties throughout the European Union” and “focuses its activity on the promotion of the right of self-determination of peoples.” Moreover, Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia participate in the Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power (REGLEG), an informal network dedicated to increasing the role of legislative regions in EU affairs through “policy formation in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity.”

Regions also derive benefits from their status as regions. For

176. KEATING, supra note 6, at 156.
177. See id. at 155–57 (describing Spanish and British regions’ more limited formal participation in the EU).
example, they receive EU structural funds funneled through their parent states. In addition, regions fall within the ambit of the EU’s “rights regime,” which ensures cultural and linguistic protections for minority groups and provides a degree of formal recognition of minority cultures at the supranational level.

Perhaps most significantly, the EU provides stateless nations with opportunities to engage in “paradiplomacy.” Catalonia in particular has actively projected Catalan interests beyond the borders of the Spanish state by integrating itself into the broader European economy, promoting Catalan culture, and cultivating inter-regional links such as the “Four Motors of Europe,” a collaboration among Catalonia and the similarly wealthy regions of Baden-Württemburg (Germany), Rhône-Alpes (France), and Lombardy (Italy) designed to promote regional economic development. Catalonia has thus been described as a “region state” that manages to participate in European affairs, particularly economic affairs, despite remaining within Spain. The success of Catalan paradiplomacy may help to explain why, until recently, Catalan nationalism typically took the form of demands for increased autonomy rather than outright independence.

Flanders has likewise engaged in paradiplomacy beyond the borders of Belgium, often by promoting Flemish culture and courting international investment. Unlike Scotland or Catalonia, Flanders possesses the ability to enter into international agreements in those areas over which it has authority at the domestic level. The impact of successful paradiplomacy on nationalist discourse in Flanders—operating within a conspicuously weak Belgian state—is far different than in Catalonia. Whereas paradiplomacy has arguably tempered calls for Catalan independence, in Flanders it has lent support to the argument that the parent state is

181. Id. at 143–47.
185. Keating, supra note 6, at 156; see also Organization, Four Motors for Eur., http://4motors.eu/-Organization-.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (noting that Flanders is also associated with the Four Motors of Europe, although it is not a full member).
186. See Keating, supra note 6, at 156 (“Belgian regions and communities have full external competences corresponding to their internal competences, and this has led to a large presence abroad . . . .”).
irrelevant in the emerging supranational order. The perceived irrelevance of the Belgian state in an integrating Europe underlies Bart De Wever’s claims that Belgium is “doomed” and that Belgium’s breakup would be “barely noticed by anyone." In advancing such claims, Flemish nationalists often draw on the principle of subsidiarity to argue that authority should reside at the Flemish regional level, which already plays a more significant role in the lives of its citizens than does the diminished Belgian state. In this respect, paradiplomacy and subsidiarity dovetail with a belief (often also expressed by Scottish nationalists) that the EU makes independence more practical and desirable by over-representing small states in EU institutions and providing them with ready access to a common market.

The differing outcomes of Catalan and Flemish paradiplomacy reflect the contradictory influence of EU institutions on sub-state nationalism. On the one hand, formal and informal regional participation in these institutions can operate as an escape valve for nationalist pressures, thereby

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188. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Stares, *supra* note 5 (quoting an N-VA spokesman as saying that “democracy needs to be closer to the people, and that is why we are a regionalist party”); *Flemish Leader Says Belgium is Doomed*, supra note 187 (noting De Wever’s statement that the N-VA “believe[s] in subsidiarity” and his argument that “smaller countries are more efficient in decision-making and economic reform”). But for an overview of the subsidiarity principle that challenges the Flemish nationalist position, see Andrew Evans, *Regional Dimensions to European Governance*, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 21, 28–32 (2003). As Evans explains, while sub-state nationalist interpretations of subsidiarity have some support, there is equal or greater support for the narrower position that subsidiarity refers primarily to relationships between the EU and its member states. *Id.* Ultimately, according to Evans, “subsidiarity fails to secure the structural adaptation of Union law necessary for legal organisation of regionalism.” *Id.* at 31.
190. See *id.* at 44 (“As a full member of the European Union, Scotland would continue to have access to its markets. Independence would enhance the opportunities for Scotland’s wider international trade and investment, underpinned by foreign and fiscal policies dedicated to Scotland’s political, social and economic interests.”); Alex Salmon, *How Scotland Will Lead the World*, ECONOMIST: THE WORLD IN 2012, Nov. 17, 2011, at 106, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21536989 (arguing for the economic benefits of Scottish independence); *FAQ: Is Flanders Too Small to Be Able to Do It All Alone?*, NIEUW-VLAAMSE ALLIANTIE, http://international.n-va.be/en/about/faq#faq-fla-eur (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (“Only one country on the list of the top 10 most prosperous countries in the world has more inhabitants than Flanders: the U.S. Therefore, being small doesn’t have to be a problem, if people openly and effectively participate in globalisation. A country like Denmark, for example, has almost the same number of inhabitants as Flanders and is listed as number one in all European ranking systems.”).
lowering the demand for separation. On the other hand, by largely limiting direct participation in its affairs to member states, and by providing regions with opportunities to demonstrate that they can act on their own, the EU can encourage separatist aspirations. For any stateless nation contemplating the leap from sub-state region to sovereign state, however, a fundamental question remains: would it automatically obtain a place within the EU?

B. The Membership Question

The membership question has become the elephant in the room as sub-state nationalism has gained momentum in recent years. “Independence in Europe” arguments often take the European dimension for granted; sub-state nationalists simply assume either that their new states would automatically possess membership in the EU or, at the very least, that they would easily gain admission through an expedited and streamlined process.192 Thus, it was viewed as a major setback for sub-state nationalists when, during a September 2012 interview with the BBC and again in a December 2012 letter to the House of Lords, European Commission president José Manuel Barroso opined that a new state created by secession from an EU member state would have to apply for membership on its own, following the EU’s standard application procedure.193

Unfortunately for sub-state nationalists, Barroso’s position is supported by international law and the practice of international organizations. New states typically do not succeed to (i.e., automatically


inherit) the international treaty obligations of their former parent states, especially with regard to treaties governing membership in international organizations. Instead, international organizations usually require new states to accede to (i.e., separately obtain) membership. Although secession from an EU member state would be without precedent and the EU’s governing treaties are silent as to how such a situation should be handled, there are both legal and political reasons why it might adhere to the general requirement of accession.

At first glance, Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties suggests that a new state’s succession to the treaty obligations of its former parent state is automatic:

1. When a part or parts of a territory of a State separate to form one or more States, whether or not the predecessor state continues to exist:
   (a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State continues in force in respect of each successor state so formed.194

With respect to treaties governing membership in international organizations, however, the effect of Article 34 is limited by Article 4 of the Convention, which stipulates that the Convention applies “without prejudice to the rules concerning acquisition of membership and without prejudice to any other relevant rules of the organization.”195 In other words, the membership rules of a given international organization take precedence over the provisions of the Vienna Convention. As the UN General Assembly’s International Law Commission explained during the drafting of the Convention:

In many organizations, membership, other than original membership, is subject to a formal process of admission. Where this is so, practice appears now to have established the principle that a new State is not entitled automatically to become a party to the constituent treaty and a member of the organization as a successor State, simply by reason of the fact that at the date of the succession its territory was subject to the treaty and within the ambit of the organization.196

195. Id. art. 4.
Although the Vienna Convention does not represent customary international law,\(^\text{197}\) it does tend to reflect the approach of international organizations to membership issues arising from the creation of new states on the former territory of member states. The UN first confronted the question of treaty succession in 1947, when British India, an original member of the UN, achieved independence and immediately was partitioned into two separate states: India and Pakistan.\(^\text{198}\) After considerable debate, the UN concluded that India continued British India’s legal personality, including its membership in the UN, while Pakistan would be required to apply for UN membership as a new state.\(^\text{199}\) In reaching this conclusion, the UN’s Sixth (Legal) Committee established general guidelines for evaluating succession to UN membership:

1. That, as a general rule, it is in conformity with legal principles to presume that a State which is a Member of the Organization of the United Nations does not cease to be a Member simply because its Constitution or its frontier have been subjected to changes, and that the extinction of the State as a legal personality recognized in the international order must be shown before its rights and obligations can be considered thereby to have ceased to exist.
2. That when a new State is created, whatever may be the territory and populations which it comprises and whether or not they formed part of a State Member of the United Nations, it cannot under the system of the Charter claim that status of a Member of the United Nations unless it has been formally admitted as such in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.
3. Beyond that, each case must be judged according to its merits.\(^\text{200}\)

The overarching principle that the UN established in addressing the partition of India and Pakistan—that a member state retains its membership despite a loss of territory, while a new state established on the former territory of a member state must apply for membership on its own—has continued to guide the UN’s approach to membership issues arising from

\(^{197}\) See Status of Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, United Nations Treaty Collection, United Nations, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-2&chapter=23&lang=en (last updated Oct. 11, 2013, 08:30 EDT) (indicating that the Vienna Convention has been ratified by only 22 states and, moreover, that Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom have not ratified the Convention).


\(^{199}\) Id. at 34–35.

changes to the territorial composition of its member states. Other international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have adopted similar approaches.

Like the UN Charter, the EU’s governing treaties do not contain any provisions for dealing with secession or the membership issues it raises. Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that the EU would follow the UN’s approach. Like most international organizations, the EU may be viewed as a voluntary association of like-minded states with a fundamental interest in maintaining control over its membership. In other words, “membership of any international organization has as its essence a willingness to co-operate in the furtherance of schemes of international solidarity. Such a willingness cannot be assumed on the part of a new State whose territory falls within the ambit of these schemes.” Indeed, as noted above, EU membership is limited to states that meet certain criteria and that are admitted through a unanimous vote. To allow for automatic treaty succession would be to allow a new state to make an end run around the EU’s membership rules. Moreover, the EU’s governing treaties allocate representation in EU institutions and access to structural funds proportionally among the member states, and these treaties must therefore be amended each time a new state is admitted.

EU member states’ responses to Kosovo’s declaration of independence suggest that, if secessionist states do not automatically succeed to EU membership, obtaining the necessary unanimous vote for accession would be fraught with political complications. Five EU member states faced with separatist movements of their own—Spain, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia, and Greece—refused to recognize Kosovo as an independent state, lest doing so set a precedent for their own dismemberment. These states (not to mention Belgium or the United


202. Id. at 25–26.


205. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.

206. Thorp & Thompson, supra note 203, at 4–5.

Kingdom) might withhold the votes necessary for accession. At the very least, the EU’s member states could make secession painful by holding up the membership applications of seceding states or by admitting them on less generous terms (e.g., limiting their access to structural funds) than they currently enjoy as sub-state regions.208

Secession would further require the EU to address issues pertaining to continuity and extinction. As the UN’s response to the partition of India and the Sixth Committee’s subsequent guidelines demonstrate, the threshold question for evaluating membership issues is whether, following secession, the predecessor state continues to exist. International law generally presumes the continued existence of states, even when those states experience losses of territory or population; the extinction of states is relatively rare.209

Michael P. Scharf has identified six factors that the international community has considered when determining whether a state has dissolved or whether a potential successor territory has inherited its legal personality: “whether the potential successor has: (a) a substantial majority of the former [state’s] territory (including the historic territorial hub), (b) a majority of its population, (c) a majority of its resources, (d) a majority of its armed forces, (e) the seat of government and control of most central government institutions, and (f) entered into a devolution agreement [i.e., an agreement on continuation of legal personality] . . . with the other components of the former State.”210 Where an established state experiences an instance of secession but nonetheless continues to satisfy most or all of the six factors, it is deemed to continue the predecessor state’s legal personality: its sovereign reach is compromised but its legal existence is unaffected. Thus, for example, the UN deemed India (following the partition of Pakistan) and Russia (following the independence of numerous former Soviet republics) to have inherited the legal personalities of British India and the Soviet Union, respectively.211 By contrast, if following an instance of secession there is no potential successor that can demonstrate continuity with the predecessor state, then the international community may conclude that the predecessor state is extinct. The most recent example of such involuntary state extinction was the dissolution of Yugoslavia following the violent breakaway of most of its constituent

208. See Happold, supra note 201, at 33–34 (speculating on the terms of Scotland’s admission to the EU).
209. See CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 716 (listing the small number of states that ceased to exist between 1945 and 2005).
211. Id. at 33–41, 43–52, 68.
republics in the early 1990s. Questions concerning continuity or extinction would be most easily answered in the cases of Scotland and Catalonia. Owing to Scotland’s relatively small size, population, and proportion of Britain’s economic wealth, the rump United Kingdom would almost certainly continue its legal personality following Scottish independence, including its membership in the EU. An independent Scotland would thus be considered a new state with respect to the EU treaties and would be required to apply for admission on its own. A similar analysis may be applied to Catalonia, which, while a significant component of the Spanish state, comprises only a fraction of Spain’s population, territory, and economy, and lies beyond Spain’s historic territorial hub and seat of government. In the Scottish and Catalan cases, then, secession would result in the creation of new states without breaking the continuity of the predecessor states. Still, the diminished British and Spanish states would face a reduction of their representation in EU bodies, which would require amendments to EU treaties even before the issue of membership for the new Scottish and Catalan states was addressed.

Belgium is more complicated. There, straightforward application of Scharf’s six factors would lead to an anomalous result: Flanders comprises the majority of Belgium’s territory and population and controls the lion’s share of its economic wealth, and it would thus be the most obvious candidate to inherit Belgium’s legal personality. To allow for this outcome, however, would be to transform Flemish secession into a situation where Flanders had, in effect, kicked Wallonia out of the Belgian state.

The future of the Belgian state would undoubtedly be addressed as

212. Id. at 52–65. The international community’s determination that the Yugoslav state had dissolved was deeply controversial. Until 2000, Serbia and Montenegro laid claim to Yugoslavia’s legal personality and its seat at the UN. CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 707–08. Several factors supported Serbia and Montenegro’s claim of continuity, including its possession of a large proportion (though not the majority) of the former Yugoslavia’s territory and population, its capital (Belgrade), and most of its central government institutions and armed forces. Scharf, supra note 198, at 53–54. Undoubtedly, the international community’s rejection of Serbia and Montenegro’s claim was based in large part on Serbia’s perceived role in fomenting the violence associated with the breakup of Yugoslavia.

In the end—or rather, very soon after the beginning [of the wars in the former Yugoslavia]—a position had to be taken as to whether one of the six republics [i.e., Serbia] was not, under the guise of the federal State, waging through the national army and various surrogates in the other Republics an irredentist war. If so . . . it should not be given the moral and legal advantage which would flow from being able to characterize the conflict as civil and its own position as metropolitan.

CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 714.

213. Happold, supra note 201, at 28.
part of the negotiations leading to Flemish secession. The obvious precedent is the “velvet divorce” that dissolved Czechoslovakia and created separate Czech and Slovak states in 1993. The Czech Republic could have made a convincing claim to be the successor to the Czechoslovak state given that it possessed the majority of the former state’s territory, population, and resources. Instead, the agreement between the Czech Republic and Slovakia stipulated that, as of December 31, 1992, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. Pursuant to the agreement, neither of the new states laid claim to the predecessor state’s legal personality but instead established their own legal personalities (e.g., through applying separately for membership in international organizations, such as the UN).

Observers have frequently suggested that Belgium might be headed towards its own “velvet divorce.” The critical complication, however—which had no corollary in the Czechoslovak case—is Brussels. Flemish nationalists envision Brussels as a part of any future Flemish state. But many Walloons—not to mention many francophones in Brussels itself—argue that in the event of Flemish secession, Brussels should be joined to Wallonia. This might involve incorporation not only of Brussels proper but also of some francophone suburbs or a corridor of territory between Brussels and the Walloon border. In such circumstances, Wallonia could make a more credible case that it represents

214. Scharf, supra note 198, at 65 & n.191.
215. Id. at 65. Notably, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was effectuated through legislation negotiated by political leaders and without any popular referendum. Crawf ord, supra note 93, at 706. In fact, it would appear that at the time of dissolution, a majority of Czechoslovakians opposed the breakup of their state. Salvatore Massa, Note, Secession by Mutual Assent: A Comparative Analysis of the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the Separatist Movement in Canada, 14 Wis. Int’l L.J. 183, 191–92 (1995).
216. Scharf, supra note 198, at 65–67. At first, the Czech Republic and Slovakia attempted to divide Czechoslovakia’s seats in various UN subsidiary bodies between themselves, but the UN rejected this approach. Id.
218. See FAQ: What Will Happen to Brussels If Flanders Becomes Independent?, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, http://international.n-va.be/en/about/faq (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (“Brussels therefore remains an extremely important city for Flanders, even if far fewer Flemings are living there now. The N-VA therefore definitely does not want to let it go.”).
220. See id. (suggesting that the majority French-speaking areas around Brussels could be joined to Wallonia to allow Brussels and Wallonia to become contiguous).
the continuation of the Belgian state. Under a third scenario, Brussels would become an autonomous capital district—in effect, the EU’s version of Washington, D.C. While this latter scenario might solve continuity and extinction issues (the international community would almost certainly consider Belgium dissolved), it would nonetheless present a different headache for the EU: the loss of one member state and two new states (or perhaps three, depending on the status of the Brussels capital district within the EU) seeking admission.

For obvious reasons, the EU is unlikely to endorse any scenario that leaves its capital outside of the EU. Indeed, although international law, the practice of international organizations, and the EU’s membership rules suggest that secessionist states would be required to accede to membership, there are also legal and practical reasons for engaging in “internal enlargement” on more streamlined terms. These reasons highlight the fundamental difference between the EU and typical international organizations: unlike, for example, the UN, the EU operates in some respects like a federal state. Thus, the people of Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia possess rights as EU citizens, and requiring accession would involve stripping them of citizenship pending readmission. Moreover,

221. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 174 & n.122. But see Van Parijs, supra note 219 (arguing that a Brussels city-state would possess “the status of an EU member state, with all the corresponding rights and obligations, and thus would be in no way comparable to Washington DC”).

222. In yet another possible scenario, Wallonia might forego independent statehood and instead seek to unite with France. See Leo Cendrowitz, No Love Lost: Is Belgium About to Break in Two?, TIME, June 30, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2000517,00.html (“In Wallonia, polls have suggested voters would seek to join France if the country was divided (on the other side of the border, polls show the French would gladly accept them.”). In that case, Wallonia might automatically remain within the EU in much the same way that East Germany became part of the European Community (EC) when it united with West Germany, an EC member. See Happold, supra note 201, at 33.

223. The EU’s position with respect to Brussels is similar to the UN’s position with respect to the Soviet Union’s seat on the UN Security Council. Had the UN concluded that the Soviet Union dissolved and that no successor state existed, it would have left open a Security Council seat. Scharf, supra note 198, at 47. The UN’s desire to avoid this outcome undoubtedly influenced its decision to recognize Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union’s legal personality and thus as the heir to its seat on the Security Council. See id. at 47–49 (describing the other permanent members’ desire not to encourage further expansion or reform of the Security Council).

224. See Jordi Matas Dalmas et al., Centre Maurits Coppieters, The Internal Enlargement of the European Union: Analysis of the Legal and Political Consequences for the European Union in the Case of a Member State’s Secession or Dissolution 25–28 (2011), available at http://www.ideasforeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/The-internal-enlargement-of-the-EU-Final.pdf (identifying EU citizenship as a cornerstone of the EU’s “system of constitutional and democratic values” and thus as a reason for supporting the “internal enlargement” of the EU in the event of secession); see also Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm in International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447, 469 (1993) (“The creation of a ‘citizenship of the Union’ as provided in the Maastricht Treaty gives legal expression to broader
EU law is already applicable in Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia, and Flanders and Catalonia fall within both the eurozone, which provides for the use of a common currency, and the terms of the Schengen Agreement, which eliminated border controls between most EU member states. To disentangle these stateless nations from the EU system would be highly problematic and arguably not worth the effort, especially since they would almost certainly qualify for membership as independent states. While putting them to the back of the membership queue might conform with the letter of the law and satisfy the punitive impulses of EU member states threatened by their own secessionist movements, it might also be an unnecessary adherence to form over function.

In the end, how the EU answers the membership question—whether it is guided strictly by the law or by a desire for political compromise—may depend on the nature of the EU that these new states are seeking to join. Here, the eurozone crisis and its potential long-term effects on European integration come into play.

C. The Eurozone Crisis

As a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Community (the forerunner of the EU), the site of the EU’s de facto capital, and a wealthy multinational state in the heart of Europe, Belgium may be viewed as emblematic of the goals of European integration. Thus, when set against the backdrop of the eurozone crisis, Belgium’s recent political woes have raised troubling questions concerning the future of Europe. According to the Economist:

The two crises have parallels: for both Belgium and the single currency, breaking up is no longer unthinkable. Indeed, Belgium might be seen as a microcosm of the EU, with a wealthy, Germanic north fed up with subsidising a poorer, Latin south. If prosperous little Belgium cannot resolve its internal rivalries, say many, what chance for the EU?227


Similar parallels can be drawn between the EU and Spain, where Catalans seek independence in part to end what they view as onerous economic ties to a poorer parent state.\footnote{228}{See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.}

The eurozone crisis is not the sole, or even primary, explanation for the recent rise of sub-state nationalism. Nationalist movements existed in Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia long before the current economic downturn and, indeed, before the process of European integration even began.\footnote{229}{See supra Part II.} Still, the eurozone crisis and sub-state nationalism are linked in at least three important respects.

First, the eurozone crisis has affected the degree of support for separation. Here, Catalonia and Scotland offer contrasting examples. In Catalonia, the eurozone crisis has been a boon to the nationalist cause. Spain’s increasingly uncertain position within the eurozone, and the squabbles among the Spanish government and its regions over how to revive Spain’s crippled economy, have laid bare the longstanding fiscal tensions between Madrid and Barcelona.\footnote{230}{See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.} Catalan nationalists have capitalized on the eurozone crisis by arguing that a Catalonia freed from the shackles of the Spanish economy would take its place among the wealthier and more stable states of the European “north.”\footnote{231}{See, e.g., Ortiz & Toyer, supra note 1 (“Mas has managed to deflect fury over his region’s economic problems onto the central government, saying if the tax system were set up differently Catalonia would not be in its quagmire.”).}

Two political science explanations of separatist nationalism shed light on Catalan nationalists’ response to the eurozone crisis. First, historical fluctuations in support for Catalan nationalism may be characterized as the reaction of Catalan institutions to threats to their autonomy emanating from Madrid.\footnote{232}{GREER, supra note 44, at 119–26 (describing Catalan institutions’ backlash against the centralizing policies of the Spanish state during the 1980s).} When the Spanish state seeks to rein in these institutions by implementing centralizing policies—as it has done during the eurozone crisis by imposing austerity measures on the regions and by refusing Catalonia’s demand for a new tax distribution arrangement—the result is an uptick in nationalist sentiment.\footnote{233}{See id. at 182–83 (arguing that “the possibility of a near-existent threat to regional organizations’ autonomy and environmental stability” might increase support for secession); see also Belgium’s Political Impasses, ECONOMIST, July 21, 2011, at 52, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18988904.}
Second, the recent rise of separatist nationalism in Catalonia may be explained in terms of Donald L. Horowitz’s theories concerning the logic of secessionist politics in economically advanced regions. Horowitz observes that advanced regions may consider breaking with their more backward parent states in order to retain control of their revenues and avoid subsidizing poorer regions. Yet he also argues that these potential benefits of secession are often trumped by the benefits that inure to advanced regions that remain within their parent states: namely, the abilities to export surplus capital outside of the region, to take advantage of domestic markets for manufactured goods, and to allow residents of the advanced region to move freely throughout the parent state in search of further economic opportunities. Under ordinary circumstances, secession would result in the loss of such benefits. The EU, however, changes the calculus for advanced regions such as Catalonia: following independence, if EU membership were secured, Catalans would still enjoy access both to Spanish markets and the markets of other EU member states. Thus, the EU may be viewed as eliminating an important brake on the separatist aspirations of economically advanced regions. To be sure, Catalan nationalist arguments concerning the economic benefits of secession may be overstated: there is a distinct possibility that an independent Catalonia would go from being Spain’s Germany to a member of the EU’s poorer “south.” Still, the prospect of economic independence from a crisis-wracked Spain has played a major role in increasing support for Catalan nationalism.

In Scotland, the eurozone crisis has had the opposite effect on nationalist support: the continent’s economic uncertainty has highlighted the potential pitfalls of independence. Whereas Catalonia is Spain’s economic powerhouse, Scotland plays a more marginal role in the United Kingdom’s economy and is more dependent on subsidies from the central government. Prior to the eurozone crisis, in the midst of the economic

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Ortiz & Toyer, supra note 1 (“Many Catalans are suspicious of what they see as the centralizing aims of the People’s Party.”).

234. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 249–54 (2d ed. 2000).

235. See id. at 250–53 (arguing that “[m]ost of the time, the lure of interests and opportunities throughout the undivided state is enough to ward off the possibility” of secession).


boom of the early 2000s, the SNP was able to argue that an independent Scotland would join an “arc of prosperity” consisting of smaller states, such as Ireland and Iceland, whose economies were experiencing astounding growth. 238 Such arguments are less tenable in the face of the economic downturn, which caused the Irish and Icelandic economies, among others, to collapse. 239 The Financial Times, for one, has argued that the key role played by central governments in weathering the eurozone crisis gives lie to the claim that smaller states are better positioned than larger ones to withstand fluctuations in the global economy. 240

Furthermore, the decreased confidence in the euro complicates calls for Scottish independence. Pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty, EU member states are generally required to adopt the euro as their currency. 241 The United Kingdom, however, is exempt from this rule, and continues to use the pound sterling. 242 Despite arguments by Scottish nationalists to the contrary, 243 it is doubtful that the United Kingdom’s exemption from the eurozone would apply to an independent Scotland, especially given that following secession the rump United Kingdom would retain its legal personality, whereas Scotland would be viewed as a new state. 244 An independent Scotland in the EU might thus be required to adopt the euro at a time when doing so is less than desirable.

The second link between the eurozone crisis and sub-state nationalism concerns broader questions of state sovereignty and the future course of European integration. The economic downturn has precipitated the emergence of two opposing viewpoints regarding sovereignty within the EU. The pro-sovereignty view regards the eurozone crisis as emblematic

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241. THORP & THOMSON, supra note 203, at 9.

242. See id. (“The UK and Denmark currently have a special status which allows them to decide when (and if) they wish to adopt the euro as their currency.”).


244. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
of fundamental flaws in the idea of European integration and a reason for states to reassert their sovereign prerogatives. Proponents of this position have advocated the breakup of the EU or, in the alternative, the creation of a smaller common currency zone consisting only of the wealthier states of northern Europe.245 This view of the crisis is evident in Germany’s initial reluctance to bail out the poorer states of the eurozone and the German Constitutional Court’s assumption of authority over the question of whether to engage in a bailout,246 as well as in calls from many British “Euroskeptics” for the United Kingdom to leave the EU altogether.247 It is also evident in the resentment of poorer states, such as Greece, towards the austerity measures imposed by Brussels and Berlin.248

Conversely, the eurozone crisis has bolstered calls for the establishment of a more fully integrated Europe. This pro-integration position is premised on the belief that the eurozone crisis demonstrates the impracticality of sustaining an economic union in the absence of a political union.249 Taken to its logical conclusion, this process could lead to the


246. See Green Light for ESM: German High Court OKs Permanent Bailout Fund with Reservations, Spiegel Online International, SPEIGEL ONLINE (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-high-court-oks-permanent-bailout-fund-with-reservations-a-855338.html (reporting on the German Federal Constitutional Court’s rejection of a petition to prevent ratification of the permanent euro bailout fund, but only with the understanding that any increase in Germany’s contribution to the fund would require German approval).


249. See Steven Hill, What Will a United States of Europe Look Like?, GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 2012, 09:00 EDT, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/mar/21/united-states-europe-transfer-union (arguing that “there seems little doubt that some sort of United States of Europe is slowly emerging” and that “[t]he only way forward is some kind of transfer union and some central bank or financial authority that has the mandate as well as the capacity to guarantee the debt of member states”).
“United States of Europe” that many proponents of European integration have long sought.250

The outcome of this debate will have important ramifications for sub-state nationalists. The breakup or substantial modification of the EU would impede nationalist goals as presently stated. The primacy of sovereignty and territorial integrity would be reasserted, and Europe would revert to a political structure more closely resembling the Westphalian system that underlies international law’s approach to self-determination and secession. The foundations of the “Independence in Europe” argument would therefore be weakened—although, by prioritizing statehood, this process could produce even greater demands for secession. On the other hand, a Europe that functions politically as a closer union might offer greater opportunities for Europe’s stateless nations. Admittedly, there are practical limits on these opportunities: a Europe consisting of dozens upon dozens of small states might prove unworkable, and “independence” within this system might bear almost no resemblance to sovereign statehood as traditionally understood. Indeed, some nationalists might even conclude that formal independence within a fully integrated Europe is unnecessary. Nonetheless, it would appear that “Independence in Europe” is a more realistic possibility within a stronger EU.

Lurking in the background of the debates over sovereignty and European integration is the third link between sub-state nationalism and the eurozone crisis: the destructive potential of the political mobilization of national identity. In many respects, the modern map of Europe is the product of unchecked nationalism.251 The project of European integration owes as much, if not more, to the desire to cabin nationalist disputes as it does to the perceived benefits of a common economic market.252 Nationalism, in the prevailing view, represents a threat to the relative peace that Europe has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War.253

250. Id.; see also Viviane Reding, Vice-President, European Comm’n, Speech to the Center for European Law at the University of Passau: Why We Need a United States of Europe Now (Nov. 8, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-796_en.htm (arguing that European political unification is the solution to the European economic crisis).

251. See, e.g., MACMILLAN, supra note 98, at 109–270 (describing the nationalist disputes at the heart of the Versailles peace conference following the First World War and the ways in which those disputes were—or more often were not—resolved).


253. See Coppieters, supra note 162, at 247 (“The EU condemns exclusive types of nationalism as
The eurozone crisis has spawned a resurgence of right-wing ultranationalist movements throughout the continent. These movements are frequently xenophobic, violent, and suspicious of (if not hostile towards) integrationist policies that infringe on state sovereignty. In many respects, then, they have little in common with Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalism. The nationalist movements in Scotland and Catalonia are typically characterized as “civic” and inclusive, resting on shared geography, institutions, and civil societies rather than on exclusivist notions of ethnic identity. Likewise, the N-VA is often viewed as departing from the extremist ethnic politics that previously dominated Flemish nationalism. And in all three of these stateless nations, nationalism goes hand-in-hand with a commitment to European integration.

Yet the success of Flemish, Scottish, or Catalan nationalism could embolden more divisive nationalist forces elsewhere. The Dutch journalist Ian Buruma expressed this concern prior to the onset of the eurozone crisis. Writing in the midst of Belgium’s 2007 political gridlock, Buruma argued that “[t]he fate of Belgium should interest all Europeans, especially those morally retrograde and conducive to conflict.”


255. See GREER, supra note 44, at 183 (“Scotland and Catalonia are also often cited as admirable exponents of civic nationalism, of inclusive, diverse national communities free of ethnic exclusivism and based on healthy civil societies, and the regional settlements in these two countries are widely admired as models of ethnic conflict regulation.”).

256. Flemish nationalism was long tarnished by collaboration with the Nazi occupation during the Second World War. See Jan Craeybeckx, From the Great Depression to the Second World War, in POLITICAL HISTORY OF BELGIUM FROM 1830 ONWARDS 183, 201–08 (Els Witte et al. eds., 2009). Prior to the recent success of the N-VA, the standard-bearer for Flemish nationalism was the Vlaams Belang (formerly the Vlaams Blok), which espouses far-right, anti-immigrant policies. LAIBLE, supra note 6, at 55–56. The N-VA has made strides in distancing itself from the more sordid aspects of Flemish nationalism’s past. See Buruma, supra note 66, at 38 (“Because Bart De Wever and his party pointedly avoid the xenophobic rhetoric that’s customary among right-wing populists, they have helped make Flemish nationalism respectable again, and his electoral gains in Flanders have come, in part, at the expense of the Vlaams Belang.”).
who wish the European Union well. For what is happening in Belgium now could end up happening on a continental scale.” Buruma warned that the process of supranational integration that had weakened the authority of the Belgian state and provided fertile ground for Flemish nationalism might also promote similar rifts elsewhere in Europe, with disastrous consequences: “We know what happened when the twin pulls of blood and soil determined European politics before. Without having intended it, the EU now seems to be encouraging the very forces that postwar European unity was designed to contain.” Buruma’s warnings are particularly relevant now, at a time when many Europeans are falling back on national pride in the face of global economic uncertainty.

It is thus impossible to consider the future prospects for sub-state nationalism without also considering the future of the EU. The outcome of the eurozone crisis will help to determine whether the nationalist projects in places like Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia succeed in establishing new states, reach some other form of accommodation with their parent states, or fail entirely to remake the political map of Europe.

IV. SEPARATISM IN THE MIDST OF INTEGRATION

Writing at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, Christoph Schreuer observed that

Contemporary international law presupposes [a] structure of co-equal sovereign States. The international community’s constitutive set-up is dominated by it. The classical sources of international law depend on the interaction of States in the form of treaties and customary law. Diplomatic relations are conducted between States. Official arenas, like international organizations and international courts, are largely reserved to States. The protection of individual rights still depends mostly on diplomatic protection through state representatives. Central concepts of international law, like sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, self-defence or permanent sovereignty over natural resources all rely on the exclusive or dominant role of the State.

Of course, the world order that Schreuer described has always been somewhat of a fiction. Some states are more sovereign than others: by virtue of their size and strength, they are capable of acting with few impediments on the world stage, whereas smaller and weaker states often

258. Id.
259. Schreuer, supra note 224, at 448.
find their exercise of sovereignty constrained. Even within their own borders, the capacity of states to assert effective control over their territories and populations varies widely. Moreover, non-state actors have long participated in international affairs and have been recognized as subjects of international law.

Nonetheless, sovereign, co-equal states remain at the core of the international system. Perhaps nowhere is the primacy of statehood more apparent than in international law’s conception of the right to self-determination and its attitude towards secession. Susanna Mancini has described secession as “at once the most revolutionary and the most institutionally conservative of political constructs. Its revolutionary character lies in its ultimate challenge to state sovereignty; its conservative side, in the reinforcement of the virtues of the latter.”

International law has served to blunt the revolutionary potential of self-determination and reinforce the status quo by, in most cases, upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing states.

For Schreuer, the process of European integration held out the possibility of a fundamental shift away from the state-centric system towards a post-sovereignty era. And to be sure, the growth of the EU has altered the nature of statehood in Europe: from trade to the environment, from immigration to external security, the EU now exercises authority in many areas traditionally reserved to states. Yet at the same time, states remain the primary actors in the continent’s political system. “Westphalia is dead . . . . Long live Westphalia.”

The nationalist movements in Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia sit on the borderline between a state-centric international system and an integrating continent. In its broad contours, the objective of these

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262. See Jordan J. Paust, *Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion*, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 977, 994 (2011) (“It is irrefutable that traditional international law, even through the early twentieth century, recognized roles, rights, and duties of nations, tribes, peoples, belligerents, and other entities and communities in addition to the state, even though their roles were at times uneven, shifting, complex, and misperceived.”).
264. See supra Part II.A.
265. See generally Schreuer, supra note 224.
266. PINDER & USHERWOOD, supra note 163, at 104, 114–17, 141–44.
nationalist movements mirrors the objective of nationalists throughout history: the attainment of sovereign statehood. Yet upon closer inspection, it is clear that they reflect the realities of the supranational order in which they find themselves. As Stephen Tierney explains, “it is simplistic to caricature [the sub-state nationalist phenomenon] as a last desperate attempt to leap aboard the sinking ship of statehood, just as this vessel disappears beneath the waves of globalization.” \(^{268}\) Insofar as Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalists seek statehood, they do so fully aware of—and, indeed, supportive of—the limits on sovereignty imposed by the EU. By, for example, engaging in paradiplomacy and seeking to secure domestic autonomy, these nationalist movements attempt to carve out a unique space within the European supranational system and the constitutional orders of their parent states. \(^{269}\) Consequently, they invite a rethinking of the content and parameters of statehood and sovereignty.

How should the international community approach the challenges posed by sub-state nationalism? Tierney, for one, has identified the predominant state-centric paradigm of international law as a hindrance to the formal acceptance of the realities of an international system in which sovereignty is increasingly dispersed both within and beyond state borders. \(^{270}\) Given the continued primacy of statehood in the international system, however, it is unlikely that international law will undergo a fundamental shift in its approaches to statehood, self-determination, or secession anytime in the near future.

Nonetheless, there are at least three steps that the EU and its member states could take to engage constructively with sub-state nationalism. First, consistent with the Canadian Supreme Court’s advisory opinion on Quebec, \(^{271}\) states faced with separatist movements should consider allowing for referendums to gauge support for separation. There is no reason why the democratic principles that guided the Canadian Supreme Court’s framework for negotiated secession should not apply with equal force in democracies like Spain, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. Britain’s response to Scottish nationalism has already started down this path, with the British state allowing for a referendum despite its strong opposition to

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269. Id. at 168–75.

270. See id. at 170 (“In fact it is in many respects international law rather than the constitutional order of their own States which has held back radical approaches to shared sovereignty within particular multinational States.”).

271. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
Scottish independence.272 Spain should consider following suit in the event that Catalan nationalists continue to seek a plebiscite to determine their future relationship with the Spanish state.

Where independence referendums might diverge from the Canadian Supreme Court’s opinion, however, is on the issue of how referendum questions should be framed. To be sure, referendum questions must be written with clarity to ensure that voters understand the choice that is being presented to them. But that choice need not be limited to either outright independence or continued inclusion in the state.273 Rather, a question that allows for some political arrangement short of full independence would better reflect the extent to which political authority is already dispersed within states. “Devolution max” will not be on the ballot when Scottish voters go to the polls.274 Yet the increased autonomy envisioned by that proposal might have been sufficient to satisfy many Scottish nationalists. By taking the option off the table and making the referendum an all-or-nothing affair, the British government is running the risk that many Scottish voters might instead opt for independence.

Second, the EU should consider expanding the formal opportunities for sub-state regions to participate in EU policymaking. For example, the EU could elevate the Committee of the Regions to what amounts to a fourth branch of government, on par with the Commission, Council, and Parliament. It could also require (rather than simply condone) the participation of regional ministers in EU policymaking that touches on areas of regional competency. Strengthening the role of the regions at the supranational level would be consistent with the important role that regions already play within many EU member states. It would also be consistent with a broad interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity275 and might make sense if the EU emerges from the eurozone crisis with a firmer commitment to integration.276 To be sure, there is always the possibility that expanding the role of the regions at the EU level could increase support for separation. But it could also reduce separatist tensions by making statehood less of a prerequisite for formal participation in the European project.

Third, the EU should clarify its position on how it would deal with secession from a member state. Because each instance of secession would

273. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text.
raise its own unique issues, it is impossible for the EU to set out in detail all of the possible consequences of separation. But the broad question—whether a new state would automatically succeed to membership, whether it could negotiate membership on more streamlined terms, or whether it would be required to accede to membership through the EU’s normal application procedures—is one that the EU should be in a position to answer. Given the significance of the EU to the ways in which sub-state nationalists define their interests and identities, all of the parties to these separatist disputes would benefit from greater clarity concerning the future that awaits a secessionist state. It would, in short, go a long way towards shaping what Bruno Coppieters has termed “a strategic European culture with respect to secession.”

The purpose of these three steps would not be to make secession easier or more likely. Rather, they would acknowledge the fact that “[i]n the case of EU member states or prospective member states, the EU will be perceived as a potential institutional framework within which conflict transformation and resolution may take place.” Indeed, the end result may very well be to dampen support for secession. As Susanna Mancini has argued, “demonizing secession, turning it into a constitutional taboo, often adds fuel to secessionist claims. On the other hand, if secession is constructed as one among the many rights and options offered to a state’s subnational groups, chances are that it will lose much of its appeal.”

If stateless nations perceive that “Independence in Europe” is a possibility, it may free them to redirect their agendas away from separatism towards other forms of accommodation within both their parent states and the EU.

Furthermore, the way in which the EU addresses self-determination claims could have important ramifications beyond Europe. To be sure, the EU’s level of supranational integration is without parallel in other parts of the world. Moreover, the peaceful and democratic nature of Western Europe’s separatist disputes—the lack, as one journalist quipped, of “Wallonian death squads roaming the Flemish countryside”—is at odds

277. See supra Part III.B.

278. For a sense of the level of confusion among EU member states on this issue, see Glenn Campbell, Scottish Independence: Scotland and EU Membership, BBC News, BBC.COM (Feb. 27, 2013, 19:11 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21602456 (summarizing the varied responses of member states to the question of how the EU would handle Scottish independence).

279. Coppieters, supra note 162, at 254–56.

280. Id. at 256.

281. Mancini, supra note 263, at 482.

with the circumstances prevailing in the many states where separatist conflicts fuel violence and political instability. There would appear to be less at stake in Scotland or Catalonia than in Kashmir or Kurdistan. But the environment in which Western Europe’s separatist disputes play out offers a stable space in which to attempt unique solutions to self-determination claims that might have value elsewhere. These solutions need not reflect the state/non-state duality inherent in current conceptions of the right to self-determination, but rather could be built on more nuanced interpretations of statehood and sovereignty. As Nico Krisch has observed, “[i]nternational law doesn’t have much on offer, but the EU might be the place to invent intermediate forms.”

CONCLUSION

So will they stay or will they go? That question will begin to be answered in the autumn of 2014, when the people of Scotland go to the polls to decide their political future. It would be foolhardy to predict the outcome of Scotland’s referendum or to speculate on whether Catalans will follow through on their demands for “Independence Now!” or whether Bart De Wever will ultimately succeed in snuffing out Belgium “like a candle.” There are an abundance of reasons why they might stay, such as the high degree of autonomy that they already possess at home, the extent to which the EU allows them to operate both formally and informally abroad, and the uncertainty of their position vis-à-vis the EU if they were to secede. But the lure of independence within a supranational Europe might yet convince them to go.

What can be predicted, however—and what this article has sought to explain—is that the EU will play a leading role in determining the outcome of Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalist claims. The right to self-determination as currently understood in international law provides little in the way of guidance for addressing separatist claims in Europe’s stateless nations or, for that matter, in other parts of the world. In many respects, self-determination has become “a principle without a purpose—a right bereft of potential beneficiaries.” In Europe, however, self-determination claims will increasingly be dealt with through the institutions of the EU, as part of the ongoing push and pull among the EU, its member

284. Ortiz & Toyer, supra note 1.
286. Simpson, supra note 111, at 259.
states, and sub-state regions. Whether this results in “Independence in Europe” or some form of accommodation short of secession remains to be seen.