Text, History, and Tradition:  
What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second

ABSTRACT. In District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court made seemingly irreconcilable demands on lower courts: evaluate Second Amendment claims through history, avoid balancing, and retain as much regulation as possible. To date, lower courts have been unable to devise a test that satisfies all three of these conditions. Worse, the emerging default candidate, intermediate scrutiny, is a test that many jurists and scholars consider exceedingly manipulable.

This Article argues that courts could look to the Supreme Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, and in particular the Seventh Amendment’s “historical test,” to help them devise a test for the Second. The historical test relies primarily on analogical reasoning from text, history, and tradition to determine the constitutionality of any given practice or regulation. Yet the historical test is supple enough to respond to the demands of a twenty-first-century judicial system. As such, it provides valuable insights, but also its own set of problems, for those judges and scholars struggling to implement the right to keep and bear arms.

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CONCLUSION
In *District of Columbia v. Heller*, and its sequel, *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, the Court posed a riddle. The riddle can be restated like this:

What test adheres to the Second Amendment’s past, rejects balancing that right against present government interests, and preserves all but the most draconian regulations for the future?

The Court’s nascent Second Amendment jurisprudence is a riddle because while the Court demands the most scrupulous investigation of history and a near-blanket prohibition on balancing, it also states that a number of modern regulations are “presumptively lawful” despite their dubious historical provenance or their interest-balancing origins.

The Court’s challenge has left many judges frustrated because, as discussed in more detail below, the Court’s demands appear to be facially irreconcilable. Some judges have answered by mechanically citing broad dicta in *Heller* and *McDonald* concerning these “presumptively lawful” regulations, rather than conducting the historical inquiry the Court ostensibly demands. Other judges have simply ignored the Court’s rejection of balancing tests. Instead, they have allowed the right to keep and bear arms to be gobbled up by intermediate scrutiny or similar tests that weigh serious, important, or compelling government interests against Second Amendment commands.

This Article argues that these lower court efforts to fashion a test simply cannot be squared with the Court’s insistence on historical fidelity, its rejection of balancing, and the preservation of most reasonable firearm regulations. It assumes that the Court is serious when it instructs lower courts to avoid tests that call for any balancing at all, even if that means, as some lower court judges have said, eliminating the traditional levels-of-scrutiny analysis in Second

1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home).
2. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause).
4. See id. (identifying certain “longstanding prohibitions” as examples in a nonexhaustive list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures”); see also *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (stating that the Court’s holdings in both *Heller* and *McDonald* “[do] not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, ‘laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms’” (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626–27)); infra Section I.A.
5. See infra Section I.B.
Amendment cases. It suggests that one way of reexamining the riddle is to refer to the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury, one of the most historically determined of constitutional provisions.

The Seventh Amendment requires that federal courts “preserve[]” a preexisting right to a jury in suits at common law. In much the same way, the Court has stated that the Second Amendment preserves a “pre-existing” right to keep and bear arms for the core purpose of self-defense. Simultaneously, the Seventh Amendment does not operate with traditional levels of scrutiny or open-ended balancing; and yet, the “preserved” right to a trial by jury does not require that every detail of 1791 common law be transposed to the twenty-first century.

Instead of levels of scrutiny or balancing, the Court has devised a “historical test” for the Seventh Amendment. The Court’s historical test places great, but not exclusive, reliance on analogical reasoning from text, common law history, or tradition to determine the constitutionality of any given practice or regulation. That process of reasoning by historical analogy drives the Seventh Amendment inquiry in a way that far surpasses the Court’s approach to other provisions in the Bill of Rights. As such, the Court’s historical test for the Seventh Amendment offers lessons, but also presents its own set of problems, for lower courts struggling to implement the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.


7. My argument is not intended to be particularly normative. Although I believe that any Second Amendment test will have to contend with history, I am not certain that the Court will abandon levels of scrutiny in its ultimate articulation of a test. Instead, this Article assumes that the Court is serious in its demand for a test that minimizes or eliminates balancing and explores what such a test might look like and what benefits and hazards might accompany it.

8. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

9. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment . . . codified a pre-existing right.”).

10. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) (stating that the Seventh Amendment does not include the common law tradition of a twelve-member jury); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943) (stating that the Seventh Amendment does not require all the “procedural incidents” of the common law jury); see also infra Subsection II.A.2.

11. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[T]he proper interpretive approach [in Second Amendment cases involving new weapons or circumstances] is to
This Article is likely to appeal to lawyers, judges, and scholars amenable to a new approach to Second Amendment questions, one that reduces judicial reliance on hotly disputed empirical evidence surrounding the right to keep and bear arms, but one that also avoids a calcified method that is unable to address the realities of modern firearm technology and culture. The Court’s implementation of the Seventh Amendment provides a counterintuitive but important resource in this regard. The Justices appear to have reached consensus that the Seventh Amendment’s text demands a level of historical engagement that exceeds what other, more open-textured provisions of the Bill of Rights require. They also all appear to agree that it is untenable to woefully “preserve” the common law right to a jury trial as it existed in 1791. As a consequence, the Court has converged on a historical test that attempts to remain true to the text, history, and tradition of the Seventh Amendment, but is supple enough to address the demands of a twenty-first-century judicial system.

The Court’s effort to implement the Seventh Amendment through a historical test is instructive because *Heller* and *McDonald* appear to commit the Court to a similar history-centered approach in Second Amendment cases. All members of the Court seem wary of literal application of the text, but the
Heller majority and dissents differ on the method of establishing limits. The Heller majority insists that the scope of the right is to be determined by history, and they categorically reject the dissenters’ use of balancing tests. 17 But they refuse to explain how such a history-centered test may operate in litigation. To the extent that the Court is serious about rejecting balancing and embracing history, “borrowing”18 from the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence can provide clues about how courts may craft a history-centered test for the Second Amendment.

This Article is likely to appeal on a broader scale as well. The Seventh Amendment, the Second Amendment, and other areas of constitutional law present challenges about how one can create a jurisprudence from the reliquary of history that is both durable and principled. Those challenges include: Whose history do we consult when construing constitutional text? How much history do we consult? What do we do when history does not give us a clear answer? And, in particular, what rules govern when, and at what level of generality, to identify and examine a historical analogue for purposes of constitutional decisionmaking? These questions are as old as the Constitution itself.19 But they have acquired particular salience in the last twenty years, as

17. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35 (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them . . . .”); see also infra Section I.A, Subsection III.A.2.


19. In 1799, for example, James Madison raised the following questions on how to construe the term “common law” as it applied to constitutional text:

Is it to be the common law with or without the British statutes?

. . . .

[W]hat period is to be fixed for limiting the British authority over our laws?

Is it to be the date of the eldest or the youngest of the Colonies?

Or are the dates to be thrown together and a medium deduced?

Or is our independence to be taken for the date?

Is . . . regard to be had to the various changes in the common law made by the local codes of America?

Is regard to be had to such changes, subsequent as well as prior to the establishment of the Constitution?

Is regard to be had to future as well as to past changes?

Is the law to be different in every State as differently modified by its code, or are the modifications of any particular State to be applied to all?

. . . .

Questions of this sort might be multiplied with as much ease as there would be difficulty in answering them.

JAMES MADISON, Report on the Resolutions, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 341, 379 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906); see also Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism,
scholars both inside and outside the interpretive movement known as “originalism” try to use common law traditions to give text determinate meaning, not only in Second and Seventh Amendment cases, but also in other areas of constitutional law and theory. For those engaging with these questions, this Article is also likely to be of interest.

The Article progresses as follows: Part I discusses the incompatible demands that the Court’s *Heller* and *McDonald* decisions place on lower courts. Specifically, it considers the demand that judges conduct a meticulous historical evaluation of the Second Amendment’s text and context, reject balancing tests, and yet preserve a nonexhaustive list of presumably constitutional restrictions on firearms. Part II explores how the Court has developed a Seventh Amendment doctrine designed to preserve the right to a trial by jury at common law in its essential features, but which remains sufficiently flexible to deal with the demands of the modern civil justice system. Assuming the Court is serious about a history-centered approach to the Second Amendment, Part III explains how “constitutional borrowing”—drawing on


23. These same questions drive the debate about the nature and very identity of originalism, from “Originalism 1.0” to “Originalism 2.0” and beyond. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., *Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?*, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2011) (using these descriptors for originalism and discussing the different points of division between and among these theories); see also, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, *The Sacrifice of the New Originalism*, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011) (arguing that “New Originalism” is substantially more defensible than “Old Originalism,” but that this benefit has come at the expense of judicial restraint); Peter J. Smith, *How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?*, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 711 (2011) (arguing that originalists’ rejection of the claims of “new new originalists . . . undermine[s] their claims to neutrality”).

24. See generally Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 463 (offering a definition of “constitutional borrowing”).

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the Seventh Amendment’s historical test—could help to implement the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. In particular, it explains how the Court’s historical test for the Seventh Amendment can help structure an analysis of three reoccurring post-*Heller* issues: (1) the kinds of behavior that trigger Second Amendment protection; (2) the kinds of regulations that qualify as an infringement of that right, assuming the behavior falls within the scope of the Second Amendment; and (3) the character of judicially cognizable material to determine (1) and (2). Part III demonstrates how holistic constitutional interpretation, the Court’s stated methodological commitments, and the challenge of reasoning by analogy in Second Amendment cases can justify borrowing from Seventh Amendment doctrine, which represents one of the few history-centered methodologies available in the constitutional canon. It then explores what a historical test might look like for purposes of the Second Amendment, assuming the Court’s methodological commitments hold fast. Part IV outlines the potential benefits of this approach, notes its limitations, and recognizes that while the Seventh Amendment historical test may help resolve some difficulties in implementing the Second Amendment, it may aggravate others.

1. *Heller’s Riddle*

   In *District of Columbia v. Heller* and *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, a five-to-four majority of the Supreme Court held that the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home is a fundamental individual right that applies equally to federal, state, and local governments. These decisions marked the end of several decades of public and often acrimonious debate about the meaning of the Second Amendment. Unfortunately, having announced the right, the Court has offered little instruction as to its administration. With no clear agreement on a test, the Court’s pronouncements have tended toward the sententious or the oracular. Lower courts, perplexed and without the luxury

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25. Although *McDonald* is a plurality decision with respect to the manner of incorporating the Second Amendment against the states, its holding that the Amendment applies to state governments commanded a five-Justice majority. See *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058-59 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the incorporation of the Second Amendment, but through the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause).


27. *Id.* at 636 (“The Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools for
of a discretionary docket, have permitted Second Amendment doctrine to edge ever nearer to that least satisfactory of all tests, intermediate scrutiny. This Part explores that progression.

A. The High Court Challenge

The text of the Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 28 In Heller, the Court stated that the right to keep and bear arms predates the Constitution (reflected in the language, “the right of the people . . . shall not be infringed”). 29 According to the Court, the right is a legacy from our English forebears. 30 Its lineage can be traced back to the Declaration of Right in England in the seventeenth century 31 and to Blackstone’s Commentaries. 32 Some of the Court’s more sweeping passages suggest that it would be a pre-political and natural right, even if it had not been recognized in the text of the Second Amendment. 33

Methodologically, the Court purports to require the most exacting historical inquiry into any question concerning the right to keep and bear

28. U.S. CONST. amend. II.

29. Id. (emphasis added); see Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“[T]he Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right. The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it ‘shall not be infringed.’”).

30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593 (“By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects.”); id. at 599 (stating that the Second Amendment codified “a right ‘inherited from our English ancestors’” (quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897))).

31. Id. at 593.

32. Id. at 593-94.

33. Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136, *139-40; and BOSTON UNDER MILITARY RULE (1768-1769): AS REVEALED IN A JOURNAL OF THE TIMES 79 (Oliver Morton Dickerson ed., 1936), which refer to the right as natural); Michael Steven Green, Why Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of the Second Amendment, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 131, 136 (2008) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s opinion suggests that the right to keep and bear arms is natural and would have restricted government even if the Framers had not specifically included it in the Constitution). For a discussion of how Heller uses natural law in its textual construction, see Diarmuid F. O'Scanlan, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1523-26 (2011).
Commentators across the political spectrum generally acknowledge that the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence, especially *Heller*, constitutes the apogee of originalism. The originalist inquiry requires that lower courts evaluate constitutional terms like “keep” or “bear” or “arms” in light of historical sources and context. The Court also appears to forbid judges from resolving any question about the scope of the Second Amendment by weighing government interests. As Justice Alito wrote in *McDonald*, “[W]e expressly reject[] the argument that the scope of the Second Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest balancing . . . .” Justice Scalia in *Heller* insisted that no open-ended government interest analysis is permissible because the

34. See, e.g., *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (stating that the operative question in incorporation analysis is whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” (citation omitted)); *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 579-95 (examining the meaning of the Second Amendment’s operative clause in light of eighteenth-century vocabulary and usage); United States v. Masciandaro, 618 F.3d 435, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (observing that “historical meaning enjoys a privileged interpretative role in the Second Amendment context” (citing *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 625-26)); United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580, 584 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (discussing the Court’s historical inquiry and standard of review in *Heller*); see also *Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri*, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2503 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that the Petition Clause of the First Amendment was intended to codify a “pre-existing individual right, which means that we must look to historical practice to determine its scope” (citing *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 579, 592)). But see *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3030-31 (declining to use the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause to incorporate the Second Amendment).


36. See *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635 (observing that future cases will expand (and expound) upon the “historical justifications” for exceptions to Second Amendment protection); see also *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3036-38 (relying on *Heller* and discussing the historical understanding of the right to keep and bear arms); *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 579-94 (using historical sources to discern the meaning of the Second Amendment right).

37. *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (referring to the Court’s decision in *Heller*).
Second Amendment right “is the very product of an interest balancing” that occurred at the Founding.38

Finally, the Court cautioned that its decisions should not have any effect on a list of “presumptively lawful” regulations.39 These regulations include “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”40 The Court did not describe what constitutes a “sensitive place,” which “conditions and qualifications” are constitutional as opposed to an infringement on constitutional rights, or even how one determines whether a regulation is lawful or not. Furthermore, this list is not exhaustive.41 Other, unidentified regulations could fall within the “presumptively lawful” category, but the Court has decided to wait for future litigation to identify them.

The Court has thus left us with a jurisprudential puzzle: What Second Amendment test is faithful to history, rejects balancing, and keeps most existing regulations intact? It appears that no test can simultaneously satisfy all three requirements.42 The Court demands fidelity to history. It also demands that most existing regulations be preserved. But, as commentators observe, the specific examples of “longstanding” regulations offered by the Court are not all that longstanding. Many of them were unknown in 1791.43 For example, restrictions on gun possession by felons or the mentally ill appear to be twentieth-century innovations rather than relics of historical practice.44 The

38. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. In Heller, Justice Scalia hedged as to whether traditional standards of scrutiny analysis would suffice. Id. at 628-29 & n.27, 634. Justice Alito in McDonald appears much more resolute. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047. As discussed below, however, even traditional modes of scrutiny contain balancing analysis. See infra Section I.B.


40. Id. at 626-27.

41. Id. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”).

42. See Nelson Lund, Second Amendment Standards of Review in a Heller World, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 20) (describing Heller as “so Delphic, or muddled” that it cannot supply clear answers to what standard of review to apply), http://ssrn.com /abstract=2022011.

43. Lund, supra note 35, at 1356-58 (questioning the historical provenance of restrictions on felons’ access to guns); Winkler, supra note 35, at 1563 (noting the relatively recent origin of restrictions on firearm possession by felons and the mentally ill, and in certain “sensitive place[s]”).

44. Rory K. Little, Heller and Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism’s Last Gasp, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1427 (2009) (noting that while these exceptions “draw[] on commonsense and modern-day experience,” as a matter of originalist jurisprudence, they “come[] entirely out
The provenance of age requirements is similarly murky. It remains unclear how history is to be used to determine what regulations are presumptively lawful or longstanding.

The Court also says that the history of the right to keep and bear arms shows that the right is fundamental and not subject to interest balancing. But traditional tests for many fundamental rights are, in fact, balancing tests. Speech, bodily integrity, and voting are all fundamental rights. These fundamental rights are evaluated by reference to levels of scrutiny. And all traditional levels of scrutiny require some explicit evaluation of the government interest. Strict scrutiny, for example, requires that a regulation be “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest.” Intermediate scrutiny requires that a regulation be “substantially related to an important governmental objective.” As Judge Kavanaugh wrote in his recent dissent in *Heller II*, these familiar types of scrutiny “involve at least some of thin air.

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45. See United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (exploring Founding-era attitudes toward juveniles and noting “some evidence” that, in the Founding era, children would have been restricted from gun ownership on the basis that they lacked sufficient “virtue”).


48. *Heller II*, 670 F.3d 1244, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Strict and intermediate scrutiny are balancing tests and thus are necessarily encompassed by *Heller’s* more general rejection of balancing.”); see also Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1405 (11th Cir. 1993) (describing the Supreme Court’s approach to ballot-access cases as “a balancing test that ranges from strict scrutiny to a rational-basis analysis”); Competello v. LaBruno, No. Civ.A. 02-664, 2005 WL 1637907, at *12 (D.N.J. July 12, 2005) (calling intermediate scrutiny “essentially a balancing test”).


50. Traditional “levels” or “tiers” of scrutiny fall into three general types: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 634 (describing these levels as “traditional[]”).


52. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (emphasis added). A third type of scrutiny, rational basis review, requires only that a regulation “be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” *Id.* The Court has flatly rejected rational basis scrutiny for core Second Amendment rights. See *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
The _Heller_ and _McDonald_ majorities appear reluctant to permit judges to conduct _any_ balancing, even using these traditional modes of scrutiny. Given the majorities' reluctance to apply even well-established modes of scrutiny in _Heller_ and _McDonald_, it is likely they will be even more skeptical of exotic new balancing tests in Second Amendment cases. Even more perplexing, the quintessential government interest, public...
safety, has no special bearing on the scope of the right to keep and bear arms. At least, it appears to have no more bearing on the Second Amendment’s scope than it does on any other constitutional right. So, even if a court were to analyze a certain regulation using a forbidden balancing test, it is unclear what weight, if any, public safety adds to the scale.

At first blush, there appears to be no test that can simultaneously remain faithful to history, keep judges from balancing, and justify the existing set of presumptively lawful regulations, much less maintain other regulations that have developed in the last two centuries or that will develop in the future. And, much to the consternation of the Heller and McDonald dissenters, the Court has offered few hints as to a solution.

B. The Lower Court Response

The Court has left lower court judges at sea. Inundated by Second Amendment litigation, lower courts have been forced to rig what test they can from fragments of Heller’s and McDonald’s hundred-plus pages. Their product, created with little guidance and few resources, often betrays their haste.

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58. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (calling public safety “a primary concern of every government” (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987))).

59. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045 (noting that “all constitutional provisions that impose restrictions on law enforcement” can be said to have “controversial public safety implications”).

60. Id. at 3105 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the McDonald Court failed to “at least moderate the confusion [caused by Heller] . . . by adopting a rule that is clearly and tightly bounded in scope”); id. at 3126–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (raising a set of hypotheticals the Court has yet to resolve in Second Amendment cases).

Some judges have clung to the Court’s exclusionary dicta.62 When convicted felons assert Second Amendment defenses, for example, judges often simply parrot Heller’s dicta and move on.63 In United States v. Small, for example, a court cited Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful” regulations and concluded that the regulation at issue in the instant felon-in-possession case qualified.64 Other judges have assumed the Heller dicta’s nonexclusivity is an opportunity to add other categories to the list. In Nordyke v. King, for instance, a panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld laws concerning gun shows on public property by stating that certain “open public spaces” on municipal property could “fit comfortably within the same category as schools and government buildings.”65

Increasingly, judges have latched onto intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment cases.66 They have done so despite the current Court’s jaundiced

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62. Some courts say the exceptions are not dicta. E.g., United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010). Others say they are dicta, but follow them nonetheless. E.g., United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010). For an argument that these exceptions are binding, see Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1372 (2009), which suggests that “[a]lthough these exceptions are arguably dicta, they are dicta of the strongest sort” and that “[f]or all practical purposes, these [exceptions] have been decided . . . in favor of constitutionality.”

63. As one court observed: “Where a challenged statute apparently falls into one of the categories signaled by the Supreme Court as constitutional, courts have relied on the ‘presumptively lawful’ language to uphold laws in relatively summary fashion.” Hall v. García, No. 10-CV-03799, 2011 WL 995933, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (upholding state restrictions on firearms near schools); see also United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that Heller’s exceptions are not dicta and instead constitute a binding determination that “felons are categorically different” from rights-bearing individuals); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a statute prohibiting a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm or ammunition falls within Heller’s “presumptively lawful” category); United States v. Roy, 742 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D. Me. 2010) (citing language from Heller and McDonald to uphold firearm restrictions imposed on a person involuntarily committed for mental illness); Epps v. State, 55 So. 3d 710, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (dismissing a challenge to a state felon-in-possession conviction based on exclusionary dicta).


65. 563 F.3d 439, 460 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding for consideration in light of McDonald); see also United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that persons subject to domestic relations restraining orders are categorically like the mentally ill and felons for purposes of Second Amendment analysis). But cf. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734-35 (2011) (refusing to create a new harmful-to-minors category of unprotected speech).

66. See Lund, supra note 42 (manuscript at 9) (noting that courts have tended to use intermediate scrutiny for Second Amendment cases dealing with regulations that do not
view of balancing tests in general, and intermediate scrutiny in particular. In *United States v. Skoien*, an en banc Seventh Circuit held, without diving into the “‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire,” that a federal law disarming domestic violence misdemeanants had “a substantial relation” to the “important governmental objective” of “preventing armed mayhem.” A judge in the Eastern District of New York acknowledged that “it is possible that an entirely new test [for the Second Amendment] will develop.” But the judge felt “bound” to apply the “existing analytical frameworks” to the federal felon-in-possession statute, and upheld the statute as “substantially related to the important goal of promoting public safety.” Another judge in the Northern District of California upheld state restrictions on firearms within one thousand feet of a school on the ground that the restriction was “substantially related” to the “important governmental objective” of preventing harm to children. These judges have yet to engage with *McDonald*’s suggestion that

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**Notes:**


68. 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).

69. *Id.* at 642.


72. *Id.*

73. *Id.* at *2.

74. *Id.*


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balancing is forbidden and that public safety plays no special role in Second Amendment suits.

Lured by more supple First Amendment analogues, some courts have fashioned a mixed category-plus-scrutiny approach. In *United States v. Marzzarella*, a panel of the Third Circuit created a two-tiered structure for Second Amendment challenges. Under this structure, the court first examines “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.” If it does, then the court proceeds to “some form of means-end scrutiny.” Applying this framework, the Third Circuit held that prohibitions on firearms with obliterated serial numbers fell within the scope of the Second Amendment. However, in addressing the issue of means-end fit, the court concluded that the law was reasonably related to the important government interest of tracing guns for law-enforcement purposes.

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77. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).

78. *Id.* at 89.

79. *Id.*

80. *Id.* at 98.
More often than not, the burden of “doing originalism”⁸¹ collapses these two-step tests into one step: intermediate scrutiny. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Chester,⁸² claimed to apply the two-part Marzzarella test to domestic violence misdemeanants. But it concluded that history provided no definitive answers as to whether the possession of firearms by misdemeanants was within the original understanding of the Second Amendment.⁸³ It therefore moved on to the second part of the test. Finding (in apparent contradiction to its earlier conclusion) that a right of misdemeanor domestic batterers to possess firearms was “not within the core right identified in Heller,”⁸⁴ it held that “intermediate scrutiny” applied to misdemeanants like Chester.⁸⁵ In United States v. Reese,⁸⁶ the Tenth Circuit addressed federal firearms restrictions imposed on persons subject to restraining orders.⁸⁷ Purporting to follow Marzzarella’s two-step approach, the Reese court performed little investigation into the history of gun bans among those subject to restraining orders.⁸⁸ Instead, it upheld the prohibition almost entirely on the basis of intermediate scrutiny.⁸⁹

Few courts have explained how their approach complies with the Court’s insistence that no test rely on idiosyncratic evaluation of government

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⁸¹ Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32 (2004). The phrase comes from Professor Monaghan, but what I mean by the term is the difficult task originalism demands of judges and litigants, untrained in history, who have to construct a legal opinion from conflicted and remote materials. This is a flaw that Justice Scalia recognizes:

> [I]t is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient text. Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous mass of material . . . . Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation of the reliability of that material . . . . And further still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time . . . . and putting on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day. It is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer.


⁸² 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010).

⁸³ Id. at 680-81.

⁸⁴ Id. at 683.

⁸⁵ Id. (remanding for further proceedings applying intermediate scrutiny); see also United States v. Lunsford, No. 2:10-cr-00182, 2011 WL 145195, at *5-6 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 18, 2011) (finding the historical evidence for felon dispossession disputable and looking to intermediate scrutiny to uphold a felon-in-possession statute).

⁸⁶ 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010).

⁸⁷ Id. at 799-800.

⁸⁸ See id. at 800-01 (summarily finding that the prohibition falls within the scope of Second Amendment protections).

⁸⁹ Id. at 802-04.
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interests.\textsuperscript{90} Even fewer have delved into the historical materials that the Court says should guide any evaluation of the Second Amendment’s scope. Worse, the emerging consensus candidate—intermediate scrutiny—is a mode of analysis that many jurists and scholars disfavor and occasionally decry.\textsuperscript{91} Justice Scalia, for one, has signaled that “intermediate scrutiny” is not really much of a test at all, but frequently a way for judges to “load the dice.”\textsuperscript{92} And the colloquy between Justices Scalia and Breyer in \textit{Heller} concerning the propriety of applying First Amendment-inspired balancing tests to Second Amendment cases suggests that the majority rejected intermediate scrutiny as a permissible method of analysis.\textsuperscript{93} Faced with the Court’s seemingly insoluble demands and the pressure of crowded dockets, some judges have responded to the challenge with the equivalent of an exasperated shrug.\textsuperscript{94} This is where an examination of the right to a civil jury can help.

\textsuperscript{90} McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3045-46 (2010). Even those who urge a mixed category-and-scrutiny approach have yet to explain how their approach complies with the second element of the riddle, that is, that no test permit balancing of government interests. Compare Volokh, Implementing the Right, supra note 76, at 1470-73 (rejecting both intermediate scrutiny and different levels of burden tests, but adopting First Amendment time, place, manner, and substantial burden analogues), \textit{with} Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the Court should “avoid wherever possible” tests that require assessment of the importance of government interests), and \textit{Heller II}, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (observing that the “clear message” of \textit{Heller} and \textit{McDonald} is that courts should not analyze Second Amendment cases using strict or intermediate scrutiny).


\textsuperscript{92} United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{See Heller II}, 670 F.3d at 1282 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that \textit{Heller}’s majority rejected all balancing, and rejected in particular Justice Breyer’s use of a form of First Amendment-like intermediate scrutiny).

\textsuperscript{94} See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (stating that “in this instance we believe the most respectful course is to await... guidance from the nation’s highest court” and encouraging the court to defer the issue of whether the Second Amendment protects a right to keep and bear arms outside of the home).
II. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT TEXT, HISTORY, AND TEST

Like the Second Amendment, the right to trial by jury in civil cases presents its own riddle. The Seventh Amendment reads:

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 95

What does it mean to “preserve” a right to trial by jury? More specifically, what does it mean to “preserve” the right to trial by jury “in [s]uits at common law”? And how does this fit with a society in which “the rules of the common law” have never been either standardized or static?

This Part discusses the history of the Seventh Amendment and the Court’s efforts to implement its text. It explores how the Court has attempted to craft a Seventh Amendment test that is simultaneously faithful to text and history, avoids expressly balancing the right to a trial by jury against extraconstitutional demands, and yet is functional in a modern society. It concludes that the Court has fashioned a test that relies primarily on historical analogues to determine the kinds of suits that trigger a jury-trial right and the constitutionality of procedural innovations that control the jury. It notes that, in the end, the Court’s use of the historical test—and especially analogical reasoning from history—has stretched the Seventh Amendment’s protections to cover far more legal controversies than a strict reading of history would permit. But it has also expanded the government’s ability to alter the form and function of that jury from its historical roots. Part III will then explain how the Court may learn from its experience with the Seventh Amendment’s historical test in its effort to craft a historical approach to the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.

A. Seventh Amendment History, the Historical Test, and Some Initial Questions

The right to a jury is enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 96 That has not kept some scholars and tort reformers from regarding the jury with a skepticism

95. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
96. Id. The Constitution also guarantees the right to a criminal jury trial. See id. amend. VI; see also id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
that occasionally borders on contempt. As Dean Erwin Griswold sniffed: “The jury trial at best is the apotheosis of the amateur. Why should anyone think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for their lack of general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding controversies between persons?”

This curdled attitude, irrespective of its veracity, would have surprised the Founding generation. While William Blackstone praised the right to keep arms in his *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, he fairly gushed about the right to a trial by jury. The jury was “the glory of the English law”; “the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy”; and “the best criterion, for investigating the truth of facts, that was ever established in any country.”

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97. As Jerome Frank wrote, “Is it likely that twelve men, summoned from all sorts of occupations, unaccustomed to the machinery of the law, unacquainted with their own mental workings and not known to one another can, in the scant time allowed them for deliberation, do as good a job in weighing conflicting testimony as an experienced judge?” JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 193 (Transaction Publishers 2009) (1930).


100. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143 (“The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject . . . is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by [English statute] . . . and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation . . . .”).

101. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at *379.

102. Id.

103. Id. at *385.
He traced its lineage, perhaps erroneously, at least as far back as the Magna Carta.\footnote{See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 653 n.44 (1973).}

America’s Founders jealously guarded this English tradition.\footnote{3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at *350.} Thomas Jefferson, writing in 1789, regarded “trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”\footnote{Wolfram, supra note 104, at 656 (explaining that “the nascent American nation demonstrated at virtually every important step in its development” that it was “strongly attached” to the jury).} Indeed, the entire American experiment nearly faltered in part because the original Constitution contained no right to trial by jury in civil matters.\footnote{VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 97, at 16 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine, 1789, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 408 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905)).} As the Court noted almost a century later, “Those who emigrated to this country from England brought with them this great privilege [the jury trial] ‘as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had fenced around and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power.’”\footnote{Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898). Although the Court was quoting here Story’s comments on the criminal jury, see 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1779, at 541 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873). Story himself noted that the civil jury’s placement in the Bill of Rights “places upon the high ground of constitutional right the inestimable privilege of a trial by jury in civil cases, a privilege scarcely inferior to that in criminal cases,” id. § 1768.} It seems that the right to a jury, far more than the right to keep and bear arms, was originally understood to codify the ancient privileges of Englishmen and to serve as the chief bulwark against tyrannical government.\footnote{See Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How To Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1008-10 (1992) (summarizing the sentiments of Patrick Henry, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson on the civil jury, and concluding that “[t]he only disagreement seems to be over whether civil jury rights were the most important of all individual rights, or simply one of the most important rights”). For more on the history of the Seventh Amendment, see generally Wolfram, supra note 104.}
The Seventh Amendment uses the word “preserved.” 111 “Preserve,” as defined in the eighteenth century, means much the same thing as it does today: “to save; to defend from destruction or any evil; to keep.” 112 The gravity of this term is difficult to escape. 113 Even skeptics of the jury concede that the Seventh Amendment text demands some special attention to history. 114 Accordingly, the Court has interpreted the Seventh Amendment’s text to command a “historical test.” 115 Under this historical test, questions concerning the cases that demand a

111. U.S. Const. amend. VII. In fact, the term appears only once in the Constitution, although “preserve” is part of the presidential oath of office. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. The Seventh Amendment is, in fact, composed of two provisions: the “preserved” provision, and the Reexamination Clause. The historical test, with variation as discussed infra, applies to the Amendment as a whole.


113. Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 486 (1975) (noting that the “[u]se of this word has caused the seventh amendment to hold a unique position in the realm of constitutional interpretation”); Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 669, 671 (1918) (arguing that the meaning of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury “must be ascertained by a resort to history”). In fact, some states limit their jury-trial right solely to those actions that existed at the time of its ratification. See Ohio Const. art. 1, § 5 (stating that the right to a jury must remain “inviolate”); State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 852 N.E.2d 145, 153 (Ohio 2006) (“There is no right to a jury trial . . . unless that right is extended by statute or existed at common law prior to the adoption of the Ohio Constitution.”); Anderson’s Ohio Civil Practice § 174.02 (2010) (discussing the effect of the Ohio constitutional right to a jury, which applies to causes of action that existed before the state constitution’s adoption); see also Ga. Const. art. 1, § 1, para. XI(a) (stating that the right to a jury trial is “inviolate”); Swails v. State, 431 S.E.2d 101, 103 (Ga. 1993) (stating that “[t]he right to a jury trial under [Georgia’s] Constitution is not as broad as that afforded under the Federal Constitution” and noting that no state constitutional right to a jury exists for actions that did not exist in 1798); Wertz v. Chapman Township, 741 A.2d 1272, 1277-79 (Pa. 1999) (finding no jury right under the Pennsylvania state constitution for a cause of action that did not exist at the time of ratification). Thanks to Michael Solimine for this point.

114. David L. Shapiro & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 442, 449-50 (1971) (acknowledging that history must be the starting point for understanding the jury-trial right). Professor Redish makes a more subtle point, that “because jury trial is inefficient, we should apply a strictly historical test.” Redish, supra note 113, at 480. As discussed in Part III, infra, these problems exist in Second Amendment adjudication as well.

jury, the composition of that jury, and what matters the jury must hear, are all answered by history.

But this historical test raises another set of questions. *Whose* history is preserved in the Seventh Amendment? *How much* history? And what does a court do with conflicting or indeterminate history?  

In engaging with these questions of constitutional construction, the Court has compiled a record, one that may help frame a set of nearly identical issues regarding a historical approach to the Second Amendment.

1. *Whose History?*

As to the first question, *whose* common law history is preserved, the Court has held that the Constitution preserves English common law history, and not any particular state common law history. Justice Story articulated this aspect of the historical test while riding circuit in 1812. At the Founding, common law practice varied from state to state and region to region. In fact, the Federalists used the lack of uniformity of civil practice in the states as an argument against including the civil jury right in the original Constitution.

In *United States v. Wonson*, Justice Story concluded that “[b]eyond all question, the common law . . . alluded to [in the Seventh Amendment] is not the common law of any individual state, . . . but it is the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.” Courts since then have largely, but not uniformly, reaffirmed English common law as the Seventh Amendment’s touchstone.

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116. See Redish, *supra* note 113, at 486-87 (noting the difficulty of determining which legal situations required a jury trial in 1791); Shapiro & Coquillette, *supra* note 114, at 448-49 (asking “[w]hose law should one look to if such [a historical] examination is to be made”).

117. Scholars trace this aspect of the historical test to Justice Story. See, e.g., Ellen E. Sward, *The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law*, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 588 (2003); Wolfram, *supra* note 104, at 640-41. However, there are some dissenters. E.g., Margaret L. Moses, *What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence*, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 189-90 (2000) (stating that the common understanding of the right to a civil jury trial as reliant on 1791 English common law history is a twentieth-century invention).

118. Wolfram, *supra* note 104, at 665 (“[T]he provision of a civil jury varied widely among the several states.”).

119. *Id.* at 662-63, 665.

120. 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).

121. *Id.* at 750.

122. For example, although the Court uses English common law as a benchmark, it has cited state analogues as persuasive authority for its conclusions. See, e.g., *Ex parte Peterson*, 253 U.S. 300, 308-09 (1920) (looking to pre-revolutionary Maryland and Connecticut for
2. How Much History?

The second question is how much common law history the Seventh Amendment preserves. This question has two components, one temporal and one substantive. The temporal component relates to the span of English common law history relevant to Seventh Amendment construction. That matter has been settled fairly definitively. The Court has stated that the Seventh Amendment preserves English common law as it existed in 1791, the date of its ratification. But that leaves the thornier substantive problem. Assuming the Seventh Amendment preserves the common law of England as it existed in 1791, the Court must address how much of that common law is now constitutional law.

As Professor James wrote over forty years ago, does the Seventh Amendment “freeze[] the right absolutely as it was in England in 1791”? Or does it have “some elasticity so as to accommodate extensions or contractions of jury trial and, if so, what [are] the limits of this elasticity”? Put another way, when is modification of 1791 jury practice—whether an expansion or diminution, whether through legislation, executive action, or common law reasoning—a constitutional violation?

On this point, the Court is torn between its duty to the text and the reality of change. The Court frequently states that any departure from historical practice is unconstitutional. But it also tends to validate constitutional claims to

123. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (stating that English common law is preserved); Peterson, 253 U.S. at 309 n.4 (“The right to a jury trial guaranteed in the federal courts is that known to the law of England, not the jury trial as modified by local usage or statute.”); Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377-78 (1913). But see Moses, supra note 117, at 189 (casting doubt on this understanding).

124. See 6 Madison, supra note 19, at 379 (“[W]hat period is to be fixed for limiting the British authority over our laws?”).

125. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999). There still exists a smattering of opinions that cite 1789, the year in which the Amendment was proposed, but not ratified, as governing. Compare Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935), with In re Clay, 35 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1994). For a discussion of Court decisions that have not adhered to the 1791 date, see Moses, supra note 117, at 190-92.


127. Id.
a jury for suits that had no existence in 1791. Paradoxically, it also has upheld modern procedural innovations that actually diminish the jury, both as to its form and as to its function. As explained below, the result is a doctrine in which the Seventh Amendment covers more cases than it would have in 1791, but also permits greater government control over the jury that is ultimately empaneled. This Subsection explores that paradox.

Sometimes the Court suggests that any deviation from 1791 common law practice is impermissible. In *Dimick v. Schiedt*, for instance, the Court addressed the question of whether the Seventh Amendment allows a federal judge to increase a jury award in lieu of granting a new trial. Justice Sutherland wrote that the “scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment” is determined by “the appropriate rules of the common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.” The Court concluded that, while common law practice permitted English courts to modify damage awards, those modifications had largely been to decrease damages. There was no corollary historical practice of courts increasing them. The Court recognized that “the common law is susceptible of growth and adaptation to new circumstances and situations.” But the Seventh Amendment had, according to the Court, codified certain elements of the common law as it existed in the eighteenth century. To depart from those historical common law elements, even by common law reasoning, was, in effect, “to alter the Constitution.”

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128. This is a significant difference from some state laws, which do not extend jury-trial rights to new forms of action. *See supra* note 113.

129. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).

130. The particular Seventh Amendment right here would be the freedom from “re-examination” of a fact tried by a jury. *See U.S. CONST. amend. VII*. In this case, the judge and the defendant agreed to increase the award, rather than grant the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. The plaintiff did not agree to this arrangement. *Dimick*, 293 U.S. at 476. No one doubted that the district court had the power to grant a new trial, or that as a matter of stare decisis the judge had the power to condition that decision on the plaintiff’s agreement to reduce (remit) a portion of the award. *See id.* at 476, 484-85.

131. *Dimick*, 293 U.S. at 476.

132. *Id.* at 482.

133. *Id.*

134. *Id.* at 487.

135. As the *Dimick* Court noted, “Here, we are dealing with a constitutional provision which has in effect adopted the rules of the common law, in respect of trial by jury, as these rules existed in 1791.” *Id.*

On the other hand, the Court has construed the Seventh Amendment to require a jury trial in causes of action unknown to the Framers. In *Parsons v. Bedford*, Justice Story, writing for the Court, observed that the Framers of the Seventh Amendment did not mean to restrict the jury to only those causes of action that existed in 1791. As he wrote, “Probably there were few, if any, states in the union, in which some new legal remedies differing from the old common law forms were not in use . . .” Instead, the Framers used “[t]he phrase ‘common law,’ . . . in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence.” Thus, the right to a jury “in cases at common law” is implicated both as to English common law in “its old and settled proceedings,” as well as newer causes of action “in which legal rights [as distinct from equitable] [are] to be ascertained and determined.”

Twentieth-century courts cited *Parsons* to find jury-trial rights for causes of action that were unknown in 1791. *Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry* is an excellent illustration and reveals fractures within the Court with respect to fidelity to history. In *Terry*, the Court considered whether a federal statute allowing union members to obtain back pay for breach of a union’s duty of fair representation triggered the right to a jury trial. The statute itself was silent on the matter. A plurality held that the Seventh Amendment commanded a jury trial. The Court reasoned from *Parsons* that “[t]he right to a jury trial includes more than the common-law forms of action recognized in 1791.”

The jury right “extends to causes of action created by Congress,” even when those causes of action were alien to the Framers. The essential question was

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137. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830). But cf. State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 852 N.E.2d 145, 153 (Ohio 2006) (holding that no jury right exists unless extended by statute or unless the right existed at common law); Sward, supra note 117, at 590 (noting that a “purely historical analysis” would guarantee a jury “only in those precise cases where a jury would have been available in 1791 England”).


139. Id. at 447.

140. Id.

141. Id.


143. See id. at 562-63.


145. Id. at 573.

146. Id. at 564 (citing *Parsons*, 28 U.S. at 447).

147. Id. at 564-65.

148. See id. at 565-66 (observing that an action for breach of a union’s duty of fair representation was unknown in 1791 and that collective bargaining was actually unlawful).
whether the federal suit was equitable (in which case no jury would be required) or legal.

The Terry plurality used a two-part mechanism for deciding Seventh Amendment cases. First, it employed an analogical process, whereby the Court “compare[d] the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England.”149 The Court’s task here was to see if the individual issues in a cause of action are more analogous to a 1791 suit brought in equity or a suit brought in law. Second, the Court “examine[d] the remedy sought and determine[d] whether it is legal or equitable in nature.”150 According to the Terry plurality, this second test is the most important.151

The Terry Court reasoned that a fair-representation cause of action was analogous to either of two eighteenth-century suits: an equitable claim against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty152 or a legal claim against a lawyer for malpractice or breach of contract.153 On balance, the plurality thought the trust analogy slightly more convincing for the case as a whole, but not for individual issues within the suit.154 The plurality insisted that the analogical portion of the historical test was only “preliminary.”155 Finding the analogical analysis placed the case in “equipoise,” the Court then moved onto the requested relief.156 It concluded that back pay, although equitable in other contexts, was, at its core in this case, a demand for legal rather than equitable relief.157 Accordingly, the Terry plaintiffs were entitled to a jury.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Scalia and O’Connor, dissented. In their view, a departure from common law history violates the Seventh Amendment, regardless of whether the jury-trial right is contracted or expanded.158 For the Terry dissenters, the analogy to the trust was

149. Id. at 565 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987)).
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
152. Id. at 567-68.
153. Id. at 569-70 (“When viewed in isolation, the duty of fair representation issue is analogous to a claim against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty. The § 301 issue, however, is comparable to a breach of contract claim—a legal issue.”); id. at 573 (“[T]he search for an adequate 18th-century analog revealed that the claim includes both legal and equitable issues . . . .”).
154. Id. at 569-70.
155. Id. at 570 (citing Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 47).
156. Id. at 569-71.
157. Id. at 570-73.
158. See id. at 592-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935) (stating that the Seventh Amendment text limits what the Court can do through common law analogical reasoning).
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determinative.159 Justice Kennedy emphasized the Seventh Amendment’s textual command that the right be “preserved”; he warned that “[i]f we abandon the plain language of the Constitution to expand the jury right, we may expect Courts with opposing views to curtail it in the future.”160 The way to avoid such judicial manipulation is scrupulous adherence to history. “We cannot preserve a right existing in 1791,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “unless we look to history to identify it.”161 Echoing Dimick, any other result would “rewrit[e] the Constitution.”162 Justice Kennedy acknowledged the difficulty of historical proofs, but offered nothing short of an originalist manifesto in response: “Our obligation to the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, no less than the compact we have with the generation that wrote them for us, do[es] not permit us to disregard provisions that some may think to be mere matters of historical form.”163

Ironically, the Court has long disregarded Justice Kennedy’s concern with historical form when it comes to the actual mechanics of adjudication. Indeed, the Court applies the historical test to procedural challenges with an extremely light touch. The Court has stated on numerous occasions that the Seventh Amendment does not bind the government to ancient procedure or practices. Instead, it prevents only those innovations that keep the jury from functioning in its most “fundamental elements.”164

As early as 1897, the Court stated that “[the Seventh Amendment’s] aim is not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but substance of right.”165 In Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad Co., a statute empowered a judge to enter judgment for a defendant, even though the general verdict was for the plaintiff, when the general verdict and the special findings of fact

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159. Terry, 494 U.S. at 584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Having made this decision in favor of an equitable action, our inquiry should end.”).

160. Id. at 593.

161. Id.

162. Id.

163. Id. at 594.


165. Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897); see also Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (“The aim . . . is to preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury, as distinguished from mere matters of form or procedure . . . .”).
conflicted.\textsuperscript{166} The plaintiff argued that the most the judge could have done at common law in 1791 was to grant a new trial. In response, the Court asked rhetorically, “But why should the power of the court be thus limited?”\textsuperscript{167} The lack of precise historical analogue was no bar for this legislation. “So long as th[e] substance of [the jury] right is preserved,” the Court held, “the procedure by which this result shall be reached is wholly within the discretion of the legislature.”\textsuperscript{168} Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court in 1920, went further. In \textit{Ex parte Peterson}, he found that a judge could refer questions to an “auditor” to “sharpen” the factual issues for the jury, even though no identical practice existed in 1791. “New devices may be used to adapt the ancient institution to present needs . . . . Indeed,” he ventured, “such changes are essential to the preservation of the right.”\textsuperscript{169}

In a majority opinion in 1931, Justice Stone flatly rejected the \textit{Terry} dissenters’ faithfulness to historical form. In \textit{Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co.},\textsuperscript{170} the Court considered whether the Seventh Amendment allowed an appellate court to remand for retrial only those issues on which the jury verdict was defective, or whether the entire matter had to be retried.\textsuperscript{171} The Court amassed a string of eighteenth-century citations that showed that “at common law there was no practice of setting aside a verdict in part. If the verdict was erroneous with respect to any issue, a new trial was directed as to all.”\textsuperscript{172} Quoting Lord Mansfield, the Court recognized the common law belief was that “for form’s sake, [a court] must set aside the whole verdict.”\textsuperscript{173} Nevertheless, the Court found no Seventh Amendment violation. The common law may be concerned with form, Justice Stone declared, but “[i]t is the Constitution which we are to interpret; and the Constitution is concerned, not with form, but with substance.”\textsuperscript{174} The only issue of “vital significance” to the

\textsuperscript{166} See \textit{Walker}, 165 U.S. at 595 (citing 1889 N.M. Laws 97). The law governed the New Mexico territories before they became a state, and hence implicated the Seventh Amendment. \textit{Id.} at 595-96.
\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Id.} at 598.
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Id.} at 596.
\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Ex parte Peterson}, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920) (footnote omitted).
\textsuperscript{170} \textit{283 U.S. 494} (1931).
\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Id.} at 497.
jury-trial right is that “issues of fact be submitted for determination” by the jury “with . . . instructions and guidance” provided by the court to “afford opportunity for that consideration by the jury which was secured by the rules governing trials at common law.”175

The procedural revolution of the late 1930s sharpened these Seventh Amendment questions. In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure collapsed equity and law into a single “civil action.”176 The merger of procedures for law and equity made Seventh Amendment questions all the more pertinent and vexing. In Galloway v. United States, for example, the Court considered a challenge to a federal judge’s ability to grant a directed verdict in a civil case.177 Justice Rutledge rejected the argument that empowering the judge to enter judgment for the defendant based on an examination of the facts of the case had denied the plaintiff her Seventh Amendment rights. Observing that demurrers to the evidence and motions for new trials were sufficiently analogous to the directed verdict, he upheld the judgment.178 He added, “The [Seventh] Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence then prevailing.”179

Hence, today, not every element of eighteenth-century common law is contained in the Seventh Amendment jury-trial right,180 any more than every element of eighteenth-century common law is contained in the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right.181 Only those 1791 practices that “preserve the basic institution of jury trial in . . . its most fundamental elements”182 are beyond

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177. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
178. Id. at 389-90.
179. Id. at 390.
180. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) (stating that “constitutional history reveals no intention on the part of the Framers ‘to equate the constitutional and common-law characteristics of the jury’” and finding that six-member juries did not violate the right to trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment).
181. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (finding that although the eighteenth-century Framers might have expected a twelve-man jury, “the [twelve]-man requirement cannot be regarded as an indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment”).
182. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987) (“Only those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond the reach of the legislature.”

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legislative or judicial manipulation. Conversely, only those innovations in procedure that cripple these fundamental functions of the jury are unconstitutional.

3. What About Conflicting or Indeterminate History?

What does the Court do with conflicting or indeterminate history? What does the Seventh Amendment preserve when common law practice is unclear, or contradictory, or so fragmentary as to frustrate reconstruction?\textsuperscript{183}

The problem is acute. Even if one limits the historical inquiry to 1791, eighteenth-century English common law itself was in flux. Justice Brennan reiterated that “[t]he line between law and equity (and therefore between jury and non-jury trial) was not a fixed and static one.”\textsuperscript{184} There was “a continual process of borrowing by one jurisdiction from the other,” which eventually “led to a very large overlap between law and equity.”\textsuperscript{185} Professor James wrote that this division was a historical accident, as “[a]t no time in history was the line dividing equity from law altogether—or even largely—the product of a rational choice.”\textsuperscript{186} To the extent historical data from other centuries come into play, the potential for conflict increases. Modern procedures and forms of action unknown to the Framers only exacerbate the problem of obscure or indeterminate history.

The Court has attempted to resolve conflicting or indeterminate Seventh Amendment history through a combination of analogical reasoning and policy considerations. In \textit{Ross v. Bernhard},\textsuperscript{187} for example, the Court employed a three-part framework to decide whether a claim triggered the Seventh Amendment. Within this framework, a court first considers “pre-merger custom,”\textsuperscript{188} meaning the custom as it existed in 1791. Second, the court considers “the remedy sought”;\textsuperscript{189} this, the Court has stated, is the more

\textsuperscript{183} For variants on this theme, see MADISON, supra note 19, at 379.
\textsuperscript{184} Id. (quoting James, supra note 126, at 661).
\textsuperscript{185} Id. (quoting James, supra note 126, at 658-59).
\textsuperscript{186} James, supra note 126, at 661.
\textsuperscript{187} 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
\textsuperscript{188} Id. at 538 n.10.
\textsuperscript{189} Id.
important factor. Third, the court considers “the practical abilities and limitations of juries.”

First, a court attempts to find historical analogues. Sometimes, the analogue is apparent; sometimes, it is not. One difficulty with reasoning from historical analogy is a basic matter of judicial competence. As Justice Brennan lamented in *Terry*, to require judges “with neither the training nor time necessary for reputable historical scholarship, to root through the tangle of primary and secondary sources to determine [a suitable analogy] . . . embroil[s] courts in recondite controversies better left to legal historians.”

Even if a court had the competence and leisure to investigate this history, “the most exacting historical research may not elicit a clear historical analog.” History may be schematic or fragmentary. In such a case, the most appropriate historical analogue simply appears to be the one that can garner five votes on the Supreme Court.

Additionally, there is the problem of the appropriate level of generality at which to look for an analogue. To determine whether a cause of action triggers a jury-trial right, is the question whether a twenty-first-century suit is more akin to an eighteenth-century suit to obtain money simpliciter (which looks like damages), or to obtain money wrongfully withheld (which looks like equitable restitution)? To determine whether a statutory procedural device violates the Seventh Amendment, is the question whether the judge had the ability to modify a jury verdict in 1791, or to modify a jury verdict to increase the award? The Court has not arrived at a consistent answer to these

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191. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
192. See id. at 533 (noting that “some proceedings were unmistakably actions at law triable to a jury” and listing as examples “actions for damages to a person or property, for libel and slander, for recovery of land, and for conversion of personal property”).
193. See id. at 538 n.10 (regarding this part of the test as “the most difficult to apply”).
195. Id. at 577.
197. See *Terry*, 494 U.S. at 565 (plurality opinion) (disagreeing with the concurrences on the proper eighteenth-century analogue).
199. In *Dimick*, for instance, the Court acknowledged that judges had the ability to modify a jury verdict in exchange for an agreement not to hold a new trial. But the majority considered that analogue pitched at too high a level of abstraction. The issue was whether a court had
questions, although, as discussed below, the Court has sent some signals as to how to frame the appropriate level of generality.

Where history is not dispositive or an analogy not apparent, the Court has used policy considerations to resolve these problems. But only rarely has it done so in an explicitly interest-balancing manner. The Court later repudiated the fleeting footnote in *Ross* that counseled express consideration of “the practical abilities and limitations of juries,” although that admonition appears to have been partially resurrected. Instead of an open-ended balancing of jury rights on the one hand and government interests on the other, an unstated preference for erring on the side of jury trials appears to hover over the Seventh Amendment, at least where Congress has not spoken. It serves as a type of judicial tiebreaker when historical questions of Seventh Amendment coverage are inconclusive. In hard cases, the Court’s approach, at least in the twentieth century, seems to “reflect[,] . . . an unarticulated but apparently overpowering bias in favor of jury trials in civil actions.”

However, this bias is less prevalent in cases concerning jury form and function, rather than whether a jury is constitutionally required in the first instance. As discussed below, in practice, the Court’s receptivity to historical analogues acts in two, slightly contradictory ways: it expands the number of matters that trigger the civil-jury right far beyond those that existed in 1791, and simultaneously empowers rulemakers to restrain that jury to a far greater degree than they could in 1791.

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200. See *Tull v. United States*, 481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4 (1987); *see also Redish, supra note 113*, at 524 (speculating that the *Ross* footnote may have adopted a “balancing” approach to Seventh Amendment claims).


203. Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Favé, *Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory*, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 408 (1995) (noting that “the Court has been more than vigorous in its protection of the jury trial right in the absence of a congressional directive to the contrary,” but also observing the Court’s deference to Congress when the latter expressly limits jury-trial rights).

B. The Seventh Amendment Historical Test Restated: Boundary Setting and Tailoring

Despite its complications, the Seventh Amendment historical test endures. Further, the historical test performs functions that are familiar in scrutiny analysis: it defines the coverage of a constitutional provision and helps to gauge whether regulations that fall within that covered area are appropriately tailored. First, history serves as a familiar boundary-setting device. It guides judicial discretion as to which cases fall within the scope of the Seventh Amendment and which cases do not. Second, history serves a tailoring function. It dictates the extent to which legislatures or courts may alter both the form and the function of the jury that the Seventh Amendment guarantees. Procedural innovations that preserve the fundamentals of the jury-trial right are constitutional; procedural innovations that destroy the fundamentals are not.

I do not want to minimize the criticisms surrounding the Seventh Amendment historical test. As Ellen Sward has written, “[T]he use of the word ‘preserved’ and the reference to the common law [in the Seventh Amendment] invoke[] history, but the precise role of history has been the subject of considerable controversy and inconsistency over the last two centuries.” Some writers argue that the historical test itself is not required by the Amendment: the test is nothing more than a tottering doctrinal structure built upon a faulty interpretive premise. Others agree that the historical test is required, but that its current formulation is so baroque as to be nearly useless.

These are powerful criticisms, but they tend to discount the Seventh Amendment historical test’s value as a remarkably complete instance of history-centered constitutional implementation. For, despite its detractors, the Seventh Amendment historical test represents one of the few areas in which a constitutional decision rule based on history and common law has been most fully realized. In fact, the historical test represents a rare instance in which the modern Court has come to almost complete agreement on methodology, if

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205. Sward, supra note 117, at 573.
206. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 110, at 1021-22 (stating that Justice Story misread the Seventh Amendment in Wonson and that the mistake has been compounded ever since).
207. See Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 576-78 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (urging a more simplified historical approach); see also Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 114, at 448-49.
208. Meyler, supra note 10, at 596 (noting the value of Seventh Amendment doctrine to methodologies that try to integrate history and common law).
not actual outcomes. As such, the Seventh Amendment test may serve as a model from which to construct a durable but flexible Second Amendment test reliant on text, history, tradition, and the common law.

This Section discusses how the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence performs these scope and tailoring functions, and how it represents a fragile agreement among all members of the Court on how to craft a doctrinal test from history. Part III will then discuss how these lessons could apply to the Second Amendment.

The Court issued what amounts to a restatement of the historical test in *Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.* and *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.* *Markman* concerned whether the claim-construction portion of a patent infringement suit—the portion dealing with the scope of the patentee’s rights—required a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. In *Markman*, a unanimous Supreme Court endorsed a two-part historical test. First, a court must decide whether it is “dealing with a cause of action that either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one that was.” If the action falls within Seventh Amendment protection, the court must then ask “whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.”

The first part of *Markman* performs what may be described as the scope- or boundary-setting function. The *Markman* Court had little difficulty with the first part of the test. The infringement suit did not present a “conflict between actual English common-law practice and American assumptions about [that practice], or between English and American practices at the relevant time.” The correct application of historical boundaries was undisputed. “[C]omparing the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England” led to a clear conclusion that infringement actions are jury actions.

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209. See id. (noting the agreement on methodology across a wide range of ideological opinions on the Court).
213. Id. at 376.
214. Id.; see also *Del Monte Dunes*, 526 U.S. at 708 (reating *Markman* as “[c]onsistent with the textual mandate [of the Seventh Amendment]”).
216. Id. at 377 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989)).
However, the conclusion that infringement actions are jury actions did not mean that every question in the infringement suit went to the jury. Admitting that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed a jury-trial right did not answer the question whether the particular issue of claim construction had to be tried to a jury. In other words, the fact that the Constitution requires a jury says little about what the jury must hear or, more broadly, what form the jury must take.

In addressing what the jury must hear, the Court adopted what may be described as the tailoring portion of the historical test, that is, “whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.” Essentially, the Court asked whether allowing judges to construe claims actually deprived litigants of the jury right that the Seventh Amendment guarantees. According to the Markman Court, the Seventh Amendment text preserves only “those incidents which are regarded as fundamental”—in particular, those incidents “inherent in and of the essence of the system of trial by jury.”

What are those fundamental incidents? Elsewhere, the Court has stated the purpose of any jury-trial right in criminal and civil cases is to provide “fair and equitable resolution of factual issues” and to “prevent government oppression.” It does not require, in the words of commentators, a “photographic reproduction of historical procedures.” So, for instance, a jury reduced from twelve to six members does not impair the fundamental role of the jury, even though the English common law tradition was to empanel twelve jurors. Nor are procedural innovations such as the directed verdict, the limited remand for retrial, summary judgment, and judgment on special answers considered so disruptive as to impair the jury in its most fundamental elements.

217. Id.
218. Id. at 376.
219. Id. at 377 (citation omitted).
221. Redish & La Fave, supra note 203, at 415.
222. See Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 160.
223. Conversely, unanimity of the jury verdict was a feature of the common law civil jury that is part of the Seventh Amendment. In American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897), the Court called unanimity “one of the peculiar and essential features of trial by jury at the common law.” The matter was so obvious to the Court that “[n]o authorities are needed to sustain this proposition.” Id. Strangely enough, unanimity is not so fundamental as to be applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause in criminal cases. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1972) (finding that unanimity is not required in state criminal proceedings); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359-60 (1972) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not require unanimity in state criminal trials); see also
The Markman Court conceded that “[t]he ‘substance of the common-law right’ is . . . a pretty blunt instrument for drawing distinctions.”224 While some tailoring questions will be historically clear, courts will often be “forced to make a judgment . . . without the benefit of any foolproof test.”225 In the absence of unequivocal historical practice, a court decides whether a process preserves the Seventh Amendment in its fundamentals by (1) “seeking the best analogy . . . between an old [practice] and the new”;226 failing that, by reference to (2) “existing precedent”;227 and, failing that, as a last resort, to (3) “functional considerations” of the respective capacities of judges or juries.228 Using these tests, the unanimous Markman Court ultimately found that the judge and not the jury should perform the claim construction portion of an infringement suit. First, the Court found no consistent practice in England during the relevant time period that put the matter of claim construction, or any analogous practice, in the hands of the jury.229 Second, the limited precedent on point tended to reflect the view that analogues to claim constructions were legal issues for a judge to decide.230 Third, the Court concluded that the issue of claim construction was better suited to the judge’s role as expositor of the law, rather than the jury’s role as a finder of fact.231 Finally, allocating this function to the judge advanced the general policy of uniformity in patent litigation.232

In Del Monte Dunes, the Court reaffirmed Markman’s method of implementing the Seventh Amendment through a historical test.233 But the Court fractured as to its application. Del Monte Dunes addressed whether certain liability and compensation issues in an inverse condemnation proceeding brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require a jury trial.234 Every

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225. Id. at 377.
226. Id. at 378 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1987)).
227. Id. at 384.
228. Id. at 388.
229. Id. at 379-81, 384.
230. Id. at 384-88.
231. Id. at 388-89.
232. Id. at 390-91.
234. An “inverse condemnation” proceeding is “a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
member of the Court agreed that the historical test applies to the Seventh Amendment. Every member of the Court agreed that the first question is whether the cause of action was tried at law at the Founding or analogous to such a cause of action.\textsuperscript{235} And every member of the Court also agreed that, if a jury is required, the next part of the test uses “history to determine whether the particular issues, or analogous ones, were decided by judge or by jury . . . at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted.”\textsuperscript{236} Finally, “[w]here history does not provide a clear answer, [the Court] look[s] to precedent and functional considerations.”\textsuperscript{237}

Only a plurality, however, concluded that a jury was required. The threshold point of disagreement was whether a § 1983 inverse condemnation proceeding was more like a tort suit, which requires a jury, or more like an eminent domain proceeding, which does not. In Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, this specific type of § 1983 inverse condemnation proceeding was sufficiently analogous to a tort suit to fall within the boundaries of the Seventh Amendment.\textsuperscript{238} As to the second part of the historical test—whether the factual issues raised by the proceeding must go to a jury to preserve the right in its fundamentals—the plurality admitted that there was neither a clear historical analogue nor direct precedent. But it held that the traditional factfinding function of the jury justified a jury trial in this case.\textsuperscript{239}

Justice Scalia believed that the appropriate level of analogy was a common law action similar to a § 1983 suit simpliciter, not a § 1983 suit for inverse condemnation, as argued by Kennedy’s plurality decision,\textsuperscript{240} and not “some generic . . . Fifth Amendment taking” as advanced by the dissent.\textsuperscript{241} Justice Souter, too, found the plurality’s reasoning wanting. The most logical analogue for an inverse condemnation proceeding was the same as that for an ordinary condemnation proceeding: eminent domain.\textsuperscript{242} Because there was no

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{235} See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 708.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Id. at 718.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Id.; see also id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that “history is our guide” with respect to both portions of the test and in adopting the \textit{Markman} formulation); id. at 733 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the \textit{Markman} formulation of the Seventh Amendment test).
\item \textsuperscript{238} Id. at 711-15 (plurality opinion).
\item \textsuperscript{239} Id. at 719-22 (plurality opinion).
\item \textsuperscript{240} Id. at 710-13 (plurality opinion).
\item \textsuperscript{241} Id. at 724 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
\item \textsuperscript{242} Id. at 736-40 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
\end{itemize}
right to a jury in an eminent domain proceeding in 1791, the fact that the suit was presented as a § 1983 tort claim was irrelevant. Condemnation proceedings “carried ‘no uniform and established right to a common law jury trial’” at English common law in 1791.243 In Justice Souter’s view, the Seventh Amendment “preserve[s]” the common law right but “does not create a right where none existed.”244

Together, Markman and Del Monte Dunes restate the historical approach to Seventh Amendment questions. First, as to the question of Seventh Amendment coverage, the issue is whether the party claiming the right can establish a clear historical source or analogue for the right to a trial by jury. A court must search for an analogue at the appropriate level of generality. If history shows that the analogue does not display a “uniform and established right,” or if it shows that there was, in fact, no jury right, that is normally the end of the inquiry. Second, even if the Seventh Amendment is implicated because an analogue exists, the court must address whether the challenged procedure has violated the Seventh Amendment right in its fundamentals. In this portion of the test, the court first looks to history to examine whether there are analogues to the type of procedural innovation at issue in the case. If not, the court looks to precedent. If precedent is unclear, the court may resolve the matter based upon “functional considerations” so long as none of those factors impairs the function of the jury in its fundamentals. What are those fundamentals? The fundamentals of the jury are to act as a factfinder and to serve as a buffer against government oppression.245 Rulemakers have a fairly free hand in creating new procedures, as long as they retain these essential jury functions.

Markman and Del Monte Dunes are also important as a matter of constitutional theory. In some respects, these two cases represent a détente of sorts between the originalist and non-originalist wings of the Court.246 For

243. Id. at 738 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 5 James William Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 38.82[1], at 38-268 (2d ed. 1996)).

244. Id.

245. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (identifying these two purposes of the jury right); see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.”); Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 723, 751 (1993) (“The value of a jury buffer in civil cases was demonstrated by the English experience, where juries had awarded substantial damages against officials who had committed unreasonable searches and seizures.”).

246. Meyler, supra note 19, at 596 (observing that Seventh Amendment doctrine is valuable in analyzing how and when to incorporate the common law in interpreting the Constitution “precisely because Justices from Brennan and Marshall to Kennedy and Scalia generally concur that, in the Seventh Amendment context . . . history is relevant to constitutional
years, originalists and non-originalists have struggled over how much discretion is to be left to judges in construing the Constitution. In the last decade or so, the battle has become internecine among originalists themselves. In each case, the fundamental question has been how much judges should allow constitutional norms to be constrained by the history that surrounds that text.

Markman and Del Monte Dunes establish that it is possible to have every member of the Court—right, left, and center—subscribe to the following propositions: (1) history should drive constitutional interpretation; (2) history frequently does not itself provide sufficient guidance for constitutional implementation; and (3) some reference point outside the text, but not hostile to it, is required to successfully translate a piece of eighteenth-century script into a workable legal norm. The fact that the Court has reached some level of methodological agreement over the relatively sleepy issue of the right to a civil jury offers hope, however faint, that something similar may be possible with the far more charged issue of the right to keep and bear arms.

III. A SECOND AMENDMENT HISTORICAL TEST: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT’S (PARTIAL) ANSWER TO HELLER’S RIDDLE

With its Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has drafted a schematic, if not quite a blueprint, for how to construct a historical test. This schematic shows that a historical test can address some familiar problems of constitutional implementation, problems that have been resolved by other doctrinal tests in other areas. In particular, the Seventh Amendment historical test provides a structure for deciding (1) which activities or prohibitions fall within the scope of the constitutional guarantee; (2) which activities or prohibitions transgress that constitutional guarantee; and (3) what kinds of proof or arguments may be deployed in evaluating both (1) and (2). Furthermore, it does so in a way that minimizes (though it can never completely eliminate) recourse to judicial evaluations of government interests, including those that appear in the traditional tiers-of-scrutiny formulation.

Applying a history-centered methodology shaped by the Seventh Amendment, however, requires an additional layer of justification. The Seventh Amendment uses the terms “preserve” and “common law”; the Second

\[\text{adjudication}^\dagger\).

\[247\text{ See supra notes 20–23 for literature on divisions amongst originalists.}\]

\[248\text{ For a more thorough discussion of the ways in which originalism has migrated from “original intent” to “original meaning” to “objective original public understanding,” as well as the concessions that migration has required, see Colby, supra note 23, at 713–44.}\]

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Amendment does not. Critics of this Article will say that I expect a doctrinal tail to wag a textual dog; they will insist that doctrine should sprout organically from the constitutional provision itself, rather than be transplanted from some far-off corner of the Bill of Rights. While that criticism may ring true for those who subscribe to a clause-bound approach to constitutional interpretation, as I explain below, more holistic methodologies support the approach discussed here. Borrowing is a common feature of constitutional construction, as Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai have recently explored. As these authors note, judges borrow a range of material, including text, frameworks, doctrine, rationales, and principles, from both within and without the Constitution. Borrowing can be driven by the text, context, and history of a particular constitutional provision, by prudential concerns about stability and predictability in the law, by the incremental nature of common law reasoning itself, and often by all three.

This Part aims to justify why anyone should borrow from the Seventh Amendment to resolve problems with the Second. I reiterate, however, that the

249. A working definition of holistic legal reasoning is that methodology which assumes that a provision of constitutional text should be interpreted in light of other portions of the text and in light of the structure, purpose, and values of the Constitution as a whole. For some definitions, see Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1267 (2001), which argues for a “holistic form of constitutional interpretation in which parts of the Constitution adopted at different time periods are read together to create a principle with respect to the former parts that differs from the reading those parts previously had”; and Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 940 (2003), which defines “constitutional holism” as “a commitment to attempting, if fairly possible, to read the Constitution . . . [including its underlying principles] as a coherent, integrated whole.” See also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 795-802 (1999) (discussing the benefits and risks of holistic constitutional interpretation). But see Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000) (challenging holistic legal reasoning).

250. See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18.

251. See id. at 467.

252. For example, the Seventh Amendment speaks of preserving the right to trial by jury, which points to some repository of law outside the Constitution itself. Both Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment use the terms “privileges” and “immunities.” See U.S. CONST. art. IV; id. amend. XIV. The Court in Heller looked to see how “people” was used elsewhere in the Constitution to determine how it should be interpreted in the Second Amendment. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-81 (2008). For more on holistic readings of the Constitution, see supra note 249.

253. See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 521 (identifying these advantages to borrowing).

254. See id. at 516-17 (discussing borrowing and judicial minimalism).

255. Cf. id. at 511-22 (discussing borrowing’s applicability to various forms of constitutional theory).
necessity of borrowing a historical test—indeed the need to adopt any historical test, borrowed or not—flows from some contestable postulates: First, that the Court’s rhetorical commitments in *Heller* and *McDonald* reflect genuine methodological convictions, as opposed to transient judicial politics; second, that the Court expects the lower courts to produce and apply a test that satisfies these rhetorical commitments; and third, that the various flavors of scrutiny (intermediate, intermediate-intermediate, strict, semi-strict, rational basis with bite, etc.) are unpalatable to the majorities that decided both *Heller* and *McDonald*.

The postulates having been restated, Section III.A briefly summarizes the reasons for borrowing and explains why the Seventh Amendment historical test is suitable for borrowing. Section III.B will demonstrate how the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms raises the same questions about the use of history that have challenged the Court in Seventh Amendment cases. In particular, Section III.B will showcase how the Court’s *Heller* and *McDonald* decisions raise familiar questions of whose history counts for Second Amendment construction, how much history counts, and what a court must do about conflicting and indeterminate history. Section III.C will then explain how a Second Amendment historical test, patterned from the Seventh, can supply the familiar boundary-setting and tailoring functions normally provided by tiers-of-scrutiny or mixed-category-and-tiers-of-scrutiny approaches. Section III.C ends by demonstrating how a historical test for the Second Amendment might operate in practice.

### A. Borrowing from the Seventh Amendment for the Second: A Justification in Four Parts

Courts often borrow from other areas of constitutional law to interpret text and to create decision rules. Justice Scalia borrowed liberally from First Amendment doctrine in *Heller* to support the personal and preconstitutional nature of the Second Amendment and to urge a categorical approach to its limitations. But once we move beyond the proposition that the Second Amendment, like the First, contemplates categories, we are set adrift. The

256. The more exotic the label, the more it appears to create a “de facto if not official intermediate scrutiny.” Sullivan, supra note 66, at 299. For a list of the various approaches, see Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 12, at 439 n.12; and sources cited supra note 57.

257. See generally Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 460-84 (describing how judges and litigants appropriate legal materials associated with other areas of the law). For more on the concept of decision rules, see Mitchell N. Berman, *Constitutional Decision Rules*, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2004).

258. See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 473-74.
flexible levels-of-scrutiny analysis that encumbers the First Amendment is “baggage” the *Heller* majority seems eager to shed when it comes to the Second Amendment. The question, then, is what sources courts may use to implement the Second Amendment once we accept the notion that it is to be implemented primarily through categories rather than balancing. The Seventh Amendment historical test provides some guidance.

First, the Seventh Amendment offers intratextual clues as to what it means to “not infringe” or to “preserve” rights when those rights are understood to come from some prior, extratextual source. Second, even if one rejected the usefulness of understanding the word “infringe” by reference to the word “preserve,” the Court insists that the Second Amendment simply reflects a preconstitutional right whose scope is determined by extratextual historical sources. It makes sense, then, for the Court to borrow doctrine that it has used to implement another right that shares the same features. Third, Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, for the most part, rejects balancing tests and forces the Court to depend primarily on analogical reasoning from history and common law in order to determine its applicability and scope. As such, the Court’s implementation of the Seventh Amendment through analogical reasoning supplies a set of framing devices that may be transplanted to the Second Amendment. Finally, borrowing from the Seventh Amendment to develop a historical test is apolitical, in the sense that a historical test does not lead to predetermined outcomes. Borrowing could reinforce the argument that history-centered doctrinal tests are largely neutral and trans-substantive, rather than rationalizations for conservative policy preferences.

1. The Textual Necessity for Second Amendment Construction and Holistic Justifications for Borrowing from the Seventh Amendment

The Second Amendment does not mean what it says. We know this because applying the strict lexical meaning of the Second Amendment words

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260. See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 474, 513 (noting that *Heller* borrowed a First Amendment category-and-exception approach, but declined to borrow balancing approaches). A rejection of balancing would also seem to encompass rejection of the time, place, and manner restrictions that the First Amendment has developed. See Sullivan, supra note 66, at 207 (describing the evaluation of time, place, and manner regulations as a type of intermediate scrutiny).

261. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 5-6.

262. This is contrary to what Senator James McClure and Michael Barone may believe. See 132 CONG. REC. 9,603 (1986) (statement of Sen. McClure); Michael Barone, *The Supreme Court*
“keep,” “bear,” and “arm” would be cataclysmic. “Keep” means “have.”265 “Bear” means “carry.”264 “Arm” means “weapon.”265 A man strolling along Pennsylvania Avenue with a tactical nuclear warhead under his arm satisfies the dictionary sense of all these words.266

Constitutional construction267 is necessary when the meaning of the text “runs out.”268 With the Second Amendment, however, the problem is not that the text has run out;269 it is that a literal reading of the text leads to absurd results.270 Consequently, these quotidian terms, “keep,” “bear,” “arm,” are bracketed by two other terms: “right” and “infringed.” These two words

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263. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) ("[T]he most natural reading of ‘keep Arms’ in the Second Amendment is to ‘have weapons.’").

264. Id. at 584 ("At the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to ‘carry.’") (citing various Founding-era dictionaries).

265. Id. at 581.

266. This normatively unacceptable level of risk also challenges champions of what has been described as “semantic originalism,” in which the meaning of constitutional text is “stated at the level of generality found in the text.” Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1210 (2012). See generally Richard A. Allen, What Arms? A Textualist’s View of the Second Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. J. 191 (2008) (discussing the textual challenges of construing the Second Amendment).

267. Modern originalist theory recognizes a distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction. Constitutional construction recognizes that interpreting the historical meaning of a constitutional phrase may not be sufficient to produce a workable rule of law, and that judges may have to fashion a workable doctrine “consistent with . . . original meaning but not deducible from it.” See Colby, supra note 23, at 731-33 (quoting RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 121 (2004)). Heller exemplifies this turn. See Solum, supra note 20, at 975-80.

268. Colby, supra note 23, at 733 (internal quotation marks omitted).

269. The word “bear,” meaning “carry,” is not ambiguous or vague, unlike the word “equality” or “due.” If you asked an eighteenth-century time traveler to bear a letter for you, he would know exactly what you meant.

270. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 5 (1985) ("[T]hough the common-law pedigree of Tennessee’s rule [permitting deadly force against any fleeing felon] is pure on its face, changes in the legal and technological context mean the rule is distorted almost beyond recognition when literally applied."); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617-18 (1972) (rejecting a “literalistic” approach to the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1, in favor of a purposivist approach). As Professor Eskridge points out, Justice Scalia’s opinion effectively rewrites the text to read: “The right of law-abiding people to keep Arms in their homes, for self-defense purposes, shall not be subjected to unreasonable regulation.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation and Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 209 (2009). This reading of the text may be plausible in light of tradition, but it is not a plain reading. See id.
transform plain meaning into idiomatic meaning. And idiomatic meanings require construction.

Holistic legal reasoning from the Seventh Amendment provides some clues as to how to construe this phrase. Reading the constitutional text as a whole allows interpretations of one section of text to shed light on the meaning of others. The Court’s Heller and McDonald opinions are saturated with such “intratextual” reasoning. As just one example, Justice Scalia observed that the right of the “people” to assemble and the right of the “people” to keep and bear arms must be interpreted identically to allow for individual rather than solely collective rights. Although the Seventh Amendment uses the terms “preserved” and “common law,” which do not appear in the Second Amendment, the textual implications can be overdrawn. As a matter of holistic legal reasoning, the Court’s construction of the term “preserved” can help us understand how it could construe the word “infringed” in the Second Amendment.

The Heller Court said that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them.” Whatever the truth of this assertion with respect to other constitutional rights, this language signals that the Heller majority understands the scope of the right to keep and bear arms to be fixed at some definitive period of adoption, and that fixation insulates it from legislative, executive, or judicial alteration. Moreover, the scope of the right does not appear on the face of the text itself:

271. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-600 (discussing idiomatic use of common terminology in the Second Amendment).
272. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 249, at 940. Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert have argued, for instance, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause extends to sex-based discrimination when read in light of the Nineteenth Amendment’s extension of voting rights to women. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011).
273. For an assessment of holistic legal reasoning applied to the Second Amendment, see Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145 (2008) (discussing the use of holistic legal reasoning in both the majority opinion and the dissent in Heller). See generally Amar, supra note 249 (discussing the benefits and risks of holistic constitutional interpretation).
274. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 579-81.
275. Cf. Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 84 (2009) (“[T]he Second Amendment’s text does not ‘preserve’ a preexisting right or regulatory scheme, but rather contemplates more generally that the militia be ‘well-regulated.’”).
277. See id. at 635 (explaining that the Second Amendment is “the very product of an interest balancing by the people” at the time of its adoption).
arm, bear, and keep have the same meanings now as they did in 1791, but “longstanding” regulations are “presumptively” constitutional. 278 The sources used to define the scope of the right, and the nature of an infringement, must be extratextual and roughly contemporaneous with the relevant dates of ratification or, as I will discuss below, incorporation.

This is where the idea of “preservation” in the Seventh Amendment helps. What does it mean to “infringe” a “right,” given that both the right and its scope are fixed by some extraconstitutional sources in the past? “Infringe,” according to eighteenth-century lexicographers, means “to violate; to break laws or contracts” or “to destroy; to hinder.” 279 By comparison, the civil jury right must be “preserved.” “Preserve,” as defined in the eighteenth century, means “[t]o save, to defend from destruction or any evil, to keep.” 280

Taking these sources at face value and examining them intratextually, “preserve[]” 281 connotes restraints on government activity at least equivalent to those implied by “not infringe[].” 282 That is, as a matter of raw text, government regulations that result in departures from the jury-trial right as understood by Englishmen in 1791 are an infringement because they cannot be said to preserve, save, or keep the right as it existed in 1791. 283 And, at least according to classical logic, if all infringements are failures to preserve, then if something has been preserved, it has not been infringed. 284

278. See id. at 626–27 & n.26.

279. JOHNSON, supra note 112; see also 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, Edward & Charles Dilly in the Poultry 1775) (defining “infringed” as “[v]iolated, broken, destroyed”); 1 SHERIDAN, supra note 112 (defining “infringe” as “to violate, to break laws or contracts; to destroy, to hinder”). Evidence of eighteenth-century usage suggests it was sometimes used as an absolute, connoting a binary. So, for example, in the case of Harwood v. Goodright, the litigants spoke of the “infringe[ment]” of a testament, by which they meant its “revocation,” 98 E.R. 981, 982 (1774); see also Atkinson v. Baker, 100 E.R. 989, 990 (1791) (stating that the court “must take care not to infringe one of [the] first rules” of estate law). But all usages of the term do not convey this sense. See Jones v. Kitchen, 126 E.R. 787, 790 (1797) (discussing “rules of pleading, which if we infringe here, we may destroy altogether”).

280. 1 JOHNSON, supra note 112; 1 SHERIDAN, supra note 112; see also PERRY, supra note 112, at 408 (defining preserve as “to save, defend”).

281. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

282. Id. amend. II.

283. This is a position taken by some states, to the extent that they forbid the application of a jury-trial right to any action that did not exist prior to the adoption of that state’s constitution. See supra note 113 (citing the Ohio and Georgia state constitutional rights to a jury).

284. As Professor Ernest Young pointed out, one could also argue that the most reasonable source for borrowing definitions is the First Amendment, which uses the term “abridging.” E-mail from Ernest A. Young, Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke University School of
But the Court has had little trouble dispensing with ancient forms of common law practice, expanding coverage of the right to novel types of actions, or condoning numerous procedural innovations when construing the Seventh Amendment’s text. And yet, despite these departures, the Court maintains that the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury has been “preserved.” It is possible that this method of implementing the Seventh Amendment is wrong. But let us assume that the requirement to “preserve” the jury-trial right permits some latitude for common law development and legislative innovation, so long as the fundamentals are kept intact. A fortiori, then, modern deviations from eighteenth-century practice in the Second Amendment context cannot be said to “infringe” upon the right, if such modern deviations from eighteenth-century practice in the Seventh Amendment context “preserve” that right. If preserving the fundamentals of the jury-trial right is all that is required to remain faithful to the Seventh Amendment constitutional text, then any regulation that does not affect the fundamentals of the right to keep and bear arms cannot be said to infringe upon the Second. Thus, by examining dictionary definitions of a key term,

Law, to Darrell A.H. Miller, Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law (Mar. 20, 2012) (on file with author); see U.S. CONST. amend. I. While this is undoubtedly appealing, there are two responses. First, “abridge,” as defined by Samuel Johnson, not only means “to deprive” but also means “[t]o contract, to diminish, to cut short.” 1 JOHNSON, supra note 112. This latter meaning suggests that a regulation may run afoul of the First Amendment even if the regulation falls short of the complete violation, break, or destruction connoted by the term “infringe.” See id. Second, the Court has used various levels of scrutiny analysis, including overbreadth, to implement this concept of “abridge,” in the sense of diminution or contraction of the right. This is a mode of implementation the Court seems reluctant to apply in Second Amendment cases. So, from a purely descriptive and predictive point of view, such reluctance limits the usefulness of the intratextual links between “abridge[ ]” and “infringe[ ].”


286. See Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (plurality opinion) (extending the jury-trial right to a union fair representation suit).


288. Thomas, supra note 21, at 130–60 (arguing that the procedural innovation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 violates the Seventh Amendment). It is equally possible that the Court’s prior Seventh Amendment decisions are a type of “super precedent” that requires an unusual amount of effort to overturn. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205-06 (2006) (describing super precedents as those constitutional decisions so embedded in American institutions and norms that they are effectively insulated from reconsideration).

289. One objection, of course, is that the Court has set the bar far too low for preserving the Seventh Amendment right, and that the Court needs to protect Seventh Amendment rights
“preserved” in the Seventh Amendment, and recognizing how that term has been construed through time, we get a better sense of what the term “infringed” may mean in the Second Amendment.

2. Constitutional Construction and the Second and Seventh Amendments as Preconstitutional, Preexisting Rights

Skeptics of holistic legal reasoning may argue that interpreting “infringe” in light of “preserve” is “too clever by half.” The Seventh Amendment textual command to “preserve” drives the historical test, not the other way around. But even skeptics must admit that a majority of the Court has apparently dedicated itself to a construction of the Second Amendment that replicates methodologically the focus on history that the Seventh Amendment demands textually.

First, as I have stated previously, not one member of the Court has suggested the meaning of the words “keep,” “bear,” or “arm” is exhausted by consulting Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary. Some construction is required. The Court has stated more than once that the right to keep and bear arms is, in some yet undefined sense, a product of preconstitutional history, rather than an eighteenth-century textual invention. The clues, according to the Court, are in the text itself: “The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right [to keep and bear arms] and declares only that it ‘shall not be infringed.’” Therefore, according to the Court, the Second Amendment does not create the right to keep and bear arms; it merely

far more vigorously. This Article takes no position on that point, but assumes the legitimacy of the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.

290. See Amar, supra note 249, at 799 (“Carried to extremes, intratextualism may lead to readings that are too clever by half—cabalistic overreadings conjuring up patterns that were not specifically intended and that are upon deep reflection not truly sound but merely cute . . . or mystical.”). For a similar caution, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitutional Justice, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1611, 1617 (1997), which describes the “[a]esthetic [f]allacy” of constitutional interpretation as a supposition “that the Constitution is like a poem, a symphony, or a great work of political philosophy. Each word and every phrase must come together to form a harmonious and pleasing composition.”

291. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (“[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) (“This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.”); see also infra Subsection III.B.1 for a fuller discussion of the implications of this pre-textual right.

recognizes, through the word “infringe,” a right that the Framers believed they possessed as free Englishmen.293

The Court has construed the Seventh Amendment in much the same way. One of the defenses of borrowing is the notion that it “foster[s] a sense of fairness . . . a perception that comparable cases are being treated comparably, even though they may fall into different doctrinal categories.”294 As the Court has said, the Seventh Amendment does not create a trial by jury at common law, but simply acknowledges a preexisting right of Englishmen.295 Therefore, even putting aside holistic legal reasoning, since the Court indicates that both Amendments share the same features—both are considered preconstitutional, and the scope of each is determined in large part by common law history—an investigation into the Seventh Amendment’s implementation through a historical test can be illuminating.

Furthermore, in areas of constitutional law far more open-textured than the Second Amendment, the Court has appealed to history to give the text meaning. For example, the Court’s originalists consider the rights the Fourth Amendment protects to be preconstitutional.296 Hence, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Scalia looks to common law practice in 1791 to determine when a “search” or “seizure” is “unreasonable.”297 Justice Scalia recently observed that a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment must at the very least mean a physical invasion that would have constituted a trespass in 1791.298 Similarly, originalists have looked to 1791 practice to determine what is meant by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel” or “unusual”

293. Id. at 593.
294. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 485.
295. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 738 (1999) (characterizing the “trial decision” as “preserv[ing] the substance of the common law right as it existed in 1791”); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (affirming that the right is that “which existed under English common law when the Amendment was adopted”); Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (“The right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English common law when the Amendment was adopted.”); see also Township of Haddon v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 929 F. Supp. 774, 777 (D. N.J. 1996) (“[T]he Seventh Amendment merely preserved preexisting rights . . . .”).
296. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (citing the Fourth Amendment as an example of a “pre-existing” right).
297. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (“In determining whether a search or seizure is unreasonable, we begin with history. We look to the statutes and common law of the founding era to determine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve.”). See generally Sklansky, supra note 22 (discussing and criticizing the historical approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
punishment.\textsuperscript{299} And the Court has construed the Eleventh Amendment to acknowledge a common law tradition of sovereign immunity that the text itself does not disclose.\textsuperscript{300}

The Court’s process of borrowing doctrine from other areas of constitutional law is well documented. Given that the Second Amendment is still largely unknown territory, the Court may wish to seize the opportunity to select vehicles that have not been “spoilt” by non-originalist precedent,\textsuperscript{301} or that are laden with less “baggage.”\textsuperscript{302} Using lessons from the Seventh Amendment’s analytical framework to answer Second Amendment questions fits within the Court’s current project of constitutional construction grounded in historical methods.

3. History, Common Law, and Reasoning by Analogy in Constitutional Construction

The Seventh Amendment has forced the Court to address second-order questions about the use of analogical reasoning itself. Of course, analogical reasoning is not unique to the Seventh Amendment. What is unique is that the Seventh Amendment’s text drives the Court to look for historical analogues in a fashion that it can avoid when construing other constitutional provisions.\textsuperscript{303} The Amendment says “preserve” and “rules of the common law,” and the Court must remain faithful to the literal meaning of those terms. But it cannot

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\item[300] See Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 727 (1999) (recognizing that the common law tradition of sovereign immunity is part of the Eleventh Amendment, even though the concept “fall[s] outside the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 54 (1996) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.” (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 779 (1991))).
\item[301] I take no position on the wisdom of distinguishing “originalist” from “non-originalist” precedent, or on the relative weights of either. For more on this distinction, see Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729.
\item[303] With other constitutional rights, the tug of intermediate scrutiny is irresistible because of what Sullivan identifies as “a crisis in analogical reasoning”—when some issue arises that does not fit in any of the boxes the Court has already created. See Sullivan, supra note 66, at 207. The text of the Seventh Amendment tends to keep judges from dispensing with analogues altogether.
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consign the republic to the absurdity of a federal judiciary operating exactly as it did in 1791, wigs and all. The Seventh Amendment text tends to cut off other avenues of construction except analogical reasoning. Something is constitutional now—the Seventh Amendment right is “preserved”—because something similar to it existed in 1791.

Second Amendment originalism, at least as it has been articulated thus far, puts the Court in the same box methodologically that the Seventh Amendment does textually. According to the Court, the Second Amendment is the textual expression of a preexisting natural right the Founding generation understood. But a right to what? As stated previously, few people seriously argue that the right extends to tactical nuclear weapons, no matter what the dictionary says. Also, few people believe that the Second Amendment only guarantees a right to a flintlock. But the fact that Justice Scalia can only say the latter argument “border[es] on the frivolous”304 betrays an anxiety that needles all champions of originalism. Specifically, what criterion, other than the judge’s own taste or will, justifies his conclusion that $x$ is “bearing” or “keeping” or an “arm” because something like it existed in 1791?

A full explanation of the role of analogical reasoning in general, and among originalists in particular, is beyond the scope of this particular Article. However, the Court’s development of a historical test for the Seventh Amendment provides some guidance.305 First, a historical investigation is required. Second, the litigants must produce a sufficient data set of historical practices or meanings in order to accurately construe what the text demands. Third, the Court must acknowledge when consensus about textual meaning or historical practice forms a baseline for a constitutional norm, if such a consensus is forthcoming.306 Fourth, as Professor Lee Strang has written, “[W]here the Constitution’s original meaning is under- or indeterminate,”


305. In articulating these lessons from the Seventh Amendment, I am indebted to Professor Strang’s articulation of “abduced-principle originalism.” See Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927 (2009). Abduced-principle originalism is a method by which a court identifies a constitutional norm either from the semantic “uses of the constitutional term or phrase” or identifies the norm from “the discrete practices that the Framers and Ratifiers understood the constitutional text in question to prohibit, require, or permit.” Id. at 930 (emphasis omitted). Professor Strang does not mention the Seventh Amendment, but it appears that the Court has engaged in a type of abduced-principle originalism in its implementation of the Seventh Amendment historical test.

306. See id. at 957 (stating that, with abduced-principle originalism, “first, a judge must identify the data, the archetypal practices regarding which there was a consensus” and then “put forward possible norms to explain the data”).

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legislative judgments are owed some special deference.\(^\text{307}\) This deference is especially justified when the Constitution itself contemplates that the political branches will help shape a constitutional norm or institution.\(^\text{308}\) Fifth, the norm that is abstracted from this analogical process\(^\text{309}\) must be tested to ensure that it does not eliminate the reason for the constitutional provision itself\(^\text{310}\) and to check that it does not “generate disturbing or even calamitous results.”\(^\text{311}\)

However the Court engages with the analogical abstraction issue in the Second Amendment, it has already done so in the Seventh Amendment. As such, the Seventh Amendment historical test offers “a general repertoire of doctrinal moves”\(^\text{312}\) that is “sufficiently developed”\(^\text{313}\) to be useful. Further, these moves, while contested in their outcomes, enjoy support from Justices representing a range of ideological inclinations.\(^\text{314}\)

4. A Word on Good Faith Borrowing

Finally, one objection to using the Seventh Amendment as a model for the Second is that such borrowing is solely “instrumental”\(^\text{315}\) or is otherwise

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307. Id. at 981 (“When Congress is working within the underdeterminate constitutional text, it may not violate the determinate original meaning that exists but, within those strictures, Congress can be creative.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 758 (1993) (“Analogical reasoning is often silent or unhelpful on the question of social consequences.”).

308. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 2 (giving Congress the power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment through “appropriate legislation”); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment through “appropriate legislation”); id. amend. XV, § 2 (giving Congress the power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment through “appropriate legislation”); see also id. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress the power to “organiz[ing], ar[m][], and disciplin[e] the Militia”). For more on this point, see infra note 446 and accompanying text.

309. See Strang, supra note 305, at 957.


311. Fallon, supra note 23, at 20 (identifying originalist historical arguments against the constitutionality of paper money or Social Security).

312. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 484.

313. Id. at 468 (discussing the elements of a “plausible act of borrowing”).

314. See id. at 472 (arguing that transplantation from one area to another is tempting when one idea “possesses a track record of success in the sense that it seems defensible, has proven useful, or . . . enjoys support among specialists or the public”).


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pursued in bad faith. At its most mild, the argument would be that the Seventh Amendment’s text and structure offer slim support for appropriation of its doctrinal apparatus to implement a fundamental right, such as the right to keep and bear arms, and thus such borrowing is badly misguided. At its most biting, the argument would be that this exercise is simply a way of getting at a preconceived end.

As for the first, milder criticism, I have already stated that the Seventh Amendment’s appeal lies in its schematic for how to construct a historical test that can accomplish the practical task of turning constitutional script into rules of decision. The Second Amendment text is insufficiently precise to work as law, and the lower courts need guidance. Furthermore, they need guidance in a way that respects the categorical and historical approach of the Heller and McDonald majorities, but that is cognizant that twenty-first-century society is far different than eighteenth. In this limited sense, a decision to borrow from the Seventh Amendment can be instrumental. But so can a decision not to borrow. Conservative stalwarts have spent the last half-century urging the Court to be more respectful of text and history in construing constitutional provisions and have vetted potential judges and Justices specifically for their fidelity to that program. One would have to ask why, when the opportunity arises to rely upon a well-developed corpus of frameworks, arguments, and doctrine that advances that very program, they should opt for some other, more malleable test, drawn from some other area of law.

As to the second, more cutting criticism, a historical test built upon the example of the Seventh Amendment does not necessarily lead to predictable pro-gun or pro-regulation positions. Depending on how the Court describes the relevant analogy, a right to keep and bear arms in a house, for example, could be broad or narrow. One of the appeals of borrowing from the Seventh

316 Tebbe and Tsai describe good faith borrowing as “an honest desire to arrive at a defensible position and enhance general understanding of the law,” as opposed to bad faith borrowing, which is motivated not by a desire to understand, explain, or improve the law, but rather is “for the purpose of confusing observers, insulating a matter from accountability, or rendering a doctrine unusable by practitioners.” Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 468, 482.

317 See id. at 471 (“[D]ecisions to borrow (or refusals to borrow) are [sometimes] so strained they seem outcome determinative.”).

318 Cf. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (remarking that “just because gun regulations are assessed by reference to history and tradition” does not mean the government does not have latitude, and perhaps even more latitude, to craft regulations).

319 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 46, at 926, 934-35 (suggesting that an armed corporate compound could be analogized to a large arms-bearing family).
Amendment historical test is that constitutional borrowing “is agnostic to political ideology.”320

Finally, there are better and worse arguments about what the text and context of the Second Amendment might mean, as well as the consequences that flow from such meaning. But the historical test proposed in this Article is concerned primarily with articulating a workable framework within the parameters the Court itself has set. These parameters are simply stated: Be faithful to history; don’t balance; preserve as much regulation as possible. This Article assumes that the Court is serious about these conditions, and that it expects a test that complies with all three to percolate up from the lower courts. That a test can be bent or twisted to reach a predetermined outcome is not a problem unique to historically defined ones. And, if anything, to bend a historical test may require more mental exertion than to twist a more malleable intermediate scrutiny or undue burden analysis.321

B. A Historical Test for the Second Amendment: Some Familiar Questions

The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms could be implemented through a historical test based on historical materials and common law reasoning and sources, just as the Seventh Amendment right has been. This approach would comply with the Court’s stated desire to avoid balancing and yet be flexible enough to address twenty-first-century concerns. However, the Court’s focus on defining the Second Amendment by history triggers a number of problems similar to those posed by the Seventh Amendment historical test. First, there is the problem of whose history. Second, there is the problem of how much history. And third, there is the problem of conflicting or indeterminate history. As I explain in this Section, those problems are still being worked out and are not completely resolvable. Nevertheless, the Court’s efforts to work through those problems in Seventh Amendment cases offer some useful guidance.

1. Whose History?

Whose history counts for the purpose of the Second Amendment historical test? The Seventh Amendment jury-trial right is at least textually helpful. It

320. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 489.
321. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985-87 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (referring to the undue burden test as “unprincipled,” “standardless,” and “inherently manipulable”).
says “common law” and “preserved.” The courts agree, due in part to variations in colonial practice, that English common law history is the touchstone. The Second Amendment text is not as clear. It says the right to keep and bear arms shall not be “infringed.” Nevertheless, both Justice Scalia and Justice Alito have reiterated that the history that counts for purposes of the right comes from both English and American traditions.

English history clearly counts for purposes of Second Amendment construction. *Heller* and *McDonald* both construed the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense as a preexisting right, one that the Constitution codifies but does not create. As Justice Scalia insisted, the Second Amendment “was not intended to lay down a ‘novel princip[e]’ but rather codified a right ‘inherited from our English ancestors’”: “By the time of the founding the right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects.” The Court in both *Heller* and *McDonald* referred to English sources to determine what precisely is the substance of the right that must not be “infringed.” The Court cited, among other sources, Blackstone’s *Commentaries*, Hawkins’s *Treatise on the Pleas of the Crown*, and the seventeenth-century English Bill of Rights—which *Heller* identified as “the predecessor to our Second

322. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

323. Id. amend. II.


325. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 599 (quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)). Compare id. (stating that self-defense was a preexisting right), with Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898) (stating that the Founders considered the jury trial “their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had fenc[ed] round and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power” (quoting 2 STORY, supra note 109, § 1779, at 541)).

326. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 593; see also *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (noting that *Heller* recognizes this right’s key role in the American notion of liberty and its incorporation as part of the concept of due process); id. at 3066 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (referring to the rights contained in the Bill of Rights as “inalienable rights” that are merely “codifie[d]” in the Constitution).

327. For other English sources, see, for example, *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 583 n.7, 587-88 n.10.

328. See *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 n.15 (citing Blackstone for the proposition that self-defense was a fundamental right); see also *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 593-94 (citing Blackstone for the proposition that “the arms provision of the Bill of Rights [was] one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen”).

329. See *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 582.

330. See *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3036; *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 593; see also *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3064 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (referring to the English Bill of Rights for the antecedents of fundamental rights such as the right to bear arms).
Amendment.” According to the Court, English history must inform how the Second Amendment right is to be construed.

But American history counts as well. Justice Alito in McDonald concluded that the right to keep and bear arms applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment because it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty”—it is a right “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”

Heller cited “Postratification Commentary” by the likes of St. George Tucker and Joseph Story, “Pre-Civil War Case Law” (including from states that did not exist in 1791), “Post-Civil War Legislation” and “Post-Civil War Commentators,” in support of its construction of the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right. McDonald cited legislation and cases and other materials from the Reconstruction period. As one lower court has stated, “[W]hen state- or local-government action is challenged, the focus of the original-meaning inquiry is carried forward in time; the Second Amendment’s scope as a limitation on the States depends on how the right was understood when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified [in 1868].”

Consequently, the history that matters for Second Amendment purposes appears to be not just English history, as it is in the Seventh Amendment, but rather a particular Anglo-American mix of history.

331. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593. For a similar proposition, see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3064 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).


333. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.

334. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).

335. Heller, 554 U.S. at 606.

336. Id. at 608.

337. Id. at 610-14.

338. Id. at 613 (citing State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840)).

339. Id. at 614-16.

340. Id. at 616-19.

341. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011). As I have mentioned elsewhere, using Reconstruction understandings of Founding-era rights is deeply problematic. See Miller, supra note 76, at 1327-36, 1347-49 (discussing problems with claiming natural rights to rebellion and self-defense in the Reconstruction era); Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 940-74 (2011) [hereinafter, Miller, Retail Rebellion] (discussing the problems that arise when the English common law right to resist unlawful arrest is interpreted in light of the reality of Reconstruction violence).
2. How Much History?

Although Anglo-American history is relevant to the construction of the Second Amendment, that still leaves the question: How much history? As with the Seventh Amendment, this raises two issues. The first is temporal: The Second Amendment concerns history over what period of time? The second, more substantive question, mirrors that posed by the Seventh Amendment: How much of that history is now constitutional law? In particular, how much of the Anglo-American common law of self-defense, or tort, or criminal law, did the Second Amendment put beyond the powers of legislatures, executives, and courts, and, conversely, how much was left to these institutions?

As to the first question, the Court in *Heller* and *McDonald* did not feel confined to the history of the right to keep and bear arms in 1791, but drew upon sources dating as late as a century later. The historical sweep of the Second Amendment’s construction clusters, very roughly, around three eras: English and preconstitutional American history, American antebellum history, and Reconstruction and its close contemporaries.

The second question—how much of that history is now constitutional law—is far more difficult to answer. *Heller* and *McDonald* both describe self-defense as the “central component” of the Second Amendment right. They also both declare that the right to have firearms for “the core lawful purpose of self defense” is a right “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” But neither *Heller* nor *McDonald* explains how deep those roots penetrate. It is apparent that the common law right to self-defense is constitutionalized to some degree. But how much? Is all of self-defense common law as it existed in 1791, or 1868, or somewhere in between now constitutional law? The *McDonald* Court cited Blackstone for the proposition that if one kills an attacker, “the slayer is in no kind of fault whatsoever, not even in the minutest degree; and is therefore to be totally acquitted and


344. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).

345. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for the World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 247-49 (2008) (arguing that *Heller* made self-defense law part of the Second Amendment rather than the Ninth Amendment or common law). As Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf wrote with respect to “a right to be left alone,” the right to self-defense “cannot serve as a constitutional rule of decision”; some “less abstract formulation of the right” is necessary to be constitutionally meaningful. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1067.

346. See infra Subsection III.B.3 for conflicting common law.
discharged, with commendation rather than blame.”347 If the Second Amendment merely reflects a preexisting right inherited from the English, is Blackstone’s commentary now part of that right? Just the part about acquittal? What do we do with the fact that in 1791 there was a common law right to resist an illegal arrest with force?248 Is that now part of the Second Amendment? At common law, private or quasi-private parties could enforce criminal law, for example, through the “hue and cry” and the *posse comitatus*.349 These types of collective arms bearing for self-defense stretched over three hundred years of Anglo-American history. Are they now constitutional rights?350

Common law customs have been “constitutionalized” in other areas.351 But there has not been a coherent system to decide what common law is constitutional law and what is not. Further, the history of the Court’s constitutionalization of the common law is a decidedly mixed bag.352 The Court has, in the past, constitutionalized the common law defense of truth to an allegation of libel,353 common law liberty-of-contract values to an allegation of

347. See *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 n.15 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at *182).
348. See *Miller*, *Retail Rebellion*, supra note 341, at 945-59 (discussing the Second Amendment’s effect on the right to resist arrest).
349. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 29 (1993) (noting the hazy distinction in colonial America between public and private law enforcement and between mob violence and common law tradition); cf. *Rehberg v. Paulk*, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 (2012) (observing that in 1871 “it was common for criminal cases to be prosecuted by private parties”).
racial discrimination,354 and the common law right to recover humans as chattel.355

The problem that the Court faces today with the Second Amendment is the same one it faced with the Seventh Amendment in Dimick: When does “adaptation to new circumstances and situations” by courts or legislatures cease, and an “alter[ation] [of] the Constitution” begin?356 Beyond a poorly delineated right to self-defense in the home, the Court has not stated how much common law, of any source, is now Second Amendment law. Section III.C, infra, will offer at least some guidance on how to approach this question of how deep the common law may reach into constitutional law.

3. What About Conflicting or Indeterminate History?

Assuming that the history that counts for Second Amendment purposes is Anglo-American history up to and including 1791, and solely American history up to and including 1868, and assuming that some unknown quantity of that history is now constitutionalized, we still have a problem of conflicting and indeterminate history.357 Indeed, it is hard to imagine periods more fraught with conflict and indeterminacy than those surrounding the nation’s Founding and the Civil War.

Consider this minor sampling of historical conflicts358:

At the time of the Founding, a group of persons could attack a law enforcement officer if those persons correctly determined that the officer was

354. See Peller & Tushnet, supra note 351, at 802 (“[T]he protection of private liberty to choose contractual partners entailed the constitutional nullification of anti-discrimination laws that would take this choice out of private hands.”); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 15, 25 (1883) (holding that private discrimination is not the proper target of Reconstruction legislation and exceeds the Tenth Amendment).

355. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 613 (1842) (holding that the common law right of “recaption” applies to human property as recognized in the Fugitive Slave Clause). For more on the constitutionalization of common law customs with respect to slavery, see Darrell A.H. Miller, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Regulation of Custom, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1811 (2012). For more on the constitutionalization of the common law in general, see Kaplan, supra note 352, at 464-72.

356. Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935). In this sense, I understand “constitutionalization” of common law slightly differently from Kaplan, who suggests that the Court is doing so as an alternative to “assess[ing] the meaning of the [Constitution’s] text, history and structure.” Kaplan, supra note 352, at 467.

357. See Eskridge, supra note 270, at 194 (“Tradition is rarely simple and univocal; it is multifarious, evolving, and complicated.”).

358. For additional examples of historical conflict, see Massey, supra note 57, at 1095-1125.
behaving against the Magna Carta. During the same period, a select militia of Massachusetts business elites put down an incipient guerilla campaign of fellow Massachusetts citizens who opposed taxes and marched in defense of their “first principles [of] natural self-preservation.”

In 1788, James Madison suggested that the American right to arms is “a barrier against the enterprises of ambition.” Six years later, President George Washington crushed an uprising of Pennsylvania frontiersmen who had used those constitutionally guaranteed arms to attack federal officers on the ground that they had subverted the Constitution.

During Reconstruction, both black freedmen and white Klan members claimed to be a repressed minority, disarmed and threatened by lawless militia forces and criminals, and possessed of a right to keep and carry arms for self-defense against those hostile forces.


362. See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 214 (1977); see also Massey, supra note 57, at 1102, 1105 (discussing Madison and the Whiskey Rebellion).

363. Compare ORGANIZATION AND PRINCIPLES OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (1868), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 499, 500 (Henry Steele Commager & Milton Cantor eds., 10th ed. 1988) (identifying one principle as “the inalienable right of self-preservation of the people against the exercise of arbitrary and unlicensed power”), PROCEEDINGS IN THE KU KLUX TRIALS AT COLUMBIA, S.C. IN THE UNITED STATES—CIRCUIT COURT, NOVEMBER TERM, 1871, at 150-51, 425-26 (Benn Pitman & Louis Freeland Post eds., Columbia, S.C., Republican Printing Co. 1872) (defending Klan members’ gun rights on the basis that whites needed to protect themselves from better-armed blacks), and HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE INTO THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN THE LATE INSURRECTIONARY STATES (1871) (statement of John B. Gordon), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION (1865-1877), at 98, 99 (Richard N. Current ed., 1965) (calling the Klan “nothing more and nothing less . . . [than] an organization . . . [of] the peaceable, law-abiding citizens of the State, for self-protection”), with STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876, at 60 (1998) (quoting a letter from a group of freedmen to a Freedmen’s Bureau official complaining of a seizure of arms by local law enforcement), LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 390 (1979) (quoting a letter from a black woman who complained to the Freedmen’s Bureau of the fact that blacks were not allowed to have arms to defend themselves), McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3039 (2010) (“Throughout the South, armed parties, often consisting of ex-Confederate soldiers serving in the state militias, forcibly took firearms from newly freed slaves.”), and id. at 3088 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The use of firearms for self-defense was often the only way black citizens could protect themselves from mob violence.”). For more on this conflict, see Saul Cornell & Justin Florence, The Right To Bear Arms in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment: Gun Rights or Gun Regulation?, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1043,
Conflict exists even at the fine-grained level of common law doctrine and historical regulation. At English common law, a man was permitted to assemble an armed retinue in his house, but if he left home with the same retinue, the entire party could be charged with a crime. In Woodroe v. State, a Texas court stated that “[a] party may act in self-defense in a difficulty, and at the same time violate the law against carrying a pistol.” But in State v. Huntley, a North Carolina court stated that “the carrying of a gun per se constitutes no offence.” In Texas in 1871, a pistol was not an “arm” as that term is used in the Second Amendment. In Georgia in 1846, it was.

Even assuming one could artfully construct a seamless narrative within a historical era—for example, the Founding or Reconstruction respectively—there is undeniable tension between these historical periods. The private use of firearms in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in service of crime fighting was considered part of one’s civic duty and a public good. The
private use of firearms during Reconstruction, in sharp contrast, was part of a campaign of racial and political terrorism.371

Finally, as with the Seventh Amendment, the Second Amendment presents the problems of judicial competence, analogical abstraction, and policy choice. Judges are no more equipped to make judgments about the reliability of historical evidence during Reconstruction than they are to determine which writ would have been brought in the Court of Exchequer in 1791.372 For example, Texas passed a law during Reconstruction that targeted public arms bearing as a way to reduce the risk of confrontations between pro- and anti-Union forces.373 Some commentators have discounted this law on the theory that the Texas government was—to conservative Southerners, at least—an unpopular Republican puppet.374 Does the mere fact that ex-Confederates hated Reconstruction government make Reconstruction history unreliable? If it does, what does that say about the Fourteenth Amendment itself, as that Amendment exists as a result of military compulsion?375

371. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3039 (2010) (noting the predations of the unreconstructed Southern militia); see also Hearing Before the Select Committee To Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States, supra note 363, at 101 (calling the Klan “a peace police—a law-abiding concern”).

372. Compare McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3117 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“No mechanical yardstick can measure which of us [the Heller majority or dissent] was correct, either with respect to the [historical] materials we chose to privilege or the insights we gleaned from them.”), with Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 576 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (disparaging judges’ ability to distinguish between historical writs).


375. Professor Kent Greenawalt, for instance, has observed that “serious questions can be raised about the original validity of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments,” including the fact that the latter was proposed by a Congress without former Confederate representation and that ex-Confederate states had to ratify it to be readmitted to the Union. Kent Greenawalt, Hart’s Rule of Recognition and the United States, 1 RATIO JURIS 40, 45 (1988). For similar ruminations on an even broader level, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291 (2002), which discusses the implications of the fact that West Virginia broke away from Virginia as a result of the Civil War. One could
Even if judges had the time and resources to amass the historical sources, the looming issue of analogical abstraction remains. As Judge Sutton recently observed, "[l]evel of generality is destiny in interpretive disputes."\(^{376}\) In interpreting the word “bear” in the Second Amendment, do the eighteenth-century restrictions on “riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons”\(^{377}\) encompass all forms of “riding” (as on a train, or airplane, or coach) or only those forms of “riding” that can be done individually (as on a horse or a motorcycle)? Does the historic restriction on carrying arms in fairs, markets, and in the presence of the King’s ministers\(^{378}\) apply today anywhere people congregate, any place the state controls, or just where people buy things or where police officers or other government agents are stationed\(^{379}\)

These are just some of the multiple crosscurrents, complexities, and ambiguities that the history of Anglo-American arms bearing presents. One nineteenth-century legal scholar sums up the frustration:

On the one hand, as long as the machinery which society has afforded for the prevention of private injuries remains in its present ineffective state, society cannot justly require the individual to surrender . . . the means of self-protection in seasons of personal danger . . . . On the other hand, the peace of society and the safety of peaceable citizens plead loudly for protection against the evils which result from permitting other citizens to go armed with dangerous weapons, and the
utmost that the law can hope to do is to strike some sort of balance between these apparently conflicting rights.\textsuperscript{380}

One may quibble with the extent of the disagreement, but one cannot maintain that there is historical certainty in this area.\textsuperscript{381} The question, of course, is what to do with this history.

As discussed in Part II, the Court has created a historical test for the Seventh Amendment that attempts to implement the text, notwithstanding these historical problems of Seventh Amendment construction, and avoids, as much as possible, overt use of interest balancing or levels of scrutiny. Given that the Second Amendment presents a similar set of problems, an analogous test might be structured for the Second Amendment.

\textbf{C. A Second Amendment Historical Test: Boundary Setting and Tailoring}

To restate the riddle from the Introduction: What test adheres to the Second Amendment’s past, rejects “balancing” the right against present government interests, and preserves all but the most draconian regulations for the future?

A historical test modeled on the Seventh Amendment may be a partial solution. Such a test might take the following form: First, does the asserted right to “keep” or “bear” or to a particular “arm” have a clear or arguable historical analogue? If it does, then it can be said to implicate the Second Amendment.\textsuperscript{382} If it does not, there is no Second Amendment right. Assuming

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{380} The Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence, 1 CENT. L.J. 259, 287 (1874).
\item \textsuperscript{381} Professor Volokh has, I think, misread my prior work as standing for the proposition that history points in one indubitable position with regard to arms bearing, and public arms bearing in particular. See Volokh, supra note 315. I reiterate here that “while the text and history are not definitive, there are better and worse interpretations of the record, and there are zones of greater and less agreement as to textual and historical scope.” Miller, supra note 76, at 1311. Professor Volokh and others may disagree with me about the extent, or the jurisprudential relevance, of this historical conflict and indeterminacy, but they cannot reasonably claim that this conflict and ambivalence do not exist.
\item \textsuperscript{382} In this sense, Nelson Lund’s focus on the analogue for the \textit{restriction} jumps the gun. In a short aside in a longer piece, Professor Lund suggested:

Modern gun control regulations would then be upheld only if they had close analogues in identifiable common law or statutory restrictions in place at that time, just as modern causes of action are covered by the Seventh Amendment only if they are more like cases that in 1791 would have been tried at law rather than in equity.

Lund, supra note 35, at 1354–55 (2009). But the first question must be whether the asserted “keeping” or “bearing” or “arm” is even within the contemplation of the Second
\end{itemize}
the right asserted has a clear or colorable historical analogue, the second part of
the test asks whether the regulation “infringes” upon the right to keep and bear
arms. Here, infringement means something similar to a failure to preserve in
the Seventh Amendment context, i.e., a law that regulates keeping or bearing
an arm so thoroughly as to destroy the fundamental nature of the right.
Regulations that have precise common law or historical antecedents or
analogues do not infringe upon the right; newer regulations grounded in
precedent or functional considerations do not infringe upon the right so long
as they retain the Second Amendment right in its essential features.

The following Subsection discusses both elements of the test.

1. Boundary Setting

The first part of the historical test asks whether the asserted type of
keeping, bearing, or arm falls within the ambit of the Second Amendment text.
Keeping, bearing, or arms that are directly supported by history or have a
colorable historical analogue fall within the protections of the Second
Amendment text. Keeping, bearing, or arms that have no historical or colorable
historical analogue do not. This portion of the test recognizes that to determine
whether a certain keeping, bearing, or arm falls within the ambit of the text,
one must go beyond the text to examine the history, statutes, and customs
surrounding that text.383

At this point, the problem of choosing an appropriate analogue becomes
critical. If the boundaries for Second Amendment analogues are set at too high
a level of abstraction, they become unmooled from both history and reason.
For example, if the historical analogue to “keeping” and “bearing” is simply
any historical example of “possessing” or “carrying” a weapon, then the Second
Amendment right devours all.384 Restrictions on the possession of firearms by
criminals, children, the mentally ill, or potential terrorists, as well as on the
carrying of firearms in prisons, kindergarten classes, insane asylums, and the

Second Amendment is not in its text but in its history); see also Borough of Duryea v.
Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2503 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(referring to the Petition Clause of the First Amendment as a “pre-existing individual right,
which means that we must look to historical practice to determine its scope” (citing Heller,
554 U.S. at 579, 592)).

384. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“[T]he [Second Amendment] right was not a right to keep and
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”); see
also Miller, supra note 76, at 1287 (noting that the Court “stopped short of careening off the
textualist precipice”).
White House, fall within the scope of the Second Amendment and cannot be infringed in their fundamentals. If the historical analogue to an “arm” is “anything that can be carried in the hand for defense,” then hand grenades and anthrax fall within the boundaries of Second Amendment protection, and no amount of tailoring can keep them out of private armories.

Conversely, pitching the abstraction too narrowly risks the near-“frivolous” argument that only muskets and black powder count as “arms,” or that hanging a gun above the mantle is the only type of “[k]eep[ing]” that counts. Or, equally pernicious, too narrow an abstraction produces a “radical reductionism” in which the Second Amendment splinters. What results is that the knife, the pistol, the rifle, the city, the suburb, the highway, and the sidewalk each becomes “a law unto itself.”

One way to address the analogy abstraction problem is to look for historical consensus at the narrowest level of specificity that is functional as a rule of decision. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has written, “The need to produce a theory of meaning that is also adequate to justify the judicial role constrains the level of abstraction”; judges must “enforce . . . only the portion of the text or rule sufficiently complete and general to count as law.” The roots of this approach come from none other than the author of Heller himself. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Justice Scalia stated that the level of generality at which to assess a constitutional right is “the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”

The Court has stated that the Second Amendment protects a preexisting right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. It has also stated that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them.” But that right has been subject to numerous types of regulation by statute and common law throughout

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385. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 582.
387. See *Kovacs v. Cooper*, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (observing that each of “[t]he moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator” is “a law unto itself” when it comes to First Amendment protection); see also Tribe & Dorf, *supra* note 310, at 1070 (discussing Kovacs).
389. *Id.*
390. 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined this portion of the opinion.
history,\(^\text{392}\) including outright bans on the public bearing of weapons.\(^\text{393}\) Since balancing is not permitted,\(^\text{394}\) one must look to historical consensus for a limit. Is there an indisputable place where, for example, “keeping” and “bearing” an “arm” was permitted as a matter of historical practice? As I have written elsewhere, there appears to be a strong historical consensus—from ancient history to the modern era—that the one indisputable place one could keep and bear arms was in the home, for the purpose of self-defense.\(^\text{395}\)

But the framework outlined here does not require a court to articulate the right at that particular level of specificity. The right could be articulated at higher levels of abstraction. For instance, it could be described as a right to bear arms for self-defense in any circumstance in which one is threatened with imminent injury or death.\(^\text{396}\) Imminence as a method of construing the scope of the right to self-defense has a long pedigree.\(^\text{397}\) More broadly, the right could

\(^{392}\) For a listing of such regulations, see Charles, \textit{ supra} note 57, at 23-26 & nn.77-85.

\(^{393}\) See, e.g., WYO. COMP. LAWS ch. 52 § 1 (1876), codified in WYO. STAT. § 980 (1887) (“Hereafter it shall be unlawful for any resident of any city, town or village, or for any one not a resident of any city, town or village, in said territory, but a sojourner therein, to bear upon his person, concealed or openly, any fire-arm or other deadly weapon, within the limits of any city, town or village.”); Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.) (“[N]o Man great nor small, of what Condition soever he be, except the King’s Servants in his Presence, and his Ministers in executing of the King’s Precepts . . . be so hardy to . . . go nor ride armed by Night nor by Day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the Presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no Part elsewhere, upon Pain to forfeit their Armour to the King, and their Bodies to Prison at the King’s Pleasure.”); ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, \textit{THE CATTLE TOWNS} 121 (1968) (noting that local statutes in Kansas prohibited “the carrying of dangerous weapons of any type, concealed or otherwise, by persons other than law enforcement officers”). Some argue that these laws prohibited the carrying of arms only when carried “in terrorem populi” (that is to the terror of the people) or argue that laws like the Statute of Northampton were seldom enforced, or that they are outliers, and therefore should not be considered constitutionalized historical limits on the right to keep and bear arms. \textit{See} Marshall, \textit{ supra} note 379, 716-17. But those arguments are question begging, and only underscore the need for a theory of which historical or common law limitations count as part of the constitutional law and which limitations do not. \textit{See} 6 MADISON, \textit{ supra} note 19, at 379 (“Is it to be the common law with or without the British statutes?”).

\(^{394}\) See \textit{Heller}, 554 U.S. at 634.

\(^{395}\) See Miller, \textit{ supra} note 76, at 1350.

\(^{396}\) Cf. 1879 Tex. Crim. Stat. 319 (providing an exception to the prohibition on carrying arms for “persons traveling” or “one who has reasonable ground for fearing an unlawful attack upon his person” when the danger is “imminent and threatening”).

\(^{397}\) \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{id.}; Pierson v. State, 12 Ala. 149, 153 (1847) (stating that Alabama law “is derived from, and the same as, the common law of England,” which provides that there is no claim of self-defense “unless the assault . . . is such as to produce a well-grounded apprehension of imminent danger to life or limb”); \textit{cf.} U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (forbidding a state from “engag[ing] in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”).
be articulated as a right to keep and bear arms for self-defense anywhere one has a reasonable apprehension of violence. Or, even more broadly, as the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense anywhere one has a right to be. Of course, specifying the right at these higher levels of generality "portend[s] all sorts of litigation over schools, airports, parks, public thoroughfares, and various additional government facilities," as well as litigation over use of firearms against law enforcement.

The object of this Article is not to state definitively at what level of generality the right to keep and bear arms should be specified, but to help frame how the question should be asked. A number of issues could guide a court’s judgment in specifying whether a type of keeping, bearing, or arm has a common law analogue. The first is to recognize that some value judgments are inescapable. But just because they are inescapable does not mean the choice of level of abstraction must be untethered from text or consequence. Any decision about any one of these essential terms—keep, bear, arm—must fall within certain "widely shared beliefs of what makes sense" with regard to the text and history. The decision must also be functional, in that it must "provide stable meaning that can be used to resolve a legal issue," and must interact with other constitutional text and norms, such as equal protection, due process, federalism, and participatory democracy. And, as discussed above,

399. See Miller, Retail Rebellion, supra note 341, at 939 (discussing the implications of Second Amendment history with respect to self-defense against the police).
400. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1087 ("Judges must choose among competing traditions those which will receive legal protection—and [that] choice . . . requires value judgments.").
401. See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 16 (2005) ("Institutions and methods of interpretation must be designed . . . to be sustainable . . . and capable of translating the people’s will into sound policies.").
402. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1076.
403. See id. at 1099 ("Abstraction pushes us constantly to check practice against principle.").
404. Eskridge, supra note 270, at 194.
405. See Donofrio v. City of New York, No. 04-CV-3336, 2009 WL 6588381, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2009) (discussing due process rights in handgun licenses). For more on these implications, see Miller, Retail Rebellion, supra note 341, at 971-74.
406. The concern with federalism has two components, the first being how much of state law to displace through the Second Amendment, and the other being the issue of “lateral federalism” between states. Courts should be cautious of too heavy a reliance on constitutional construction that “privilege[s] the traditions of a great number of states over those of the few.” Kaplan, supra note 352, at 475 (discussing lateral federalism in constitutional cases).
courts should avoid choosing a level of abstraction that is “prone to generating disturbing or calamitous results,” as opposed to an analogy that “leave[s] more room for discretionary judgment.” As Judge Easterbrook has written, the ability to choose a level of abstraction is itself a type of power. At least with regard to the Second Amendment, it seems that the level of generality ought to be one that is “capable of justifying a judicial role. Unless it is possible to find an answer that adequately differentiates judicial from political action, the judge should allow political and private actors to proceed on their way . . . .” This point is apt when textual features of the Constitution, as well as history and tradition, contemplate that the political branches and the states will retain authority to regulate arms and to discipline arms bearers, especially when those arms are borne publicly for purposes of confrontation.

Finally, it should be noted that, as with the Seventh Amendment, the Second Amendment is a floor, not a ceiling. States, through their own constitutions, and Congress, through its commerce or Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, have the ability to grant greater rights through positive law, as they have done on many occasions.

2. Tailoring

Once the court has concluded that the Second Amendment’s text covers keeping, or bearing, or arm, the second part of the test asks whether the restriction amounts to an infringement. In this circumstance, an infringement means something similar to what it means in the Seventh Amendment: a

407. Fallon, supra note 23, at 20 (identifying originalist historical arguments against the constitutionality of paper money or Social Security).
408. Id. at 6.
409. Easterbrook, supra note 388, at 372.
410. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress power to “organiz[e], arm[], and disciplin[e]” the militia, and giving states authority to designate the leaders of such militias); id. amend. II (providing that arms are protected because of the need for a “well regulated” militia).
regulation that destroys the right in its fundamentals. If the regulation does not destroy the right in its fundamentals, then it simply regulates an incident of the right, much as changes to the number of jurors or procedural innovations like the directed verdict do not fail to preserve the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury.412

Admittedly, history is no keener an instrument for making Second Amendment distinctions than it is for making the Seventh Amendment distinctions.413 Courts will often have to decide cases “without the benefit of any foolproof test.”414 Nevertheless, the Court’s framework for the jury-trial right is instructive here as well. The tailoring function begins with historical analogues. As Chief Justice Roberts suggested in Heller, just as there are modern arms that are “lineal descendents” of those arms referred to in the Second Amendment, “presumably there are lineal descendents of the restrictions [on firearms] as well.”415 A well-established historical restriction, or its modern analogue, demonstrates that that right has not been infringed in its fundamentals. In much the same way, a rule restricting the number of jurors to twelve adults could not be a Seventh Amendment violation because twelve jurors was a well-established limitation on jury size in 1791.416 Where history is unclear, the court moves to precedent.417 For example, although there may be no historical analogue to police officers temporarily sequestering weapons from persons during the course of a temporary stop, a storehouse of precedent upholding such limited sequesters may answer the Second Amendment question.418 Where precedent is unclear, the court resorts to functional

412. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) (holding that a jury of six members rather than twelve does not violate the right to trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment).
414. Id. at 377.
416. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899) (stating that the English common law understanding is that a jury shall be of twelve men). But see Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 156 (holding that a six-member jury satisfies the Seventh Amendment).
417. Cf. Markman, 517 U.S. at 384 (consulting precedent “since evidence of common-law practice at the time of the framing” did not answer the question of the meaning of the Seventh Amendment’s jury guarantee).
418. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment permits “a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime”).
considerations. Functional considerations, however, are not completely open-ended. They are measured against the fundamentals of the right as assessed by the historical nature of the right. That is, in the Seventh Amendment context, the key functional consideration is the traditional distinction between the judge’s role to decide matters of law and the jury’s role to decide matters of fact. Procedural innovations that eliminate this basic division of labor between the judge and the jury destroy the right in its fundamentals.

This focus on fundamentals, of course, begs the question: what are the Second Amendment’s fundamentals? One way of identifying those “fundamentals” is to examine “whether the practices mandated or proscribed by the [Second Amendment] presuppose some view without which the textual requirements are incoherent.” The Second Amendment, like the Seventh Amendment, is a right designed to “prevent government oppression.” But this fundamental right is, and must be, inchoate. Clearly, widespread confiscation of all firearms makes the textual language incoherent: there is no reason to guarantee the right if regulations that are the equivalent to confiscation are legitimate. But short of confiscation, it is difficult to say that historical analogues to prohibitions on taking arms into schools or police stations make the text incoherent. So long as there is an arguable analogue to

419. Cf. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 ("Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional considerations also play their part in the choice between judge and jury to define terms of art.").


421. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1063.

422. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) (applying this reasoning to the Seventh Amendment); cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008) ("[W]hen the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist tyranny."). For more on the link between the right to arms and the right to a jury, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 324-25 (2005).

423. The Constitution’s text contemplates the suppression of rebellions and the punishment of traitors. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during rebellion); id. art. III, § 3 (defining treason); id. art. IV, § 4 (providing for the protection of states in case of domestic violence); id. amend. XIV, § 4 (voiding any debt "incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion"). Consequently, the Second Amendment cannot be construed to guarantee a right to armed rebellion. See Miller, supra note 76, at 1319-20; see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951) ("Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument that there is a ‘right’ to rebellion against dictatorial governments is without force where the existing structure of the government provides for peaceful and orderly change.").

424. Patrick Charles has listed some types of restrictions that existed historically on the right to
a given regulation, or absent that, some precedent or functional reason for the regulation, and so long as the regulation does not destroy the right in its fundamentals, then it would seem to be constitutional. 425

At its core, the right to keep and bear arms is also related to individual |self-defense. 426 Therefore, regulations that render a person unable in all circumstances to defend himself would destroy the right in its fundamentals. 427 However, regulations that stop short of destroying the fundamental right in this way would be constitutional. So, for instance, a regulation that forbade firearms from travelling out of doors but permitted less lethal defensive weapons, such as pepper spray or tasers, could potentially pass constitutional muster. Alternatively, a regulation that permitted the removal of firearms from one’s premises only in circumstances of imminent physical injury or death would not destroy the right in its fundamentals. But, of course, the fundamentals of the Second Amendment right need not be articulated in this fashion. Again, the question is one of abstraction: a fundamental right to “self defense,” like the right to “the pursuit of happiness” or “the right to be let alone,” may be adequate moral propositions, but operate at too high a level of abstraction to be useful as law. 428 The level of abstraction must be tethered to the text of the Second Amendment itself, 429 but it also must be informed by the Amendment’s relationship with other textual provisions, history, and the structure of the Constitution as a whole. Finally, the analysis must justify judicial as opposed to legislative involvement. 430


425. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (assuring legislatures that they possess “a variety of tools for combating th[e] problem [of handgun violence], including some measures regulating handguns” short of “absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home”).

426. Id. at 599 (referring to self-defense as the “central component” of the Second Amendment); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 599) (same).

427. Cf. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 249 (1846) (finding that a law that renders the right to keep and bear arms nugatory under the pretense of regulation is unconstitutional).

428. See Easterbrook, supra note 388, at 364.

429. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 494 (2007) (“The proper level of generality for the constitutional principles in the text is the one we find in the text itself.”). Neither I nor a majority of the Court think the level of generality for the right to “bear” arms is determined by the strict lexical meaning of the word “bear.”

430. See supra text accompanying notes 402-410.
3. The Test in Action: High Capacity Magazines

Federal law formerly prohibited magazines that held more than ten rounds of ammunition.431 Some states and localities still prohibit similar large-capacity magazines or weapons.432 With respect to a firearm that can hold more than ten rounds of ammunition, for example, the analysis might work as follows. First, the plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality.433 She must demonstrate that a firearm with a capacity of more than ten rounds of ammunition even counts as an “arm” for purposes of the Second Amendment.434 Just as new causes of action can trigger the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury, or new forms of surveillance can implicate the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches,435 modern technology can implicate the Second Amendment, even if the precise weapon under consideration did not exist in 1791. Beginning broadly, the plaintiff could argue that the term “arm” in 1791 meant “any thing that a man . . . takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another,”436 and that this definition has not changed since that time. This textual definition, however, would likely be too broad, as it would encompass high explosive rounds,

433. The need for the plaintiff to overcome the presumption of constitutionality is generally less onerous for allegations of a violation of an enumerated right. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). However, the presumption of constitutionality is strengthened by other textual and historical features that repose regulatory authority in other branches of government over the militia—even an unorganized one. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress power to “organiz[e], arm[1], and disciplin[e]” the militia, and giving states authority to designate the leaders of such militias); id. amend. II (providing that arms are protected because of the need for a “well regulated” militia); cf. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883) (articulating a presumption of constitutionality for congressional legislation). The historical framework in this Article attempts to respect the extent to which firearms implicate both the Second Amendment individual right and the authority of federal and state officials to regulate weapons, especially when borne in public for the purpose of self-defense and crime control.
434. This first inquiry is a critical step that many gun-rights advocates overlook. See supra note 382.
435. See Kyllo v. United States, 553 U.S. 27, 33-36 (2001) (recognizing that changes in technology, as through thermal imaging devices, can affect the well-established and historical Fourth Amendment protections of the home).
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grenade launchers, and Stinger missiles.\textsuperscript{437} Simply put, there are some weapons that, despite their superficial similarity to a weapon that existed in 1791 or 1868, are simply too hazardous to fall within the category of “arm” as that term would have been commonly understood.\textsuperscript{438} Hence, she would likely need to marshal historical evidence that a firearm with more than ten rounds bears some resemblance to—or is a “lineal descendent”\textsuperscript{439} of—arms in “common use”\textsuperscript{440} during the relevant time period. Such a claim might focus on whether weapons capable of rapid reloading, multiple firing, or excess capacity, were understood to qualify as a personal “arm” in common use for purposes of the individual right to keep and bear arms. Her argument would be that a firearm with more than a ten-round capacity is sufficiently analogous to such a weapon that a reasonable person would have understood it to be an “arm.”

Once the plaintiff has met the threshold scope issue, the burden would shift to the defendant to establish that the regulation is not an infringement. An infringement here means roughly what a failure to preserve means in the Seventh Amendment: a regulation that destroys the right in its fundamentals.\textsuperscript{441} A defendant would show that the right has not been

\textsuperscript{437} In the same sense, a plaintiff would need to establish that “keep” and “bear” support meanings similar to what is understood by those terms at the historically relevant periods for purposes of arms, rather than engage in a simple semantic exercise of demonstrating they mean the same thing now as they did in the years from 1791 to 1868. See supra text accompanying note 266; see also Allen, supra note 266, at 202-08 (making similar points concerning a literalist approach to the Second Amendment).

\textsuperscript{438} See Allen, supra note 266, at 202 (observing that “the Second Amendment is fundamentally different, for interpretative purposes, from other constitutional provisions that have been applied to changing technologies”). Inevitably, whether something falls within or without that definition will require some consequentialist investigation. But that only shows that construction of categories in open-textured sections of the Constitution cannot be completely insulated from consequentialist reasoning. See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 388 (2009) (recognizing that categories are often constructed by balancing various conflicting policies). The analysis in this Article suggests that the construction of the categories can be informed and restrained by historical data and analogical reasoning, rather than through a purely policy-oriented investigation.

\textsuperscript{439} Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) (question of Roberts, C.J.)).

\textsuperscript{440} Heller, 554 U.S. at 624. In this sense, Judge Kavanaugh’s statement that weapons “are in common use today” is slightly off the mark. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1287 (emphasis added). The question is whether the weapon at issue is one analogous to one in common use during the relevant ratification period, not in common use today. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) (question of Roberts, C.J.) (speaking of “lineal descendents” of older firearms).

\textsuperscript{441} See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1063.
destroyed in its fundamentals by showing that the regulation is analogous to a historical restriction on the right, is supported by relevant precedent, or is justified by functional considerations, so long as those considerations do not destroy the reason for the Second Amendment’s codification.\footnote{In other words, functional considerations cannot be used to argue for interpretations that flatly contradict the text itself. Cf. Rosenthal, supra note 266, at 1207 (“[A] changed reading of constitutional text cannot be based on a fact or belief that would have produced a different text in the first instance . . . .” (citing and describing the “fidelity in translation” theory of Lawrence Lessig, \textit{Fidelity in Translation}, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1251-63 (1993))).}

For example, the defendant might point to historical regulations that restricted private access to certain especially lethal or dangerous weapons, or that restricted the private possession of quantities of powder or ammunition.\footnote{For example, both King Henry VII and Henry VIII placed restrictions on the private ownership of new lethal technologies such as the crossbow and what they called “hand-guns.” These restrictions were apparently “rigidly enforced” in England at least until 1539. \textit{See Ralph Payne-Gallwey, The Crossbow: Its Military and Sporting History, Construction and Use} 32-33 (2007). They were apparently subsequently abandoned. \textit{See id.} at 34. Whether such regulations should be considered part of the historical and common law understanding of permissible restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms is contested. \textit{See Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,} 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 239 n.235 (1983) (raising such doubts).} The defendant could then argue that regulations restricting these weapons or quantities of ammunition are sufficiently analogous to a restriction on the amount of ammunition in a firearm to meet constitutional muster. Alternatively, the defendant may show precedent for this type of regulation. Absent clearly analogous historical restrictions, the defendant may point to precedent from the states on the amount, size, or capacities of weapons that a person could keep. For example, the defendant could point to the fact that there is precedent for regulations on access to weapons that are particularly obnoxious, or whose use is primarily criminal or military, rather than recreational.

Finally, if these considerations are not dispositive, one might then as a last resort consider the functional considerations of the regulation. These considerations would not be completely open-ended, but, as Patrick Charles has suggested, would be shaped by reference to ideological commitments concerning the right of self-defense, public safety, and the distribution of coercive power between private and public parties.\footnote{See Charles, \textit{supra} note 332, at 229 (stating that the matter of permissible gun control regulation is resolved “by examining the ideological and philosophical origins of gun control, not by finding an exact eighteenth-century parallel”).} If the Second Amendment is about access to the tools of private self-defense in the home, would allowing only magazines with fewer than eleven rounds preclude...
effective exercise of that prerogative? This latter inquiry, as in the Seventh Amendment context, might focus on institutional arrangements more broadly. Who is in a better position to determine how many rounds are necessary to defend a person’s home? Have legislatures already protected a particular type of weapon? What is more likely: the harm caused because a person did not have the eleventh bullet, or the harm caused by the person who did? The question, of course, is where to leave the discretion, and it appears that in the Second Amendment—unlike, perhaps, in other areas of constitutional rights—discretion is left with the political branches. In any event, so long as such a regulation does not destroy the fundamental aspects of the right (at whatever level of abstraction those fundamentals are defined), the regulation is legitimate.

IV. REWARDS AND RISKS OF A HISTORICAL TEST FOR THE SECOND AMENDMENT

A. Rewards

Attempting to implement the Second Amendment by reference to what the Court has done with the right to trial by jury could produce some tangible rewards. First, this approach would hold the Court to its current stated desire to avoid balancing tests in Second Amendment cases. To the extent that originalists in particular desire that their history-centered methodology be more than a mere rhetorical weapon, it makes sense to show how the

445. Cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 213 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result) (stating that the statutory canon of constitutional avoidance recognizes that “[t]he task of defining the objectives of public policy and weighing the relative merits of alternative means of reaching those objectives belongs to the legislature”). But see Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (recognizing that the constitutional text “takes certain policy choices off the table”).

446. For support for this proposition, see Miller, supra note 76, at 1318-21. Consider also Bernadette Meyler’s summary of Keith Whittington’s originalism, which she explains as follows: “Once indeterminacy is located, the task of constitutional construction begins, a task that should be allocated to the political branches rather than the judiciary.” Meyler, supra note 19, at 594 (citing, but disagreeing with, KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 205 (1999)).

447. The idea of a core purpose of self-defense, of course, leads to the debate as to whether the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense extends outside the home. This is a position I have already discussed and do not need to revisit here. See Miller, supra note 76, at 1350; Miller, Retail Rebellion, supra note 341, at 972-74.

methodology can actually help decide numerous discrete, factually disparate cases.449 Second, it would minimize the problem that has befallen Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: a proliferation of categories that provide little guidance at all. Third, it would recognize the residual institutional parameters of the right to keep and bear arms.

1. Reducing Judicial Empiricism

The Roberts Court is wary of empowering judges with an open-ended ability to balance government interests against constitutional rights. Kathleen Sullivan has noted that courts take a big risk when they engage in overt balancing, and even more so when the test actually requires some express evaluation of the government interest. As Professor Sullivan observes, intermediate scrutiny in particular exposes the Court “to the charge of ‘legislating from the bench’”—a charge that “[n]o amount of bureaucratic lingo in the formulas of intermediate scrutiny (‘substantial, significant, important interest,’ ‘directly, sub[s]tantially, closely served,’ ‘no more extensive than necessary’) can wholly dispel . . . .”450 The lessons of the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, however, could temper this fear that judges, as opposed to the political branches, become empowered by balancing tests with loose policymaking authority.

Second, few rights seem less conducive to levels of scrutiny than the right to keep and bear arms. Levels of scrutiny require courts to make difficult empirical judgments in areas in which they have limited ability and resources, as Justice Breyer noted in his McDonald dissent.452 How frequently does a person use a firearm to protect himself rather than to kill his neighbor? How effective is law enforcement at policing a particular neighborhood?453 Which is

449. See Rosenthal, supra note 266, at 1188 (stating that originalism is only “genuinely distinctive and useful . . . if, in practice, it provides a genuinely originalist vehicle for deciding real cases”). I defer to others as to whether the approach outlined in this Article satisfies that condition, or whether it is indistinguishable from nonoriginalist methods. See id.

450. Sullivan, supra note 66, at 301.

451. Id. (footnote omitted).

452. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3128 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[J]udges do not know the answers to the kinds of empirically based questions that will often determine the need for particular forms of gun regulation. Nor do they have readily available ‘tools’ for finding and evaluating the technical material submitted by others.”); see also Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1660 (2005) (noting a general consensus that courts are “less able [than other institutions] to resolve complicated factual questions”).

453. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3126 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asking rhetorically about budget cuts
more common: the kindergarten teacher who fights off a stalker, or the kindergarten teacher’s pupil who accidentally injures herself with a misplaced firearm. And how does the Court evaluate the methodological soundness of this kind of evidence?

Second Amendment scrutiny also makes little practical sense. The government’s central goal is the welfare and safety of its citizens. The very purpose of government is to monopolize legitimate violence. But the McDonald Court forcefully argued that the welfare and safety of the populace has no special meaning when it comes to firearm restrictions. If that is the case, then what exactly is the court balancing? If public safety cannot be weighed as a compelling or even an important interest, what is left to put on the scale? Perhaps one answer is that scrutiny is designed to “smoke out” otherwise impermissible motives. Scrutiny puts governments to the proof that their motives are pure and not designed to curtail fundamental liberties. But that begs the question of impermissible motive. Wholesale disarmament of the entire citizenry is clearly an impermissible motive; otherwise there would be no Second Amendment at all. But constitutional protection of firearms in the home, which Heller recognizes, already prevents that. What then, short of

on police and “[h]ow effective . . . that police force [was] to begin with”).

454. Id. at 3126–29 (raising similar hypotheticals).

455. Gowder v. City of Chicago, No. 11–CV-1304, 2012 WL 2325826, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2012) (observing that “pointing to certain studies as . . . justification” creates the very same empirically driven inquiry Justice Scalia says should be avoided in Second Amendment cases because “for every study, there can be a credible or convincing rebuttal study”). Of course, Gowder minimizes the fact that historical evidence itself can generate similar disagreement.

456. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3114 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (“[W]e can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (“The promotion of safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State’s police power . . . .”)).

457. “[T]he state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory . . . .” Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Jan. 28, 1919), in THE VOCATION LECTURES 33 (David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004).

458. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality decision) (“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”); see also Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 320, 365 (1995) (suggesting that scrutiny can “smoke out” bad motives in economic liberty matters).
universal citizen disarmament, is an impermissible motive? Is the safety of law enforcement an impermissible motive? Is keeping guns out of the hands of persons who plan to overthrow the state or federal government an impermissible motive? Is advancing a moral preference for dialogue, orderly dispute resolution, or the political process (rather than threats of violence) an impermissible motive?

Levels-of-scrutiny analysis also depends on the judicial capacity to make empirical judgments about what regulations actually relate to a legitimate motive and what regulations are pretext. For example, if it is permissible to protect the health and welfare of police officers, does a regulation that keeps guns out of automobiles bear a substantial relation to that purpose, or is it a pretext? Does the matter of “fit” between the regulation and its purpose change if the regulation is in New York City rather than Dubuque? Even if the scrutiny question is not about smoking out impermissible motives, but is, instead, about not inhibiting activity that Americans consider wholesome and beneficial, this raises again the question of the operative constitutional proposition of the right to keep and bear arms, and how much incursion is too much incursion.

Not all individual rights need to be balanced. As Adam Winkler has observed, there is a common misperception that fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights cannot be impaired unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Professor Winkler notes:

The Court has never purported to apply strict scrutiny in every provision of the Bill of Rights. . . . Laws invading on First Amendment rights of speech, association, and religious liberty are often subject to strict scrutiny, as are laws that restrict the due process and (invisible) equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. But strict scrutiny


461. Cf. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937) (stating that the Court will not search for “hidden motives” behind a tax on firearms dealers).

462. See Roosevelt, supra note 452, at 1684 (discussing how scrutiny “ensur[es] that the government has not intruded on highly important interests needlessly or without adequate justification”).
Winkler wrote those lines before *Heller*, but his critique remains sound. The Second Amendment does not require express balancing or levels of scrutiny analysis. And the Court’s stated preference for originalist, or at least historically grounded, arguments about the Second Amendment’s scope means that any test that hints at interest balancing is not likely to garner support among more than a plurality of the existing *Heller* and *McDonald* majorities. This Article’s framework respects that reality.

2. Reducing the Potential of Categorical Creep

There is also a risk that Second Amendment jurisprudence will suffer the fate of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It will begin with a categorical test, but undergo categorical creep, as the various occasions involving “self-defense,” “carrying,” and “keeping” arise. As one scholar put it with respect to the Fourth Amendment, the

application of different principles to seizures of persons than to seizures of things [and] the development of different rules for arrests in restaurants than for arrests in houses . . . have rendered the [F]ourth [A]mendment a Ptolemaic system. Only a police officer who studies Professor LaFave’s three-volume treatise . . . can master the epicycles.

One can imagine lower courts forced to navigate a similar set of interlocking epicycles for gun-rights claims. There could be the felon-in-possession category, not to be confused with the misdemeanant-in-possession category, not to be confused with the domestic-batterer-misdemeanant-in-possession category, not to be confused with the domestic-batterer-

463. Adam Winkler, *Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights*, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 229 (2006); see also *Heller II*, 670 F.3d 1244, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (listing rights not subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny analysis).

464. Cf. Blocher, supra note 55, at 435-36 (noting that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule began with a “flat ban” on evidence but “beg[a]t” so many exceptions that the doctrine became “so dotted with holes and sub-rules” as to be unrecognizable).

misdemeanant-in-possession-at-home category, and so on. In its desire to rely upon rules and avoid balancing, the Court could offer no rule at all.

The analysis in this Article would reduce, but cannot eliminate, this risk. It invites courts to frame historical analogues so that they function at a high enough level of generality to encompass both the scope of the right and the scope of permissible regulation or protection under the Second Amendment. Just as Seventh Amendment analogues enable the Seventh Amendment to cover new causes of action and allow for new forms of procedural regulation, courts could identify a level of generality in Second Amendment analogues that expands both the number of technologies and practices that implicate the Second Amendment and the scope of permissible limits. In this way, while more types of phenomena will implicate the Second Amendment, the actual content of the categories of permissible keeping, bearing, and arms will be left to more politically responsive branches.

3. Acknowledging the Institutional Aspects of the Right To Keep and Bear Arms

Both *Heller* and *McDonald* disparaged the organized militia as an institution that structures the meaning of the Second Amendment right. *Heller* in particular treated the militia portion of the Second Amendment as little more than a throat-clearing exercise. Some of the majority’s skepticism is justifiable, but largely on historical rather than strictly textual grounds. During Reconstruction, the militia that the Framers conceived of as a virtuous group of citizen-soldiers became a tool of racist oppression. Nonetheless, the clause “a well regulated Militia” has not been purged from the text. This clause, even if prefatory, must still be integrated into an understanding of the Second Amendment in particular, as well as into the Constitution as a whole.

Accordingly, the tailoring portion of the historical test grants the politically responsive branches of government latitude to regulate the militia—both

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467. U.S. Const. amend II.

468. See David C. Williams, *The Unitary Second Amendment*, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 822, 829 (1998) ("[J]udges] should seek to give both [the prefatory “militia” and the operative “keep and bear arms” clauses] as much meaning as possible, and they should prefer those interpretations that make the two clauses as consistent as possible.").
organized and unorganized—so long as the regulations do not destroy the right to keep and bear arms for personal defense in its fundamentals. In doing so, this test best integrates the term “militia” as it is used throughout the Constitution,\footnote{See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing for divided responsibility between Congress and the states for discipline and training of the militia); id. art. II, § 2 (designating the President Commander-in-Chief of the militia when called into service).} and guarantees that Heller and McDonald have not rendered \textit{that} portion of the Second Amendment “extinct.”\footnote{Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (“[I]t is not the role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.”).}

\textit{B. Risks}

\textit{1. The Reek of Law-Office History}

As much as the Seventh Amendment provides positive instruction for how the courts may implement the Second Amendment, it also serves as a cautionary tale. Irrespective of outcomes, a Second Amendment test driven by too rigid an application of history could lead to the same problem that has afflicted the Seventh Amendment: a test that demands “intricate examination of historical detail which . . . ‘reek[s] unduly of the study.’”\footnote{Redish, supra note 113, at 486-87 (quoting Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1961)).}

There is already an undeniable fustiness about Heller. How many federal district court judges, not to mention city municipal court officers,\footnote{Bound, as they are, by McDonald. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.} have the time or ability to consult and consider John Ayliffe’s 1734 treatise \textit{A New Pandect of Roman Civil Law}, or John Brydall’s 1704 work \textit{Privilegia Magnatud apud Anglos}, both of which were cited and quoted in Heller?\footnote{See Heller, 554 U.S. at 583 n.7, 587 n.10 (2008) (citing and quoting same).} Judges are not historians, and so, in addition to the risk that they will not understand the materials they are charged to consult, there is the additional risk that they will not conduct a dispassionate examination of the historical evidence and will simply marshal historical anecdotes to achieve what they have already decided is the preferred outcome.\footnote{Charles, supra note 57, at 11 (noting the difference between the role of historians and that of advocates or jurists).}

Certainly, these are challenges to developing a historical test for the Second Amendment. But whatever the challenges, the written nature of our Constitution commands some engagement with history, no matter the
difficulty. The important caveat for the historical test for the Second Amendment is that engagement with history is the beginning point. It sets the terms of the process of analogical reasoning, a task at which lawyers and judges consider themselves relatively adept. Historical analogues, as Seventh Amendment jurisprudence shows, can be understood to govern both the scope of the Second Amendment right and the scope of permissible regulations of that right. To the extent that a historical test for the Second Amendment permits discretion, and especially discretion reposed in those bodies most responsible for policymaking, perhaps this approach will make the smell of law-office history less noisome.

2. The Persistence of the Collapse Problem

Neither will this suggested framework eliminate the problem of analytical collapse. The second part of the test, whether a regulation interferes with the right in its “fundamentals,” is an easier step than is the first, which requires more historical heavy lifting in terms of defining the right or finding the appropriate historical analogue. But that problem is already present in the existing standards of review used by intermediate courts.

Again, the answer is that forcing the judge to engage at some level with the historical materials, even at the level of analogical reasoning, controls discretion to a degree that is absent without such a process. Judgment cannot be taken out of the process of judging. The fact that some originalists oversold their methodology as a way to take discretion out of constitutional law is not a good reason to reject history and tradition altogether. The historical test for the Second Amendment, and especially its requirement of linking either the right itself or a regulation to a historical analogue, forces judges at least to pause before they launch into a policy prescription that may not be consonant with the text, history, or structure of the document. Furthermore, it imposes

475. Cf. Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 594 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that “[o]ur obligation to the Constitution and its Bill of Rights requires such historical investigations); Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 114, at 450 (noting that history must be the place to begin in Seventh Amendment adjudication).


477. See Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 609, 617 (2008) (“The new originalism, like the old, fails to deliver on its claim about eliminating judicial subjectivity, judgment, and choice.”). For more on originalism’s failure to deliver on its promises, see Smith, supra note 23, at 710-11, 733, which discusses originalism’s inability to consistently defend its claim to political neutrality.

478. See Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1179, 1194
a type of Burkean humility by obliging the judiciary to attempt to link its current judgments to the accumulated judgments of the past.\footnote{See id.; Cass R. Sunstein, \textit{Burkean Minimalism}, 105 \textit{Mich. L. Rev.} 353, 368-72 (2006) (discussing how minimalist decisions based on tradition may reduce the likelihood of catastrophic error).}

3. \textit{Popular, but Not Constitutionally Popular}

A final problem with this approach is that, although it may result in decisions that have broad popular support, if originalism is now the people’s methodology of choice,\footnote{See Reva B. Siegel, \textit{Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller}, 122 \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} 191 (2008).} it may create friction between outcomes and reasoning, at least among those people who are watching.

Without a doubt, citizens want some voice in how and where firearms are kept and where they are borne. Even after \textit{Heller} and \textit{McDonald}, public opinion polling shows strong support for reasonable regulation in those areas.\footnote{See Guns, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/guns.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (showing strong support for firearm ownership, as well as bans on assault rifles and high-capacity magazines).} As a matter of brute politics, then, judgments taking those decisions away from legislatures or local officials will encounter some hostility. So, preserving regulation is popular. But this popular outcome is not so easily squared with originalism as an accessible form of popular constitutionalism. There is a type of popular originalism, often vocal, in which nonlawyers assert that they know what the Constitution says, and understand what the words “keep,” “bear,” “arm,” and “infringe” mean. Citizens may resent doctrinal embellishments that pull the text away from its plain, but contemporary, meaning. In all likelihood, whatever decision the Court makes, whether through the test articulated in this Article or some other test, a successful doctrinal apparatus will maximize popular will at the expense of originalism as a form of popular constitutionalism.

\section*{Conclusion}

This Article has argued that the Roberts Court has issued seemingly irreconcilable demands to lower courts: Be faithful to Second Amendment history, do not balance Second Amendment rights, and preserve reasonable
firearm regulations. It argues that a Second Amendment historical test patterned on the Seventh Amendment may provide a pathway to a solution.

The Court’s jurisprudence could be wrong on both fronts, of course. That is, it is perfectly plausible to argue that the Second Amendment’s emerging doctrine should not replicate the mistakes of its Seventh Amendment ancestor, and that a strict historical test should apply to both provisions—or to neither.

But if what we expect from our judges is to apply history in ways that are not only faithful but useful, then the answer is not to permit judges to manipulate historical sources in any manner they prefer, but to create an analytical structure in which history can be integrated into adjudication despite the fact that history will be at times deeply contested or unknowable. This Article has attempted to set the discussion on that course. The hope is familiar: that history can be a guiding hand, rather than a dead one.\footnote{See Colby, supra note 23, at 740 (noting that the “New Originalism” means that “we are not so much ruled by the dead hand of the past as gently guided by it”).}